Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | 1.06x | 0.94x | 0.85x | 0.72x | — |
| Interest burden | 0.34x | 0.30x | 0.34x | 0.45x | — |
| Operating margindriver | 13.3% | 13.4% | 13.5% | 16.2% | -0.5% |
| Asset turnover | 0.37x | 0.33x | 0.37x | 0.40x | 0.37x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 3.62x | 3.39x | 3.31x | 3.29x | 3.84x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 6.4% | 4.3% | 4.7% | 6.9% | — |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 6.7% | 5.7% | 5.2% | 5.7% | — |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 0.37x | 0.39x | 0.36x | 0.40x | 0.47x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 0.36x | 0.38x | 0.34x | 0.39x | 0.47x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 0.13x | 0.20x | 0.05x | 0.07x | 0.08x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | -Rp 13 T | -Rp 16 T | -Rp 13 T | -Rp 13 T | -Rp 17 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 1.77x | 1.71x | 1.73x | 1.76x | 2.09x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 2.62x | 2.39x | 2.31x | 2.29x | 2.84x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.49x | 0.50x | 0.52x | 0.53x | 0.54x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | Rp 33 T | Rp 39 T | Rp 45 T | Rp 45 T | Rp 60 T |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 1.52x | 1.43x | 1.51x | 1.82x | -0.06x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 3.62x | 3.39x | 3.31x | 3.29x | 3.84x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 65.5% | 62.6% | 64.5% | 64.4% | 54.9% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 13.3% | 13.4% | 13.5% | 16.2% | -0.5% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 4.8% | 3.8% | 3.9% | 5.3% | -10.4% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | Rp 9.2 T | Rp 9.6 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 11 T |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 34.5% | 33.0% | 33.8% | 36.6% | 25.8% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 1.8% | 1.3% | 1.4% | 2.1% | -3.8% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 6.4% | 4.3% | 4.8% | 7.0% | -14.8% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 1.06x | 0.94x | 0.85x | 0.72x | — |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 0.34x | 0.30x | 0.34x | 0.45x | — |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 6.7% | 5.7% | 5.2% | 5.7% | — |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.37x | 0.33x | 0.37x | 0.40x | 0.37x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 58.92x | 26.72x | 30.33x | 63.34x | 100.96x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 45.52x | 36.87x | 22.49x | 17.95x | 8.37x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 14.52x | 21.41x | 20.77x | 11.14x | 23.08x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 6.2 days | 13.7 days | 12.0 days | 5.8 days | 3.6 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 8.0 days | 9.9 days | 16.2 days | 20.3 days | 43.6 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 25.1 days | 17.0 days | 17.6 days | 32.8 days | 15.8 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | -10.9 days | 6.5 days | 10.7 days | -6.7 days | 31.4 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | Rp 4.7 T | Rp 5.3 T | Rp 5.7 T | Rp 8.3 T | Rp 8.2 T |
Price Rp 2,440 · market cap Rp 44 T
| Multiple | EXCL | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | NM | 12.86x(2/3) | — |
| P/B | 1.49x | 1.69x | -12% |
| P/S | 1.05x | 1.08x | -4% |
| EV/EBITDA | 9.56x | 5.44x | +76% |
| EV/EBIT | NM | 9.83x(2/3) | — |
| EV/Sales | 2.47x | 2.18x | +13% |
| FCF Yield | 18.46% | 15.76% | +17% |
| Dividend Yield | 10.03% | 8.08% | +24% |
Only 3 peers are covered here, so the median is itself one of the members. A 0% gap can simply mean EXCL sits at the median.
EV = mkt cap Rp 44 T + debt Rp 63 T − cash Rp 2.7 T + minority interest Rp 174 M = Rp 105 T
At today’s price, the market is paying for 8.1%/yr FCF growth (5.0% at 12.0% to 11.0% at 16.0% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: 15.1% FCF · 12.2% revenue.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 12.0–16.0% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
Mechanical DCF suppressed: on these default assumptions the modelled enterprise value falls BELOW net debt and minority interests, so the equity residual is negative. Equity cannot be worth less than nothing, so no per-share figure is published here: read it as the model saying the debt claims consume the whole enterprise at this discount rate and growth path, which is itself the signal. The components are shown below so the arithmetic stays checkable, and the sliders let you test what it would take to change the answer.
