Equal
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| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)(Capital / RWA) | 23.3% | 25.2% | 24.4% | 21.1% |
| Leverage Ratio(Tier 1 / Total Exposure) | 16.6% | 13.7% | 13.4% | 12.8% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross NPL(NPL / Total Loans) | 2.8% | 3.1% | 2.9% | 3.3% |
| Net NPL((NPL − Reserves) / Loans) | 0.7% | 0.8% | 0.8% | 1.0% |
| Non-Performing Assets(NPA / Total Assets) | 1.7% | 2.0% | 1.9% | 2.2% |
| Non-Performing Productive Assets(NP Earning / Earning Assets) | 1.7% | 2.0% | 1.9% | 2.2% |
| Allowance for Impairment (CKPN)(CKPN / Earning Assets) | 6.1% | 5.2% | 4.5% | 4.1% |
| Cost of Credit(Provision Expense / Gross Loans) | 2.3% | 2.3% | 2.7% | 3.1% |
| NPL Coverage(Allowance for Impairment (CKPN) / Gross NPL) | 291.2% | 215.4% | 199.1% | 165.0% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR)(Loans / Deposits) | 79.2% | 84.7% | 89.4% | 92.0% |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)(ASF / RSF) | 134.5% | 135.2% | 127.8% | 117.7% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)(HQLA / Net Cash Outflows (30d)) | 180.0% | 161.6% | 159.3% | 135.2% |
| CASA Ratio((Demand + Savings) / Total Deposits) | 66.9% | 64.6% | 67.5% | 70.9% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 3.8% | 3.9% | 3.8% | 3.3% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 20.9% | 22.9% | 22.9% | 20.8% |
| Net Interest Margin (NIM)(NII / Avg Earning Assets) | 6.8% | 6.8% | 6.8% | 6.5% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Expense to Income (BOPO)(Opex / Operating Income) | 64.2% | 64.4% | 67.6% | 71.5% |
| Cost-to-Income Ratio (CIR)(Opex (ex-provisions) / Income) | 41.9% | 37.7% | 37.9% | 38.9% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan Growth (YoY)(Gross Loans / Prior Year − 1) | — | 11.3% | 6.1% | 10.4% |
| Deposit Growth (YoY)(Total Deposits / Prior Year − 1) | — | 4.0% | 0.6% | 7.3% |
Price Rp 3,040 · market cap Rp 458 T
| Multiple | BBRI | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 9.08x | 8.04x | +13% |
| P/B | 1.53x | 0.78x | +95% |
| Dividend Yield | 11.38% | 7.46%(14/15) | +53% |
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
A bank cannot be valued on operating cash flow the way a factory can, because for a bank debt is raw material rather than financing. So this model values the equity directly: start from book value, then add the present value of everything the bank earns above its cost of equity. A bank that earns exactly its cost of equity is worth exactly its book value (P/B 1.0).
| Assumption | Default | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Book equity (BV₀) | Rp 299 T | audited Individual-basis equity, FY2025 publication |
| ROE, start of fade | 20.78% | FY2025 disclosed ROE (OJK ratio table) |
| ROE, terminal | 21.92% | median disclosed ROE, FY2022–FY2025: the bank's own demonstrated through-cycle level, fading linearly |
| Fade horizon | 5 yrs | linear fade; final year pins to terminal |
| Retention (explicit phase) | 3.0% | implied from delivered equity growth FY2022–FY2025 (CAGR 0.7%) ÷ average ROE 21.9%. An approximation: equity growth also carries OCI effects (FVOCI marks, revaluations), not only retention |
| Cost of equity | 11.21% | National-footprint franchises (KBMI 3–4 and large private banks). |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | house terminal growth 2.5% (capped at terminal ROE by the engine when binding) |
Equity = BV₀ Rp 299 T + PV(excess, yrs 1–5) Rp 112 T + PV(terminal) Rp 224 T = Rp 636 T
