Equal · Financial Report

Petrindo Jaya Kreasi

CUAN/FY2021–FY2025/Educational Analysis/USD/Data source · 2026-07-09

ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Tax burden	0.58x	0.77x	0.78x	—	—
Interest burdendriver	0.64x	0.98x	0.95x	-0.30x	-1.29x
Operating margin	14.6%	49.6%	21.4%	4.4%	2.9%
Asset turnover	0.34x	0.87x	0.43x	0.45x	0.45x
Leverage (equity mult.)	1.66x	1.37x	1.91x	3.14x	4.30x
= Return on Equity (consolidated)	3.1%	44.8%	12.9%	—	—
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)	4.7%	45.6%	12.2%	—	—

Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.

Liquidity

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities)	0.68x	1.98x	3.52x	1.95x	1.70x
Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities)	0.42x	1.42x	2.66x	1.74x	1.54x
Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities)	0.25x	0.55x	1.30x	0.79x	0.39x
Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities)	-$ 11 M	$ 29 M	$ 118 M	$ 330 M	$ 422 M

Leverage & Solvency

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity)	0.19x	0.00x	0.62x	1.45x	2.31x
Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity)	0.66x	0.37x	0.91x	2.14x	3.30x
Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets)	0.12x	0.00x	0.32x	0.46x	0.54x
Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash)	$ 1.3 M	-$ 16 M	$ 14 M	$ 545 M	$ 1.2 B
Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense)	2.80x	56.59x	22.00x	0.77x	0.44x
Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity)	1.66x	1.37x	1.91x	3.14x	4.30x

Profitability

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue)	46.5%	71.1%	38.0%	14.7%	13.2%
Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue)	14.6%	49.6%	21.4%	4.4%	2.9%
Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue)	5.5%	37.6%	15.9%	20.1%	11.1%
EBITDA(EBIT + D&A)	$ 5.5 M	$ 51 M	$ 23 M	$ 119 M	$ 172 M
EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue)	19.5%	51.9%	23.8%	14.8%	14.1%
Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets)	1.9%	32.8%	6.8%	9.0%	5.0%
Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners))	4.2%	52.0%	14.4%	52.5%	39.7%
Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax)	0.58x	0.77x	0.78x	—	—
Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT)	0.64x	0.98x	0.95x	-0.30x	-1.29x
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)	4.7%	45.6%	12.2%	—	—

Operations & Efficiency

Turnover	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets)	0.34x	0.87x	0.43x	0.45x	0.45x
Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory)	1.77x	1.68x	1.51x	9.16x	10.87x
Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables)	5.85x	11.35x	61.87x	4.09x	3.84x
Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables)	1.68x	34.96x	6.96x	5.22x	3.42x

Conversion Period	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS)	205.7 days	217.2 days	242.1 days	39.8 days	33.6 days
Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue)	62.4 days	32.1 days	5.9 days	89.3 days	95.0 days
Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS)	217.9 days	10.4 days	52.4 days	70.0 days	106.9 days
Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO)	50.2 days	238.9 days	195.6 days	59.1 days	21.6 days

Cash Flow

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex)	-$ 209 K	$ 24 M	-$ 13 M	-$ 173 M	-$ 537 M

Valuation

price as-of 2026-07-31fundamentals: FY2025FX 18,058 IDR/USD (2026-07-31)

Price Rp 665 · market cap Rp 75 T ($ 4.1 B at the cited rate; statements are filed in USD)

Multiple	CUAN	Peer median	vs median
P/E	30.76x	16.25x(15/16)	+89%
P/B	12.20x	1.68x	+625%
P/S	3.41x	1.92x	+77%
EV/EBITDA	32.85x	10.31x	+219%
EV/EBIT	158.61x	14.25x	+1,013%
EV/Sales	4.64x	2.27x	+104%
FCF Yield	-12.97%	0.01%	-123,275%
Dividend Yield	—	5.27%(11/16)	—

EV = mkt cap $ 4.1 B + debt $ 1.4 B − cash $ 237 M + minority interest $ 287 M = $ 5.6 B

What the price implies

not computable: negative or zero base-year FCF. Shown as-is rather than estimated.

Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 9.3–13.3% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.

Forward DCF (glass-box)

This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.

Mechanical DCF suppressed: on these default assumptions the modelled enterprise value falls BELOW net debt and minority interests, so the equity residual is negative. Equity cannot be worth less than nothing, so no per-share figure is published here: read it as the model saying the debt claims consume the whole enterprise at this discount rate and growth path, which is itself the signal. The components are shown below so the arithmetic stays checkable, and the sliders let you test what it would take to change the answer.

Cyclical normalization: Commodity/cyclical name: the trailing years are a sample drawn from the price cycle, not a trend. Defaults are therefore normalized, using the full-window mean margin with no cycle-position growth extrapolation. That normalized margin is itself the embedded commodity-price assumption.

Assumption	Value	Basis
Rf (risk-free)	4.66%	US 10Y Treasury, 30 Jul 2026
ERP (Rm − Rf)	6.69%	Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%)
β	0.96 → 1.22	Metals & Mining (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.35
Cost of equity	12.82%	Rf + β × ERP
Cost of debt	7.39%	median interest coverage 2.8x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a Baa2/BBB synthetic rating and a 1.11% default spread, over a 6.28% base (US 10Y 4.66% + Indonesia's 1.62% sovereign spread). Its BOOK rate is 5.6%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms)
Tax rate	23.0%	median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest)
WACC	10.97%	74% E × CoE + 26% D × Kd × (1 − t)
Revenue growth (yr 1, fading)	2.5%	terminal growth from year 1, cyclical normalization: the delivered 4-yr CAGR (156.1%) reflects cycle position, not a trend
EBIT margin	18.6%	full-cycle mean EBIT margin, FY2021–FY2025 (cyclical normalization: this margin is the embedded commodity-price assumption)
D&A / revenue	8.0%	mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs
Capex / revenue	25.0%	mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 11.0% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 22.8% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 10.9% of revenue against depreciation of 8.0%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral
ΔNWC / Δrevenue	15.1%	median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP)
Terminal growth	2.5%	BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%)

Growth path

year 1 → fading to terminal over 5 yrs2.5%

EBIT margin18.6%

WACC11.0%

Terminal growth2.5%

Explicit years5

FCFF drivers

FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − capex − ΔNWC

Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.

Capex

% of revenue25.0%

D&A

% of revenue8.0%

ΔNWC

% of the CHANGE in revenue15.1%

Year	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	T∞
Growth	2.5%	2.5%	2.5%	2.5%	2.5%	2.5%
Revenue	$ 1.2 B	$ 1.3 B	$ 1.3 B	$ 1.3 B	$ 1.4 B	$ 1.4 B
EBIT	$ 232 M	$ 238 M	$ 244 M	$ 250 M	$ 256 M	$ 262 M
NOPAT	$ 179 M	$ 183 M	$ 188 M	$ 192 M	$ 197 M	$ 202 M
+ D&A	$ 99 M	$ 102 M	$ 104 M	$ 107 M	$ 110 M	$ 113 M
− Capex	$ 312 M	$ 320 M	$ 328 M	$ 336 M	$ 344 M	$ 153 M
− ΔNWC	$ 4.6 M	$ 4.7 M	$ 4.8 M	$ 4.9 M	$ 5.1 M	$ 5.2 M
FCFF	-$ 39 M	-$ 40 M	-$ 41 M	-$ 42 M	-$ 43 M	$ 156 M
PV	-$ 35 M	-$ 32 M	-$ 30 M	-$ 27 M	-$ 25 M	$ 1.1 B

Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding

EV = PV(explicit) -$ 150 M + PV(TV) $ 1.1 B = $ 945 M · TV 116% of EV · − net debt $ 1.2 B − minority $ 287 M = equity -$ 554 M ÷ shares outstanding · per share is in USD, shown in IDR at 18,058

Model output: Rp -89/share (-113% vs price Rp 665)· exit-multiple check (10.3x): Rp 95

Under these assumptions the model lands 113% below today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for faster growth, a fatter margin, or a lower discount rate than the inputs here assume.