Base year contains named one-off item(s): FY2025: XLSmart merger with Smartfren: the asset base, the cost base and the depreciation charge all step up together. The EBIT basis screens out most non-operating items, but read the Earnings Quality section before trusting the base margin.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 7.26% | Indonesia 10Y government bond, re-verified 31 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.37 → 0.81 | Telecom. Services (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 1.41 |
| Cost of equity | 12.71% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 10.47% | median interest coverage 1.5x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a B2/B synthetic rating and a 3.21% default spread, over a 7.26% base (Indonesia 10Y 7.26%, already the sovereign rate). Its BOOK rate is 6.3%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms) |
| Tax rate | 15.0% | median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest) |
| WACC | 10.48% | 41% E × CoE + 59% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 12.2% | delivered 4-yr revenue CAGR 12.2%, fading linearly to terminal |
| EBIT margin | 9.7% | mean EBIT margin, last 3 FYs |
| D&A / revenue | 22.3% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 27.3% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 10.5% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 23.9% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 23.8% of revenue against depreciation of 22.3%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | 21.2% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 12.2% | 9.8% | 7.4% | 4.9% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | Rp 48 T | Rp 52 T | Rp 56 T | Rp 59 T | Rp 60 T | Rp 62 T |
| EBIT | Rp 4.6 T | Rp 5.1 T | Rp 5.5 T | Rp 5.7 T | Rp 5.9 T | Rp 6.0 T |
| NOPAT | Rp 3.9 T | Rp 4.3 T | Rp 4.7 T | Rp 4.9 T | Rp 5.0 T | Rp 5.1 T |
| + D&A | Rp 11 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 14 T |
| − Capex | Rp 13 T | Rp 14 T | Rp 15 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 15 T |
| − ΔNWC | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 988 M | Rp 815 M | Rp 586 M | Rp 312 M | Rp 320 M |
| FCFF | Rp 487 M | Rp 753 M | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 3.9 T |
| PV | Rp 441 M | Rp 617 M | Rp 782 M | Rp 923 M | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 30 T |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding
EV = PV(explicit) Rp 3.8 T + PV(TV) Rp 30 T = Rp 34 T · TV 89% of EV · − net debt Rp 60 T − minority Rp 174 M = equity -Rp 27 T ÷ shares outstanding
Model output: Rp -1,472/share (-160% vs price Rp 2,440)· exit-multiple check (5.4x): Rp 412
Under these assumptions the model lands 160% below today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for faster growth, a fatter margin, or a lower discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 9.5% | 10.5% | 11.5% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | -1,273 | -1,566 | -1,795 |
| 2.5% | -1,144 | -1,472 | -1,724 |
| 3.0% | -996 | -1,365 | -1,645 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | Rp 27 T | Rp 29 T | Rp 32 T | Rp 34 T | Rp 42 T |
| Cost of Goods Sold | Rp 9.2 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 19 T |
| Gross Profit | Rp 18 T | Rp 18 T | Rp 21 T | Rp 22 T | Rp 23 T |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | Rp 3.6 T | Rp 3.9 T | Rp 4.4 T | Rp 5.6 T | -Rp 233 M |
| Interest Expense | Rp 2.3 T | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 2.9 T | Rp 3.1 T | Rp 3.9 T |
| Net Income | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 1.8 T | -Rp 4.4 T |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 1.8 T | -Rp 4.4 T |
