Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | 2.44x | 0.24x | 0.32x | 0.27x |
| Interest burdendriver | 0.29x | 0.60x | 0.90x | 0.84x |
| Operating margin | 6.6% | 3.6% | 4.3% | 9.1% |
| Asset turnover | 0.19x | 0.41x | 0.54x | 0.38x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 1.55x | 1.41x | 1.46x | 1.59x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 1.4% | 0.3% | 1.0% | 1.3% |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 1.6% | 0.5% | 0.9% | 1.1% |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 2.85x | 2.19x | 1.92x | 1.62x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 2.37x | 1.39x | 1.26x | 1.20x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 1.70x | 0.81x | 0.58x | 0.34x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | $ 305 M | $ 426 M | $ 385 M | $ 346 M |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 0.39x | 0.21x | 0.29x | 0.40x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 0.55x | 0.41x | 0.46x | 0.59x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.25x | 0.15x | 0.20x | 0.25x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | $ 335 M | $ 202 M | $ 440 M | $ 752 M |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 1.42x | 2.52x | 10.48x | 6.43x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 1.55x | 1.41x | 1.46x | 1.59x |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 9.7% | 5.8% | 6.2% | 11.6% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 6.6% | 3.6% | 4.3% | 9.1% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 4.8% | 0.5% | 1.2% | 2.1% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | $ 48 M | $ 100 M | $ 166 M | $ 221 M |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 10.6% | 7.5% | 9.0% | 15.4% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 0.9% | 0.2% | 0.7% | 0.8% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 2.3% | 0.5% | 1.5% | 1.9% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 2.44x | 0.24x | 0.32x | 0.27x |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 0.29x | 0.60x | 0.90x | 0.84x |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 1.6% | 0.5% | 0.9% | 1.1% |
| Turnover | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.19x | 0.41x | 0.54x | 0.38x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 5.21x | 4.35x | 6.29x | 5.46x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 7.10x | 11.14x | 10.30x | 4.95x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 6.23x | 4.77x | 8.66x | 8.05x |
| Conversion Period | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 70.0 days | 84.0 days | 58.0 days | 66.9 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 51.4 days | 32.8 days | 35.4 days | 73.7 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 58.6 days | 76.5 days | 42.1 days | 45.3 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 62.8 days | 40.2 days | 51.3 days | 95.3 days |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | -$ 419 M | -$ 384 M | -$ 163 M | -$ 156 M |
Price Rp 505 · market cap Rp 55 T ($ 3.0 B at the cited rate; statements are filed in USD)
| Multiple | MBMA | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 102.16x | 16.25x(15/16) | +529% |
| P/B | 1.91x | 1.68x | +13% |
| P/S | 2.11x | 1.92x | +10% |
| EV/EBITDA | 20.50x | 10.31x | +99% |
| EV/EBIT | 34.65x | 14.25x | +143% |
| EV/Sales | 3.16x | 2.27x | +39% |
| FCF Yield | -5.15% | 0.01% | -49,015% |
| Dividend Yield | — | 5.27%(11/16) | — |
EV = mkt cap $ 3.0 B + debt $ 945 M − cash $ 193 M + minority interest $ 764 M = $ 4.5 B
not computable: negative or zero base-year FCF. Shown as-is rather than estimated.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 9.3–13.3% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
Mechanical DCF suppressed: on these default assumptions the modelled enterprise value falls BELOW net debt and minority interests, so the equity residual is negative. Equity cannot be worth less than nothing, so no per-share figure is published here: read it as the model saying the debt claims consume the whole enterprise at this discount rate and growth path, which is itself the signal. The components are shown below so the arithmetic stays checkable, and the sliders let you test what it would take to change the answer.
Cyclical normalization: Commodity/cyclical name: the trailing years are a sample drawn from the price cycle, not a trend. Defaults are therefore normalized, using the full-window mean margin with no cycle-position growth extrapolation. That normalized margin is itself the embedded commodity-price assumption.
