Equal
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| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)(Capital / RWA) | 20.2% | 20.1% | 18.5% | 19.0% |
| Leverage Ratio(Tier 1 / Total Exposure) | 5.8% | 6.1% | 6.4% | 6.5% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross NPL(NPL / Total Loans) | 3.4% | 3.0% | 3.2% | 3.2% |
| Net NPL((NPL − Reserves) / Loans) | 1.3% | 1.3% | 1.9% | 1.8% |
| Non-Performing Assets(NPA / Total Assets) | 2.8% | 2.6% | 2.6% | 2.6% |
| Non-Performing Productive Assets(NP Earning / Earning Assets) | 2.7% | 2.6% | 2.6% | 2.6% |
| Allowance for Impairment (CKPN)(CKPN / Earning Assets) | 4.4% | 4.1% | 3.1% | 3.5% |
| Cost of Credit(Provision Expense / Gross Loans) | 1.5% | 1.3% | 0.6% | 1.8% |
| NPL Coverage(Allowance for Impairment (CKPN) / Gross NPL) | 173.9% | 174.7% | 131.6% | 127.4% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR)(Loans / Deposits) | 92.7% | 95.4% | 93.8% | 91.3% |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)(ASF / RSF) | 132.2% | 122.8% | 120.6% | 127.6% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)(HQLA / Net Cash Outflows (30d)) | 238.5% | 190.2% | 191.2% | 193.0% |
| CASA Ratio((Demand + Savings) / Total Deposits) | 48.5% | 53.7% | 54.1% | 46.9% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 1.0% | 1.1% | 0.8% | 0.9% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 16.4% | 13.9% | 10.8% | 11.6% |
| Net Interest Margin (NIM)(NII / Avg Earning Assets) | 4.4% | 3.8% | 2.9% | 4.2% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Expense to Income (BOPO)(Opex / Operating Income) | 86.0% | 86.1% | 88.7% | 89.0% |
| Cost-to-Income Ratio (CIR)(Opex (ex-provisions) / Income) | 46.7% | 45.3% | 57.2% | 49.2% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan Growth (YoY)(Gross Loans / Prior Year − 1) | — | 11.2% | 5.9% | 10.1% |
| Deposit Growth (YoY)(Total Deposits / Prior Year − 1) | — | 8.7% | 9.1% | -0.8% |
Price Rp 1,215 · market cap Rp 17 T
| Multiple | BBTN | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 4.98x | 8.04x | -38% |
| P/B | 0.47x | 0.78x | -40% |
| Dividend Yield | 4.41% | 7.46%(14/15) | -41% |
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
A bank cannot be valued on operating cash flow the way a factory can, because for a bank debt is raw material rather than financing. So this model values the equity directly: start from book value, then add the present value of everything the bank earns above its cost of equity. A bank that earns exactly its cost of equity is worth exactly its book value (P/B 1.0).
| Assumption | Default | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Book equity (BV₀) | Rp 36 T | audited Individual-basis equity, FY2025 publication |
| ROE, start of fade | 11.57% | FY2025 disclosed ROE (OJK ratio table) |
| ROE, terminal | 12.72% | median disclosed ROE, FY2022–FY2025: the bank's own demonstrated through-cycle level, fading linearly |
| Fade horizon | 5 yrs | linear fade; final year pins to terminal |
| Retention (explicit phase) | 91.0% | implied from delivered equity growth FY2022–FY2025 (CAGR 12.0%) ÷ average ROE 13.2%. An approximation: equity growth also carries OCI effects (FVOCI marks, revaluations), not only retention |
| Cost of equity | 11.21% | National-footprint franchises (KBMI 3–4 and large private banks). |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | house terminal growth 2.5% (capped at terminal ROE by the engine when binding) |
Equity = BV₀ Rp 36 T + PV(excess, yrs 1–5) Rp 1.5 T + PV(terminal) Rp 6.3 T = Rp 44 T