Sensitivity (per share, Rp)

g \ WACC	10.0%	11.0%	12.0%
2.0%	-72	-100	-123
2.5%	-57	-89	-114
3.0%	-40	-76	-104

Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.

Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.

Macro backdropfull backdrop + sensitivity map →

BI Rate 5.75%IDR/USD 18,05810Y government bond yield 7.26%Inflation 3.34%(as-of 2026-07-31)

Coal ↑(H)Nickel ↑(H)Rupiah weaker(H)Oil ↑(M)

Income Statement

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Revenue	$ 28 M	$ 98 M	$ 98 M	$ 802 M	$ 1.2 B
Cost of Goods Sold	$ 15 M	$ 28 M	$ 61 M	$ 684 M	$ 1.1 B
Gross Profit	$ 13 M	$ 70 M	$ 37 M	$ 117 M	$ 160 M
Operating Income (EBIT)	$ 4.1 M	$ 49 M	$ 21 M	$ 36 M	$ 36 M
Interest Expense	$ 1.5 M	$ 858 K	$ 954 K	$ 46 M	$ 81 M
Net Income	$ 1.5 M	$ 37 M	$ 16 M	$ 161 M	$ 135 M
Net Income Attributable to Owners	$ 1.5 M	$ 37 M	$ 16 M	$ 161 M	$ 135 M
Depreciation & Amortization	$ 1.4 M	$ 2.2 M	$ 2.3 M	$ 84 M	$ 136 M

Balance Sheet

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Cash & Equivalents	$ 8.4 M	$ 16 M	$ 61 M	$ 273 M	$ 237 M
Accounts Receivable	$ 4.8 M	$ 8.6 M	$ 1.6 M	$ 196 M	$ 316 M
Inventory	$ 8.5 M	$ 17 M	$ 40 M	$ 75 M	$ 97 M
Current Assets	$ 23 M	$ 59 M	$ 165 M	$ 678 M	$ 1.0 B
Total Assets	$ 83 M	$ 112 M	$ 230 M	$ 1.8 B	$ 2.7 B
Accounts Payable	$ 9.0 M	$ 808 K	$ 8.7 M	$ 131 M	$ 309 M
Current Liabilities	$ 33 M	$ 30 M	$ 47 M	$ 347 M	$ 606 M
Total Liabilities	$ 33 M	$ 30 M	$ 109 M	$ 1.2 B	$ 2.1 B
Total Interest-Bearing Debt	$ 9.7 M	$ 0	$ 75 M	$ 818 M	$ 1.4 B
Total Equity	$ 50 M	$ 82 M	$ 121 M	$ 566 M	$ 626 M
Equity Attributable to Owners	$ 37 M	$ 71 M	$ 109 M	$ 306 M	$ 339 M

Cash Flow Statement

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Operating Cash Flow	$ 613 K	$ 27 M	-$ 1.1 M	-$ 2.6 M	-$ 28 M
Capital Expenditure	$ 822 K	$ 2.7 M	$ 12 M	$ 170 M	$ 509 M