| Depreciation & Amortization | Rp 5.7 T | Rp 5.7 T | Rp 6.5 T | Rp 7.0 T | Rp 11 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 5.2 T | Rp 966 M | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 2.7 T |
| Accounts Receivable | Rp 588 M | Rp 790 M | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 5.1 T |
| Inventory | Rp 156 M | Rp 408 M | Rp 378 M | Rp 194 M | Rp 190 M |
| Current Assets | Rp 7.7 T | Rp 10 T | Rp 7.2 T | Rp 8.4 T | Rp 15 T |
| Total Assets | Rp 73 T | Rp 87 T | Rp 88 T | Rp 86 T | Rp 115 T |
| Accounts Payable | Rp 635 M | Rp 509 M | Rp 552 M | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 829 M |
| Current Liabilities | Rp 21 T | Rp 26 T | Rp 20 T | Rp 21 T | Rp 32 T |
| Total Liabilities | Rp 53 T | Rp 62 T | Rp 61 T | Rp 60 T | Rp 85 T |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | Rp 36 T | Rp 44 T | Rp 46 T | Rp 46 T | Rp 63 T |
| Total Equity | Rp 20 T | Rp 26 T | Rp 26 T | Rp 26 T | Rp 30 T |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | Rp 20 T | Rp 26 T | Rp 26 T | Rp 26 T | Rp 30 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | Rp 12 T | Rp 14 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 18 T | Rp 18 T |
| Capital Expenditure | Rp 7.3 T | Rp 8.8 T | Rp 10 T | Rp 9.5 T | Rp 9.3 T |
XL Axiata is the smallest of the three telcos and the clearest consolidation turnaround bet. Its economics were sub-scale for years (ROE just 4–7%, FY22–24) and then tipped into a FY25 loss (ROE -14.8%, operating margin -0.55%), driven by the XLSmart merger with Smartfren and the integration charges that came with it. The underlying EBITDA engine still runs (~26% margin, FCF ~Rp8tn), and the strategic logic is scale: XLSmart is meant to be a stronger third player against Telkomsel and IOH. This is a high-risk, high-reward consolidation play, and everything rides on the merger delivering its synergies and lifting returns off a low base.
Spectrum licences, base stations and backhaul are paid for up front, then carry traffic for years. Capital spending ran Rp7,292.6bn, Rp8,831.1bn, Rp10,424.6bn, Rp9,496.9bn and Rp9,303.6bn across FY2021 to FY2025.
EconomicsThe cost is sunk and then released through the income statement as depreciation, which ran Rp5,656.4bn, Rp5,716.0bn, Rp6,540.5bn, Rp6,987.2bn and Rp11,194.3bn. That last figure is 60.21% above the prior year and is the single largest reason FY2025 profit and FY2025 cash tell opposite stories.
Indonesian mobile penetration is past one connection per person, so revenue comes from price per gigabyte and from combining subscriber bases rather than from finding new users.
EconomicsGross margin held between 62.57% and 65.55% for four years and then fell to 54.92% in FY2025, a drop of 9.44 percentage points in the year revenue rose 23.42%. Combining two networks brought the revenue and the cost base together at once, and the cost base arrived first.
A prepaid-heavy telco normally collects almost immediately. Receivable days ran 8.02, 9.90, 16.23, 20.34 and then 43.62.
EconomicsThe cash cycle went from negative 6.66 days to positive 31.42 days in FY2025, a 38.08-day deterioration, and it came from both sides at once: receivable days added 23.29 days and payable days, halving from 32.76 to 15.82, added another 16.94. Inventory is negligible at 3.62 days. Collecting later while paying sooner is the working-capital signature of an integration year.
Cost structureCost of goods sold took 34.45% of revenue in FY2021 and 45.08% in FY2025, and the operating cost layer above it moved further still: operating margin went from 13.32% to negative 0.55%, the first negative reading of the window. The structure is heavily fixed, which is why EBITDA margin of 25.82% remains substantial even in a loss year, and why the gap between EBITDA and EBIT, Rp11,194.3bn of depreciation, decides whether this business looks profitable at all.
