Equal
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| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)(Capital / RWA) | 25.3% | 25.3% | 24.4% | 23.8% |
| Leverage Ratio(Tier 1 / Total Exposure) | 17.4% | 16.6% | 15.9% | 15.4% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross NPL(NPL / Total Loans) | 2.9% | 2.3% | 1.9% | 1.6% |
| Net NPL((NPL − Reserves) / Loans) | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% |
| Non-Performing Assets(NPA / Total Assets) | 1.4% | 1.2% | 0.9% | 0.9% |
| Non-Performing Productive Assets(NP Earning / Earning Assets) | 1.3% | 1.1% | 0.9% | 0.8% |
| Allowance for Impairment (CKPN)(CKPN / Earning Assets) | 4.1% | 4.2% | 3.9% | 3.3% |
| Cost of Credit(Provision Expense / Gross Loans) | 2.0% | 1.7% | 1.6% | 1.2% |
| NPL Coverage(Allowance for Impairment (CKPN) / Gross NPL) | 206.5% | 241.1% | 274.6% | 281.2% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR)(Loans / Deposits) | 91.0% | 96.5% | 96.5% | 95.5% |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)(ASF / RSF) | 134.2% | 123.6% | 123.5% | 125.0% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)(HQLA / Net Cash Outflows (30d)) | 151.7% | 130.9% | 137.2% | 152.5% |
| CASA Ratio((Demand + Savings) / Total Deposits) | 63.6% | 52.1% | 41.7% | 42.5% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 2.1% | 2.1% | 1.6% | 1.8% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 10.5% | 10.6% | 7.9% | 8.7% |
| Net Interest Margin (NIM)(NII / Avg Earning Assets) | 5.2% | 5.1% | 4.8% | 4.5% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Expense to Income (BOPO)(Opex / Operating Income) | 72.9% | 75.7% | 81.6% | 79.3% |
| Cost-to-Income Ratio (CIR)(Opex (ex-provisions) / Income) | 50.1% | 51.6% | 55.8% | 55.3% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan Growth (YoY)(Gross Loans / Prior Year − 1) | — | 18.4% | 8.5% | 10.6% |
| Deposit Growth (YoY)(Total Deposits / Prior Year − 1) | — | 10.7% | 8.8% | 15.3% |
Price Rp 4,202 · market cap Rp 41 T
| Multiple | BDMN | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 12.45x | 8.04x | +55% |
| P/B | 0.93x | 0.78x | +18% |
| Dividend Yield | 3.38% | 7.46%(14/15) | -55% |
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
A bank cannot be valued on operating cash flow the way a factory can, because for a bank debt is raw material rather than financing. So this model values the equity directly: start from book value, then add the present value of everything the bank earns above its cost of equity. A bank that earns exactly its cost of equity is worth exactly its book value (P/B 1.0).
