Equal
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| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)(Capital / RWA) | 19.2% | 20.1% | 19.7% | 21.2% |
| Leverage Ratio(Tier 1 / Total Exposure) | 7.3% | 7.4% | 7.7% | 8.5% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross NPL(NPL / Total Loans) | 1.2% | 1.4% | 2.2% | 2.9% |
| Net NPL((NPL − Reserves) / Loans) | 0.5% | 0.8% | 1.0% | 1.3% |
| Non-Performing Assets(NPA / Total Assets) | 0.9% | 1.1% | 1.7% | 2.1% |
| Non-Performing Productive Assets(NP Earning / Earning Assets) | 0.9% | 1.1% | 1.7% | 2.1% |
| Allowance for Impairment (CKPN)(CKPN / Earning Assets) | 1.1% | 1.2% | 1.4% | 2.0% |
| Cost of Credit(Provision Expense / Gross Loans) | 0.1% | 0.5% | 0.7% | 1.2% |
| NPL Coverage(Allowance for Impairment (CKPN) / Gross NPL) | 124.3% | 113.3% | 85.6% | 95.4% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR)(Loans / Deposits) | 85.0% | 87.5% | 89.5% | 88.1% |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)(ASF / RSF) | 104.8% | 104.3% | 104.4% | 109.9% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)(HQLA / Net Cash Outflows (30d)) | 206.7% | 202.7% | 200.9% | 280.2% |
| CASA Ratio((Demand + Savings) / Total Deposits) | 40.4% | 42.3% | 41.8% | 42.1% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 1.8% | 1.3% | 0.9% | 0.7% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 18.6% | 13.4% | 9.6% | 7.3% |
| Net Interest Margin (NIM)(NII / Avg Earning Assets) | 5.9% | 4.9% | 3.8% | 3.8% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Expense to Income (BOPO)(Opex / Operating Income) | 80.4% | 85.7% | 90.2% | 92.2% |
| Cost-to-Income Ratio (CIR)(Opex (ex-provisions) / Income) | 70.0% | 69.0% | 71.5% | 70.9% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan Growth (YoY)(Gross Loans / Prior Year − 1) | — | 7.5% | 2.9% | -6.3% |
| Deposit Growth (YoY)(Total Deposits / Prior Year − 1) | — | 8.3% | -1.8% | -2.9% |
Price Rp 790 · market cap Rp 8.3 T
| Multiple | BJBR | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 8.05x | 8.04x | +0% |
| P/B | 0.49x | 0.78x | -38% |
| Dividend Yield | 10.79% | 7.46%(14/15) | +45% |
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
A bank cannot be valued on operating cash flow the way a factory can, because for a bank debt is raw material rather than financing. So this model values the equity directly: start from book value, then add the present value of everything the bank earns above its cost of equity. A bank that earns exactly its cost of equity is worth exactly its book value (P/B 1.0).