Cash cycleCash conversion cycle: negative 10.92, positive 6.51, 10.69, negative 6.66 and positive 31.42 days. The FY2025 move is the largest of the window and decomposes cleanly: of the 38.08 days lost, receivables contributed 23.29 days (61.15%) and shortened payables 16.94 days (44.49%), with inventory giving back 2.15 days. A telco that historically ran a negative cash cycle, collecting before it paid, no longer does.
Unit economicsOperating cash flow converted 41.23% of FY2025 revenue, Rp17,501.5bn on Rp42,446.0bn, and fell only 1.86% year on year in a year the income statement swung to a Rp4,426.6bn loss. The unit economics of carrying traffic did not break; what changed sits between EBITDA and net income.
Equipment vendors and spectrum carry pricing power; sub-scale historically weakened XL’s leverage: the merger should help.
Implication → Scale is the fix; pre-merger, weak buying power compounded thin margins.
Price-sensitive prepaid base with low switching costs; XL competed hardest on price as the challenger.
Implication → The core reason returns were lowest among the three telcos.
Spectrum and capex barriers; the merger reduces the field and reinforces the three-player structure.
Implication → Consolidation is structurally supportive: fewer, larger players.
OTT and Wi-Fi substitute for voice/SMS and data.
Implication → Adds pressure; XLSmart must build scale and adjacent services to offset.
The fiercest competitor historically; the merger aims to convert price competition into a more rational three-player market.
Implication → If consolidation holds, rivalry eases: the central thesis for the merger.
The loss is an accounting event; the cash is not; and both statements need the caveat that follows. FY2025 reported a net loss of Rp4,426.6bn while generating free cash flow of positive Rp8,197.9bn. The bridge is depreciation of Rp11,194.3bn, up 60.21% on a merged asset base. EBITDA remained positive at Rp10,961.2bn. So far this supports the reading that the loss is non-cash. The caveat is that depreciation is a real economic cost deferred, not a fictional one, and the test is whether capital spending must rise to match it. FY2025 capital expenditure of Rp9,303.6bn is 0.83 times the new depreciation charge but 1.33 times the FY2024 charge of Rp6,987.2bn. On the pre-merger asset base the company is investing above its depreciation rate; on the post-merger base it is investing below it. One year of merged accounts cannot settle which base is the honest maintenance requirement, and this narrative does not pretend otherwise. The engine, for its part, declines to publish ROIC or a tax-burden ratio for FY2025, stating that EBIT or pretax income was not positive.
| Period | One-off item | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| FY2025 | XLSmart merger with Smartfren: the asset base, the cost base and the depreciation charge all step up together | Revenue rose 23.42% to Rp42,446.0bn, total assets rose 33.81% to Rp115,318.4bn, total debt rose 36.32% to Rp62,827.0bn, and depreciation rose 60.21% to Rp11,194.3bn. Gross margin fell 9.44 points and operating margin turned negative. No FY2021 to FY2025 trend for this company should be read as organic: the FY2025 column describes a different entity from the FY2024 column. |
Cash conversionThe strongest fact in this file. Operating cash flow was Rp11,963.3bn, Rp14,104.5bn, Rp16,095.5bn, Rp17,833.6bn and Rp17,501.5bn, and free cash flow was positive in all five years at Rp4,670.7bn, Rp5,273.4bn, Rp5,670.9bn, Rp8,336.7bn and Rp8,197.9bn, cumulating to Rp32,149.6bn. FY2025 free cash flow fell only 1.67% despite the reported loss. Whatever the income statement says, this business has produced cash every year of the window, and that is the reason it can carry the leverage it does.
Mixed, and the mixture is unusual: EXCL reinvests heavily, levers heavily, and distributes heavily, all at once. Across five years capital expenditure of Rp45,348.8bn absorbed 58.52% of operating cash flow of Rp77,498.4bn, leaving cumulative free cash flow of Rp32,149.6bn. Total debt rose 76.24%, from Rp35,648.6bn to Rp62,827.0bn, taking debt to equity from 1.77 to 2.09. And the trailing dividend yield is 10.03%. Doing all three simultaneously is only possible because the cash conversion is as strong as it is, and it leaves no margin for the cash conversion weakening.
