Equal · Financial Report

PP London Sumatra Indonesia

LSIP/FY2021–FY2025/Educational Analysis/IDR/Data source · 2026-07-03

ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Tax burdendriver	0.61x	0.86x	0.84x	0.77x	0.97x
Interest burden	1.00x	1.00x	1.00x	1.00x	1.00x
Operating margin	35.7%	26.4%	21.7%	42.1%	35.4%
Asset turnover	0.38x	0.37x	0.33x	0.33x	0.35x
Leverage (equity mult.)	1.16x	1.14x	1.10x	1.10x	1.11x
= Return on Equity (consolidated)	9.7%	9.5%	6.7%	11.8%	13.5%
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)	9.7%	9.5%	6.7%	11.8%	13.5%

Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.

Liquidity

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities)	6.18x	7.20x	9.53x	10.50x	9.45x
Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities)	5.66x	6.28x	8.76x	9.13x	8.52x
Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities)	4.84x	5.42x	7.99x	8.04x	8.25x
Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities)	Rp 3.6 T	Rp 4.4 T	Rp 4.8 T	Rp 6.4 T	Rp 7.8 T

Leverage & Solvency

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity)	0.00x	0.00x	0.00x	0.00x	0.00x
Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity)	0.16x	0.14x	0.10x	0.10x	0.11x
Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets)	0.00x	0.00x	0.00x	0.00x	0.00x
Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash)	-Rp 3.4 T	-Rp 3.8 T	-Rp 4.5 T	-Rp 5.5 T	-Rp 7.6 T
Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense)	3,661.79x	1,791.65x	1,603.53x	2,938.30x	1,658.36x
Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity)	1.16x	1.14x	1.10x	1.10x	1.11x

Profitability

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue)	41.1%	31.4%	27.5%	46.8%	39.9%
Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue)	35.7%	26.4%	21.7%	42.1%	35.4%
Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue)	21.9%	22.6%	18.2%	32.4%	34.2%
EBITDA(EBIT + D&A)	Rp 2.0 T	Rp 1.6 T	Rp 1.3 T	Rp 2.3 T	Rp 2.3 T
EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue)	43.9%	34.3%	30.8%	50.4%	42.3%
Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets)	8.4%	8.3%	6.1%	10.7%	12.1%
Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners))	9.7%	9.5%	6.7%	11.8%	13.5%
Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax)	0.61x	0.86x	0.84x	0.77x	0.97x
Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT)	1.00x	1.00x	1.00x	1.00x	1.00x
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)	9.7%	9.5%	6.7%	11.8%	13.5%

Operations & Efficiency

Turnover	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets)	0.38x	0.37x	0.33x	0.33x	0.35x
Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory)	7.25x	4.82x	7.04x	2.62x	3.85x
Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables)	26.25x	20.29x	128.58x	8.92x	136.86x
Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables)	12.57x	9.53x	14.12x	13.46x	13.20x

Conversion Period	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS)	50.3 days	75.8 days	51.8 days	139.1 days	94.8 days
Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue)	13.9 days	18.0 days	2.8 days	40.9 days	2.7 days
Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS)	29.0 days	38.3 days	25.8 days	27.1 days	27.6 days
Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO)	35.2 days	55.5 days	28.8 days	152.9 days	69.8 days

Cash Flow

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex)	Rp 1.6 T	Rp 783 M	Rp 1.0 T	Rp 1.2 T	Rp 2.6 T

Valuation

price as-of 2026-07-31fundamentals: FY2025

Price Rp 1,430 · market cap Rp 9.8 T

Multiple	LSIP	Peer median	vs median
P/E	5.16x	5.16x	0%
P/B	0.70x	0.56x	+24%
P/S	1.77x	0.46x	+283%
EV/EBITDA	0.92x	3.02x	-69%
EV/EBIT	1.10x	4.15x	-73%
EV/Sales	0.39x	0.39x	0%
FCF Yield	26.49%	25.92%	+2%
Dividend Yield	4.55%	4.55%	0%

Only 3 peers are covered here, so the median is itself one of the members. A 0% gap can simply mean LSIP sits at the median.

EV = mkt cap Rp 9.8 T + debt Rp 329 jt − cash Rp 7.6 T = Rp 2.2 T

What the price implies

At today’s price, the market is paying for -48.3%/yr FCF growth (-49.2% at 12.0% to -47.3% at 16.0% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: 13.2% FCF · 5.1% revenue.

Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 12.0–16.0% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.

Forward DCF (glass-box)

This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.

Assumption	Value	Basis
Rf (risk-free)	7.26%	Indonesia 10Y government bond, re-verified 31 Jul 2026
ERP (Rm − Rf)	6.69%	Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%)
β	0.81 → 0.81	Farming/Agriculture (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.00
Cost of equity	12.68%	Rf + β × ERP
Cost of debt	7.66%	median interest coverage 1791.7x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a Aaa/AAA synthetic rating and a 0.40% default spread, over a 7.26% base (Indonesia 10Y 7.26%, already the sovereign rate). Its BOOK rate is 357.4%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms)
Tax rate	16.0%	median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest)
WACC	12.68%	100% E × CoE + 0% D × Kd × (1 − t)
Revenue growth (yr 1, fading)	5.1%	delivered 4-yr revenue CAGR 5.1%, fading linearly to terminal
EBIT margin	33.0%	mean EBIT margin, last 3 FYs
D&A / revenue	8.2%	mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs
Capex / revenue	8.3%	mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 12.7% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 19.7% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 11.7% of revenue against depreciation of 8.2%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral
ΔNWC / Δrevenue	80.0%	median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP)
Terminal growth	2.5%	BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%)

Growth path

year 1 → fading to terminal over 5 yrs5.1%

EBIT margin33.0%

WACC12.7%

Terminal growth2.5%

Explicit years5

FCFF drivers

FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − capex − ΔNWC

Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.

Capex

% of revenue8.3%

D&A

% of revenue8.2%

ΔNWC

% of the CHANGE in revenue80.0%

Year	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	T∞
Growth	5.1%	4.4%	3.8%	3.1%	2.5%	2.5%
Revenue	Rp 5.8 T	Rp 6.0 T	Rp 6.3 T	Rp 6.5 T	Rp 6.6 T	Rp 6.8 T
EBIT	Rp 1.9 T	Rp 2.0 T	Rp 2.1 T	Rp 2.1 T	Rp 2.2 T	Rp 2.2 T
NOPAT	Rp 1.6 T	Rp 1.7 T	Rp 1.7 T	Rp 1.8 T	Rp 1.8 T	Rp 1.9 T
+ D&A	Rp 473 M	Rp 494 M	Rp 513 M	Rp 529 M	Rp 542 M	Rp 556 M
− Capex	Rp 481 M	Rp 502 M	Rp 521 M	Rp 537 M	Rp 551 M	Rp 795 M
− ΔNWC	Rp 223 M	Rp 204 M	Rp 183 M	Rp 158 M	Rp 129 M	Rp 133 M
FCFF	Rp 1.4 T	Rp 1.5 T	Rp 1.6 T	Rp 1.6 T	Rp 1.7 T	Rp 1.5 T
PV	Rp 1.2 T	Rp 1.2 T	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 1.0 T	Rp 937 M	Rp 8.2 T

Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding

EV = PV(explicit) Rp 5.4 T + PV(TV) Rp 8.2 T = Rp 14 T · TV 60% of EV · − net debt -Rp 7.6 T − minority Rp 0 = equity Rp 21 T ÷ shares outstanding

Model output: Rp 3,108/share (+117% vs price Rp 1,430)· exit-multiple check (3.0x): Rp 2,573

Under these assumptions the model lands 117% above today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for slower growth, a thinner margin, or a higher discount rate than the inputs here assume.

Sensitivity (per share, Rp)

g \ WACC	11.7%	12.7%	13.7%
2.0%	3,250	3,054	2,891
2.5%	3,320	3,108	2,934
3.0%	3,398	3,168	2,980

Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.

Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.

