Equal · Financial Report

Elang Mahkota Teknologi

EMTK/FY2021–FY2025/Educational Analysis/IDR/Data source · 2026-07-09

ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Tax burdendriver	4.60x	27.26x	—	2.25x	9.04x
Interest burden	0.92x	0.72x	—	0.86x	0.84x
Operating margin	10.4%	2.8%	-0.3%	6.2%	4.7%
Asset turnover	0.34x	0.22x	0.22x	0.27x	0.31x
Leverage (equity mult.)	1.13x	1.11x	1.12x	1.16x	1.14x
= Return on Equity (consolidated)	16.8%	13.6%	—	3.7%	12.7%
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)	4.0%	0.7%	—	1.9%	1.7%

Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.

Liquidity

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities)	4.03x	5.27x	4.93x	3.08x	6.08x
Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities)	3.61x	4.53x	4.42x	2.74x	5.76x
Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities)	2.30x	2.78x	2.25x	1.53x	3.93x
Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities)	Rp 9.7 T	Rp 13 T	Rp 13 T	Rp 9.9 T	Rp 29 T

Leverage & Solvency

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity)	0.02x	0.03x	0.03x	0.03x	0.04x
Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity)	0.13x	0.11x	0.12x	0.16x	0.14x
Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets)	0.02x	0.03x	0.02x	0.03x	0.04x
Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash)	-Rp 6.6 T	-Rp 7.5 T	-Rp 6.2 T	-Rp 6.1 T	-Rp 20 T
Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense)	13.07x	3.55x	-0.40x	7.22x	6.37x
Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity)	1.13x	1.11x	1.12x	1.16x	1.14x

Profitability

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue)	28.7%	33.5%	30.9%	32.9%	26.1%
Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue)	10.4%	2.8%	-0.3%	6.2%	4.7%
Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue)	44.1%	55.2%	-1.5%	12.0%	35.5%
EBITDA(EBIT + D&A)	Rp 1.8 T	Rp 793 M	Rp 501 M	Rp 1.4 T	Rp 1.6 T
EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue)	14.4%	8.0%	5.4%	11.4%	8.6%
Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets)	14.8%	12.2%	-0.3%	3.2%	11.2%
Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners))	19.9%	15.2%	-0.4%	4.1%	17.9%
Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax)	4.60x	27.26x	—	2.25x	9.04x
Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT)	0.92x	0.72x	—	0.86x	0.84x
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)	4.0%	0.7%	—	1.9%	1.7%

Operations & Efficiency

Turnover	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets)	0.34x	0.22x	0.22x	0.27x	0.31x
Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory)	6.76x	2.82x	3.90x	5.16x	7.83x
Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables)	5.62x	3.71x	3.43x	4.34x	6.21x
Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables)	12.44x	8.55x	8.47x	8.29x	16.37x

Conversion Period	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS)	54.0 days	129.5 days	93.5 days	70.7 days	46.6 days
Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue)	64.9 days	98.5 days	106.4 days	84.1 days	58.8 days
Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS)	29.3 days	42.7 days	43.1 days	44.0 days	22.3 days
Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO)	89.6 days	185.3 days	156.9 days	110.8 days	83.1 days

Cash Flow

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex)	Rp 1.2 T	-Rp 1.3 T	Rp 250 M	Rp 875 M	Rp 1.3 T

Valuation

price as-of 2026-07-31fundamentals: FY2025

Price Rp 530 · market cap Rp 32 T

Multiple	EMTK	Peer median	vs median
P/E	4.78x	4.78x(3/4)	0%
P/B	0.86x	1.27x	-32%
P/S	1.70x	2.30x	-26%
EV/EBITDA	16.83x	156.66x(2/4)	-89%
EV/EBIT	31.09x	196.82x(2/4)	-84%
EV/Sales	1.45x	1.80x	-19%
FCF Yield	4.01%	1.27%	+215%
Dividend Yield	1.89%	1.89%(1/4)	0%

EV = mkt cap Rp 32 T + debt Rp 2.1 T − cash Rp 22 T + minority interest Rp 16 T = Rp 28 T

What the price implies

At today’s price, the market is paying for 15.8%/yr FCF growth (12.3% at 12.0% to 19.0% at 16.0% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: 2.7% FCF · 10.5% revenue.

Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 12.0–16.0% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.

Forward DCF (glass-box)

This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.

Assumption	Value	Basis
Rf (risk-free)	7.26%	Indonesia 10Y government bond, re-verified 31 Jul 2026
ERP (Rm − Rf)	6.69%	Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%)
β	1.55 → 1.63	Software (Internet) (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.07
Cost of equity	18.16%	Rf + β × ERP
Cost of debt	7.96%	median interest coverage 6.4x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a A1/A+ synthetic rating and a 0.70% default spread, over a 7.26% base (Indonesia 10Y 7.26%, already the sovereign rate). Its BOOK rate is 6.5%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms)
Tax rate	22.0%	statutory 22% (no clean effective-rate year in window)
WACC	17.42%	94% E × CoE + 6% D × Kd × (1 − t)
Revenue growth (yr 1, fading)	10.5%	delivered 4-yr revenue CAGR 10.5%, fading linearly to terminal
EBIT margin	3.5%	mean EBIT margin, last 3 FYs
D&A / revenue	5.0%	mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs
Capex / revenue	6.2%	mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 17.4% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 14.3% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 5.3% of revenue against depreciation of 5.0%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral
ΔNWC / Δrevenue	1.7%	median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP)
Terminal growth	2.5%	BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%)

Growth path

year 1 → fading to terminal over 5 yrs10.5%

EBIT margin3.5%

WACC17.4%

Terminal growth2.5%

Explicit years5

FCFF drivers

FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − capex − ΔNWC

Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.

Capex

% of revenue6.2%

D&A

% of revenue5.0%

ΔNWC

% of the CHANGE in revenue1.7%

Year	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	T∞
Growth	10.5%	8.5%	6.5%	4.5%	2.5%	2.5%
Revenue	Rp 21 T	Rp 23 T	Rp 24 T	Rp 25 T	Rp 26 T	Rp 27 T
EBIT	Rp 740 M	Rp 803 M	Rp 855 M	Rp 893 M	Rp 916 M	Rp 939 M
NOPAT	Rp 577 M	Rp 626 M	Rp 667 M	Rp 697 M	Rp 714 M	Rp 732 M
+ D&A	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 1.2 T	Rp 1.3 T	Rp 1.3 T	Rp 1.3 T
− Capex	Rp 1.3 T	Rp 1.4 T	Rp 1.5 T	Rp 1.6 T	Rp 1.6 T	Rp 1.4 T
− ΔNWC	Rp 34 M	Rp 31 M	Rp 26 M	Rp 19 M	Rp 11 M	Rp 11 M
FCFF	Rp 275 M	Rp 305 M	Rp 332 M	Rp 355 M	Rp 372 M	Rp 627 M
PV	Rp 234 M	Rp 221 M	Rp 205 M	Rp 187 M	Rp 167 M	Rp 1.9 T

Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding

EV = PV(explicit) Rp 1.0 T + PV(TV) Rp 1.9 T = Rp 2.9 T · TV 65% of EV · − net debt -Rp 20 T − minority Rp 16 T = equity Rp 7.6 T ÷ shares outstanding

Model output: Rp 125/share (-76% vs price Rp 530)· exit-multiple check (156.7x): Rp 2,636

Under these assumptions the model lands 76% below today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for faster growth, a fatter margin, or a lower discount rate than the inputs here assume.

Sensitivity (per share, Rp)

g \ WACC	16.4%	17.4%	18.4%
2.0%	127	123	120
2.5%	129	125	121
3.0%	130	126	122

Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.

Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.

