…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | 0.80x | 0.80x | 0.78x | 0.80x | 0.81x |
| Interest burden | 0.99x | 0.99x | 0.98x | 0.99x | 0.99x |
| Operating margindriver | 15.3% | 14.7% | 12.0% | 12.6% | 13.0% |
| Asset turnover | 1.02x | 1.06x | 1.13x | 1.11x | 1.15x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 1.21x | 1.23x | 1.17x | 1.20x | 1.24x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 15.0% | 15.3% | 12.0% | 13.2% | 14.8% |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 15.1% | 15.5% | 12.2% | 13.4% | 14.9% |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 4.45x | 3.77x | 4.91x | 4.11x | 3.47x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 2.98x | 2.16x | 2.77x | 2.55x | 2.16x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 1.76x | 0.89x | 1.00x | 1.13x | 0.81x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | Rp 12 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 13 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 0.03x | 0.05x | 0.03x | 0.02x | 0.01x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 0.21x | 0.23x | 0.17x | 0.20x | 0.24x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.02x | 0.04x | 0.02x | 0.02x | 0.01x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | -Rp 5.6 T | -Rp 2.8 T | -Rp 2.6 T | -Rp 4.2 T | -Rp 4.0 T |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 88.62x | 103.05x | 43.99x | 72.82x | 129.91x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 1.21x | 1.23x | 1.17x | 1.20x | 1.24x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 42.3% | 39.8% | 37.9% | 39.0% | 39.0% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 15.3% | 14.7% | 12.0% | 12.6% | 13.0% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 12.1% | 11.7% | 9.1% | 9.9% | 10.4% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | Rp 4.6 T | Rp 4.9 T | Rp 4.3 T | Rp 4.8 T | Rp 5.3 T |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 17.7% | 17.0% | 14.2% | 14.8% | 15.1% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 12.4% | 12.4% | 10.2% | 11.0% | 11.9% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 16.3% | 16.6% | 12.9% | 14.2% | 15.7% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 0.80x | 0.80x | 0.78x | 0.80x | 0.81x |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 0.99x | 0.99x | 0.98x | 0.99x | 0.99x |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 15.1% | 15.5% | 12.2% | 13.4% | 14.9% |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 1.02x | 1.06x | 1.13x | 1.11x | 1.15x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 2.94x | 2.44x | 2.72x | 3.06x | 3.08x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 7.65x | 6.27x | 6.62x | 6.71x | 6.25x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 9.09x | 8.72x | 11.18x | 10.52x | 8.96x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 124.3 days | 149.6 days | 134.1 days | 119.2 days | 118.4 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 47.7 days | 58.2 days | 55.1 days | 54.4 days | 58.4 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 40.2 days | 41.8 days | 32.7 days | 34.7 days | 40.7 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 131.9 days | 166.0 days | 156.6 days | 138.9 days | 136.1 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | Rp 2.3 T | Rp 566 M | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 3.9 T | Rp 2.5 T |
Price Rp 725 · market cap Rp 33 T
| Multiple | KLBF | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 8.95x | 9.09x | -2% |
| P/B | 1.41x | 1.41x | -0% |
| P/S | 0.93x | 0.93x | +0% |
| EV/EBITDA | 5.65x | 5.35x | +5% |
| EV/EBIT | 6.59x | 6.62x | -0% |
| EV/Sales | 0.85x | 0.78x | +10% |
| FCF Yield | 7.76% | 7.21% | +8% |
| Dividend Yield | 4.96% | 6.85% | -28% |
EV = mkt cap Rp 33 T + debt Rp 299 M − cash Rp 4.3 T + minority interest Rp 1.4 T = Rp 30 T
At today’s price, the market is paying for 6.9%/yr FCF growth (3.9% at 12.0% to 9.8% at 16.0% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: 2.3% FCF · 7.7% revenue.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 12.0–16.0% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 7.26% | Indonesia 10Y government bond, 8 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.89 → 0.90 | Drugs (Pharmaceutical) (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.01 |
| Cost of equity | 13.26% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 11.79% | FY2025 interest expense ÷ total debt |
| Tax rate | 19.9% | median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest) |
| WACC | 13.22% | 99% E × CoE + 1% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 7.7% | delivered 4-yr revenue CAGR 7.7%, fading linearly to terminal |
| EBIT margin | 12.5% | mean EBIT margin, last 3 FYs |