Company Deep Analysis

Reviewed: 2026-07-31

Analyst Verdict

CUAN gross margin: 46.5 % (2021) → 71.1 % (2022) → 38.0 % (2023) → 14.7 % (2024) → 13.2 % (2025). OPM: 14.6 % → 49.6 % → 21.4 % → 4.4 % → 2.9 %. Net margin: 5.5 % → 37.6 % → 16.0 % → 20.1 % (2024, notably higher than that year's OPM; consistent with a material non-operating gain, likely acquisition-related, not asserted as a specific confirmed mechanism here) → 11.1 %. ROE: 4.2 % → 52.0 % → 14.4 % → 52.5 % → 39.7 %. Asset turnover: 0.34× → 0.87× → 0.43× → 0.45× → 0.45×. D/E: 0.19× (2021) → n/a (2022) → 0.62× (2023) → 1.45× (2024) → 2.31× (2025); L/E: 0.66× → 0.37× → 0.91× → 2.14× → 3.30×; leverage more than tripled in two years. Net debt (USD): 1.3 M (2021) → n/a (2022) → 13.8 M (2023) → 544.8 M (2024) → 1,212.3 M (2025); an almost 100x increase from 2023 to 2025, funding the MUTU acquisition and subsequent expansion. Interest coverage: 2.80× → 56.59× (2022 peak) → 22.00× → 0.77× (2024, below 1×) → 0.44× (2025, below 1× and still falling); the lowest, and still-deteriorating, coverage of any company added to this project. FCF (USD): −0.2 M → 23.8 M (the only positive year) → −12.9 M → −172.7 M → −537.0 M; the burn rate roughly tripled in the most recent year alone. Current ratio: 0.68× (2021, below 1×) → 1.98× → 3.52× (2023 peak) → 1.95× → 1.70×. Revenue (USD): 28.2 M → 97.8 M → 97.9 M → 801.7 M → 1,215.6 M. This is a genuine growth-via-leverage story: the MUTU acquisition and diversification drove real, large revenue gains, but the balance sheet has deteriorated every year since 2023, and by the two most recent years interest coverage has fallen below the threshold where operating earnings alone cover interest expense.

Business Model

CUAN is a Kalimantan-focused mining holding company operating six coal concessions through subsidiaries: PT Tamtama Perkasa (TP, thermal coal, 9,540 ha, North Barito Regency, Central Kalimantan, 8.1 Mt reserves), PT Multi Tambangjaya Utama (MUTU, the largest at 24,970 ha across North/South/East Barito Regency, thermal bituminous and coking coal, 24.4 Mt reserves, PKP2B rights to 2039; acquired from Indika Energy subsidiaries for USD 218 M, closed February 26, 2024), PT Daya Bumindo Karunia (DBK, Murung Raya Regency, 14,800 ha) and PT Bara International (BI, adjacent to DBK), plus a gold and silver concession in West Nusa Tenggara and a quartz sand concession in East Kalimantan. The MUTU acquisition brought coking (metallurgical) coal into the portfolio alongside thermal coal, and the mineral concessions represent a real, if still-early, diversification beyond pure coal.

Segments

The 2024-2025 revenue explosion (USD 97.9 M → USD 801.7 M → USD 1,215.6 M) is dominated by MUTU's consolidation: a partial year in 2024 (from the February close) and a full year in 2025. Gross margin compressed sharply over the same window (38.0 % → 14.6 % → 13.2 %), consistent with the newly-consolidated coking/thermal coal volumes carrying lower margins than CUAN's smaller, higher-margin pre-acquisition base, layered on top of the same industry-wide coal-price normalisation every peer has faced. The gold/silver and quartz sand concessions are not independently broken out in the ratios available and appear immaterial to current earnings.

Value Chain & Positioning

Overburden removal → open-pit mining across six concessions (thermal coal: TP, DBK, BI; thermal-and-coking coal: MUTU) → coal processing/blending → domestic sale (DMO) or export. The gold/silver and quartz sand concessions represent separate, earlier-stage value chains not yet material to group revenue. The MUTU acquisition (February 2024) was funded substantially through debt, which shows up directly in the sharp D/E and net-debt increases from 2023 onward.

Competitive Forces (Porter’s 5)

Supplier powerLow

How much leverage input/funding providers have over pricing.

CUAN owns its coal concessions across six subsidiaries; no meaningful third-party supplier dependency for its core mining operations.

Implication → Cost pressure is financing-cost driven (the debt funding MUTU and expansion) far more than supplier-driven: the real risk sits in the capital structure, not the supply chain.

Buyer powerHigh

How much leverage customers have to push prices down.

Thermal and coking coal are both benchmark-priced: CUAN is a price-taker on both product lines, the same dynamic as every listed coal peer.