At today's price the market pays 39% of this model's equity value. The price embeds less than these inputs produce, which amounts to assuming a higher cost of equity or a lower terminal ROE than the defaults here.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 11.57% | 11.86% | 12.14% | 12.43% | 12.71% | 12.71% |
| Book (start) | Rp 36 T | Rp 40 T | Rp 45 T | Rp 49 T | Rp 55 T | Rp 61 T |
| Net income | Rp 4.2 T | Rp 4.8 T | Rp 5.4 T | Rp 6.1 T | Rp 7.0 T | Rp 7.8 T |
| Retained | Rp 3.8 T | Rp 4.3 T | Rp 4.9 T | Rp 5.6 T | Rp 6.4 T | — |
| Excess return | Rp 132 M | Rp 261 M | Rp 417 M | Rp 604 M | Rp 830 M | Rp 926 M |
| PV | Rp 119 M | Rp 211 M | Rp 303 M | Rp 395 M | Rp 488 M | Rp 6.3 T |
Check it yourself: NI = ROE × book · ER = (ROE − COE) × book · PV = ER ÷ (1+COE)^yr · next book = book + NI × retention · TV = ER(T∞) ÷ (COE − g), discounted from year 5
| ROE_T \ COE | 10.21% | 11.21% | 12.21% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10.72% | 1.11x | 0.94x | 0.81x |
| 12.72% | 1.43x | 1.21x | 1.05x |
| 14.72% | 1.77x | 1.50x | 1.30x |
Model output under the stated assumptions, never a target. ROE record: FY2022 16.42% · FY2023 13.86% · FY2024 10.76% · FY2025 11.57%
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interest income | Rp 26 T | Rp 28 T | Rp 30 T | Rp 36 T |
| Interest expense | Rp 11 T | Rp 15 T | Rp 18 T | Rp 18 T |
| Net interest income | Rp 15 T | Rp 14 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 18 T |
| Fees & commissions | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 1.4 T |
| Impairment/provision expense | Rp 4.0 T | Rp 3.8 T | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 6.2 T |
| Personnel expenses | Rp 3.4 T | Rp 3.3 T | Rp 4.4 T | Rp 5.0 T |
| Operating profit | Rp 3.9 T | Rp 4.5 T | Rp 3.9 T | Rp 4.4 T |
| Profit before tax | Rp 3.9 T | Rp 4.4 T | Rp 3.8 T | Rp 4.3 T |
| Net profit | Rp 3.0 T | Rp 3.5 T | Rp 3.0 T | Rp 3.4 T |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 2.1 T | Rp 2.1 T | Rp 2.0 T |
| Placement with Bank Indonesia | Rp 38 T | Rp 49 T | Rp 27 T | Rp 35 T |
| Placement with other banks | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 6.0 T | Rp 2.5 T |
| Securities | Rp 54 T | Rp 41 T | Rp 57 T | Rp 53 T |
| Loans (gross) | Rp 267 T | Rp 297 T | Rp 314 T | Rp 346 T |
| Allowance for impairment: loans (CKPN) | -Rp 16 T | -Rp 16 T | -Rp 13 T | -Rp 14 T |
| Fixed assets & equipment | Rp 11 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 14 T | Rp 16 T |
| Total assets | Rp 402 T | Rp 439 T | Rp 470 T | Rp 462 T |
| Demand deposits (Giro) | Rp 114 T | Rp 144 T | Rp 161 T | Rp 142 T |
| Savings deposits (Tabungan) | Rp 42 T | Rp 44 T | Rp 46 T | Rp 35 T |
| Time deposits (Deposito) | Rp 166 T | Rp 162 T | Rp 175 T | Rp 201 T |
| Borrowings | Rp 34 T | Rp 43 T | Rp 40 T | Rp 35 T |
| Total liabilities | Rp 376 T | Rp 408 T | Rp 437 T | Rp 426 T |
| Total equity | Rp 26 T | Rp 30 T | Rp 33 T | Rp 36 T |
BTN is the housing-finance specialist and Indonesia's leader in subsidised mortgages (FLPP), and that niche defines its economics. It runs the lowest CASA of any SOE bank (~47–54%), which keeps its cost of funds high and its margin thin; NIM fell to 2.86% in FY24 before recovering to 4.20% in FY25. Everything downstream follows from that: the highest BOPO among the SOE banks (~89%), the lowest ROA (~0.9%), and the lowest ROE (~11%, bottoming at 10.8% in FY24). Asset quality is softer too, with gross NPL around 3.2% against 127% coverage. What you own here is a defensive, policy-backed mortgage franchise built for low but durable returns, and the levers that move it are cost of funds, the rate cycle, and government housing-subsidy policy.