Macro backdropfull backdrop + sensitivity map →

BI Rate 5.75%IDR/USD 18,05810Y government bond yield 7.26%Inflation 3.34%(as-of 2026-07-31)

BI rate ↑(H)GDP/consumption ↑(M)Rupiah weaker(M)

Income Statement

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Revenue	Rp 13 T	Rp 9.9 T	Rp 9.2 T	Rp 12 T	Rp 19 T
Cost of Goods Sold	Rp 9.1 T	Rp 6.6 T	Rp 6.4 T	Rp 8.2 T	Rp 14 T
Gross Profit	Rp 3.7 T	Rp 3.3 T	Rp 2.9 T	Rp 4.0 T	Rp 5.0 T
Operating Income (EBIT)	Rp 1.3 T	Rp 278 M	-Rp 32 M	Rp 759 M	Rp 891 M
Interest Expense	Rp 102 M	Rp 78 M	Rp 80 M	Rp 105 M	Rp 140 M
Net Income	Rp 5.7 T	Rp 5.4 T	-Rp 141 M	Rp 1.5 T	Rp 6.8 T
Net Income Attributable to Owners	Rp 5.7 T	Rp 5.4 T	-Rp 141 M	Rp 1.5 T	Rp 6.8 T
Depreciation & Amortization	Rp 513 M	Rp 515 M	Rp 533 M	Rp 638 M	Rp 755 M

Balance Sheet

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Cash & Equivalents	Rp 7.4 T	Rp 8.7 T	Rp 7.2 T	Rp 7.3 T	Rp 22 T
Accounts Receivable	Rp 2.3 T	Rp 2.7 T	Rp 2.7 T	Rp 2.8 T	Rp 3.1 T
Inventory	Rp 1.4 T	Rp 2.3 T	Rp 1.6 T	Rp 1.6 T	Rp 1.8 T
Current Assets	Rp 13 T	Rp 17 T	Rp 16 T	Rp 15 T	Rp 35 T
Total Assets	Rp 38 T	Rp 44 T	Rp 43 T	Rp 46 T	Rp 61 T
Accounts Payable	Rp 735 M	Rp 766 M	Rp 754 M	Rp 991 M	Rp 863 M
Current Liabilities	Rp 3.2 T	Rp 3.1 T	Rp 3.2 T	Rp 4.8 T	Rp 5.7 T
Total Liabilities	Rp 4.5 T	Rp 4.6 T	Rp 4.5 T	Rp 6.4 T	Rp 7.4 T
Total Interest-Bearing Debt	Rp 787 M	Rp 1.2 T	Rp 1.0 T	Rp 1.3 T	Rp 2.1 T
Total Equity	Rp 34 T	Rp 40 T	Rp 38 T	Rp 40 T	Rp 53 T
Equity Attributable to Owners	Rp 28 T	Rp 36 T	Rp 35 T	Rp 35 T	Rp 38 T

Cash Flow Statement

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Operating Cash Flow	Rp 1.6 T	-Rp 811 M	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 1.5 T	Rp 2.1 T
Capital Expenditure	Rp 437 M	Rp 518 M	Rp 888 M	Rp 578 M	Rp 842 M

