Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | — | — | — | — | — |
| Interest burden | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating margin | -487.3% | -267.2% | -69.5% | -14.1% | -2.1% |
| Asset turnoverdriver | 0.03x | 0.08x | 0.27x | 0.37x | 0.40x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 1.12x | 1.13x | 1.51x | 1.42x | 1.59x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | — | — | — | — | — |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 2.93x | 2.81x | 2.62x | 2.62x | 2.73x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 2.93x | 2.80x | 2.62x | 2.62x | 2.72x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 2.53x | 2.39x | 1.96x | 1.91x | 2.04x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | Rp 24 T | Rp 22 T | Rp 21 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 18 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 0.02x | 0.02x | 0.12x | 0.16x | 0.27x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 0.12x | 0.13x | 0.51x | 0.42x | 0.59x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.02x | 0.02x | 0.08x | 0.11x | 0.17x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | -Rp 29 T | -Rp 27 T | -Rp 21 T | -Rp 14 T | -Rp 14 T |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | -102.12x | -156.93x | -28.73x | -4.63x | -0.72x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 1.12x | 1.13x | 1.51x | 1.42x | 1.59x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 16.8% | 51.7% | 65.6% | 53.4% | 57.7% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | -487.3% | -267.2% | -69.5% | -14.1% | -2.1% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | -471.6% | -348.7% | -611.4% | -32.4% | -6.5% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | -Rp 21 T | -Rp 29 T | -Rp 9.0 T | -Rp 2.0 T | -Rp 123 M |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | -467.0% | -255.8% | -61.1% | -12.5% | -0.7% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | -13.8% | -28.4% | -167.1% | -11.9% | -2.6% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | -15.2% | -31.7% | -238.3% | -15.6% | -3.7% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax)pretax income not positive | — | — | — | — | — |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT)EBIT not positive | — | — | — | — | — |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)EBIT or pretax not positive | — | — | — | — | — |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.03x | 0.08x | 0.27x | 0.37x | 0.40x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 109.45x | 76.92x | 71.31x | 109.06x | 66.32x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 8.95x | 18.09x | 13.36x | 7.78x | 5.59x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 4.35x | 4.45x | 3.80x | 5.97x | 6.18x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 3.3 days | 4.7 days | 5.1 days | 3.3 days | 5.5 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 40.8 days | 20.2 days | 27.3 days | 46.9 days | 65.3 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 83.9 days | 82.1 days | 96.1 days | 61.1 days | 59.1 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | -39.7 days | -57.2 days | -63.7 days | -10.9 days | 11.7 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | -Rp 15 T | -Rp 18 T | -Rp 4.5 T | -Rp 802 M | Rp 5.0 M |
Price Rp 50 · market cap Rp 53 T
| Multiple | GOTO | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | NM | 4.78x(3/4) | — |
| P/B | 1.68x | 1.27x | +32% |
| P/S | 2.91x | 2.30x | +26% |
| EV/EBITDA | NM | 156.66x(2/4) | — |
| EV/EBIT | NM | 196.82x(2/4) | — |
| EV/Sales | 2.14x | 1.80x | +19% |
| FCF Yield | 0.01% | 1.27% | -99% |
| Dividend Yield | — | 1.89%(1/4) | — |
EV = mkt cap Rp 53 T + debt Rp 7.7 T − cash Rp 22 T = Rp 39 T
at any discount rate in the 12–16% band, today’s price implies FCF growth beyond +60% a year. The market is pricing an inflection far outside the delivered record, not a continuation of it.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 12.0–16.0% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
Mechanical DCF suppressed: mean EBIT margin over the last 3 FYs is negative (-28.6%), so a mechanical FCFF perpetuity is not meaningful for a pre-profit record. The reverse DCF above shows what the price implies, and the sliders below let you impose a path-to-margin scenario (a target, not history).