BTN is the state’s housing lender. Gross loans grew 29.6% to Rp345.7tn, dominated by mortgages including the subsidised programmes, and the loan-to-deposit ratio ran 91.3% to 95.4% throughout, one of the tightest deployments in the group (BDMN at 95.5%, ARTO at 94.0% and BBRI at 92.0% run tighter still).
EconomicsA subsidised mortgage is priced by policy, not by the bank, so BTN starts every year with less pricing freedom than any peer. That is the structural reason its pre-tax return on assets is only about 0.89% and its BOPO around 89%, the weakest of the group. It is not mismanagement, it is the business it was created to do.
Deposits grew 17.6% to Rp378.7tn, but the mix is weak and got weaker: CASA ran 48.5%, 53.7%, 54.1%, then fell to 46.9% in FY2025 as savings dropped 22.6% and current accounts 11.5% while time deposits rose 14.7%. On top of deposits sit Rp35.2tn of wholesale borrowings.
EconomicsThis is the defining risk of a mortgage bank: the asset reprices in years, the funding reprices in months. FY2024 is the proof, when funding costs peaked and NIM collapsed to 2.86% with profit down to Rp3.01tn. A bank with 47% CASA feels every move in policy rates almost immediately, and BTN cannot raise mortgage rates to match.
In FY2025 interest income rose Rp6.46tn (+21.9%) while interest expense was flat at Rp17.8tn, so net interest income jumped 55% (Rp11.70tn → Rp18.19tn) and NIM recovered 2.86% → 4.20%.
EconomicsThe mismatch that hurts on the way up helps on the way down: once funding costs stop rising, a long book that has repriced keeps earning the higher rate. This is the single best illustration in the roster of why a bank’s margin is a timing story, not a quality story.
Provisions tripled in the same year, Rp1.98tn → Rp6.15tn, lifting cost of credit 0.63% → 1.78%. Gross NPL is 3.17% and coverage fell from 174% (FY2023) to 127%. Net profit therefore rose only 14%, from Rp3.01tn to Rp3.42tn, on a 55% jump in margin income.
EconomicsRun the subtraction one more time, because it is the whole point of these bank pages: margin minus credit cost was 2.89% (FY2022), 2.48%, 2.23%, and 2.42% (FY2025). The risk-adjusted spread is 47bp WORSE than four years ago while the headline NIM is only 20bp lower, which is exactly the kind of divergence a reader who only looks at NIM will miss.
BTN pays out only about 20% of earnings, so equity grew 40.4% (Rp25.9tn → Rp36.4tn) and assets-to-equity fell 15.52× → 12.72×. Even so, CAR of 19.02% is the lowest of the fifteen banks here and leverage the highest.
EconomicsCompare BRIS, which also retains almost everything, and the difference is the reason. BRIS retains to fund 15% growth from strength; BTN retains because the group’s lowest capital ratio, set against an NPL among the group’s highest, leaves it little choice. Same behaviour, opposite motive, and only one of them is a compounding machine.
Cost structureThin revenue against a heavy cost base, which is why BOPO is among the weakest in the group at 86.0%, 86.1%, 88.7%, 89.0% (only BJBR at 92.2% and ARTO at 90.9% are higher in the latest year). Funding is the largest line: Rp17.8tn of interest paid against Rp36.0tn earned in FY2025, so half of what the assets produce goes back to depositors and lenders. Personnel expense grew 46% over the window (Rp3.40tn → Rp4.97tn) while cost-to-income ran 46.7%, 45.3%, 57.2%, 49.2%. On a pre-tax return on assets of about 0.89%, there is very little slack: a bank earning this little per rupiah of assets has to be either very efficient or very leveraged, and BTN is currently the latter.