Company Deep Analysis

Reviewed: 2026-07-31

Analyst Verdict

EMTK gross margin: 28.7% (2021) → 33.5% → 30.9% → 32.9% → 26.1% (2025); a relatively stable 26-34% range, more mature and less volatile than BUKA's steep decline. OPM: 10.4% (2021) → 2.8% → −0.35% (2023, the loss year) → 6.2% → 4.66%. NM diverges sharply from OPM in most years, 44.1% vs 10.4% (2021), 55.2% vs 2.8% (2022), 35.5% vs 4.66% (2025), a large, recurring gap consistent with EMTK's holding-company structure, where investment/equity-method income from its stakes (including BUKA) materially affects the bottom line most years, not just occasionally. ROE: 19.9% → 15.2% → −0.41% (2023 loss) → 4.14% → 17.9% (2025). ROIC is far thinner than the margin line implies (3.95% → 0.70% → n/a in the 2023 loss year → 1.92% → 1.67%). Leverage stayed very low throughout, D/E never exceeded 0.04×, with a large net cash position every year (net debt negative Rp 6.1-20.3 trillion). Interest coverage swung with profitability: 13.07× (2021) → 3.55× → −0.40× (2023 loss) → 7.22× → 6.37×. Current ratio stayed healthy throughout (3.08-6.08×), never a liquidity concern. FCF: +Rp 1,170.2 B (2021) → −Rp 1,329.2 B (2022) → +Rp 250.1 B → +Rp 875.1 B → +Rp 1,301.6 B (2025); positive in 4 of 5 years. Revenue (Rp): 12,840.7 B → 9,856.1 B → 9,241.4 B → 12,233.5 B → 19,119.7 B (+56.3% in FY2025, matching independently-reported growth almost exactly). The pattern most worth noting: EMTK's 2023 loss year and 2025 profit surge both coincide with BUKA's own worst (2023, −Rp 1.37 T) and best (2025, +Rp 3.14 T) years; a plausible, disclosed linkage given the majority-ownership stake, though the exact consolidation/equity-method mechanism has not been independently confirmed here.

Business Model

EMTK (Elang Mahkota Teknologi), operating as Emtek Group, is a diversified conglomerate spanning media (five free-to-air TV stations, SCTV, Indosiar, Mentari TV, Ajwa TV, Moji, via subsidiary SCMA), health (private hospitals), aviation support services (ground handling, cargo handling, aircraft dispatch, maintenance, catering, flight training) and a real, fast-growing digital-products-and-services segment (~29% of FY2025 revenue). Its most direct connection to the technology-digital industry is capital allocation, not operations: EMTK holds a majority stake in BUKA (~55% combined, direct plus via PT Kreatif Media Karya, as of February 2026), making the two companies' financial results genuinely, structurally linked.

Segments

FY2025 revenue of Rp 19.1 T splits across media (Rp 6.9 T, via SCMA's SCTV/Indosiar/Mentari TV/Ajwa TV/Moji network), digital products and services (Rp 5.6 T, the fastest-growing segment) and health/aviation-support/other businesses (the remainder). Digital is real and growing but still a minority of consolidated revenue: EMTK is not becoming a pure digital company on this data, it is a diversified conglomerate whose digital arm is growing faster than its legacy media/health/aviation businesses.

Value Chain & Positioning

Four largely separate value chains run in parallel: broadcast content production/licensing → advertising and subscription revenue (media); hospital operations → patient care revenue (health); ground/cargo/catering services → airline-contract revenue (aviation support); and digital-products development/investment, including the BUKA stake, monitored and capital-allocated rather than operated day-to-day.

Competitive Forces (Porter’s 5)

Supplier powerLow

How much leverage input/funding providers have over pricing.

EMTK's media segment sources content internally (own production) and from licensing deals with standard industry terms; its health and aviation-support segments source medical/aviation supplies and equipment from established, competitive vendor markets.

Implication → No single supplier relationship materially constrains EMTK's diversified operating segments: cost pressure, where it exists, comes from segment-specific competitive dynamics, not supplier leverage.

Buyer powerMedium

How much leverage customers have to push prices down.

Media advertisers can shift budgets across broadcasters and increasingly toward digital channels; hospital patients have limited real-time price sensitivity in acute care but more choice for elective services; aviation-support clients (airlines) are large, sophisticated negotiators on service contracts.

Implication → Buyer power varies by segment and is manageable overall: no single buyer relationship explains EMTK's real earnings volatility, which is more attributable to its investment portfolio (including BUKA) than to its operating segments' pricing power.

Threat of new entryLow

How easily new competitors can enter the market.

Free-to-air broadcasting requires scarce spectrum licenses; hospital operation requires significant capital and regulatory approval; aviation ground-handling requires airport concessions and certifications: all three operating segments have real, structural entry barriers.