Base year contains named one-off item(s): FY2023: Goodwill impairment on the Gojek–Tokopedia merger stack dominated the reported loss; FY2024: Tokopedia e-commerce handover to TikTok changed the revenue perimeter. The EBIT basis screens out most non-operating items, but read the Earnings Quality section before trusting the base margin.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 7.26% | Indonesia 10Y government bond, re-verified 31 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 1.55 → 1.73 | Software (Internet) (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.15 |
| Cost of equity | 18.80% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 26.26% | median interest coverage -28.7x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a D2/D synthetic rating and a 19.00% default spread, over a 7.26% base (Indonesia 10Y 7.26%, already the sovereign rate). Its BOOK rate is 6.8%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms) |
| Tax rate | 22.0% | statutory 22% (no clean effective-rate year in window) |
| WACC | 19.02% | 87% E × CoE + 13% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 30.0% | delivered 4-yr revenue CAGR 41.8% (default capped at 30%), fading linearly to terminal |
| EBIT margin | -28.6% | mean EBIT margin, last 3 FYs |
| D&A / revenue | 3.8% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 1.3% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 19.0% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 0.0% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 3.8% of revenue against depreciation of 3.8%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | 31.6% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 30.0% | 23.1% | 16.3% | 9.4% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | Rp 24 T | Rp 29 T | Rp 34 T | Rp 37 T | Rp 38 T | Rp 39 T |
| EBIT | -Rp 6.8 T | -Rp 8.4 T | -Rp 9.7 T | -Rp 11 T | -Rp 11 T | -Rp 11 T |
| NOPAT | -Rp 5.3 T | -Rp 6.5 T | -Rp 7.6 T | -Rp 8.3 T | -Rp 8.5 T | -Rp 8.7 T |
| + D&A | Rp 903 M | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.5 T |
| − Capex | Rp 313 M | Rp 385 M | Rp 447 M | Rp 489 M | Rp 502 M | Rp 1.5 T |
| − ΔNWC | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 294 M | Rp 302 M |
| FCFF | -Rp 6.5 T | -Rp 7.5 T | -Rp 8.3 T | -Rp 8.4 T | -Rp 7.9 T | -Rp 9.0 T |
| PV | -Rp 5.4 T | -Rp 5.3 T | -Rp 4.9 T | -Rp 4.2 T | -Rp 3.3 T | -Rp 23 T |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding
EV = PV(explicit) -Rp 23 T + PV(TV) -Rp 23 T = -Rp 46 T · TV 50% of EV · − net debt -Rp 14 T − minority Rp 0 = equity -Rp 32 T ÷ shares outstanding
Model output: Rp -30/share (-160% vs price Rp 50)· exit-multiple check (156.7x): Rp -589
Under these assumptions the model lands 160% below today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for faster growth, a fatter margin, or a lower discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 18.0% | 19.0% | 20.0% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | -31 | -29 | -26 |
| 2.5% | -33 | -30 | -27 |
| 3.0% | -34 | -31 | -29 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | Rp 4.5 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 15 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 18 T |
| Cost of Goods Sold | Rp 3.8 T | Rp 5.5 T | Rp 5.1 T | Rp 7.4 T | Rp 7.7 T |
| Gross Profit | Rp 760 M | Rp 5.9 T | Rp 9.7 T | Rp 8.5 T | Rp 11 T |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | -Rp 22 T | -Rp 30 T | -Rp 10 T | -Rp 2.2 T | -Rp 378 M |
| Interest Expense | Rp 216 M | Rp 193 M | Rp 358 M | Rp 484 M | Rp 523 M |
| Net Income | -Rp 21 T | -Rp 40 T | -Rp 90 T | -Rp 5.2 T | -Rp 1.2 T |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | -Rp 21 T | -Rp 40 T | -Rp 90 T | -Rp 5.2 T | -Rp 1.2 T |
| Depreciation & Amortization | Rp 920 M | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 252 M | Rp 256 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | Rp 31 T | Rp 29 T | Rp 25 T | Rp 19 T | Rp 22 T |
| Accounts Receivable | Rp 507 M | Rp 627 M | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 3.3 T |
| Inventory | Rp 34 M | Rp 71 M | Rp 71 M | Rp 68 M | Rp 117 M |
| Current Assets | Rp 36 T | Rp 34 T | Rp 34 T | Rp 26 T | Rp 29 T |
| Total Assets | Rp 155 T | Rp 139 T | Rp 54 T | Rp 43 T | Rp 46 T |
| Accounts Payable | Rp 867 M | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.3 T |