Cash cycleFunding cost → margin → credit cost → capital, and BTN is the clearest case in the roster of a bank where the timing of link one dominates everything. Short deposits fund long mortgages, so in FY2024 rising funding costs crushed the margin to 2.86% before the book could respond, and in FY2025 the repriced book delivered a 55% jump in margin income once funding costs stopped rising. Link three then took most of it (provisions Rp6.15tn), and link four is where the constraint lives: with CAR at 19.02%, the group’s lowest, and an NPL of 3.17% that ranks third-highest of the fifteen, the bank must retain about 80% of its profit just to keep the ratio moving in the right direction. It has done that, equity +40.4% and leverage down from 15.52× to 12.72×, which is genuine progress and also the reason the dividend stays small.
Unit economicsPer rupiah of loans, margin minus cost of credit: 2.89% (FY2022), 2.48%, 2.23%, 2.42% (FY2025). Now place BTN in the batch: BRIS +37bp, NISP +40bp, BDMN flat, BBTN −47bp, MEGA −175bp. Five banks, one rate cycle, and the ranking has almost nothing to do with how fast each grew its loan book. It is decided by two things only, how cheap the funding is and how much the credit costs, which is the single most useful idea to carry from these pages to any bank anywhere.
Low CASA (~47%) means BTN relies more on costlier time deposits and wholesale funding, giving funding providers more sway.
Implication → The core weakness: a high cost of funds drives the sector’s thinnest NIM and lowest ROA.
Subsidised-mortgage rates are policy-set; commercial borrowers shop on rate.
Implication → Limits pricing power on both subsidised and commercial books, capping margins.
The subsidised-housing franchise (FLPP mandate, expertise, scale) is hard to replicate.
Implication → Protects BTN’s niche, but it is a policy-granted moat, not a market one.
Other banks offer mortgages; non-bank and developer financing compete for commercial buyers.
Implication → Pressures the commercial book; the subsidised niche is more protected.
Peers compete aggressively for commercial mortgages and the same scarce CASA; BOPO ~89%.
Implication → Intensifies the funding-cost and efficiency squeeze that defines BTN’s low returns.
Honest but strained, and the strain is visible in the buffer rather than in the profit. Start with what is trustworthy: the FY2024 margin trough and the FY2025 recovery are both real movements, verified against the bank’s own published statements rather than a change in reporting basis, and the FY2025 provision charge of Rp6.15tn is the opposite of earnings management, since a bank flattering its numbers would have charged less, not almost four times more. Now the strain. Gross NPL of 3.17% is among the highest of the fifteen banks here (BJTM 3.88% and BBRI 3.29% are above it), and coverage has fallen from 174% (FY2023) to 127%, so the cushion behind that NPL is thinner at the same time as the NPL is larger. The Rp6.15tn charge did not rebuild coverage, it roughly kept pace with the problem. Meanwhile the funding mix deteriorated sharply in FY2025 (CASA 54.07% → 46.88%, savings −22.6%), which is what a bank sees when depositors chase rates elsewhere. Read the FY2025 profit of Rp3.42tn as a genuine number produced under pressure, not as evidence the pressure has passed.
| Period | One-off item | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| FY2024 | The funding-cost peak: NIM compressed to 2.86% as short-dated funding repriced faster than the mortgage book could. | Net interest income fell to Rp11.70tn and net profit to Rp3.01tn, with ROE at its 10.76% low and cost-to-income spiking to 57.15%. Verified as a real economic event rather than a basis change, so FY2024 is a legitimate trough to measure from, not an artefact to discard. |
| FY2025 | A provisioning step-change: the charge tripled to Rp6.15tn (cost of credit 0.63% → 1.78%) in the same year net interest income jumped 55%. | It absorbed roughly two thirds of the Rp6.49tn margin gain, holding net profit growth to 14%. Any forecast built off the FY2025 margin recovery has to carry an assumption about whether this charge normalises lower, and coverage at 127% gives little room to under-provide. |
Cash conversionProfit does become capital here, and it has to. Equity grew 40.4% to Rp36.4tn on a payout of only about 20%, which pulled assets-to-equity down from 15.52× to 12.72× and lifted CAR off its 18.50% FY2024 low to 19.02%. That is real strengthening from a weak base: CAR is still the lowest of the fifteen banks and the balance sheet the most leveraged. Liquidity is tight as well, with a loan-to-deposit ratio of 91.3% and Rp35.2tn of wholesale borrowings supplementing deposits, so there is no spare deposit base to lend and little room to absorb a funding shock without paying up.