Base year contains named one-off item(s): FY2023: IPO year: April 2023 listing at IDR 795 raising IDR 8.7 T, with 48% of proceeds allocated to debt repayment. The EBIT basis screens out most non-operating items, but read the Earnings Quality section before trusting the base margin.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 4.66% | US 10Y Treasury, 30 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.96 → 1.19 | Metals & Mining (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.31 |
| Cost of equity | 12.65% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 7.06% | median interest coverage 4.5x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2022–FY2025) implies a A2/A synthetic rating and a 0.78% default spread, over a 6.28% base (US 10Y 4.66% + Indonesia's 1.62% sovereign spread). Its BOOK rate is 2.2%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms) |
| Tax rate | 22.0% | statutory 22% (no clean effective-rate year in window) |
| WACC | 10.95% | 76% E × CoE + 24% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 2.5% | terminal growth from year 1, cyclical normalization: the delivered 3-yr CAGR (46.6%) reflects cycle position, not a trend |
| EBIT margin | 5.9% | full-cycle mean EBIT margin, FY2022–FY2025 (cyclical normalization: this margin is the embedded commodity-price assumption) |
| D&A / revenue | 5.0% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 18.1% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 10.9% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 22.8% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 5.8% of revenue against depreciation of 5.0%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | 7.8% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.6 B | $ 1.6 B | $ 1.7 B |
| EBIT | $ 87 M | $ 89 M | $ 91 M | $ 93 M | $ 96 M | $ 98 M |
| NOPAT | $ 68 M | $ 69 M | $ 71 M | $ 73 M | $ 75 M | $ 77 M |
| + D&A | $ 73 M | $ 75 M | $ 77 M | $ 79 M | $ 81 M | $ 83 M |
| − Capex | $ 266 M | $ 273 M | $ 280 M | $ 287 M | $ 294 M | $ 97 M |
| − ΔNWC | $ 2.8 M | $ 2.9 M | $ 2.9 M | $ 3.0 M | $ 3.1 M | $ 3.1 M |
| FCFF | -$ 128 M | -$ 131 M | -$ 135 M | -$ 138 M | -$ 141 M | $ 59 M |
| PV | -$ 116 M | -$ 107 M | -$ 99 M | -$ 91 M | -$ 84 M | $ 416 M |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding
EV = PV(explicit) -$ 496 M + PV(TV) $ 416 M = -$ 80 M · TV -521% of EV · − net debt $ 752 M − minority $ 764 M = equity -$ 1.6 B ÷ shares outstanding · per share is in USD, shown in IDR at 18,058
Model output: Rp -267/share (-153% vs price Rp 505)· exit-multiple check (10.3x): Rp -155
Under these assumptions the model lands 153% below today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for faster growth, a fatter margin, or a lower discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 9.9% | 10.9% | 11.9% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | -261 | -271 | -278 |
| 2.5% | -256 | -267 | -275 |
| 3.0% | -250 | -263 | -272 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $ 456 M | $ 1.3 B | $ 1.8 B | $ 1.4 B |
| Cost of Goods Sold | $ 411 M | $ 1.3 B | $ 1.7 B | $ 1.3 B |
| Gross Profit | $ 44 M | $ 77 M | $ 114 M | $ 166 M |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | $ 30 M | $ 47 M | $ 79 M | $ 131 M |
| Interest Expense | $ 21 M | $ 19 M | $ 7.6 M | $ 20 M |
| Net Income | $ 22 M | $ 6.9 M | $ 23 M | $ 30 M |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | $ 22 M | $ 6.9 M | $ 23 M | $ 30 M |
| Depreciation & Amortization | $ 18 M | $ 52 M | $ 86 M | $ 90 M |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $ 280 M | $ 290 M | $ 244 M | $ 193 M |
| Accounts Receivable | $ 64 M | $ 119 M | $ 179 M | $ 290 M |
| Inventory | $ 79 M | $ 288 M | $ 275 M | $ 232 M |
| Current Assets | $ 469 M | $ 784 M | $ 804 M | $ 905 M |
| Total Assets | $ 2.4 B | $ 3.3 B | $ 3.4 B | $ 3.7 B |
| Accounts Payable | $ 66 M | $ 262 M | $ 200 M | $ 157 M |