| Assumption | Default | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Book equity (BV₀) | Rp 17 T | audited Individual-basis equity, FY2025 publication |
| ROE, start of fade | 7.32% | FY2025 disclosed ROE (OJK ratio table) |
| ROE, terminal | 11.47% | median disclosed ROE, FY2022–FY2025: the bank's own demonstrated through-cycle level, fading linearly |
| Fade horizon | 5 yrs | linear fade; final year pins to terminal |
| Retention (explicit phase) | 30.0% | implied from delivered equity growth FY2022–FY2025 (CAGR 3.7%) ÷ average ROE 12.2%. An approximation: equity growth also carries OCI effects (FVOCI marks, revaluations), not only retention |
| Cost of equity | 11.27% | Regional development banks (BPD) and small/niche franchises. The EM cohort averages are nearly identical across the two buckets: company-specific risk (e.g. a digital bank pre-scale) is NOT captured by a sector beta; the panel slider is the adjustment surface. |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | house terminal growth 2.5% (capped at terminal ROE by the engine when binding) |
Equity = BV₀ Rp 17 T + PV(excess, yrs 1–5) -Rp 1.3 T + PV(terminal) Rp 256 M = Rp 16 T
At today's price the market pays 52% of this model's equity value. The price embeds less than these inputs produce, which amounts to assuming a higher cost of equity or a lower terminal ROE than the defaults here.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 7.32% | 8.36% | 9.40% | 10.43% | 11.47% | 11.47% |
| Book (start) | Rp 17 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 18 T | Rp 18 T | Rp 19 T | Rp 20 T |
| Net income | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 2.2 T |
| Retained | Rp 375 M | Rp 437 M | Rp 504 M | Rp 575 M | Rp 652 M | — |
| Excess return | -Rp 673 M | -Rp 508 M | -Rp 335 M | -Rp 154 M | Rp 37 M | Rp 38 M |
| PV | -Rp 605 M | -Rp 410 M | -Rp 243 M | -Rp 101 M | Rp 22 M | Rp 256 M |
Check it yourself: NI = ROE × book · ER = (ROE − COE) × book · PV = ER ÷ (1+COE)^yr · next book = book + NI × retention · TV = ER(T∞) ÷ (COE − g), discounted from year 5
| ROE_T \ COE | 10.27% | 11.27% | 12.27% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 9.47% | 0.85x | 0.75x | 0.67x |
| 11.47% | 1.07x | 0.94x | 0.83x |
| 13.47% | 1.29x | 1.13x | 1.00x |
Model output under the stated assumptions, never a target. ROE record: FY2022 18.63% · FY2023 13.37% · FY2024 9.57% · FY2025 7.32%
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interest income | Rp 13 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 14 T | Rp 14 T |
| Interest expense | Rp 5.0 T | Rp 6.8 T | Rp 8.4 T | Rp 8.1 T |
| Net interest income | Rp 7.9 T | Rp 6.5 T | Rp 5.5 T | Rp 5.6 T |
| Fees & commissions | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 1.6 T |
| Impairment/provision expense | Rp 141 M | Rp 609 M | Rp 815 M | Rp 1.3 T |
| Personnel expenses | Rp 3.0 T | Rp 2.3 T | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 2.3 T |
| Operating profit | Rp 2.8 T | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 1.3 T |
| Profit before tax | Rp 2.8 T | Rp 2.1 T | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 1.3 T |
| Net profit | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 1.0 T |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash | Rp 3.2 T | Rp 3.5 T | Rp 4.3 T | Rp 4.5 T |
| Placement with Bank Indonesia | Rp 17 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 14 T |
| Placement with other banks | Rp 3.3 T | Rp 2.6 T | Rp 2.3 T | Rp 1.8 T |
| Securities | Rp 24 T | Rp 27 T | Rp 36 T | Rp 32 T |
| Loans (gross) | Rp 108 T | Rp 116 T | Rp 119 T | Rp 112 T |
| Allowance for impairment: loans (CKPN) | -Rp 1.6 T | -Rp 1.8 T | -Rp 2.3 T | -Rp 3.1 T |
| Fixed assets & equipment | Rp 6.2 T | Rp 6.7 T | Rp 7.1 T | Rp 7.5 T |
| Total assets | Rp 170 T | Rp 176 T | Rp 184 T | Rp 181 T |
| Demand deposits (Giro) | Rp 21 T | Rp 23 T | Rp 18 T | Rp 17 T |
| Savings deposits (Tabungan) | Rp 27 T | Rp 31 T | Rp 34 T | Rp 34 T |
| Time deposits (Deposito) | Rp 70 T | Rp 74 T | Rp 73 T | Rp 71 T |
| Total liabilities | Rp 155 T | Rp 160 T | Rp 167 T | Rp 164 T |
| Total equity | Rp 15 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 17 T |