At today's price the market pays 72% of this model's equity value. The price embeds less than these inputs produce, which amounts to assuming a higher cost of equity or a lower terminal ROE than the defaults here.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 20.78% | 21.07% | 21.35% | 21.64% | 21.92% | 21.92% |
| Book (start) | Rp 299 T | Rp 301 T | Rp 303 T | Rp 305 T | Rp 307 T | Rp 309 T |
| Net income | Rp 62 T | Rp 63 T | Rp 65 T | Rp 66 T | Rp 67 T | Rp 68 T |
| Retained | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 2.0 T | — |
| Excess return | Rp 29 T | Rp 30 T | Rp 31 T | Rp 32 T | Rp 33 T | Rp 33 T |
| PV | Rp 26 T | Rp 24 T | Rp 22 T | Rp 21 T | Rp 19 T | Rp 224 T |
Check it yourself: NI = ROE × book · ER = (ROE − COE) × book · PV = ER ÷ (1+COE)^yr · next book = book + NI × retention · TV = ER(T∞) ÷ (COE − g), discounted from year 5
| ROE_T \ COE | 10.21% | 11.21% | 12.21% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 19.92% | 2.19x | 1.95x | 1.76x |
| 21.92% | 2.39x | 2.12x | 1.91x |
| 23.92% | 2.59x | 2.30x | 2.06x |
Model output under the stated assumptions, never a target. ROE record: FY2022 20.93% · FY2023 22.94% · FY2024 22.91% · FY2025 20.78%
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interest income | Rp 124 T | Rp 147 T | Rp 162 T | Rp 164 T |
| Interest expense | Rp 23 T | Rp 38 T | Rp 51 T | Rp 50 T |
| Net interest income | Rp 101 T | Rp 108 T | Rp 112 T | Rp 114 T |
| Fees & commissions | Rp 18 T | Rp 20 T | Rp 20 T | Rp 21 T |
| Impairment/provision expense | Rp 24 T | Rp 27 T | Rp 33 T | Rp 41 T |
| Personnel expenses | Rp 29 T | Rp 27 T | Rp 27 T | Rp 28 T |
| Operating profit | Rp 59 T | Rp 68 T | Rp 70 T | Rp 63 T |
| Profit before tax | Rp 59 T | Rp 67 T | Rp 69 T | Rp 62 T |
| Net profit | Rp 48 T | Rp 53 T | Rp 55 T | Rp 50 T |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash | Rp 27 T | Rp 32 T | Rp 30 T | Rp 32 T |
| Placement with Bank Indonesia | Rp 204 T | Rp 150 T | Rp 122 T | Rp 40 T |
| Placement with other banks | Rp 34 T | Rp 37 T | Rp 47 T | Rp 53 T |
| Securities | Rp 338 T | Rp 339 T | Rp 311 T | Rp 358 T |
| Loans (gross) | Rp 1,030 T | Rp 1,146 T | Rp 1,216 T | Rp 1,343 T |
| Allowance for impairment: loans (CKPN) | -Rp 85 T | -Rp 77 T | -Rp 71 T | -Rp 73 T |
| Fixed assets & equipment | Rp 54 T | Rp 60 T | Rp 65 T | Rp 69 T |
| Total assets | Rp 1,751 T | Rp 1,835 T | Rp 1,840 T | Rp 1,932 T |
| Demand deposits (Giro) | Rp 349 T | Rp 347 T | Rp 376 T | Rp 450 T |
| Savings deposits (Tabungan) | Rp 521 T | Rp 527 T | Rp 543 T | Rp 585 T |
| Time deposits (Deposito) | Rp 430 T | Rp 480 T | Rp 442 T | Rp 425 T |
| Borrowings | Rp 39 T | Rp 42 T | Rp 50 T | Rp 33 T |
| Total liabilities | Rp 1,457 T | Rp 1,537 T | Rp 1,541 T | Rp 1,632 T |
| Total equity | Rp 294 T | Rp 299 T | Rp 299 T | Rp 299 T |
BRI monetises the deepest micro-lending franchise in the world. Its NIM is the highest among the big banks (6.54%, FY25) and ROE has run in the ~21–23% range, powered by the KUR programme and the Ultra Micro holding it leads with Pegadaian and PNM. The trade-off is credit risk: as micro asset quality normalised, cost of credit rose to 3.06% and gross NPL to 3.29% (FY25, both the highest among the big-four), and BOPO climbed to 71.5%. Capital is ample (CAR 21.1%) and CASA is improving (~71%). The moat in micro distribution is unrivalled and the margins are structurally high, but earnings live and die by micro credit cost, and that is the single most important variable to watch here.
Rp1,460tn of third-party funds (FY2025), ~71% CASA (Rp450tn demand + Rp585tn savings) gathered through the largest physical network in Indonesian banking.