| Current Liabilities | $ 164 M | $ 358 M | $ 419 M | $ 559 M |
| Total Liabilities | $ 862 M | $ 954 M | $ 1.1 B | $ 1.4 B |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | $ 615 M | $ 492 M | $ 684 M | $ 945 M |
| Total Equity | $ 1.6 B | $ 2.3 B | $ 2.3 B | $ 2.3 B |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | $ 957 M | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.6 B | $ 1.6 B |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $ 109 M | -$ 15 M | $ 78 M | $ 37 M |
| Capital Expenditure | $ 528 M | $ 369 M | $ 242 M | $ 193 M |
MBMA gross margin: 9.74 % (2022) → 5.83 % (2023) → 6.19 % (2024) → 11.61 % (2025). OPM: 6.62 % → 3.55 % → 4.31 % → 9.13 %. Net margin: 4.75 % → 0.52 % (2023 low) → 1.23 % → 2.06 % (2025 high, still thin). ROE: 2.26 % → 0.45 % (2023 low) → 1.47 % → 1.87 %. ROIC: 1.59 % → 0.46 % → 0.90 % → 1.13 %. Asset turnover: 0.19× → 0.41× → 0.54× (peak) → 0.38×. D/E: 0.39× → 0.21× → 0.29× → 0.40× (2025 high); L/E: 0.55× → 0.41× → 0.46× → 0.59×. Net debt: $335.0 M (2022) → $202.2 M (2023, improved) → $440.1 M (2024, worsened) → $752.3 M (2025, worst); more than doubled since 2022 despite the IPO proceeds. Interest coverage: 1.42× (2022, dangerously thin) → 2.52× → 10.48× (2024 high) → 6.43× (2025); the most volatile, non-monotonic coverage trajectory of any company tracked in this project. FCF (USD): −$419.0 M → −$384.4 M → −$163.3 M → −$155.6 M; negative all 4 years, though the burn rate has slowed. Current ratio: 2.85× → 2.19× → 1.92× → 1.62×; declining every year, still above 1× but the trend is worth watching. Revenue (USD): $455.7 M → $1,328.3 M → $1,844.7 M (2024 peak) → $1,434.5 M (2025, −22.2 %). This is the weakest financial profile of any mining-metals name in this project by margin and ROE: a genuine, still-unresolved capital-intensive build-out, not yet a proven business at scale.
Nickel ore comes from the SCM mine project and from third parties, feeding a smelting complex whose capacity was built ahead of the mine supplying it.
EconomicsUnlike INCO and NCKL, the ore is not wholly captive, so part of the input carries a third-party margin. That shows in the gross margin, which never exceeded 11.61% in four years against NCKL’s 32.69% floor.
The ZHN RKEF smelter converts ore into nickel pig iron and matte, with the AIM and HPAL 1a projects intended to add battery-grade output.
EconomicsThis is where FY2025 turned. EBIT rose 64.75%, from USD 79.5m to USD 130.9m, while revenue FELL 22.24%, from USD 1,844.7m to USD 1,434.5m. Operating margin went 4.31% to 9.13% and gross margin 6.19% to 11.61%, both the best of the four years. Fewer tonnes at better economics is a genuine improvement in the processing step.
Output sells into the same LME-priced battery-metals market as INCO and NCKL, against the Chinese-JV RKEF and HPAL cluster.
EconomicsPrice is taken, as it is for every name in this group. What differs is that MBMA converts less of each dollar: net income of USD 29.6m was 22.58% of EBIT of USD 130.9m in FY2025, with interest expense of USD 20.4m taking 15.54% of EBIT on its own.
Receivable days ran 51.40, 32.76, 35.44 and then 73.73 in FY2025.
EconomicsThis is the step that undid the smelting gain. Receivable days more than doubled in FY2025, up 38.29 days or 108.06%, in the same year revenue fell 22.24%. The cash cycle stretched from 51.34 to 95.28 days, and operating cash flow fell 52.62% even as EBIT rose 64.75%.
Cost structureCost of goods sold absorbed 90.26% of revenue in FY2022 and 88.39% in FY2025, having peaked at 94.17% in FY2023. This is a thin-margin conversion business, and the four-year range is narrow: gross margin of 9.74%, 5.83%, 6.19% and 11.61%. Set against NCKL, which never fell below 31.31% gross margin in five years, the gap is not cyclical timing, because both sold into the same nickel market in the same years. It reflects a different position in the chain: MBMA converts, NCKL owns the ore body and refines to the end product.
