Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burdendriver | 0.57x | 1.39x | — | — | -2.80x |
| Interest burden | 0.70x | 0.37x | -0.06x | -0.01x | 0.15x |
| Operating margin | 23.5% | 12.9% | 5.7% | 5.3% | 7.7% |
| Asset turnover | 0.30x | 0.22x | 0.34x | 0.43x | 0.33x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 1.64x | 1.91x | 1.80x | 1.80x | 1.95x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 4.6% | 2.9% | — | — | -2.1% |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 5.3% | 3.8% | — | — | — |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 1.38x | 1.48x | 1.33x | 1.10x | 1.25x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 0.94x | 1.07x | 0.84x | 0.70x | 0.87x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 0.62x | 0.73x | 0.57x | 0.41x | 0.32x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | $ 114 M | $ 291 M | $ 297 M | $ 115 M | $ 280 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 0.48x | 0.70x | 0.57x | 0.60x | 0.71x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 0.64x | 0.91x | 0.80x | 0.80x | 0.95x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.30x | 0.36x | 0.32x | 0.34x | 0.36x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | $ 192 M | $ 968 M | $ 1.1 B | $ 1.3 B | $ 1.7 B |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 3.37x | 1.60x | 0.95x | 0.99x | 1.18x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 1.64x | 1.91x | 1.80x | 1.80x | 1.95x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 31.5% | 18.9% | 8.5% | 7.9% | 11.4% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 23.5% | 12.9% | 5.7% | 5.3% | 7.7% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 9.5% | 6.7% | -1.2% | -2.5% | -3.3% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | $ 197 M | $ 228 M | $ 238 M | $ 328 M | $ 372 M |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 51.6% | 26.2% | 14.0% | 14.6% | 19.6% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 2.8% | 1.5% | -0.4% | -1.1% | -1.1% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 4.8% | 5.8% | -2.2% | -6.0% | -7.8% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 0.57x | 1.39x | — | — | -2.80x |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 0.70x | 0.37x | -0.06x | -0.01x | 0.15x |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 5.3% | 3.8% | — | — | — |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.30x | 0.22x | 0.34x | 0.43x | 0.33x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 1.98x | 2.81x | 3.52x | 4.54x | 3.98x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 642.94x | 13.20x | 14.15x | 12.45x | 5.69x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 8.81x | 6.43x | 5.14x | 8.63x | 7.79x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 183.9 days | 129.8 days | 103.7 days | 80.3 days | 91.7 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 0.6 days | 27.6 days | 25.8 days | 29.3 days | 64.1 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 41.4 days | 56.7 days | 71.1 days | 42.3 days | 46.8 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 143.0 days | 100.7 days | 58.4 days | 67.4 days | 109.0 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | $ 22 M | -$ 286 M | -$ 554 M | -$ 272 M | -$ 292 M |
Price Rp 2,719 · market cap Rp 66 T ($ 3.7 B at the cited rate; statements are filed in USD)
| Multiple | MDKA | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | NM | 16.25x(15/16) | — |
| P/B | 4.65x | 1.68x | +176% |
| P/S | 1.94x | 1.92x | +1% |
| EV/EBITDA | 20.26x | 10.31x | +96% |
| EV/EBIT | 51.38x | 14.25x | +261% |
| EV/Sales | 3.98x | 2.27x | +75% |
| FCF Yield | -7.93% | 0.01% | -75,369% |
| Dividend Yield | 0.45% | 5.27%(11/16) | -91% |
EV = mkt cap $ 3.7 B + debt $ 2.1 B − cash $ 355 M + minority interest $ 2.1 B = $ 7.5 B
not computable: negative or zero base-year FCF. Shown as-is rather than estimated.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 9.3–13.3% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
Mechanical DCF suppressed: on these default assumptions the modelled enterprise value falls BELOW net debt and minority interests, so the equity residual is negative. Equity cannot be worth less than nothing, so no per-share figure is published here: read it as the model saying the debt claims consume the whole enterprise at this discount rate and growth path, which is itself the signal. The components are shown below so the arithmetic stays checkable, and the sliders let you test what it would take to change the answer.
Cyclical normalization: Commodity/cyclical name: the trailing years are a sample drawn from the price cycle, not a trend. Defaults are therefore normalized, using the full-window mean margin with no cycle-position growth extrapolation. That normalized margin is itself the embedded commodity-price assumption.
