Equal
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| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)(Capital / RWA) | 25.8% | 29.4% | 29.4% | 29.8% |
| Leverage Ratio(Tier 1 / Total Exposure) | 13.6% | 14.1% | 15.2% | 15.3% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross NPL(NPL / Total Loans) | 1.7% | 1.9% | 1.8% | 1.7% |
| Net NPL((NPL − Reserves) / Loans) | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.7% |
| Non-Performing Assets(NPA / Total Assets) | 0.9% | 1.0% | 1.0% | 1.0% |
| Non-Performing Productive Assets(NP Earning / Earning Assets) | 0.8% | 0.9% | 0.9% | 0.8% |
| Allowance for Impairment (CKPN)(CKPN / Earning Assets) | 3.0% | 2.8% | 2.5% | 2.1% |
| Cost of Credit(Provision Expense / Gross Loans) | 0.6% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.3% |
| NPL Coverage(Allowance for Impairment (CKPN) / Gross NPL) | 291.8% | 231.5% | 209.1% | 183.3% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR)(Loans / Deposits) | 65.2% | 70.2% | 78.4% | 76.8% |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)(ASF / RSF) | 169.2% | 166.6% | 155.9% | 158.8% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)(HQLA / Net Cash Outflows (30d)) | 393.5% | 357.8% | 323.0% | 310.8% |
| CASA Ratio((Demand + Savings) / Total Deposits) | 82.3% | 81.1% | 82.4% | 84.6% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 3.9% | 4.5% | 4.9% | 4.8% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 21.7% | 23.5% | 24.6% | 23.3% |
| Net Interest Margin (NIM)(NII / Avg Earning Assets) | 5.3% | 5.5% | 5.8% | 5.7% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Expense to Income (BOPO)(Opex / Operating Income) | 46.5% | 43.8% | 41.7% | 41.6% |
| Cost-to-Income Ratio (CIR)(Opex (ex-provisions) / Income) | 33.9% | 33.8% | 31.5% | 30.7% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan Growth (YoY)(Gross Loans / Prior Year − 1) | — | 13.9% | 13.6% | 7.5% |
| Deposit Growth (YoY)(Total Deposits / Prior Year − 1) | — | 5.7% | 2.5% | 10.0% |
Price Rp 6,325 · market cap Rp 777 T
| Multiple | BBCA | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 13.61x | 8.04x | +69% |
| P/B | 2.86x | 0.78x | +265% |
| Dividend Yield | 5.31% | 7.46%(14/15) | -29% |
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
A bank cannot be valued on operating cash flow the way a factory can, because for a bank debt is raw material rather than financing. So this model values the equity directly: start from book value, then add the present value of everything the bank earns above its cost of equity. A bank that earns exactly its cost of equity is worth exactly its book value (P/B 1.0).
| Assumption | Default | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Book equity (BV₀) | Rp 272 T | audited Individual-basis equity, FY2025 publication |
| ROE, start of fade | 23.28% | FY2025 disclosed ROE (OJK ratio table) |
| ROE, terminal | 23.38% | median disclosed ROE, FY2022–FY2025: the bank's own demonstrated through-cycle level, fading linearly |
| Fade horizon | 5 yrs | linear fade; final year pins to terminal |
| Retention (explicit phase) | 36.9% | implied from delivered equity growth FY2022–FY2025 (CAGR 8.6%) ÷ average ROE 23.3%. An approximation: equity growth also carries OCI effects (FVOCI marks, revaluations), not only retention |
| Cost of equity | 11.21% | National-footprint franchises (KBMI 3–4 and large private banks). |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | house terminal growth 2.5% (capped at terminal ROE by the engine when binding) |
Equity = BV₀ Rp 272 T + PV(excess, yrs 1–5) Rp 141 T + PV(terminal) Rp 338 T = Rp 751 T