DeploymentOn the trailing yield of 10.03%, distributions run at roughly Rp4,453.5bn, which FY2025 free cash flow of Rp8,197.9bn covers 1.84 times. Stress it against the merged depreciation charge, lifting capital expenditure to the full Rp11,194.3bn, and free cash flow falls to about Rp6,307.1bn, still covering the distribution 1.42 times. The payout is therefore funded by cash flow rather than by earnings, which is the correct way to read a telco in a heavy-depreciation year. One timing point for honesty: a trailing yield reflects a dividend declared on the prior year’s result, so this is a statement about affordability from current cash flow, not a claim that the board declared a dividend out of a loss.
Returns trendThis is the finding the existing narrative does not make, and it changes how the merger should be judged. ROIC ran 6.71%, 5.71%, 5.21% and 5.68% in FY2021 to FY2024 against an engine WACC of 10.48%, short of the hurdle by 3.76, 4.77, 5.27 and 4.79 percentage points. FY2025 is not measurable, because EBIT was negative. EXCL therefore did not earn its cost of capital in a single measurable year of this window, including the four years BEFORE the merger. The merger is not rescuing a business that was creating value and stumbled; it is an attempt to fix economics that were already below the hurdle. Note also that the rupiah discount band shown for sensitivity is 12% / 14% / 16%, above the computed WACC of 10.48%. Unlike at PGAS, where the choice between the two flips the verdict, here it does not: ROIC never reached even the lower figure.
ROIC of 6.71%, 5.71%, 5.21% and 5.68% against a WACC of 10.48%, a shortfall of between 3.76 and 5.27 percentage points in every measurable year, with FY2025 not measurable because EBIT was negative. The pre-merger record is not a base of value creation to return to.
Total debt rose 76.24% across the window to Rp62,827.0bn and debt to equity reached 2.09, its highest. The current ratio has never exceeded 0.4717 in five years, so current liabilities run at roughly twice current assets throughout. Interest coverage was never better than 1.82 times even in the best year and printed negative 0.06 in FY2025. The model suppresses a fair value for EXCL because the equity residual comes out below zero, which is a direct consequence of net debt of Rp60,160.9bn.
The case that the FY2025 loss is non-cash rests on depreciation of Rp11,194.3bn, up 60.21%. Capital expenditure of Rp9,303.6bn is 0.83 times that charge but 1.33 times the FY2024 charge. If the merged charge is the honest replacement rate, the company is under-investing by roughly Rp1,890.7bn a year; if the older charge is, it is not. One year of merged accounts cannot distinguish them, and the distinction decides whether free cash flow of Rp8,197.9bn is sustainable or flattered.
The cash cycle moved 38.08 days against the company in FY2025, from negative 6.66 to positive 31.42 days. Receivable days rose 114.50%, from 20.34 to 43.62, and payable days halved from 32.76 to 15.82. Collecting later while paying sooner in the same year is a combination worth watching, because it consumes cash exactly when integration spending is highest.
The trailing dividend yield of 10.03% implies distributions of roughly Rp4,453.5bn against a reported FY2025 net loss of Rp4,426.6bn. Free cash flow covers it 1.84 times, and 1.42 times even at full merged-depreciation capital spending, so this is affordable rather than reckless. It is recorded because a double-digit yield paid alongside a loss, rising leverage and a suppressed model valuation is a combination that deserves a reader’s attention rather than their assumption.
Checked, immaterial. Non-controlling interests were 0.00% of consolidated equity in FY2021 and 0.58% in FY2025, so consolidated figures can be read as the shareholder claim without adjustment. The merger added minorities but not at a scale that changes any per-share reading.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
A saturated (>120% penetration), now-consolidated three-player mobile market worth ~USD14bn: competing on data value, not subscribers, with infraco (towers, data centres) the new growth layer.