Implication → EMTK's legacy segments are individually well-protected, but this protection does not extend to its digital-investment arm, where competition for the underlying assets (like BUKA) is a function of capital markets, not licensing barriers.

Threat of substitutesMedium

Risk that alternative products/services replace demand.

Free-to-air television faces substitution from streaming and digital media (a real, structural pressure on the media segment specifically); hospital and aviation-support services face limited substitution given their essential, licensed nature.

Implication → Substitution risk is concentrated in EMTK's media segment: the digital-products segment's faster growth (~29% of revenue and rising) is partly a rational response to exactly this pressure.

Competitive rivalryMedium

Intensity of competition among existing players.

EMTK's media segment competes with other Indonesian free-to-air broadcasters (including MNCN, not tracked in this project); health and aviation-support segments compete in their respective, more fragmented local markets.

Implication → No single rival threatens EMTK's diversified structure as a whole: the more relevant risk to monitor is capital allocation across its portfolio (including BUKA) rather than head-to-head competitive rivalry in any one segment.

Moat / Competitive Edge

EMTK's moat is diversification and licensing: five FTA broadcast licenses (via SCMA), established hospital and aviation-support operations, plus a real, growing digital-products segment and a majority stake in BUKA. Its consolidated results, though, are genuinely volatile: a real loss in 2023 (−0.35% OPM, −1.52% NM) and a large NM-OPM gap in most other years (44.1% vs 10.4% in 2021; 55.2% vs 2.8% in 2022; 35.5% vs 4.66% in 2025) point to investment/equity-method income, plausibly including its BUKA stake, materially driving the bottom line most years, not just the operating segments. This makes EMTK harder to read as a simple operating company than DCII or GOTO: its results depend meaningfully on portfolio and capital-allocation decisions, not just its consolidated operating segments.

Key Drivers & Sensitivities

Digital Segment Outgrowing Legacy Businesses
Digital products and services reached Rp 5.6 T in FY2025 (~29% of revenue) and is EMTK's fastest-growing segment: if this growth rate continues to outpace media/health/aviation, EMTK's revenue mix shifts meaningfully toward digital over the coming years, strengthening (not yet confirming) its case for inclusion in a technology-digital industry.
BUKA Stake Performance
EMTK's 2023 net loss (−Rp 140.8 B) and 2025 net income surge (+Rp 6.8 T, +361.8% YoY) both coincide with BUKA's own worst (2023) and best (2025) years: a plausible, disclosed linkage given the ~55% combined ownership stake; EMTK's own results are structurally exposed to BUKA's swings, whatever the precise accounting treatment.
Media Segment Structural Pressure
Free-to-air television faces ongoing substitution from streaming and digital media: SCMA's SCTV/Indosiar/Mentari TV/Ajwa TV/Moji network generated Rp 6.9 T in FY2025, still EMTK's largest single segment, but under the same secular pressure affecting broadcasters globally.
Large NM-OPM Divergence (Investment Income)
Net margin exceeded operating margin by 30-50+ percentage points in most years tracked (2021, 2022, 2025): a recurring pattern, not a one-off, meaning EMTK's reported profitability is materially shaped by non-operating/investment income (plausibly including equity-method income from BUKA and other stakes) in most years, which is worth understanding before reading any single year's net income as a pure operating signal.

Linkages

EMTK is BUKA's majority owner (~55% combined stake, direct plus via PT Kreatif Media Karya, as of February 2026): the single most important linkage in this entire industry, connecting two of the four companies tracked here through real, disclosed ownership rather than mere market competition. EMTK's media segment (via SCMA) also links it to Indonesia's broader media/broadcasting sector, adjacent to but distinct from the technology-digital industry it is tracked in here. It has no ownership links to GOTO or DCII.