BJBR (Bank BJB) is this dataset's first Regional Development Bank (BPD); collectively owned by dozens of West Java and Banten provincial/municipal governments (Pemprov Jawa Barat the largest single holder at ~38.52%, a plurality not a majority; Pemda Kabupaten Bandung ~7.24%; the rest split across public float and other regional governments), running the classic BPD model of civil-servant/PNS payroll-linked consumer lending. **The central, genuinely important finding, confirmed across a full 4-year window**: Individual (Bank-only) net profit has declined every single year since FY2022; Rp2.22tn→Rp1.72tn(-22.8%)→Rp1.27tn(-25.7%)→Rp1.03tn(-19.0%), a 53.6% cumulative collapse; while gross NPL climbed every year (1.16%→1.35%→2.22%→2.91%) and provisioning expense rose 9.4x (Rp141.3bn→Rp1.33tn). This is a sustained, multi-year deterioration, not a single bad year. The widely-reported "profit grew 8.85% to Rp1.58tn in 2025" headline is the CONSOLIDATED group figure: a real, disclosed divergence from the Individual reality, most plausibly explained by strong growth at the group's Sharia subsidiary (Bank BJB Syariah) partially offsetting the parent-bank decline, but the divergence is a FY2025-specific wrinkle on top of a much longer-running problem, not the whole story. CAR still rose across the window (19.19%→21.20%), but mechanically, as the loan book's growth decelerated and then reversed (peaking in FY2024 before contracting 6.3% in FY2025), not because the bank built a bigger buffer on purpose. On the positive side: BJBR's Publikasi disclosure is unusually complete; leverageRatio, NSFR and LCR (Bank AND Consolidated bases) are all directly disclosed across all 4 years, no null gaps, the first bank in this dataset with that full a picture.
Giro, Tabungan and Deposito, heavily tied to West Java/Banten regional-government and civil-servant relationships.
EconomicsA sticky, relationship-based funding base, not the current constraint on performance.
The core PNS payroll-deduction consumer book plus commercial/SME lending; gross loans fell 6.3% in FY2025.
EconomicsThe contraction is the single biggest driver of FY2025's weaker Individual-basis results.
Provisioning expense has risen every year since FY2022, 9.4x cumulatively (Rp141.3bn→Rp1.33tn), as gross NPL climbed every year (1.16%→2.91%), not a one-year jump.
EconomicsThe direct, sustained driver behind four straight years of Individual net-profit decline (-53.6% cumulative).
CAR rose from 19.70% to 21.20%, not from deliberate capital building, but because a shrinking loan book needs less risk-weighted capital.
EconomicsA mechanical, not strategic, capital-ratio improvement: worth distinguishing from ARTO or PNBN's deliberate capital choices.
Paid ~Rp897bn (FY2025) and ~Rp1.00tn (FY2024): a high payout (~87% and ~78% of Individual net profit respectively) consistent with regional-government shareholders drawing cash for their own budgets.
EconomicsA structural feature of BPD ownership, not (necessarily) a signal about growth intentions.
Cost structureInterest expense (Rp8.13tn, FY2025, -3.5% YoY) and personnel expense (Rp2.34tn, +5.7% YoY) are the two largest cost lines below net interest income; provisioning (Rp1.33tn, +62.9% YoY) is the most volatile and, this year, the most consequential.
Cash cycleDeposits gathered from regional-government/civil-servant relationships, redeployed into payroll-linked and commercial credit at a 3.84% net margin, provisioning taken against credit risk as it emerges: which it did meaningfully in FY2025. Not independently computable as a cash-flow statement from this disclosed ratio-table format.
Deposits are heavily tied to regional-government and civil-servant relationships: sticky, low-cost by construction, though this also means funding is geographically/institutionally concentrated in West Java and Banten.
Implication → Funding cost is not BJBR's current problem: asset quality and loan growth are.
PNS payroll-linked borrowers have limited alternatives for salary-deduction consumer loans: a captive-adjacent segment, though this also concentrates credit risk in one borrower class.
Implication → Structural pricing power on the core book, but concentration risk if regional public-sector employment or budgets come under stress.
Regional-government relationships and payroll-deduction arrangements built over decades are hard to replicate; BPD status itself is a real, if narrow, regulatory/relationship moat within its home provinces.
Implication → The moat protects the core payroll book, but does not protect against FY2025-style asset-quality and provisioning swings.