EconomicsFunding cost rose hard in the rate cycle: interest expense Rp23tn→Rp50tn (FY2022→25, +117%) against interest income +32%; the NIM squeeze arrives from the funding side.
Gross loans Rp1,030tn→Rp1,343tn (+30%), micro/ultra-micro-weighted (KUR channel), LDR pushed 79%→92%.
EconomicsNIM 6.54%, still the highest of the big four, but 26bp below FY2022 and bought with rising risk: gross NPL 2.82%→3.29%.
Micro lending is provision-hungry: BOPO climbed 64.2%→71.5% across the window as credit costs and funding costs stacked.
EconomicsThe premium yield funds the premium cost: the spread survives, but FY2025 shows both ends compressing at once.
Book equity was FLAT four straight years, Rp294tn→299→299→299, while cumulative net profit ran ~Rp206tn: distributions (plus OCI drag) absorbed essentially the entire earning stream.
EconomicsImplied retention ~3%. CAR paid the bill: 25.2%→21.1% from FY2023.
Cost structureTwin-cost model: funding (IE +117% in three years) and credit provisioning both scale with the micro book; BOPO 71.5% FY2025 is the worst of the window and the trend is the finding.
Cash cycleFunding-cost→NIM chain: mass CASA + rising wholesale top-up → 6.54% NIM → 3.26% pre-tax ROA → 20.8% ROE. The chain still ends double-digit above the 11.2% COE: the franchise premium is intact, thinner.
Rural and mass-market depositors are highly fragmented; CASA ~71% keeps funding power modest.
Implication → Funding power is low, but a rural deposit base means CASA lags BMRI/BBCA: a relative cost-of-funds disadvantage.
Micro and ultra-micro borrowers have minimal bargaining power and few alternatives.
Implication → Underpins the highest NIM of the large conventional banks Neraca covers (6.54%, third of the 15): pricing power on micro yields is BRI’s core advantage.
The rural/micro distribution network (units + BRILink agents) is extraordinarily hard and costly to replicate.
Implication → The micro moat is structurally defensible; fintechs partner rather than displace at scale.
Fintech P2P, paylater and other micro-lenders increasingly target the same borrowers.
Implication → Pressures micro yields over time and can worsen adverse selection and credit cost.
Competition is rising in micro/SME as peers and fintechs chase the segment; BOPO climbed to 71.5%.
Implication → Erodes margins and efficiency at the edges, but BRI’s distribution scale limits share loss.
Recurring in source but cyclically flattered in level: FY2025 net profit fell to Rp50tn (from Rp55tn) WITH gross NPL still rising; the earning stream is genuine micro-franchise NII, but the provisioning cycle has turned against it and the payout has no retention buffer left to absorb it.
Checked: no material one-offs found in the reviewed window.
Cash conversionThe equity bridge is the tell: four years of ~Rp206tn cumulative profit produced Rp5tn of net equity build. Distributions are real cash out: the model converts, but nothing is kept.
Harvest at the edge: near-total payout while CAR falls 4pp and NPL drifts up is a policy CHOICE (the state shareholder wants the dividend), but it removes the shock absorber exactly as the micro cycle softens. The excess-return model still values the franchise at 2.12x book against a 1.53x market price: the discount is the market charging for this capital path.
DeploymentFY2022→25: loans +30% (Rp1,030tn→1,343tn) funded by deposits +12% and the CAR drawdown; securities flat (Rp338tn→358tn); essentially all profit distributed.
Returns trendROE 20.9%→22.9%→22.9%→20.8%: still ~10pp above the COE, but FY2025 is the first year the spread narrowed from BOTH directions; earnings down, and the capital base no longer shrinking-flattered.
Equity flat at Rp299tn for three years, CAR 25.2%→21.1%, NPL 2.82%→3.29%; the three lines together are the flag: distribution policy is consuming the buffer while asset quality softens.
Gross NPL rose every year of the window; BOPO +7.3pp. The micro franchise prices for this, but the cycle has not yet turned back.
KUR volume targets and state dividend needs are set outside the bank; both showed up in this window (subsidized-segment growth, near-total payout).
Interest expense +117% in three years: the mass franchise repriced slower than wholesale rates; a BI easing cycle reverses this, a long plateau does not.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Large, well-capitalised and concentrated among a few systemic players, with ASEAN-leading profitability: though margins and efficiency are now under late-cycle pressure.