Macro backdropfull backdrop + sensitivity map →

BI Rate 5.75%IDR/USD 18,05810Y government bond yield 7.26%Inflation 3.34%(as-of 2026-07-31)

CPO ↑(H)Rupiah weaker(M)

Income Statement

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Revenue	Rp 4.5 T	Rp 4.6 T	Rp 4.2 T	Rp 4.6 T	Rp 5.5 T
Cost of Goods Sold	Rp 2.7 T	Rp 3.1 T	Rp 3.0 T	Rp 2.4 T	Rp 3.3 T
Gross Profit	Rp 1.9 T	Rp 1.4 T	Rp 1.2 T	Rp 2.1 T	Rp 2.2 T
Operating Income (EBIT)	Rp 1.6 T	Rp 1.2 T	Rp 908 M	Rp 1.9 T	Rp 2.0 T
Interest Expense	Rp 441 jt	Rp 676 jt	Rp 566 jt	Rp 653 jt	Rp 1.2 M
Net Income	Rp 992 M	Rp 1.0 T	Rp 762 M	Rp 1.5 T	Rp 1.9 T
Net Income Attributable to Owners	Rp 992 M	Rp 1.0 T	Rp 762 M	Rp 1.5 T	Rp 1.9 T
Depreciation & Amortization	Rp 373 M	Rp 360 M	Rp 385 M	Rp 382 M	Rp 383 M

Balance Sheet

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Cash & Equivalents	Rp 3.4 T	Rp 3.8 T	Rp 4.5 T	Rp 5.5 T	Rp 7.6 T
Accounts Receivable	Rp 172 M	Rp 226 M	Rp 33 M	Rp 511 M	Rp 40 M
Inventory	Rp 368 M	Rp 653 M	Rp 431 M	Rp 925 M	Rp 860 M
Current Assets	Rp 4.3 T	Rp 5.1 T	Rp 5.4 T	Rp 7.1 T	Rp 8.7 T
Total Assets	Rp 12 T	Rp 12 T	Rp 13 T	Rp 14 T	Rp 16 T
Accounts Payable	Rp 212 M	Rp 330 M	Rp 215 M	Rp 180 M	Rp 251 M
Current Liabilities	Rp 697 M	Rp 710 M	Rp 564 M	Rp 678 M	Rp 920 M
Total Liabilities	Rp 1.7 T	Rp 1.5 T	Rp 1.2 T	Rp 1.3 T	Rp 1.5 T
Total Interest-Bearing Debt	Rp 8.5 M	Rp 3.8 M	Rp 8.4 M	Rp 3.6 M	Rp 329 jt
Total Equity	Rp 10 T	Rp 11 T	Rp 11 T	Rp 13 T	Rp 14 T
Equity Attributable to Owners	Rp 10 T	Rp 11 T	Rp 11 T	Rp 13 T	Rp 14 T

Cash Flow Statement

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Operating Cash Flow	Rp 1.9 T	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 1.4 T	Rp 1.6 T	Rp 3.0 T
Capital Expenditure	Rp 308 M	Rp 321 M	Rp 369 M	Rp 376 M	Rp 433 M

Company Deep Analysis

Reviewed: 2026-07-31

Analyst Verdict

LSIP revenue (T IDR): 4.53 (2021) → 4.59 (2022) → 4.19 (2023) → 4.56 (2024) → 5.51 (2025). Gross margin: 41.1% → 31.4% → 27.5% → 46.8% → 39.9%. OPM: 35.7% → 26.4% → 21.7% → 42.1% → 35.4%. Net margin: 21.9% → 22.6% → 18.2% → 32.4% → 34.2%. ROE: 9.7% → 9.5% → 6.7% → 11.8% → 13.5%. ROA: 8.4% → 8.3% → 6.1% → 10.7% → 12.1%. D/E: 0.00× every year; net debt −3.36T → −3.84T → −4.50T → −5.45T → −7.60T (net cash, half of total equity by 2025). FCF (T IDR): +1.57 → +0.78 → +1.04 → +1.19 → +2.58. Current ratio: 6.18× → 7.20× → 9.53× → 10.50× → 9.45×. Asset turnover: 0.38× → 0.37× → 0.33× → 0.33× → 0.35×. The pattern is a classic price-taker cycle: the FY2023 CPO/rubber price trough cut ROE to 6.7%, and the FY2024–25 recovery lifted it to 13.5%, LSIP’s best of the five years, with revenue +21% in FY2025. One accounting artefact to note: FY2024 pairs a gross-margin spike (46.8%) with a year-end inventory build (DIO 139 days, CCC 153 days; cost capitalised into inventory mechanically lowers COGS); FY2025 normalises to DIO 95 days and GM 39.9%. The strategic tension is capital allocation: a zero-debt grower whose cash pile (Rp7.6tn ≈ 49% of assets) earns deposit yields drags blended returns; the fat-margin estate business earns well above the reported 13.5% ROE.