| Assumption | Default | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Book equity (BV₀) | Rp 44 T | audited Individual-basis equity, FY2025 publication |
| ROE, start of fade | 8.69% | FY2025 disclosed ROE (OJK ratio table) |
| ROE, terminal | 9.59% | median disclosed ROE, FY2022–FY2025: the bank's own demonstrated through-cycle level, fading linearly |
| Fade horizon | 5 yrs | linear fade; final year pins to terminal |
| Retention (explicit phase) | 0.0% | implied from delivered equity growth FY2022–FY2025 (CAGR -1.8%) ÷ average ROE 9.4%. An approximation: equity growth also carries OCI effects (FVOCI marks, revaluations), not only retention |
| Cost of equity | 11.21% | National-footprint franchises (KBMI 3–4 and large private banks). |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | house terminal growth 2.5% (capped at terminal ROE by the engine when binding) |
Equity = BV₀ Rp 44 T + PV(excess, yrs 1–5) -Rp 3.4 T + PV(terminal) -Rp 4.8 T = Rp 36 T
At today's price the market pays 114% of this model's equity value. The price embeds more franchise strength than these inputs produce, which amounts to assuming a lower cost of equity or a higher terminal ROE than the defaults here.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 8.69% | 8.92% | 9.14% | 9.37% | 9.59% | 9.59% |
| Book (start) | Rp 44 T | Rp 44 T | Rp 44 T | Rp 44 T | Rp 44 T | Rp 44 T |
| Net income | Rp 3.8 T | Rp 3.9 T | Rp 4.0 T | Rp 4.1 T | Rp 4.2 T | Rp 4.2 T |
| Retained | Rp 0 | Rp 0 | Rp 0 | Rp 0 | Rp 0 | — |
| Excess return | -Rp 1.1 T | -Rp 1.0 T | -Rp 916 M | -Rp 816 M | -Rp 716 M | -Rp 716 M |
| PV | -Rp 1.0 T | -Rp 821 M | -Rp 666 M | -Rp 534 M | -Rp 421 M | -Rp 4.8 T |
Check it yourself: NI = ROE × book · ER = (ROE − COE) × book · PV = ER ÷ (1+COE)^yr · next book = book + NI × retention · TV = ER(T∞) ÷ (COE − g), discounted from year 5
| ROE_T \ COE | 10.21% | 11.21% | 12.21% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.59% | 0.72x | 0.65x | 0.59x |
| 9.59% | 0.91x | 0.81x | 0.74x |
| 11.59% | 1.10x | 0.98x | 0.88x |
Model output under the stated assumptions, never a target. ROE record: FY2022 10.49% · FY2023 10.59% · FY2024 7.94% · FY2025 8.69%
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interest income | Rp 11 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 15 T | Rp 16 T |
| Interest expense | Rp 2.4 T | Rp 3.8 T | Rp 5.6 T | Rp 6.3 T |
| Net interest income | Rp 8.4 T | Rp 8.8 T | Rp 9.1 T | Rp 9.5 T |
| Fees & commissions | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 1.7 T |
| Impairment/provision expense | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 2.3 T | Rp 2.3 T | Rp 1.9 T |
| Personnel expenses | Rp 3.4 T | Rp 3.7 T | Rp 3.9 T | Rp 4.0 T |
| Operating profit | Rp 4.0 T | Rp 4.2 T | Rp 3.4 T | Rp 4.1 T |
| Profit before tax | Rp 3.8 T | Rp 4.0 T | Rp 3.3 T | Rp 4.0 T |
| Net profit | Rp 3.3 T | Rp 3.5 T | Rp 2.8 T | Rp 3.3 T |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash | Rp 2.6 T | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 2.3 T | Rp 2.9 T |
| Placement with Bank Indonesia | Rp 15 T | Rp 14 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 9.6 T |
| Placement with other banks | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 2.6 T |
| Securities | Rp 22 T | Rp 20 T | Rp 29 T | Rp 39 T |
| Loans (gross) | Rp 113 T | Rp 133 T | Rp 145 T | Rp 160 T |
| Allowance for impairment: loans (CKPN) | -Rp 6.7 T | -Rp 7.3 T | -Rp 7.5 T | -Rp 7.4 T |
| Fixed assets & equipment | Rp 4.1 T | Rp 4.4 T | Rp 4.4 T | Rp 4.6 T |
| Total assets | Rp 184 T | Rp 203 T | Rp 212 T | Rp 240 T |
| Demand deposits (Giro) | Rp 32 T | Rp 34 T | Rp 27 T | Rp 34 T |
| Savings deposits (Tabungan) | Rp 48 T | Rp 38 T | Rp 36 T | Rp 40 T |
| Time deposits (Deposito) | Rp 46 T | Rp 67 T | Rp 88 T | Rp 101 T |
| Total liabilities | Rp 137 T | Rp 153 T | Rp 171 T | Rp 196 T |
| Total equity | Rp 47 T | Rp 49 T | Rp 42 T | Rp 44 T |
Danamon is the laggard of the group. It earns an ROE of ~8–10%, below its own cost of equity and the 4th-lowest of the 15 banks Neraca covers, and a cost-to-income ratio of 55.3%, the 3rd-highest of those 15, squeezed by a CASA that collapsed from 63.6% to 42.5% (FY22→25) and pushed funding cost and BOPO up toward ~80%. Asset quality actually improved over the window (gross NPL 2.86%→1.64%, with cost of credit falling), and capital is strong (CAR ~24%) thanks to majority owner MUFG. Its real franchise strengths are Adira in auto and consumer finance and the MUFG relationship (access to Japanese corporates, integration with MUFG Bank). For now it is a turnaround story: the deposit franchise and efficiency both have to improve before returns can clear the cost of equity.
