Equal · Financial Report

Erajaya Swasembada

ERAA/FY2021–FY2025/Educational Analysis/IDR/Data source · 2026-06-20

ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Tax burden	0.70x	0.68x	0.66x	0.70x	0.74x
Interest burden	0.89x	0.85x	0.68x	0.70x	0.73x
Operating margin	3.8%	3.6%	3.0%	3.2%	2.9%
Asset turnover	3.82x	2.90x	2.94x	3.00x	2.65x
Leverage (equity mult.)driver	1.76x	2.37x	2.51x	2.40x	2.84x
= Return on Equity (consolidated)	15.7%	14.1%	10.2%	11.4%	11.8%
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)	14.1%	10.9%	9.3%	10.6%	9.4%

Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.

Liquidity

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities)	1.55x	1.24x	1.26x	1.22x	1.16x
Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities)	0.47x	0.50x	0.45x	0.54x	0.46x
Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities)	0.12x	0.12x	0.17x	0.16x	0.12x
Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities)	Rp 2.3 T	Rp 2.2 T	Rp 2.6 T	Rp 2.4 T	Rp 2.7 T

Leverage & Solvency

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity)	0.34x	0.67x	0.81x	0.72x	0.92x
Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity)	0.76x	1.37x	1.51x	1.40x	1.84x
Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets)	0.19x	0.28x	0.32x	0.30x	0.33x
Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash)	Rp 1.6 T	Rp 3.8 T	Rp 4.8 T	Rp 4.7 T	Rp 7.3 T
Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense)	8.86x	6.46x	3.17x	3.39x	3.67x
Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity)	1.76x	2.37x	2.51x	2.40x	2.84x

Profitability

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue)	11.0%	10.8%	10.6%	11.1%	10.8%
Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue)	3.8%	3.6%	3.0%	3.2%	2.9%
Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue)	2.3%	2.0%	1.4%	1.6%	1.6%
EBITDA(EBIT + D&A)	Rp 1.8 T	Rp 2.0 T	Rp 2.1 T	Rp 2.6 T	Rp 2.8 T
EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue)	4.2%	4.0%	3.6%	3.9%	3.7%
Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets)	8.9%	5.9%	4.0%	4.7%	4.1%
Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners))	16.5%	15.0%	11.3%	12.7%	13.1%
Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax)	0.70x	0.68x	0.66x	0.70x	0.74x
Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT)	0.89x	0.85x	0.68x	0.70x	0.73x
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)	14.1%	10.9%	9.3%	10.6%	9.4%

Operations & Efficiency

Turnover	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets)	3.82x	2.90x	2.94x	3.00x	2.65x
Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory)	8.37x	6.58x	6.48x	7.85x	5.67x
Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables)	70.52x	46.90x	44.06x	56.45x	50.66x
Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables)	25.56x	18.39x	14.64x	15.00x	11.45x

Conversion Period	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS)	43.6 days	55.5 days	56.4 days	46.5 days	64.4 days
Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue)	5.2 days	7.8 days	8.3 days	6.5 days	7.2 days
Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS)	14.3 days	19.8 days	24.9 days	24.3 days	31.9 days
Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO)	34.5 days	43.4 days	39.7 days	28.7 days	39.8 days

Cash Flow

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex)	-Rp 291 M	-Rp 188 M	-Rp 167 M	Rp 1.5 T	-Rp 571 M

Valuation

price as-of 2026-07-31fundamentals: FY2025

Price Rp 420 · market cap Rp 6.6 T

Multiple	ERAA	Peer median	vs median
P/E	5.49x	11.17x	-51%
P/B	0.72x	1.97x	-63%
P/S	0.09x	0.53x	-84%
EV/EBITDA	5.29x	6.25x	-15%
EV/EBIT	6.66x	7.91x	-16%
EV/Sales	0.19x	0.52x	-63%
FCF Yield	-8.69%	10.69%	-181%
Dividend Yield	5.95%	3.37%	+76%

EV = mkt cap Rp 6.6 T + debt Rp 9.4 T − cash Rp 2.1 T + minority interest Rp 1.0 T = Rp 15 T

What the price implies

not computable: negative or zero base-year FCF. Shown as-is rather than estimated.

Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 12.0–16.0% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.

Forward DCF (glass-box)

This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.

Assumption	Value	Basis
Rf (risk-free)	7.26%	Indonesia 10Y government bond, re-verified 31 Jul 2026
ERP (Rm − Rf)	6.69%	Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%)
β	0.95 → 1.90	Retail (Special Lines) (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 1.43
Cost of equity	19.97%	Rf + β × ERP
Cost of debt	8.15%	median interest coverage 3.7x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a A3/A- synthetic rating and a 0.89% default spread, over a 7.26% base (Indonesia 10Y 7.26%, already the sovereign rate). Its BOOK rate is 6.5%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms)
Tax rate	30.2%	median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest)
WACC	11.56%	41% E × CoE + 59% D × Kd × (1 − t)
Revenue growth (yr 1, fading)	15.2%	delivered 4-yr revenue CAGR 15.2%, fading linearly to terminal
EBIT margin	3.1%	mean EBIT margin, last 3 FYs
D&A / revenue	0.7%	mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs
Capex / revenue	1.3%	mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 11.6% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 21.6% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 0.7% of revenue against depreciation of 0.7%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral
ΔNWC / Δrevenue	15.8%	median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP)
Terminal growth	2.5%	BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%)

Growth path

year 1 → fading to terminal over 5 yrs15.2%

EBIT margin3.1%

WACC11.6%

Terminal growth2.5%

Explicit years5

FCFF drivers

FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − capex − ΔNWC

Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.

Capex

% of revenue1.3%

D&A

% of revenue0.7%

ΔNWC

% of the CHANGE in revenue15.8%

Year	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	T∞
Growth	15.2%	12.0%	8.9%	5.7%	2.5%	2.5%
Revenue	Rp 88 T	Rp 99 T	Rp 108 T	Rp 114 T	Rp 117 T	Rp 120 T
EBIT	Rp 2.7 T	Rp 3.0 T	Rp 3.3 T	Rp 3.5 T	Rp 3.6 T	Rp 3.7 T
NOPAT	Rp 1.9 T	Rp 2.1 T	Rp 2.3 T	Rp 2.4 T	Rp 2.5 T	Rp 2.6 T
+ D&A	Rp 585 M	Rp 655 M	Rp 713 M	Rp 754 M	Rp 773 M	Rp 792 M
− Capex	Rp 1.2 T	Rp 1.3 T	Rp 1.4 T	Rp 1.5 T	Rp 1.5 T	Rp 882 M
− ΔNWC	Rp 1.8 T	Rp 1.7 T	Rp 1.4 T	Rp 968 M	Rp 450 M	Rp 461 M
FCFF	-Rp 543 M	-Rp 223 M	Rp 201 M	Rp 710 M	Rp 1.3 T	Rp 2.0 T
PV	-Rp 487 M	-Rp 179 M	Rp 145 M	Rp 458 M	Rp 735 M	Rp 13 T

Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding

EV = PV(explicit) Rp 671 M + PV(TV) Rp 13 T = Rp 13 T · TV 95% of EV · − net debt Rp 7.3 T − minority Rp 1.0 T = equity Rp 5.1 T ÷ shares outstanding

Model output: Rp 328/share (-22% vs price Rp 420)· exit-multiple check (6.3x): Rp 515

Under these assumptions the model lands 22% below today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for faster growth, a fatter margin, or a lower discount rate than the inputs here assume.

Sensitivity (per share, Rp)

g \ WACC	10.6%	11.6%	12.6%
2.0%	452	315	205
2.5%	475	328	212
3.0%	501	344	221

Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.

Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.