Business Model

Pure-upstream plantation company under the Salim group’s Indofood agribusiness chain: Salim Ivomas Pratama (SIMP) holds a controlling ~59.5% stake and consolidates LSIP. Grows oil palm on ~115,000 planted ha (North Sumatra core estates plus South Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Java), harvests FFB, mills CPO and palm kernel, and sells largely intra-group to the Salim/Indofood downstream (SIMP’s refineries). Two smaller lines diversify it slightly beyond CPO: legacy rubber estates (declining but cash-generative) and the Bah Lias research station’s certified oil-palm seed business; a high-margin, IP-like niche few IDX plantation peers have. No downstream brands of its own.

Segments

Palm products dominate (CPO + palm kernel, ~85–90% of revenue); rubber, seeds, cocoa and tea make up the remainder. Revenue is effectively [CPO volume × benchmark price] with a related-party twist: a large share of output is sold to the SIMP/Indofood group at market-referenced prices, so LSIP’s customer concentration is its own parent. The engine’s numbers show the commodity cycle cleanly: revenue bottomed FY2023 (Rp4.19tn, GM 27.5%) with the CPO price trough and El Niño, then recovered to Rp5.51tn / GM 39.9% in FY2025. The seed business (Bah Lias, “SumBio” varieties) and mature low-cost North Sumatra estates explain why LSIP’s gross margins (27.5–46.8%) run structurally above typical estate peers.

Value Chain & Positioning

Seed breeding (Bah Lias) → nursery → planting (4-yr pre-productive) → FFB harvest → own CPO mills → CPO + PK sold largely intra-group (SIMP refineries) → Bimoli/Palmia consumer products via the Indofood chain → domestic retail / biodiesel. Rubber: tapping → crumb rubber → tyre and glove industries.

Competitive Forces (Porter’s 5)

Supplier powerLow

How much leverage input/funding providers have over pricing.

Inputs are fertiliser (global commodity), local plantation labour at regional minimum wages, and its OWN certified seeds: LSIP is a net seed SELLER via Bah Lias, an input-side advantage most growers lack.

Implication → Fertiliser price swings (~15–20% of estate opex) are the main input risk; seed self-sufficiency slightly cushions replanting cost.

Buyer powerHigh

How much leverage customers have to push prices down.

CPO is priced off global benchmarks and a large share of LSIP volume is sold to its own controlling group (SIMP/Indofood) at market-referenced related-party terms. The buyer is concentrated by construction: the parent.

Implication → Zero pricing power on the commodity itself; minority shareholders additionally rely on related-party pricing discipline (audited, but a governance watch-item).

Threat of new entryLow

How easily new competitors can enter the market.

The forest moratorium blocks new plantation land; LSIP’s century-old land bank and mature estate cost position cannot be replicated. Its seed IP (Bah Lias, decades of breeding data) is a second, smaller barrier.

Implication → Defensive moat: protects the existing estate economics but also caps organic growth, which is why cash accumulates instead of being reinvested.

Threat of substitutesMedium

Risk that alternative products/services replace demand.

CPO competes with soybean/sunflower/rapeseed oils globally; EUDR-driven buyer selectivity is the market-access variant of substitution. LSIP’s rubber line faces synthetic-rubber substitution in parallel.

Implication → B40 domestic biodiesel absorption cushions export substitution risk; certification (ISPO/RSPO) is becoming the price of EU market access.

Competitive rivalryHigh

Intensity of competition among existing players.

Same global CPO benchmark as every producer: unlisted giants (Wilmar, Musim Mas, GAR/Sinar Mas, Permata Hijau) and listed peers (AALI, and parent SIMP itself) compete purely on yield per hectare and cost per tonne.

Implication → Estate age profile and replanting discipline decide relative cost position; LSIP’s older North Sumatra estates cut both ways: low book cost, rising replanting need.

Moat / Competitive Edge

Irreplaceable land bank under the moratorium, century-scale agronomic data, seed-breeding IP (Bah Lias), and the fortress balance sheet (net cash Rp7.6tn, zero debt) that lets LSIP survive any CPO trough without distress. None of it confers pricing power: the moat is survivability and cost, not economics of scale. The unresolved question the numbers pose: with no land to buy and replanting well-funded, the cash pile’s only value-accretive exits are dividends or buybacks.