| Current Liabilities | Rp 12 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 10 T | Rp 11 T |
| Total Liabilities | Rp 16 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 18 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 17 T |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | Rp 2.4 T | Rp 2.4 T | Rp 4.3 T | Rp 4.8 T | Rp 7.7 T |
| Total Equity | Rp 139 T | Rp 123 T | Rp 36 T | Rp 30 T | Rp 29 T |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | Rp 140 T | Rp 125 T | Rp 38 T | Rp 33 T | Rp 32 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -Rp 15 T | -Rp 17 T | -Rp 4.3 T | -Rp 622 M | Rp 307 M |
| Capital Expenditure | Rp 265 M | Rp 348 M | Rp 171 M | Rp 180 M | Rp 302 M |
GOTO gross margin: 16.8% (2021) → 51.7% → 65.6% (2023 peak) → 53.4% → 57.7% (2025). OPM: −487.3% (2021) → −267.2% → −69.5% → −14.1% → −2.06% (2025); narrowed every single year, approaching but not reaching operating breakeven by FY2025. NM: −471.6% → −348.7% → −611.4% (2023, a severe non-cash impairment year; equity fell from Rp 122.7 T to Rp 35.7 T that year) → −32.4% → −6.47%. ROE: −15.2% → −31.7% → −238.3% (2023, the impairment shows up here too) → −15.6% → −3.73%. ROA followed the same shape: −13.8% → −28.4% → −167.1% → −11.9% → −2.59%. Asset turnover climbed steadily as the business matured: 0.03× (2021) → 0.08× → 0.27× → 0.37× → 0.40×. Leverage stayed structurally low throughout, D/E never exceeded 0.27×, L/E never exceeded 0.59×, because GOTO has carried a large net cash position every year (net debt negative Rp 14.0-28.8 trillion, i.e., Rp 14-29 T of net cash, the legacy of its 2022 IPO). Interest coverage: −102.1× (2021) → −156.9× (2022, worst) → −28.7× → −4.63× → −0.72× (2025, nearly breakeven). Current ratio stayed strong and stable throughout (2.6-2.9×): GOTO has never had a liquidity problem, only a profitability one. FCF (Rp): −14,956.1 B → −17,554.0 B (2022, worst) → −4,496.7 B → −801.7 B → +4.95 B (2025, the first positive year). Revenue (Rp): 4,535.8 B → 11,349.2 B → 14,785.5 B → 15,894.5 B → 18,322.1 B (+15.27% in FY2025, matching independently-reported growth exactly). The shape: five years of narrowing losses funded by a large IPO cash cushion, ending FY2025 at the threshold of operating breakeven, not yet profitable on a full-year basis, though GoTo's own subsequent reporting shows the first profitable single quarter arrived in Q1 2026, just after this window.
Gojek (mobility/delivery) + GoPay (fintech) after the FY2024 Tokopedia handover to TikTok: the perimeter is now on-demand services and financial services.
EconomicsTake-rates on gross transaction value; revenue quadrupled Rp4.5tn→Rp18.3tn across the window.
The window IS the deleveraging of incentives: operating margin −487%→−267%→−69%→−14%→−2.1%; five prints, one direction, no year skipped.
EconomicsFY2025 operating cash turned POSITIVE (Rp0.3tn): the first year the machine funded itself.
GoPay + lending attach to the transaction base; asset-light throughout (capex ~Rp0.2–0.3tn/yr).
EconomicsThe equity story now rests on fintech unit economics arriving before the cash cushion thins further.
Cost structureVariable-heavy (driver/merchant incentives inside contra-revenue and cost lines, cloud, promotions); which is exactly why the loss could shrink 99.6% while revenue grew: the costs were a dial, not a structure.
Cash cycleNegative working capital by construction (users prepay, merchants are settled on terms, GoPay float sits in between): at breakeven this flips from burn-softener to cash generator; FY2025’s positive OCF is that flip’s first evidence.
GOTO depends on a large, largely undifferentiated pool of Gojek drivers and merchants: low individual supplier leverage, but aggregate driver-welfare regulation (minimum-earnings rules debated across the on-demand sector) is a real, growing cost pressure that shows up in the on-demand segment's economics.
Implication → Driver-related cost/regulatory pressure is a structural, ongoing constraint on how far GoTo can push on-demand margins even as it approaches breakeven.
Consumers face near-zero switching cost between GOTO's Gojek and Grab (its main regional rival) for ride-hailing and food delivery, forcing continuous promotional/incentive spending that has been the primary driver of GoTo's historical losses.