Implication → Revenue growth so far has come from volume (the MUTU acquisition), not pricing power: the company cannot price its way to better margins or to fixing its interest-coverage problem.

Threat of new entryLow

How easily new competitors can enter the market.

Standard IUP/PKP2B/RKAB/AMDAL barriers for coal mining; MUTU's specific PKP2B rights run to 2039, a real long-dated asset. But CUAN's own history, buying its way to scale via acquisition and debt, shows growth can come from M&A as much as from organic development.

Implication → Barriers to entry protect the underlying mining assets but say nothing about CUAN's own capital-structure risk from how it chose to grow.

Threat of substitutesHigh

Risk that alternative products/services replace demand.

The sector's standard high substitution risk applies to thermal coal (LNG/solar/wind/hydro/geothermal, post-2030 demand decline); coking coal faces a somewhat different demand driver (steelmaking) with its own substitution dynamics (scrap-based EAF steel, hydrogen-based reduction) rather than the power-generation transition.

Implication → The MUTU acquisition diversifies CUAN's end-market exposure (steelmaking vs. power generation) somewhat, but does not remove long-run substitution risk from either coal type.

Competitive rivalryHigh

Intensity of competition among existing players.

CUAN competes on the seaborne thermal market against Australia, Russia, South Africa and domestic peers (PTBA, ADRO, BYAN, ITMG, INDY, HRUM, GEMS, AADI), and on the coking-coal market, a separate competitive set, following the MUTU acquisition.

Implication → Rivalry is on delivered cost through the price cycle for both product lines; CUAN's deteriorating balance sheet is a competitive disadvantage versus better-capitalised peers if the cycle turns down further.

Moat / Competitive Edge

CUAN has no pricing moat: both thermal and coking coal are benchmark-priced. Its distinguishing feature is the speed and scale of its acquisition-driven growth: revenue rose 43x in five years, chiefly via the USD 218 M MUTU acquisition (a real, long-dated PKP2B asset to 2039) plus mineral diversification. But that growth has come at the cost of balance-sheet quality that is deteriorating in real time: interest coverage fell below 1× in both 2024 (0.77×) and 2025 (0.44×), meaning operating earnings alone do not cover interest expense in the most recent year, and net debt grew nearly 100x from 2023 to 2025. This is not a moat story; it is a growth-via-leverage story whose sustainability depends entirely on whether MUTU's earnings power (and coal prices generally) can outrun the debt taken on to acquire it, and the two most recent years of data suggest they currently are not.

Key Drivers & Sensitivities

MUTU Integration & Earnings Ramp
The single largest driver of both the revenue growth and the leverage increase. Whether MUTU's coking-and-thermal-coal output can generate enough EBIT to lift group interest coverage back above 1×, let alone to a comfortable level, is the central question for CUAN's creditworthiness going forward.
Interest Coverage Below 1x
Coverage fell from 22.00x (2023) to 0.77x (2024) to 0.44x (2025): a two-year collapse, not a one-year blip, and the direction is still deteriorating. This is the most urgent number in CUAN's entire profile and should be monitored every subsequent period.
Net Debt & Leverage Escalation
Net debt grew from USD 13.8 M (2023) to USD 1,212.3 M (2025), and D/E from 0.62x to 2.31x over the same window: funding the MUTU acquisition and subsequent expansion. This pace of leverage build is not sustainable indefinitely without a corresponding rise in operating cash generation.
Accelerating FCF Burn
FCF was negative in 4 of 5 years and the burn roughly tripled in the most recent year alone (−USD 172.7 M in 2024 to −USD 537.0 M in 2025): the trend is accelerating, not stabilising, and is the clearest single number showing the growth strategy is not yet self-funding.