Cash cycleCash conversion cycle: 62.81 days (FY2022), 40.21, 51.34, then 95.28 days (FY2025). The FY2025 deterioration is entirely receivables: inventory days rose only 8.83 (58.04 to 66.87) and payable days rose 3.18 (42.14 to 45.32), while receivable days rose 38.29 (35.44 to 73.73). Customers are taking twice as long to pay in a year when volumes fell. That is the single most important operating fact in this file.
Unit economicsAsset turnover ran 0.19, 0.41, 0.54 and 0.38 times. The FY2022 figure is a build-phase artefact, assets on the balance sheet not yet selling anything; the FY2025 fall back to 0.38 is not, because by then the assets were operating. Revenue per unit of asset has gone backwards while the asset base kept growing.
MBMA controls its own mining (SCM) and processing (ZHN RKEF, HPAL 1a) assets under construction, reducing long-run third-party dependency once the build-out completes: though during construction it depends heavily on EPC contractors and equipment suppliers.
Implication → Construction-phase supplier/contractor dependency is a real, if temporary, risk layered on top of the company's already-thin margins.
Nickel is increasingly LME-benchmark-priced as MBMA scales, the same price-taker dynamic as INCO and NCKL; battery-materials buyers (EV/cathode makers) have multiple competing Indonesian and Chinese-JV suppliers to choose from.
Implication → MBMA cannot price its way to better margins: utilisation and cost control at the newly-built smelter/mine assets are the only levers available.
Nickel processing (RKEF/HPAL) is capital-intensive enough to deter casual entrants, but MBMA's own experience: a multi-year, multi-project build-out still not fully reflected in profitability 3 years post-IPO; shows entry is neither cheap nor fast even for a well-capitalised, MDKA-backed entrant.
Implication → The barrier protects incumbents once built out, but the build-out period itself is where MBMA currently sits: a multi-year execution risk, not yet a competitive advantage.
Battery-grade nickel/cobalt sits on the structurally-favoured side of the energy transition (EV/battery demand growth), unlike thermal coal: a genuine long-run demand tailwind shared with INCO and NCKL.
Implication → The long-run demand backdrop is favourable: MBMA's challenge is near-term execution and profitability, not a structurally shrinking market.
MBMA competes with INCO and NCKL's established HPAL/matte operations and with Chinese-JV RKEF/HPAL players (Huayou/QMB, named in the industry's own prose) for the same nickel/cobalt battery-materials demand: as a still-building entrant, it is not yet competing from a position of operational strength.
Implication → MBMA is a scale-disadvantaged, margin-disadvantaged challenger relative to INCO/NCKL today: its investment case rests on the build-out eventually closing that gap, not on current performance.
The FY2025 profit improvement is real at the operating line and did not reach cash. EBIT rose 64.75% and operating margin nearly doubled to 9.13%, both genuine. In the same year operating cash flow fell 52.62%, from USD 78.5m to USD 37.2m, and receivable days rose 108.06%. Operating cash flow as a share of EBIT collapsed from 98.76% to 28.40%. The pattern, profit up and receivables up faster while cash falls, is the classic accrual-quality warning, and it is the reason this narrative treats the FY2025 turn as unproven rather than as a trend. One further caution on the base: net income of USD 29.6m is 22.58% of EBIT, so small movements below the operating line swing the reported result heavily.
| Period | One-off item | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| FY2023 | IPO year: April 2023 listing at IDR 795 raising IDR 8.7 T, with 48% of proceeds allocated to debt repayment | The recapitalisation is why total debt dipped from USD 615.3m (FY2022) to USD 492.4m (FY2023) before rising to USD 944.9m by FY2025. Any leverage trend measured from the FY2023 trough rather than the FY2022 starting point understates the build in debt. |
Cash conversionWeak, and weaker than the headline ratio suggests. Operating cash flow of USD 37.2m against net income of USD 29.6m is 1.258 times, which looks adequate only because net income is small. Against EBIT the same cash flow is 28.40%, down from 98.76% a year earlier. Across all four years operating cash flow totalled USD 209.1m while capital expenditure totalled USD 1,331.4m, so investment ran at 6.37 times the cash the business produced. Free cash flow was negative in every one of the four years and cumulated to negative USD 1,122.3m, equal to negative 22.17% of cumulative revenue.