| D&A / revenue | 2.2% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 2.6% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years; in the terminal year capex falls to replacement level (equal to depreciation, 2.2% of revenue) because holding a build-phase or pause-phase ratio in perpetuity misprices the company in whichever direction that phase points |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | 17.3% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 7.7% | 6.4% | 5.1% | 3.8% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | Rp 38 T | Rp 40 T | Rp 43 T | Rp 44 T | Rp 45 T | Rp 46 T |
| EBIT | Rp 4.8 T | Rp 5.1 T | Rp 5.3 T | Rp 5.5 T | Rp 5.7 T | Rp 5.8 T |
| NOPAT | Rp 3.8 T | Rp 4.1 T | Rp 4.3 T | Rp 4.4 T | Rp 4.5 T | Rp 4.6 T |
| + D&A | Rp 831 M | Rp 884 M | Rp 929 M | Rp 964 M | Rp 988 M | Rp 1.0 T |
| − Capex | Rp 981 M | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.0 T |
| − ΔNWC | Rp 469 M | Rp 420 M | Rp 356 M | Rp 279 M | Rp 191 M | Rp 195 M |
| FCFF | Rp 3.2 T | Rp 3.5 T | Rp 3.7 T | Rp 4.0 T | Rp 4.2 T | Rp 4.5 T |
| PV | Rp 2.8 T | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 2.6 T | Rp 2.4 T | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 22 T |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5
EV = PV(explicit) Rp 13 T + PV(TV) Rp 22 T = Rp 35 T · TV 64% of EV · − net debt -Rp 4.0 T − minority Rp 1.4 T
Model output: Rp 833/share (+15% vs price Rp 725)· exit-multiple check (5.4x): Rp 763
Under these assumptions the model lands 15% above today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for slower growth, a thinner margin, or a higher discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 12.2% | 13.2% | 14.2% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | 883 | 807 | 743 |
| 2.5% | 916 | 833 | 764 |
| 3.0% | 952 | 862 | 788 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | Rp 26 T | Rp 29 T | Rp 30 T | Rp 33 T | Rp 35 T |
| Cost of Goods Sold | Rp 15 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 19 T | Rp 20 T | Rp 22 T |
| Gross Profit | Rp 11 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 14 T |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | Rp 4.0 T | Rp 4.2 T | Rp 3.6 T | Rp 4.1 T | Rp 4.6 T |
| Interest Expense | Rp 45 M | Rp 41 M | Rp 83 M | Rp 56 M | Rp 35 M |
| Net Income | Rp 3.2 T | Rp 3.4 T | Rp 2.8 T | Rp 3.2 T | Rp 3.7 T |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | Rp 3.2 T | Rp 3.4 T | Rp 2.8 T | Rp 3.2 T | Rp 3.7 T |
| Depreciation & Amortization | Rp 618 M | Rp 659 M | Rp 665 M | Rp 716 M | Rp 767 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | Rp 6.2 T | Rp 3.9 T | Rp 3.2 T | Rp 4.7 T | Rp 4.3 T |
| Accounts Receivable | Rp 3.4 T | Rp 4.6 T | Rp 4.6 T | Rp 4.9 T | Rp 5.7 T |
| Inventory | Rp 5.2 T | Rp 7.1 T | Rp 6.9 T | Rp 6.5 T | Rp 7.0 T |
| Current Assets | Rp 16 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 19 T |
| Total Assets | Rp 26 T | Rp 27 T | Rp 27 T | Rp 29 T | Rp 31 T |
| Accounts Payable | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 2.4 T |
| Current Liabilities | Rp 3.5 T | Rp 4.4 T | Rp 3.2 T | Rp 4.2 T | Rp 5.3 T |
| Total Liabilities | Rp 4.4 T | Rp 5.1 T | Rp 3.9 T | Rp 4.8 T | Rp 6.0 T |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | Rp 626 M | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 622 M | Rp 562 M | Rp 299 M |
| Total Equity | Rp 21 T | Rp 22 T | Rp 23 T | Rp 25 T | Rp 25 T |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | Rp 20 T | Rp 20 T | Rp 21 T | Rp 23 T | Rp 23 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | Rp 2.8 T | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 2.9 T | Rp 4.8 T | Rp 3.3 T |
| Capital Expenditure | Rp 504 M | Rp 705 M | Rp 882 M | Rp 908 M | Rp 726 M |
Kalbe Farma is Indonesia’s pharma leader, built on four divisions: prescription drugs, OTC consumer health (Promag, Komix, Mixagrip), nutritionals (Diabetasol, Morinaga) and distribution and logistics (Enseval). It is defensive and net-cash (D/E ~0.01), with solid returns (ROE 13–16%, ROIC ~12–15%). The key vulnerability sits on the cost side: roughly 90% of its active raw materials are imported, so a weaker rupiah squeezes margins (ROE dipped to ~13% in FY23 before recovering to 15.7% in FY25), while government price controls through the BPJS e-catalogue cap what it can charge on prescriptions. It is a defensive healthcare compounder, and the things that move it are the rupiah and raw-material costs on one hand and pricing policy on the other.
Roughly 90% of KLBF active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) are imported and priced in foreign currency.
EconomicsThis is the single biggest margin swing: a weaker rupiah raises input cost, which is exactly why gross margin fell from 42% to 38% through FY22–23 before recovering.
It turns those inputs into prescription drugs, branded OTC health (Promag, Komix, Mixagrip) and nutritionals (Diabetasol, Morinaga).