Danamon consolidates Adira Finance, a high-yield auto and consumer lender. On the consolidated basis the ratios look very different (margin around 7.4%, after-tax return on assets around 1.6%) because Adira’s expensive lending is inside them. Every figure on this page is deliberately the bank-only (Individual) basis from the OJK publication, so it compares like for like with the other fourteen banks here.
EconomicsThis is the first habit to build when reading any group: the same bank can show two honest but incompatible margin profiles depending on the perimeter. If a broker quotes Danamon at a 7% margin and this page says 4.47%, neither is lying, they are measuring different animals. Always ask which perimeter before you compare.
Deposits grew from Rp125.7tn to Rp174.7tn, but the mix inverted: time deposits +120% (Rp45.8tn → Rp100.5tn) while savings FELL 17% (Rp47.8tn → Rp39.8tn) and current accounts barely moved. CASA went 63.6% → 42.5%.
EconomicsCheap deposits are a franchise asset that takes years to build and can be lost in months. Losing Rp8.0tn of savings and replacing it with Rp54.8tn of time money is the single most consequential thing in these four years: interest expense rose 169% while interest income rose 47%.
Loans grew 42% to Rp160.1tn and the loan-to-deposit ratio moved 91.0% → 95.5%, having touched 96.5% twice. Securities grew too (Rp21.8tn → Rp38.6tn), so total assets rose 31%.
EconomicsCompare this with BRIS at 83.7% or MEGA at 64.5%. At 95% the deposit base is fully worked, so every additional loan has to be funded by buying more deposits at the margin, and the marginal deposit is a time deposit. That is how a funding problem becomes self-reinforcing.
Gross NPL fell every year (2.86%, 2.28%, 1.89%, 1.64%), cost of credit fell 1.97% → 1.21%, and reserve coverage rose 207% → 281%.
EconomicsDo the arithmetic that matters: margin minus credit cost was 3.21% in FY2022 and 3.26% in FY2025. The risk-adjusted spread is FLAT. Credit improvement paid for the entire margin loss, exactly as it did at BRIS. So neither the margin nor the loan book is the reason profit stalled.
Cost-to-income rose 50.1% → 55.3% and BOPO 72.9% → 79.3%, with personnel expense up 17.6% (Rp3.36tn → Rp3.95tn) against net interest income up 13.4%.
EconomicsSince the risk-adjusted spread was flat, the fall in return on assets (2.14% → 1.75%) is almost entirely an operating-cost story. And leverage was no help: assets grew 31% while equity fell, so assets-to-equity rose from 3.92× to 5.42×. Danamon put MORE balance sheet behind each rupiah of capital and still earned a lower return on it, which is the clearest possible sign the incremental business was not paying for itself.
Cost structureA people-and-branch consumer bank carrying a cost base built for a bigger margin. Personnel expense of Rp3.95tn is the largest controllable line and it grew 17.6% while net interest income grew 13.4%, which is the whole efficiency problem in one comparison. Cost-to-income at 55.3% is the weakest in the fifteen banks tracked here on the latest year, against BBCA at roughly 31% and BMRI at roughly 34% in their best years. The second cost is funding, and it is no longer small: Rp6.34tn of interest paid against Rp15.88tn earned, so 40% of what the assets earn now goes back to depositors, against 22% in FY2022.