At today's price the market pays 104% of this model's equity value. That is roughly in line with the stated assumptions.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 23.28% | 23.31% | 23.33% | 23.36% | 23.38% | 23.38% |
| Book (start) | Rp 272 T | Rp 295 T | Rp 320 T | Rp 348 T | Rp 378 T | Rp 411 T |
| Net income | Rp 63 T | Rp 69 T | Rp 75 T | Rp 81 T | Rp 88 T | Rp 96 T |
| Retained | Rp 23 T | Rp 25 T | Rp 28 T | Rp 30 T | Rp 33 T | — |
| Excess return | Rp 33 T | Rp 36 T | Rp 39 T | Rp 42 T | Rp 46 T | Rp 50 T |
| PV | Rp 29 T | Rp 29 T | Rp 28 T | Rp 28 T | Rp 27 T | Rp 338 T |
Check it yourself: NI = ROE × book · ER = (ROE − COE) × book · PV = ER ÷ (1+COE)^yr · next book = book + NI × retention · TV = ER(T∞) ÷ (COE − g), discounted from year 5
| ROE_T \ COE | 10.21% | 11.21% | 12.21% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 21.38% | 2.86x | 2.50x | 2.21x |
| 23.38% | 3.17x | 2.76x | 2.44x |
| 25.38% | 3.49x | 3.04x | 2.68x |
Model output under the stated assumptions, never a target. ROE record: FY2022 21.70% · FY2023 23.49% · FY2024 24.56% · FY2025 23.28%
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interest income | Rp 68 T | Rp 82 T | Rp 89 T | Rp 92 T |
| Interest expense | Rp 7.9 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 12 T |
| Net interest income | Rp 60 T | Rp 70 T | Rp 77 T | Rp 80 T |
| Fees & commissions | Rp 16 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 18 T | Rp 19 T |
| Impairment/provision expense | Rp 4.4 T | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 3.0 T |
| Personnel expenses | Rp 12 T | Rp 14 T | Rp 15 T | Rp 16 T |
| Operating profit | Rp 49 T | Rp 59 T | Rp 68 T | Rp 71 T |
| Profit before tax | Rp 49 T | Rp 59 T | Rp 67 T | Rp 70 T |
| Income tax | Rp 9.0 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 13 T |
| Net profit | Rp 40 T | Rp 48 T | Rp 55 T | Rp 57 T |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash | Rp 21 T | Rp 22 T | Rp 29 T | Rp 25 T |
| Placement with Bank Indonesia | Rp 121 T | Rp 91 T | Rp 43 T | Rp 50 T |
| Placement with other banks | Rp 16 T | Rp 8.3 T | Rp 10 T | Rp 9.7 T |
| Securities | Rp 244 T | Rp 322 T | Rp 382 T | Rp 436 T |
| Loans & financing (gross) | Rp 691 T | Rp 787 T | Rp 895 T | Rp 962 T |
| Allowance for impairment (CKPN) | -Rp 34 T | -Rp 34 T | -Rp 33 T | -Rp 30 T |
| Fixed assets & equipment | Rp 33 T | Rp 35 T | Rp 37 T | Rp 39 T |
| Total assets | Rp 1,283 T | Rp 1,371 T | Rp 1,406 T | Rp 1,537 T |
| Demand deposits (Giro) | Rp 322 T | Rp 346 T | Rp 359 T | Rp 431 T |
| Savings deposits (Tabungan) | Rp 520 T | Rp 531 T | Rp 554 T | Rp 601 T |
| Time deposits (Deposito) | Rp 181 T | Rp 205 T | Rp 195 T | Rp 188 T |
| Total liabilities | Rp 1,071 T | Rp 1,138 T | Rp 1,153 T | Rp 1,266 T |
| Total equity | Rp 212 T | Rp 233 T | Rp 253 T | Rp 272 T |
BBCA is the sector’s quality benchmark. Its dominant transaction-banking franchise feeds the highest CASA of the 15 banks Neraca covers (~85% against 70.9% for the next highest), which keeps its cost of funds minimal, and that funding edge did something unusual: NIM actually widened (5.34%→5.73%, FY22–25) while peers were compressing. The payoff is elite returns (ROE ~23%, peaking at 24.6% in FY24) and best-in-class efficiency (BOPO ~42%, CIR ~31% against a sector running ~72%/46%). Capital is a fortress (CAR ~30%), asset quality is pristine (gross NPL 1.71%, coverage 183%), and a low LDR (~77%) still leaves plenty of room to lend. The one trade-off is valuation: the quality is fully in the price. This is the defensive compounder of Indonesian banking, and the questions that move it are whether loan growth re-accelerates and whether the CASA moat holds against digital competition.