A builder, unambiguously, and one that has not yet shown the return. Over FY2022 to FY2025 MBMA spent USD 1,331.4m of capital expenditure against USD 209.1m of operating cash flow, a ratio of 6.37 times. The gap was funded by the April 2023 IPO and by debt: net debt rose from USD 335.0m to USD 752.3m, and total debt from USD 615.3m to USD 944.9m. Non-controlling interests hold 32.56% of consolidated equity, so a third of the asset base built with this capital is owned by partners rather than by MBMA shareholders. Judged on the standard question, did the capital create value, four years of evidence say not yet: ROIC has never exceeded 1.59%.
DeploymentCapital expenditure fell each year, USD 527.9m, USD 368.9m, USD 241.8m and USD 192.8m, which reads as a build passing its peak. FY2025 spending was still 13.44% of revenue and 2.13 times depreciation of USD 90.4m, so it remains growth spending rather than maintenance. No dividend has been paid; the dividend yield is not meaningful. Every dollar generated and every dollar raised has gone into the asset base.
Returns trendROIC ran 1.59%, 0.46%, 0.90% and 1.13% against an engine WACC of 10.95% and a discount band of 9.3% / 11.3% / 13.3%. MBMA missed its cost of capital in all four years, by 9.36, 10.49, 10.04 and 9.82 percentage points, and has never come within nine points of it. This is the widest return shortfall of the four nickel-complex names tracked here. It also explains why the valuation panel shows no fair value: MBMA is one of the names the model suppresses because the equity residual comes out below zero. Against that, the market pays 1.91 times book and 102.16 times earnings. The gap between what the record shows and what the price assumes is the whole investment question here, and this narrative does not resolve it in the buyer’s favour.
In FY2025 EBIT rose 64.75% while operating cash flow fell 52.62% and receivable days rose 108.06%, from 35.44 to 73.73. Operating cash flow against EBIT fell from 98.76% to 28.40%. All three moved the wrong way together, in a year revenue fell 22.24%. Until the receivables convert, the FY2025 margin recovery should not be treated as earnings.
Four-year capital expenditure of USD 1,331.4m against operating cash flow of USD 209.1m is 6.37 times. Free cash flow was negative in all four years and cumulated to negative USD 1,122.3m. Net debt rose from USD 335.0m to USD 752.3m. The build is financed, not self-funded, and the financing gap has not begun to close.
ROIC of 1.59%, 0.46%, 0.90% and 1.13% against a WACC of 10.95%. The shortfall has never been narrower than 9.36 percentage points. Three years after a well-funded IPO, the capital deployed is not earning its hurdle.
MBMA is one of the companies whose discounted-cash-flow output is suppressed because the modelled equity residual falls below zero. The valuation panel is blank by design, not by omission. A reader should treat the absence as information: on the project’s own assumptions, the modelled enterprise value does not cover the debt.
Minorities held 38.63% of consolidated equity at FY2022 and 32.56% at FY2025. Consolidated revenue, assets and EBIT are reported in full while roughly a third of the underlying equity belongs to partners. Per-share measures built off consolidated figures overstate the shareholder claim by that margin.
Two structural caveats, disclosed rather than hidden. First, only FY2022 to FY2025 are tracked; FY2021 predates the entity’s consolidated public existence, so no five-year comparison with INCO, NCKL or MDKA is possible. Second, MBMA is MDKA’s consolidated nickel sub-holding, and MBMA’s revenue equals 75.71% of MDKA’s consolidated revenue in FY2025. MBMA and MDKA are therefore not two independent observations, and no comparison in this project should treat them as such.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Indonesia controls >60 % of global nickel supply and is the world's largest thermal-coal exporter; hilirisasi mandates in-country ore processing, reshaping value chains from raw ore to battery-grade products.