Implication → The five-year march from −487% to −2.06% operating margin reflects years of gradually reducing promotional intensity and improving unit economics against this buyer-power pressure, not a one-time fix.
On-demand/super-app entry is capital-intensive at scale but has real precedent (Grab, and historically several smaller domestic players): the barrier is subsidised-growth capital and network density, not proprietary technology.
Implication → GOTO's large historical losses were themselves the entry-deterrence mechanism: few competitors can sustain a decade of losses at GOTO's scale, which is a form of moat even though it looks like weakness on the income statement.
On-demand services compete against informal/traditional alternatives (conventional taxis, in-person shopping, cash transactions instead of GoPay) with real but slowly declining relevance as digital-payment and app-based habits deepen across Indonesia.
Implication → Substitution risk has structurally fallen over GoTo's five-year window as GoPay's fintech adoption grew (net revenue reaching Rp 5.19 T, first full year of segment profitability): part of why margins have improved even without e-commerce.
GOTO competes directly with Grab (Singapore-headquartered) across on-demand and fintech: the region's other dominant super-app, in a multi-year standoff neither side has decisively won.
Implication → Rivalry intensity is the single largest reason GoTo's path from −487% to −2.06% operating margin took five full years rather than resolving faster, and why FY2025's barely-positive FCF (+Rp 5.0 B) is a fragile, recent inflection rather than an established trend.
The reported bottom line has been dominated by non-cash items for the entire window; the question is not quality of profits (there are none yet) but the honesty of the loss: FY2025’s −Rp1.2tn with positive OCF is the first print where the accounting loss overstates rather than understates the economics.
| Period | One-off item | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| FY2023 | Goodwill impairment on the Gojek–Tokopedia merger stack dominated the reported loss | NI −Rp90.4tn against OCF of only −Rp4.3tn: most of the headline loss was the non-cash write-down of merger-era goodwill; equity fell Rp122.7tn→Rp35.7tn. |
| FY2024 | Tokopedia e-commerce handover to TikTok changed the revenue perimeter | FY2024-onward revenue mix is not like-for-like with FY2021–23; growth rates crossing FY2024 need the perimeter footnote. |
Cash conversionBurn fell Rp17.2tn→Rp0.6tn then turned +Rp0.3tn: the cash line has led the P&L by roughly a year throughout; watch OCF, not NI, for the inflection’s durability.
The dataset’s one true diluter, and the label is the history, not the present: ~Rp110tn of equity consumed across the window (Rp139tn→Rp28.7tn) by merger goodwill written down, operating burn, and share-based compensation. The current regime is the opposite discipline: burn near zero, capex tiny. Whether the remaining Rp29tn of equity ever earns a return decides if the platform was bought or built; the FY2025 inflection is necessary, not yet sufficient.
DeploymentFY2021→25: the capital went to incentives (cumulative operating burn ~Rp36tn), the merger write-down (non-cash but real shareholder value), and SBC; essentially nothing to hard assets (capex ~Rp1.3tn cumulative).
Returns trendROIC is unmeasurable by design (negative EBIT throughout; the DCF on this page is suppressed by rule for exactly that reason); the measurable trend is the loss line: −Rp39.6tn→−Rp1.2tn in three years. The reverse DCF, not ROIC, is the right instrument here.
Rp110tn of shareholder capital consumed in four years: mostly the merger-era goodwill marked to reality. The write-down is done; the lesson about acquisition pricing stands.
OM −2.1% and OCF +Rp0.3tn are one competitive round from reversing: the inflection is real and thin simultaneously.
Merger (FY2021), impairment (FY2023), Tokopedia handover (FY2024): no two adjacent years are fully comparable; every trend cited here carries that caveat.
Owners’ equity exceeds total equity (NCI −Rp3.1tn): loss-absorbing minorities; the EV bridge floors it at zero by standard practice, disclosed in the engine.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Indonesia's ~USD 100 B digital economy (2025, e-Conomy SEA) is Southeast Asia's largest, but its four listed anchors span radically different models: DCII (data-center infrastructure, the physical backbone), GOTO (Gojek on-demand + GoPay fintech, after deconsolidating Tokopedia to TikTok in 2024), BUKA (a former e-commerce marketplace that fully exited physical goods in 2025 to focus on virtual goods, gaming and O2O), and EMTK (a diversified media/health/aviation conglomerate with a real, fast-growing digital arm and majority ownership of BUKA).