EconomicsThe branded OTC and nutrition lines carry the higher margins; the prescription line is high-volume but its price is capped by the BPJS e-catalogue, so the mix, not raw scale, drives profitability.
KLBF owns Enseval, its nationwide distribution arm reaching pharmacies and hospitals directly.
EconomicsOwning distribution captures margin a third-party distributor would otherwise take, and guarantees shelf reach no competitor can easily match: the structural edge behind the wide moat.
Where policy caps prescription pricing, KLBF leans on price increases in branded OTC and nutrition to hold the blend.
EconomicsThis is why blended gross margin holds ~39% even though one whole division is price-controlled: the branded portfolio subsidises the regulated one.
Capex is light (~Rp0.5–0.9tn a year on Rp30tn+ revenue), the balance sheet is net cash (D/E to 0.01), and it pays out ~45% of earnings.
EconomicsA distribution-led model needs little new capital to grow, so most of the cash returns to shareholders while a cushion builds: defensive compounding, not capital-hungry growth.
Cost structureImport-cost-led. The dominant cost is imported active ingredients (~90% of APIs), priced in foreign currency, so gross margin (~39%) moves with the rupiah, the structural swing demonstrated in the FY22–23 compression to 38%. Manufacturing and distribution (Enseval) are scale-efficient, and because it owns Enseval, KLBF keeps the distribution margin in-house rather than paying it away.
Cash cycleWorking-capital-heavy but self-funding. KLBF carries meaningful inventory (roughly 20–25% of revenue) and receivables (~15%), so cash conversion swings with the input-cost cycle: in FY22 operating cash flow fell to just 0.38x net income as inventory built during the cost spike, then snapped back above 1.0x by FY24 as it unwound. Net cash throughout, so it funds itself.
Unit economicsPer product, the imported API is the cost and the brand (OTC/nutrition) or the tender (prescription) is the revenue. The margin depends on two things KLBF only half-controls: the rupiah on the cost side and BPJS policy on the price side. Owning Enseval adds a second margin layer, distribution, that a non-integrated rival pays away.
~90% of active pharmaceutical ingredients are imported, so raw-material suppliers and the rupiah drive the cost base.
Implication → The core margin pressure: a weaker rupiah squeezes gross margin (ROE dipped to ~13% in FY23).
Government/BPJS sets prescription prices (e-catalogue); OTC consumers are brand-loyal.
Implication → Caps prescription margins, but branded OTC/nutrition retains pricing power.
Manufacturing scale, brands, R&D and the Enseval distribution network are high barriers.
Implication → The integrated franchise is defensible; distribution is hard to replicate.
Generics and competing brands substitute; herbal/traditional remedies compete in OTC.
Implication → Pressures pricing in generics; brand strength defends OTC/nutrition.
Competes with other pharma and consumer-health players across all divisions.
Implication → Steady; scale, brands and distribution keep KLBF the leader.
High and cash-backed over the full window, with one explainable wobble. Across FY21–25 operating cash flow roughly tracks cumulative net income, but FY22 stands out at just 0.38x, not an earnings problem but an inventory build (inventory rose to ~25% of revenue) as KLBF stocked up through the input-cost spike; it reversed to 1.48x by FY24. Earnings are recurring and operating, with no reliance on one-off gains.
Checked: no material one-offs found in the reviewed window.
Cash conversionOver five years OCF broadly equals net income; the FY22 dip to 0.38x and the FY24 rebound to 1.48x are the two ends of one working-capital cycle around imported-input stocking, not a quality signal.
A cash cow that reinvests lightly and returns the rest. Capex runs a modest ~2–3% of revenue, the balance sheet is net cash and getting cleaner (D/E 0.05→0.01), and KLBF pays out ~45% of earnings, so it grows revenue mid-single-digits without needing much capital and hands back the surplus.
DeploymentLight reinvestment (capex ~Rp0.5–0.9tn) into capacity and Enseval, a growing cash cushion, and a steady ~45% dividend. It does not chase acquisitions or leverage.
Returns trendROIC ~12–15% and ROE ~13–17% sit above the cost of capital, but both dipped in FY23 (ROE to ~13%) when the rupiah squeezed margins, then recovered to 15.7% by FY25, so returns are healthy but FX-cyclical.
About 90% of active ingredients are imported, so margins are structurally exposed to the rupiah, the FY22–23 gross-margin compression (42%→38%) is the demonstrated cost. A durable, not one-off, sensitivity.
BPJS e-catalogue price controls cap what the prescription division can charge, structurally limiting that segment margin regardless of cost.
Inventory swings with input-cost stocking (to ~25% of revenue in FY22, dragging that year cash conversion to 0.38x); it reversed, so a timing effect to monitor rather than a problem.
Net cash (D/E 0.01) with strong coverage, no leverage or solvency concern.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
A ~USD 10–12B market dominated by generics and shaped by JKN/BPJS reimbursement: Kalbe Farma leads ASEAN, but ~90% API import dependency and IDR exposure are structural cost risks.