A builder by necessity rather than by choice, and the distinction changes how you should read the same numbers. BTN retains about 80% of profit (payout roughly 20%), grew equity 40.4% and loans 29.6%, and de-levered from 15.52× to 12.72× assets-to-equity. On the surface that is the same behaviour as BRIS, which also retains almost everything. The motive is opposite: BRIS retains to fund 15% growth while already earning 17% on equity, whereas BTN retains because a 19.02% CAR, the group’s lowest, against a 3.17% NPL that ranks third-highest of the fifteen, does not leave a choice. Judge it on the value test and the verdict is uncomfortable: ROE of 11.57% against a cost of equity of 11.21% means the retained rupiah is earning almost exactly what it costs, so the growth is close to value-neutral.
DeploymentIn, FY2022 to FY2025: loans +Rp79.0tn, fixed assets +Rp5.1tn, while securities were roughly flat (Rp53.7tn → Rp53.3tn) and central-bank placements fell Rp38.0tn → Rp35.5tn. Funded by: deposits +Rp56.8tn, retained profit +Rp10.5tn of equity, and wholesale borrowings held around Rp35tn. Out: a dividend of roughly 20% of earnings. Note what is NOT here: no capital raise, and no securities build of the kind NISP undertook. Every incremental rupiah went into mortgages, which is the mandate, and the capital ratio had to be rebuilt out of retained earnings alone.
Returns trendROE 16.42% → 13.86% → 10.76% → 11.57% against a cost of equity of 11.21% (risk-free 7.26% plus a 0.59 emerging-market money-centre bank beta on a 6.69% equity risk premium). The bank cleared its required return comfortably in FY2022, fell below it in FY2024, and is back just 0.36pp above it. The excess-return model still values BTN above book at 1.21×, because it fades from the four-year median ROE of 12.72% rather than from today’s number, while the market pays 0.469× book, roughly 39% of modeled value and the widest price-to-model gap in the roster. That gap is the argument in one line: the model believes the four-year median, the market believes the last two years. Given that the FY2025 recovery came with a tripled credit charge, deteriorating CASA and the group’s thinnest capital, the market’s scepticism is not unreasonable, and this is one of the few names in the roster where the honest reading favours the price over the model.
Gross NPL 3.17% is among the highest of the fifteen banks tracked here, behind only BJTM (3.88%) and BBRI (3.29%), while coverage fell 174% (FY2023) → 127%, and the FY2025 provision charge of Rp6.15tn (cost of credit 1.78%) roughly kept pace with the problem rather than rebuilding the buffer. Mortgage collateral justifies lower coverage than an unsecured lender needs, but the direction of both series is the concern, not the level of either alone.
CAR 19.02% is the lowest and assets-to-equity 12.72× the highest of the fifteen banks here, even after four years of retaining about 80% of profit. It is comfortably above the regulatory minimum, so this is not a solvency alarm, it is a constraint: the combination of the group’s thinnest capital and an NPL among its highest is why the dividend must stay small and why a credit shock would bite faster here than anywhere else in the roster.
CASA fell 54.07% → 46.88% in FY2025 (savings −22.6%, current accounts −11.5%) while time deposits rose 14.7%, and Rp35.2tn of wholesale borrowings sits on top. A long mortgage book funded this way means FY2024 can repeat: that year, rising funding costs alone took NIM to 2.86% and profit to Rp3.01tn.
A pre-tax return on assets of about 0.89% is very thin and BOPO of 89.04% is among the group’s weakest (only BJBR 92.2% and ARTO 90.9% are higher). Note that ROA is not comparable across every bank here, since some disclose it pre-tax and others after tax, so the like-for-like test is ROE against each bank’s own cost of equity: 11.57% versus 11.21%, a margin of just 0.36pp. Policy-priced subsidised mortgages are the structural reason, so the fix is volume, funding cost and credit discipline rather than pricing. Personnel cost growing 46% over the window against that thin a spread is worth watching.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Large, well-capitalised and concentrated among a few systemic players, with ASEAN-leading profitability: though margins and efficiency are now under late-cycle pressure.