CASA franchise: Rp431tn demand + Rp601tn savings vs only Rp188tn time deposits (FY2025); ~85% of third-party funds are transaction balances.
EconomicsInterest expense just Rp12.3tn on Rp1,537tn of assets: a funding cost no Indonesian peer matches at this scale.
Gross loans Rp962tn (LDR 76.8%) plus a Rp436tn securities book: redeployed from LDR 65.2% in FY2022 as loan demand returned.
EconomicsNIM 5.73% earned at gross NPL 1.71%: margin from the funding side, not from risk.
BOPO 41.6% and CIR 30.7% (FY2025), both improving every year since FY2022 (46.5% / 33.9%).
EconomicsEvery 100 rupiah of operating income costs ~42 to produce: the widest operating cushion of the big four.
Implied retention ~37% (payout ~63%) from the delivered equity build Rp212tn→Rp272tn, yet CAR still ROSE 25.8%→29.8%.
EconomicsCapital generation outruns both the dividend and RWA growth simultaneously: the definition of a franchise compounder.
Cost structureOpex-led, not funding-led: the CASA base keeps interest expense small (Rp12.3tn FY2025), so the cost story is branch/IT scale, and BOPO fell every single year of the window.
Cash cycleFunding-cost→NIM chain: ~0.9% effective funding cost → 5.73% NIM → 4.75% pre-tax ROA → 23.3% ROE at ~5x leverage. Each link is disclosed in the OJK table above.
Depositors (the funding "suppliers") are fragmented and sticky; ~85% CASA means they have almost no pricing power over BBCA.
Implication → Structurally the lowest cost of funds of the 15 covered banks, 1.01% against 2.40% for the next cheapest: the core of its margin and ROE lead.
Prime borrowers court BBCA for its rates and service; with LDR ~77% it can be selective, so borrower leverage is limited.
Implication → Pricing power on both deposits and loans sustains best-in-class spreads.
Trust, the payments network and scale are near-impossible to replicate; digital entrants lack the deposit franchise.
Implication → The deposit franchise is defensible for years and cannot be bought.
Fintech wallets/QRIS and OTT payments nibble at fees, but BBCA co-opts them (QRIS, blu).
Implication → Fee/payment pools face fintech pressure, but co-option (QRIS, blu) limits the leakage.
Competes hardest with BMRI/BBRI for prime credit and CASA, but its funding-cost edge is durable.
Implication → It competes for prime credit, but the funding-cost edge keeps returns ahead of peers.
High and boring in the best sense: NII-led, no named one-offs in the FY2022–25 disclosed record, and the FY2025 ROE easing (24.6%→23.3%) is a DENOMINATOR effect of the capital build, not an earnings problem; pre-tax ROA held at 4.75%.
Checked: no material one-offs found in the reviewed window.
Cash conversionOn the bank-only record the check is the equity bridge: equity grew Rp212tn→Rp272tn while paying ~63% out; comprehensive income tracks reported earning power with no visible accrual divergence.
The cleanest capital story in the dataset: pays out roughly two-thirds of earnings AND builds CAR 4pp in four years. ROE 23.3% against an 11.2% cost of equity is a ~12pp excess spread; the excess-return model prices it at 2.76x book, and the market pays 2.86x: this is the one big bank the market prices AT its demonstrated economics.
DeploymentFY2022→25: gross loans +39% (Rp691tn→962tn), securities +79% (Rp244tn→436tn), dividends ~63% of earnings, no M&A; growth funded entirely by the deposit franchise.
Returns trendROE rose 21.7%→23.3% while the excess spread over the 11.21% COE widened with every BOPO improvement: returns rising on a growing base, the rarest combination.
Checked the Individual-basis record: no related-party funding or lending dependence visible in the disclosed lines; ownership concentration itself is a governance fact, not a balance-sheet finding.
Securities are Rp436tn (~28% of assets): FVOCI marks swing equity through OCI in rate moves; the retention figure above partly carries that noise.
The entire economics chain starts at the ~0.9% funding cost; digital banks and rate competition attack exactly that link. No degradation visible yet: CASA share held through the window.
The LDR climb 65%→77% powered four years of NII growth; that lever is now largely spent: from here, growth follows system loan demand.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Large, well-capitalised and concentrated among a few systemic players, with ASEAN-leading profitability: though margins and efficiency are now under late-cycle pressure.