Macro backdropfull backdrop + sensitivity map →

BI Rate 5.75%IDR/USD 18,05810Y government bond yield 7.26%Inflation 3.34%(as-of 2026-07-31)

GDP/consumption ↑(H)Rupiah weaker(M)BI rate ↑(L)

Income Statement

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Revenue	Rp 43 T	Rp 49 T	Rp 60 T	Rp 65 T	Rp 77 T
Cost of Goods Sold	Rp 39 T	Rp 44 T	Rp 54 T	Rp 58 T	Rp 68 T
Gross Profit	Rp 4.8 T	Rp 5.3 T	Rp 6.4 T	Rp 7.2 T	Rp 8.3 T
Operating Income (EBIT)	Rp 1.6 T	Rp 1.8 T	Rp 1.8 T	Rp 2.1 T	Rp 2.2 T
Interest Expense	Rp 184 M	Rp 273 M	Rp 577 M	Rp 619 M	Rp 608 M
Net Income	Rp 1.0 T	Rp 1.0 T	Rp 826 M	Rp 1.0 T	Rp 1.2 T
Net Income Attributable to Owners	Rp 1.0 T	Rp 1.0 T	Rp 826 M	Rp 1.0 T	Rp 1.2 T
Depreciation & Amortization	Rp 199 M	Rp 192 M	Rp 318 M	Rp 460 M	Rp 578 M

Balance Sheet

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Cash & Equivalents	Rp 521 M	Rp 1.0 T	Rp 1.8 T	Rp 1.8 T	Rp 2.1 T
Accounts Receivable	Rp 616 M	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 1.4 T	Rp 1.2 T	Rp 1.5 T
Inventory	Rp 4.6 T	Rp 6.7 T	Rp 8.3 T	Rp 7.4 T	Rp 12 T
Current Assets	Rp 6.6 T	Rp 11 T	Rp 13 T	Rp 13 T	Rp 20 T
Total Assets	Rp 11 T	Rp 17 T	Rp 20 T	Rp 22 T	Rp 29 T
Accounts Payable	Rp 1.5 T	Rp 2.4 T	Rp 3.7 T	Rp 3.9 T	Rp 6.0 T
Current Liabilities	Rp 4.3 T	Rp 9.0 T	Rp 10 T	Rp 11 T	Rp 17 T
Total Liabilities	Rp 4.9 T	Rp 9.9 T	Rp 12 T	Rp 13 T	Rp 19 T
Total Interest-Bearing Debt	Rp 2.2 T	Rp 4.8 T	Rp 6.6 T	Rp 6.5 T	Rp 9.4 T
Total Equity	Rp 6.5 T	Rp 7.2 T	Rp 8.1 T	Rp 9.1 T	Rp 10 T
Equity Attributable to Owners	Rp 6.1 T	Rp 6.7 T	Rp 7.3 T	Rp 8.1 T	Rp 9.1 T

Cash Flow Statement

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Operating Cash Flow	Rp 18 M	Rp 427 M	Rp 882 M	Rp 2.2 T	Rp 225 M
Capital Expenditure	Rp 309 M	Rp 615 M	Rp 1.0 T	Rp 773 M	Rp 796 M

Company Deep Analysis

Reviewed: 2026-07-31

Analyst Verdict

ERAA is a high-volume, low-margin distribution model: Indonesia's largest smartphone and consumer-electronics retailer, running Erafone, iBox (the authorised Apple reseller), and Samsung flagship stores. Gross margin is structurally thin at ~11% (2021–2025), because device retailing is fundamentally a volume business. High asset turnover (2.7–3.8×) compensates for those thin margins and lifts ROE to 11–17%. The worry is that ROIC is falling (14.1%→9.4%) while D/E is rising (0.34→0.92), which points to more capital intensity without a matching improvement in returns. FCF is mostly negative, since device inventory ties up heavy working capital; only 2024 threw off meaningful positive FCF (+IDR 1.47 T). The iBox Apple exclusivity and Samsung flagship partnerships are the near-term moats, but structural margin compression in device retailing is a long-term headwind.