Cash cycleThe loop is funding cost → margin → credit cost → capital, and Danamon shows what happens when the first and last links both leak. Deposits now arrive mostly as time money that reprices in months; the loans they fund reprice more slowly; the gap is the margin, and it narrowed 71bp. Credit losses then took LESS (a genuine improvement), and operating cost took more. What is left should accumulate as capital, and this is the part a reader must check for themselves: book value ended FY2025 at Rp44.30tn, which is Rp2.54tn BELOW the FY2022 level of Rp46.84tn, even though the bank earned Rp9.58tn across FY2023 to FY2025. The capital ratios thinned in step, CAR 25.34% → 23.80% and the leverage ratio 17.40% → 15.37%, while assets grew 31%.
Unit economicsPer rupiah of loans, margin minus credit cost: 3.21% (FY2022) versus 3.26% (FY2025), essentially unchanged. Now line it up against the two banks analysed alongside it. BRIS improved the same measure by 37bp (4.48% → 4.85%), MEGA lost 175bp (5.21% → 3.46%), Danamon held flat. Three banks, one rate cycle, three different answers, and each answer is decided by a different link in the chain: BRIS by credit, MEGA by funding mix, Danamon by operating cost and capital. Learn to run this one subtraction and you can place almost any bank in a couple of minutes.
CASA fell to ~42% (FY25), so Danamon leans on costlier time deposits: funding providers hold real sway.
Implication → The central weakness: a high funding cost drives the highest BOPO (~80%) and lowest ROE in the group.
Mass-market and auto borrowers (via Adira) shop on rate; corporate clients negotiate.
Implication → Caps yields, compounding the funding-cost squeeze on margins.
Scale, licensing and Adira’s auto-finance network are barriers; MUFG backing adds capital strength.
Implication → The franchise is defensible, but defensibility hasn’t translated into competitive returns.
Fintech, captive auto-financiers and digital banks substitute for parts of consumer/auto credit and deposits.
Implication → Pressures both the lending franchise and the already-weak deposit base.
Intense competition for CASA and consumer/auto credit; Danamon is losing the funding battle.
Implication → Drove the CASA collapse and the efficiency deterioration: the heart of its underperformance.
The income statement is clean and the balance sheet asks a hard question. On the P&L there is no flattery to unwind: provisions FELL (Rp2.22tn → Rp1.94tn) while reserve coverage ROSE to 281% of non-performing loans, which is the opposite of a reserve release, and gross NPL improved in all four years. Now the question. Book value ended FY2025 at Rp44.30tn against Rp46.84tn in FY2022, a Rp2.54tn DECLINE, even though the bank earned Rp9.58tn in the three intervening years. At the current payout of about 27% (DPS Rp142.19) dividends explain only around Rp2.6tn, so retained profit should have added roughly Rp7.0tn and book value instead fell: a gap of about Rp9.5tn that these figures cannot account for. The engine’s implied retention for Danamon is 0% as a direct result, which is why its excess-return model assumes no self-funded growth. The series itself is sound (bank-only Individual basis in all four years, with assets equal to liabilities plus equity and interest income minus interest expense equal to net interest income, checked exactly), so this is a real movement rather than a basis artefact. The two credible explanations are a large distribution to the parent group or negative fair-value and other-comprehensive-income marks on the Rp38.6tn securities book, and they cannot be separated from the ratios shown here. Read the statement of changes in equity before drawing a conclusion, and treat this as the first thing to verify about Danamon.
| Period | One-off item | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| FY2024 | The trough year on both statements: net profit Rp2.78tn (−20.5% year on year) and book value down Rp7.66tn (Rp49.24tn → Rp41.58tn), with CAR 25.34% → 24.38%. | ROE 7.94% and ROA 1.59%, the lows of the window, and BOPO peaked at 81.62%. Note that this dip is a bank-level event: at the consolidated level Adira’s contribution masks it, which is why the two bases tell different stories about the same year. |
Cash conversionFor a bank the test is whether profit becomes capital, and this is where Danamon does not pass cleanly. Assets grew 31% while CAR fell 25.34% → 23.80% and the leverage ratio fell 17.40% → 15.37%, so the balance sheet expanded faster than the capital supporting it. Liquidity is the tighter constraint too: at a 95.5% loan-to-deposit ratio there is little unlent deposit left, unlike BRIS at 83.7% or MEGA at 64.5%. Capital is still comfortably above requirement and the MUFG relationship stands behind it, so this is not a solvency question, it is a question about how much self-funded growth is actually available.