Recent Developments

EMTK shows the same disconnect as BUKA. Net margin was 35.5% in FY2025 on an operating margin of 4.7%, and ROIC of 1.7% sits far below ROE of 17.9%, so the reported return is not being generated by operations. Revenue did grow strongly, 56.3% to Rp19,119.7bn, and net income rose 361.8% to Rp6,789.3bn. Read the operating line by itself and the picture is much flatter: operating margin has run 10.4%, 2.8%, minus 0.3%, 6.2% and 4.7%, and ROIC has not exceeded 4.0% in any year of the window. The balance sheet is unusually clean for a group this complex, with debt to equity at 0.04× and a current ratio of 6.08×.

Regulation

EMTK's media segment (via SCMA) operates under Kementerian Komunikasi/broadcasting-license regulation, including free-to-air spectrum licensing terms distinct from the rest of the technology-digital industry. Its health segment falls under Kementerian Kesehatan hospital-licensing requirements; aviation-support services fall under Kementerian Perhubungan/airport-authority regulation. Its digital-products segment and BUKA stake are subject to the same Kominfo PSE registration regime (GR 71/2019) and 2022 Personal Data Protection Law (UU PDP) as the rest of this industry.

ESG & Sustainability

Governance is the most material ESG dimension for EMTK: the ~55% combined ownership stake in BUKA is a real, disclosed related-party structure that materially affects both companies' reported results in ways investors should understand explicitly (2023's coincident losses, 2025's coincident profit surge) rather than read each company in isolation. Social: EMTK's hospital operations contribute directly to healthcare access; its media segment carries the standard broadcast-content responsibilities of a major FTA network. Environmental: aviation-support services (ground handling, cargo) carry a real, sector-standard emissions footprint distinct from EMTK's media and digital segments.

Risks

Net margin exceeded operating margin by 30-50+ percentage points in most years tracked -- EMTK's reported profitability is materially shaped by non-operating/investment income in most years, not just its operating segments, making single-year net income a less reliable signal than for a typical operating company
2023's real net loss (-Rp140.8B) coincided with BUKA's own loss year -- the related-party linkage cuts both ways, and BUKA's future performance remains a real, disclosed risk factor for EMTK's own consolidated results
Digital products and services is real and growing but still only ~29% of consolidated revenue -- EMTK's overall results remain meaningfully exposed to its media, health and aviation-support segments, which are unrelated to the digital-economy growth story
Free-to-air media (SCMA, ~36% of FY2025 revenue) faces ongoing structural substitution pressure from streaming and digital media
The precise accounting mechanism linking EMTK's and BUKA's coincident loss/profit years (full consolidation vs equity method) has not been independently confirmed here -- the pattern is real and disclosed, but the mechanism should be verified before being cited as fact elsewhere

Outlook & What to Watch

Base: the digital-products segment continues growing faster than media/health/aviation, gradually increasing its share of consolidated revenue; BUKA's own post-pivot performance continues to materially affect EMTK's reported results in either direction. Bull: BUKA's 2025 turnaround proves durable, digital's revenue share keeps climbing, and EMTK re-rates toward a more digital-economy-aligned valuation. Bear: BUKA's operating losses (still present at −41.7% operating margin in FY2025 despite its net profit) resume weighing on EMTK's consolidated results, and media's structural decline outpaces digital's growth. EMTK is best read as a diversified conglomerate whose results are genuinely, materially linked to BUKA's fortunes: understanding one requires understanding the other, and neither should be read in isolation. (Interpretation, not a forecast.)

Key KPIs

Digital Segment Revenue Share: ~29% of FY2025 revenue (Rp5.6T of Rp19.1T) -- the number that determines whether EMTK becomes a real digital company or stays a diversified conglomerate with a digital stake
NM-OPM Gap: 35-50+ points in most years -- signals material non-operating/investment income shaping reported profitability
BUKA Stake: ~55.4% combined (Feb 2026) -- the single most important cross-company linkage in this industry
Media Segment Revenue: Rp6.9T (FY2025, via SCMA) -- still EMTK's largest single segment despite digital's faster growth
Coincident Loss/Profit Years with BUKA: 2023 (both loss), 2025 (both profit) -- a real, disclosed pattern worth monitoring going forward

Sources

Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.