Fintech lending and other banks' payroll-partnership products compete for the same civil-servant segment; BJBR's FY2025 loan contraction (-6.3%) is consistent with either competitive pressure or a deliberate risk pullback, or both.
Implication → Worth watching whether the contraction reverses once asset quality stabilizes, or reflects a genuine competitive erosion.
Competes with the Himbara state banks (especially BBRI, BBTN) and other BPDs for regional government business and civil-servant lending: a different competitive set from the private national banks in this dataset.
Implication → BJBR's FY2025 weakness should be read against other BPDs and Himbara's consumer books, not against BBCA-class private banks.
Real, and genuinely weaker than the widely-reported FY2025 headline alone suggests: extending the data window to 4 years (FY2022-2025) revealed the Individual/parent-bank profit decline is not a single-year event but a sustained, structural trend (-53.6% cumulative), fully explained by rising NPL and a 9.4x cumulative provisioning increase, not an accounting artifact. The Consolidated headline (+8.85% for FY2025) that most coverage reports is a different, group-level number for one year only: treating it as this bank's own multi-year performance would materially overstate how the parent entity has actually done.
Checked: no material one-offs found in the reviewed window.
Cash conversionNot independently computable from the disclosed OJK ratio-table format (no operating cash flow statement in this source): flagged as a genuine data gap rather than assumed clean.
A harvester by outcome, and largely a forced one: BJBR paid out a high share of profit as dividends (~87% FY2025, ~78% FY2024) while its loan book actually shrank; capital was not deployed into growth this year. Unlike PNBN's deliberate conservatism or ARTO's deliberate capital deployment, BJBR's pattern reads more as a rough operating year (rising NPL, jumping provisioning) than a proactive strategic choice, though the high payout ratio is also a structural feature of BPD ownership.
DeploymentDividends of ~Rp897bn (FY2025) and ~Rp1.00tn (FY2024) were paid even as gross loans fell 6.3% and provisioning consumed a much larger share of operating income: capital retained mechanically (via a shrinking RWA base) rather than deployed into growth.
Returns trendROE has fallen every year across the 4-year window (18.63%→13.37%→9.57%→7.32%) and ROA likewise (1.75%→1.29%→0.86%→0.70%): a real, quantified, sustained deterioration even as CAR mechanically improved, the clearest evidence that the capital-ratio gain reflects a shrinking/de-risking balance sheet, not a genuine efficiency or strategy win. Whether FY2026 breaks the four-year decline is the central open question.
Individual net profit has fallen every single year since FY2022 (Rp2.22tn→Rp1.72tn→Rp1.27tn→Rp1.03tn, -53.6% cumulative): confirmed only after extending the data window from 2 to 4 years specifically to check this; the original 2-year ship understated the severity, framing it as a single-year divergence from the Consolidated headline rather than the much longer trend it actually is.
Gross NPL rose every year across the 4-year window (1.16%→1.35%→2.22%→2.91%) and provisioning expense grew 9.4x cumulatively (Rp141.3bn→Rp1.33tn): a real, material, sustained reversal, not yet shown to have stabilized as of this filing.
The widely-reported "+8.85% profit growth" headline for FY2025 is Consolidated-basis; this page's Individual (parent-bank) figures show a 19.0% profit DECLINE that same year. Both are real, disclosed, correctly-sourced numbers on different bases, but conflating them would materially misstate how the parent entity performed. Confirmed via 2 independent cross-checks (loansGross and netProfit both matching independent press coverage only under the Consolidated reading of the source document's 3rd/4th column).
Checked, not assumed: an initial candidate value for FY2022/2023 loan-impairment allowance (~Rp350-5,300 million) was implausibly small for this bank's loan book and was rejected in favor of a larger, correctly-labeled sub-line (-Rp1.78tn/-Rp1.56tn) confirmed via exact continuity with the already-shipped FY2024/2025 figures. Disclosed as a genuine extraction risk in dense, jumbled-layout newspaper-format source documents, caught before shipping rather than after.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Large, well-capitalised and concentrated among a few systemic players, with ASEAN-leading profitability: though margins and efficiency are now under late-cycle pressure.