Danamon behaved like a builder on the asset side and like something else entirely on the capital side, and the combination is why this is the roster’s clearest lesson in value creation. It grew loans 42% and assets 31%, which is builder behaviour. But book value fell Rp2.54tn over the same period, capital ratios thinned, and the return on that capital ended at 8.69% against a cost of equity of 11.21%. Growth funded at a cost above the return it earns does not create value no matter how profitable the bank looks in rupiah terms: Rp3.30tn of net profit in FY2025 is a real number, and it is still less than shareholders require for the equity tied up. That is the difference between earning money and earning enough.
DeploymentFollow the money across FY2022 to FY2025. Into: loans +Rp47.4tn and securities +Rp16.8tn. Funded by: time deposits +Rp54.8tn, with savings −Rp8.0tn working against it. Out: dividends at about 27% of earnings (DPS Rp142.19) plus the unexplained Rp9.5tn gap in book value discussed under earnings quality. Nothing here suggests capital was raised to support the expansion, and the falling CAR and leverage ratio confirm it was carried by the existing capital base instead.
Returns trendROE 10.49%, 10.59%, 7.94%, 8.69% against a cost of equity of 11.21% (risk-free 7.26% plus a 0.59 emerging-market money-centre bank beta on a 6.69% equity risk premium). The spread is negative in every year of the window, and this is precisely why the excess-return model values Danamon at 0.813× book, BELOW one times book. That is not pessimism, it is arithmetic: if a bank earns less on its equity than the equity costs, each retained rupiah is worth less than a rupiah, so fair value must sit under book. The market pays 0.93×, about 114% of the modeled value, so the price already embeds a recovery in returns that the record has not yet delivered. Four of the fifteen banks here share the sub-cost-of-equity condition (ARTO 4.33%, PNBN 5.80%, BJBR 7.32%, Danamon 8.69%), and Danamon is the largest of them by market value.
ROE was under the 11.21% cost of equity in all four years (10.49%, 10.59%, 7.94%, 8.69%), so the bank has been growing without earning its shareholders’ required return. The consequence is mechanical rather than debatable: the excess-return model puts fair value below book at 0.813×, and the gap is not closed by growth, only by a higher ROE.
Equity Rp46.84tn (FY2022) → Rp44.30tn (FY2025) against Rp9.58tn of cumulative profit, a roughly Rp9.5tn gap that dividends of about Rp2.6tn do not explain, with the whole step down concentrated in FY2024 (Rp49.24tn → Rp41.58tn). The data series is internally consistent, so it is a real movement, but its cause is not identifiable from the ratios here. Until the statement of changes in equity explains it, treat the implied 0% retention as a genuine constraint on self-funded growth.
CASA 63.6% → 42.5% with savings balances falling in absolute terms, and a loan-to-deposit ratio of 95.5% leaves almost no unlent deposit. Growth from here has to be bought with time deposits at the margin, which is the same trade that cost 71bp of margin over the last four years.
Cost-to-income 50.1% → 55.3% and BOPO 72.9% → 79.3%, with personnel cost growing 17.6% against net interest income up 13.4%. Since the risk-adjusted spread was flat, this line alone accounts for most of the fall in return on assets, and it is the fastest available lever for management to move.
No concern, and it deserves saying plainly: gross NPL improved every year to 1.64%, cost of credit fell to 1.21%, and reserve coverage rose to 281%. Whatever is wrong at Danamon, the loan book is not it.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Large, well-capitalised and concentrated among a few systemic players, with ASEAN-leading profitability: though margins and efficiency are now under late-cycle pressure.