Business Model

ERAA operates through two main channels: (1) Erafone; a nationwide chain of multi-brand consumer-electronics retail stores across malls and high streets; (2) iBox; Apple's authorised premium reseller in Indonesia (exclusive); and (3) Samsung Experience Stores and other brand partnerships. Revenue is driven by device unit sales (smartphones dominate) supplemented by accessories and insurance products. The model depends on high inventory turnover (5.7–8.4×) to generate returns from thin device margins. Distribution contracts with Apple, Samsung, Oppo, Vivo, and others are the critical commercial anchors.

Segments

Smartphones & tablets (est. ~70% of revenue), accessories & peripherals (~15%), services (insurance, activation, repair ~10%), and other electronics (~5%). Apple-branded products via iBox command higher unit ASP and likely higher margin relative to mass-market Android.

Value Chain & Positioning

Brand partnerships & distribution agreements → device import / local procurement → central warehousing → store replenishment → in-store retail (demo, insurance, financing) → after-sales service. Working-capital intensity is high: inventory turnover 5.7–8.4× is fast but absolute stock levels are large given device ASP.

Competitive Forces (Porter’s 5)

Supplier powerHigh

How much leverage input/funding providers have over pricing.

Apple, Samsung, and major Android OEMs hold substantial power over ERAA: they set device allocation, retail pricing, and margin terms. The iBox exclusivity with Apple is a double-edged arrangement: it provides differentiation but also concentrates dependency on a single brand owner's commercial decisions.

Implication → High supplier power structurally constrains ERAA's gross margin ceiling (~11%) and leaves the business exposed to changes in Apple/Samsung distribution policy or pricing in Indonesia.

Buyer powerMedium

How much leverage customers have to push prices down.

Individual consumers have moderate power via price comparison on e-commerce (Tokopedia, Shopee, Lazada) and competing retail stores. However, for Apple products requiring iBox authorisation (service, warranty) and for in-store financing options, ERAA retains a service moat.

Implication → Consumer price sensitivity limits margin uplift on mass-market Android models; iBox partially insulates Apple volumes through authorised-service stickiness.

Threat of new entryMedium

How easily new competitors can enter the market.

E-commerce platforms are effectively a permanent threat and are already significant competitors (official brand stores on Tokopedia/Shopee). Physical retail expansion requires scale, brand agreements, and capital: barriers that deter smaller entrants but do not block major platforms.

Implication → The primary new-entrant risk is not traditional physical retail competitors but deepening brand-direct e-commerce, which could bypass ERAA's store network entirely.

Threat of substitutesLow

Risk that alternative products/services replace demand.

Consumer electronics (smartphones) are not substitutable in any meaningful sense: demand is driven by device replacement cycles and upgrade demand. E-commerce is a channel substitute (different retailer, same product) rather than a product substitute.

Implication → Low product-level substitution ensures category demand; ERAA's risk is channel substitution (store → online), not category erosion.

Competitive rivalryHigh

Intensity of competition among existing players.

ERAA competes with iStyle (another Apple reseller), Samsung-owned stores, brand e-commerce flagships, and hundreds of independent phone retailers. E-commerce rivalry is intense: official brand stores on Tokopedia/Shopee compete head-to-head on device pricing.

Implication → Intense rivalry is the primary driver of the structurally thin 11% gross margin; ERAA's only sustainable differentiation is authorised Apple service (iBox) and consumer credit/financing integration.

Moat / Competitive Edge

Primary moat: iBox; Apple's exclusive authorised reseller status in Indonesia, providing access to full Apple ecosystem sales, AppleCare, and authorised repair that grey-market or e-commerce competitors cannot legally replicate. Secondary moat: scale (largest nationwide physical retail network for consumer electronics) enables better device allocation, lower unit logistics cost, and bundled financing partnerships with banks. Both moats are narrow and contingent on maintaining commercial relationships.