Key Drivers & Sensitivities

CPO Price (global benchmark)
The single dominant variable. The FY2023 trough took net margin to 18.2% and ROE to 6.7%; the FY2024–25 recovery lifted them to 34.2% and 13.5%. With ~35% operating margins, each 10% CPO price move shifts LSIP EBIT roughly 15–25% (operating leverage on a stable cost base).
Capital allocation of the Rp7.6tn cash pile
Net cash equals ~49% of total assets (FY2025) and earns deposit yields, diluting ROE by several points versus the estate business alone. Every Rp1tn returned to shareholders (dividend/buyback) mechanically lifts ROE ~0.5–1.0 pp at current earnings; conversely, continued accumulation compounds the drag.
Estate age / replanting (yield trajectory)
Old North Sumatra estates need progressive replanting; each replanted hectare is unproductive ~4 years. Asset turnover already sits at just 0.33–0.38×: a yield dip on top of that directly compresses the revenue line (FY2023’s Rp4.19tn shows the shape).

Linkages

LSIP sits one level upstream of its own parent: LSIP CPO → SIMP refineries → Bimoli/Palmia brands → Indofood distribution (INDF, also a tracked comp) → Indonesian consumers. Macro hooks: CPO price cycle, B40 biodiesel absorption (BPDPKS), EUDR market access, El Niño/La Niña yield swings, rupiah (CPO is USD-linked revenue with IDR costs).

Recent Developments

FY2025 was the strongest year of the series and it was earned on the operating line, not borrowed. Revenue rose 20.8% to Rp5.51tn, net margin reached 34.2% and ROE 13.5%, both the highest of the five years. Free cash flow of Rp2.58tn was more than triple the Rp0.78tn trough of FY2022. The balance sheet carries no interest-bearing debt in any year of the window and closed FY2025 holding Rp7.60tn of cash, more than a full year of revenue. The swing rather than the level is the thing to watch: operating margin ran 35.7%, 26.4%, 21.7%, 42.1% and 35.4%, a spread of twenty points on a crop whose price the company does not set.

Regulation

ISPO mandatory certification; forest moratorium caps expansion; BPDPKS export levy funds the biodiesel subsidy (levy cost, but domestic demand floor); tiered CPO export tax (Bea Keluar); EUDR traceability for EU access from 2026. Related-party transactions with the SIMP/Indofood group are governed by OJK conflicted-transaction rules.

ESG & Sustainability

ISPO/RSPO certification programmes across estates; no-burn land management; plasma smallholder schemes. Century-old land tenure means legacy land-claim disputes surface periodically. Rubber and seed operations carry lower ESG risk than palm. EUDR traceability readiness is the material near-term ESG-to-revenue link.

Risks

CPO price trough (FY2023 pattern: ROE 6.7%, revenue −9%); the cycle always returns
Idle-cash drag becomes permanent if payout policy stays conservative: ROE stuck near cost of equity despite fat margins
Related-party sales concentration to the controlling SIMP/Indofood group (pricing and governance watch-item for minorities)
Estate age: replanting older North Sumatra blocks compresses near-term volume
EUDR non-compliance would close EU-bound channels; rubber segment in structural decline

Outlook & What to Watch

Base: CPO holding near FY2025 levels → ROE 11–14%, FCF Rp2–2.5tn/yr, cash keeps compounding. Bull: sustained CPO strength (B40/B50 + La Niña) plus a more generous payout → mid-teens ROE with a yield kicker. Bear: CPO retraces to the FY2023 trough → margins compress toward GM ~27%/ROE ~7%, though zero debt removes any solvency question; LSIP’s bear case is dull returns, never distress. (Interpretation, not a forecast.)

Key KPIs

CPO Price: Global benchmark: drives the entire margin stack (GM 27.5%→46.8% swing across the cycle)
Net Cash: Rp3.4tn → Rp7.6tn (FY21–25), zero debt every year: the fortress, and the ROE drag
ROE: 6.7% (trough) → 13.5% (FY25): capped by the cash pile despite 35%+ operating margins
FFB Yield / Estate Age: Replanting of old North Sumatra estates vs near-term volume: the operational trade-off
Payout Ratio: The lever that decides whether the cash pile compounds or returns to shareholders

Sources

Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.