Linkages

CUAN competes on the same seaborne thermal market as PTBA, ADRO, BYAN, ITMG, INDY, HRUM, GEMS and AADI, and, via MUTU, enters the separate coking-coal/steelmaking market. Its acquisition of MUTU directly links it to INDY: the mine was bought from Indika Energy subsidiaries (PT Indika Indonesia Resources and Indika Capital Investments) for USD 218 M, with INDY using the proceeds to help retire its own debt; a real, disclosed transaction connecting two companies tracked in this project.

Recent Developments

Revenue rose more than twelvefold in two years, USD 97.9m in FY2023 to USD 801.7m and then USD 1,215.6m, and almost every quality measure moved the other way. Gross margin fell from 38.0% to 13.2%, operating margin from 21.4% to 2.9%, and ROIC is omitted in FY2024 and FY2025 because there was no positive operating return left to measure. The sharpest figure is interest coverage: 22.00× in FY2023, then 0.77× and 0.44×, meaning operating profit no longer covers the interest bill. Net income of USD 134.6m and ROE of 39.7% therefore do not come from the operating line, they come from below it. Debt to equity rose from 0.62× to 2.31× and free cash flow was minus USD 537.0m in FY2025.

Regulation

Standard coal-sector regulation across six concessions: IUP/PKP2B concession terms (MUTU's PKP2B rights run to 2039), RKAB annual production quotas (ESDM), the 25 % DMO obligation to PLN at a capped price, coal royalties, and AMDAL environmental/mine-rehabilitation obligations. The gold/silver and quartz sand concessions carry their own separate mineral-mining permitting.

ESG & Sustainability

Environmental: thermal and coking coal both carry the sector's high-carbon liability (Scope 3 combustion), plus mine rehabilitation obligations across six concessions. Social: employment across Central Kalimantan mining areas, expanding with the MUTU integration. Governance: the pace and structure of debt-funded acquisition growth is the single most material governance/credit consideration here; interest coverage falling below 1× in consecutive years is a real signal warranting close monitoring of subsequent disclosures and any refinancing activity.

Risks

Interest coverage below 1x in both 2024 (0.77x) and 2025 (0.44x), and still deteriorating -- operating earnings alone do not currently cover interest expense
Net debt grew nearly 100x from 2023 (USD 13.8M) to 2025 (USD 1,212.3M) -- an extremely rapid leverage build funding the MUTU acquisition and expansion
FCF burn accelerating sharply -- USD 172.7M outflow in 2024 to USD 537.0M in 2025, roughly tripling in one year
D/E rose from 0.62x to 2.31x in two years -- among the highest leverage of any mining-metals name tracked in this project
The 2024 divergence between net margin (20.1%) and operating margin (4.4%) suggests a material non-operating item that has not been independently confirmed here -- warrants scrutiny of the full financial statements

Outlook & What to Watch

Base: MUTU's output continues ramping, revenue stays elevated, but interest coverage remains thin (sub-1x to low-single-digit) until either coal prices strengthen or debt is paid down. Bull: a coking/thermal coal price recovery plus MUTU reaching full operating efficiency lifts EBIT enough to restore interest coverage comfortably above 1x, validating the acquisition. Bear: coal prices weaken further while debt service remains fixed -- interest coverage stays below 1x or falls further, forcing asset sales, equity raises, or refinancing at unfavourable terms. CUAN is best read as a high-growth, high-leverage story whose near-term creditworthiness is genuinely in question based on the two most recent years of data -- this is not a cyclical dip to be waited out passively, it is an active balance-sheet risk. (Interpretation, not a forecast.)

Key KPIs

Interest Coverage: 0.44x (2025), down from 0.77x (2024) and 22.00x (2023) -- the most urgent number in CUAN's profile
Net Debt Growth: USD 13.8M (2023) -> USD 1,212.3M (2025), ~100x -- funding the MUTU acquisition
FCF Burn Acceleration: -USD 172.7M (2024) -> -USD 537.0M (2025), roughly tripled
MUTU Integration: Acquired Feb 2024 for USD 218M -- the entire growth story in one transaction
D/E Trajectory: 0.62x (2023) -> 2.31x (2025) -- among the highest leverage tracked in this project

Sources

Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.