Key Drivers & Sensitivities

Smartphone Replacement Cycle & ASP Mix
Revenue and margins co-move with the Indonesian smartphone replacement cycle (typically 2–3 years) and the mix shift between premium (Apple/Samsung flagship) and mass-market Android. A favourable mix shift toward premium devices lifts the thin ~11% gross margin, while mass-market dominance compresses it further. Asset turnover of 2.65–3.82× reflects the volume sensitivity of this model.
Rising D/E and Working-Capital Funding Cost
D/E has climbed from 0.34 (2021) to 0.92 (2025), reflecting increasing reliance on debt to fund device inventory. With ROIC declining (14.1% → 9.4%), the spread over cost of debt is narrowing. Interest coverage of 3.4–3.7× (2024–2025) is adequate but materially below the 8.9× in 2021, leaving less buffer if revenues compress or interest rates remain elevated.
Apple iBox Exclusivity & Brand Partnerships
The iBox Apple exclusive reseller arrangement is ERAA's single strongest profitability lever. Apple products carry higher ASP and likely higher per-unit margin than mass-market Android. Any positive development in the Apple–ERAA commercial relationship (new product allocations, expanded store count) would meaningfully lift blended margins and ROIC from the current ~9.4% trough.

Linkages

ERAA is highly correlated with the Indonesian consumer credit and smartphone upgrade cycle. BI rate changes affect consumer financing rates for device purchases. IDR depreciation directly raises import cost for devices (USD-priced). Apple product launches globally drive Indonesia replacement-cycle timing. The semiconductor and global supply-chain cycle indirectly affects device availability and pricing.

Recent Developments

The FY2024 cash reversal did not hold, and that is the correction this page needed. Free cash flow was negative in FY2021, FY2022 and FY2023, turned positive at Rp1.47tn in FY2024, then went negative again at minus Rp0.57tn in FY2025. Net debt has risen in every year but one, Rp1.65tn to Rp7.27tn, and debt to equity ended at 0.92×, the highest of the series. The business runs on volume rather than margin: gross margin sits near 10.8% and net margin between 1.4% and 2.3%, so the return depends on turning assets 2.65 to 3.82 times a year. ROIC of 9.4% sits below most estimates of its cost of capital, and the trend is down from 14.1%.

Regulation

Consumer-electronics import regulation: Kemenperin IMEI registration requirement (mandatory since 2020) effectively blocks grey-market imports, benefiting authorised resellers like ERAA. Standard retail regulation (BPKM, consumer-protection law UUPK). Apple authorised reseller status is governed by Apple Inc. commercial contracts, not Indonesian law.

ESG & Sustainability

E-waste from device retailing is the primary ESG concern; ERAA participates in manufacturer take-back programmes but the sector's end-of-life device management is nascent in Indonesia. Governance: publicly listed, Santini family-controlled; board independence needs strengthening given rising leverage. Social: large direct employment across store network.

Risks

Rising D/E (0.92 in 2025) narrows interest coverage; revenue compression or rate hikes could stress the balance sheet.
ROIC below cost of capital (9.4% in 2025) signals value erosion unless the device mix shifts toward premium.
Apple or Samsung renegotiating or terminating distribution agreements would remove ERAA's primary moats.
Deepening brand-direct e-commerce (Apple Store online, Samsung.com) bypasses the physical store network.
IDR depreciation raises USD-denominated device import costs and compresses already-thin margins.

Outlook & What to Watch

ERAA's near-term outlook is mixed: the iBox Apple exclusivity and scale advantages sustain the model, but structural headwinds, declining ROIC (9.4%), rising D/E (0.92), persistent negative FCF, indicate the current capital allocation is not creating shareholder value at cost of capital. A re-rating would require either a mix shift to premium (Apple growth) or working-capital efficiency improvement. The IMEI registration policy provides a defensive moat against grey imports that supports authorised channels.

Key KPIs

GM: Gross Margin
AT: Asset Turnover
ROIC: Return on Invested Capital
D/E: Debt-to-Equity Ratio
FCF: Free Cash Flow
InvTurn: Inventory Turnover

Sources

Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.