Base year contains named one-off item(s): FY2022: Step change in the consolidation: MBMA enters the group numbers at scale. The EBIT basis screens out most non-operating items, but read the Earnings Quality section before trusting the base margin.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 4.66% | US 10Y Treasury, 30 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.96 → 1.31 | Metals & Mining (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.57 |
| Cost of equity | 13.44% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 15.13% | median interest coverage 1.2x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a Caa/CCC synthetic rating and a 8.85% default spread, over a 6.28% base (US 10Y 4.66% + Indonesia's 1.62% sovereign spread). Its BOOK rate is 6.0%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms) |
| Tax rate | 35.0% | median effective rate FY2021–FY2025 computed to 42.7%, CLAMPED to 35%: above that ceiling the pretax approximation is carrying minority interests, which are already deducted separately from enterprise value, rather than tax |
| WACC | 12.14% | 64% E × CoE + 36% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 2.5% | terminal growth from year 1, cyclical normalization: the delivered 4-yr CAGR (49.3%) reflects cycle position, not a trend |
| EBIT margin | 11.0% | full-cycle mean EBIT margin, FY2021–FY2025 (cyclical normalization: this margin is the embedded commodity-price assumption) |
| D&A / revenue | 9.8% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 28.0% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 12.1% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 20.6% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 11.0% of revenue against depreciation of 9.8%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | 13.9% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | $ 1.9 B | $ 2.0 B | $ 2.0 B | $ 2.1 B | $ 2.1 B | $ 2.2 B |
| EBIT | $ 214 M | $ 220 M | $ 225 M | $ 231 M | $ 236 M | $ 242 M |
| NOPAT | $ 139 M | $ 143 M | $ 146 M | $ 150 M | $ 154 M | $ 158 M |
| + D&A | $ 191 M | $ 196 M | $ 201 M | $ 206 M | $ 211 M | $ 216 M |
| − Capex | $ 543 M | $ 557 M | $ 571 M | $ 585 M | $ 600 M | $ 241 M |
| − ΔNWC | $ 6.6 M | $ 6.7 M | $ 6.9 M | $ 7.1 M | $ 7.3 M | $ 7.4 M |
| FCFF | -$ 220 M | -$ 225 M | -$ 231 M | -$ 236 M | -$ 242 M | $ 125 M |
| PV | -$ 196 M | -$ 179 M | -$ 164 M | -$ 150 M | -$ 137 M | $ 732 M |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding
EV = PV(explicit) -$ 825 M + PV(TV) $ 732 M = -$ 93 M · TV -789% of EV · − net debt $ 1.7 B − minority $ 2.1 B = equity -$ 4.0 B ÷ shares outstanding · per share is in USD, shown in IDR at 18,058
Model output: Rp -2,922/share (-207% vs price Rp 2,719)· exit-multiple check (10.3x): Rp -1,540
Under these assumptions the model lands 207% below today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for faster growth, a fatter margin, or a lower discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 11.1% | 12.1% | 13.1% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | -2,881 | -2,948 | -2,999 |
| 2.5% | -2,848 | -2,922 | -2,979 |
| 3.0% | -2,810 | -2,894 | -2,958 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $ 381 M | $ 870 M | $ 1.7 B | $ 2.2 B | $ 1.9 B |
| Cost of Goods Sold | $ 261 M | $ 705 M | $ 1.6 B | $ 2.1 B | $ 1.7 B |
| Gross Profit | $ 120 M | $ 165 M | $ 146 M | $ 176 M | $ 216 M |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | $ 90 M | $ 112 M | $ 97 M | $ 119 M | $ 147 M |
| Interest Expense | $ 27 M | $ 70 M | $ 102 M | $ 120 M | $ 125 M |
| Net Income | $ 36 M | $ 58 M | -$ 21 M | -$ 56 M | -$ 62 M |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | $ 36 M | $ 58 M | -$ 21 M | -$ 56 M | -$ 62 M |
| Depreciation & Amortization | $ 107 M | $ 116 M | $ 141 M | $ 209 M | $ 225 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $ 185 M | $ 444 M | $ 519 M | $ 451 M | $ 355 M |
| Accounts Receivable | $ 593 K | $ 66 M | $ 121 M | $ 180 M | $ 333 M |
| Inventory | $ 131 M | $ 251 M | $ 444 M | $ 454 M | $ 422 M |
| Current Assets | $ 411 M | $ 896 M | $ 1.2 B | $ 1.2 B | $ 1.4 B |
| Total Assets | $ 1.3 B | $ 3.9 B | $ 5.0 B | $ 5.2 B | $ 5.7 B |
| Accounts Payable | $ 30 M | $ 110 M | $ 304 M | $ 239 M | $ 215 M |
| Current Liabilities | $ 297 M | $ 605 M | $ 909 M | $ 1.1 B | $ 1.1 B |
| Total Liabilities | $ 499 M | $ 1.9 B | $ 2.2 B | $ 2.3 B | $ 2.8 B |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | $ 378 M | $ 1.4 B | $ 1.6 B | $ 1.8 B | $ 2.1 B |
| Total Equity | $ 779 M | $ 2.0 B | $ 2.8 B | $ 2.9 B | $ 2.9 B |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | $ 756 M | $ 1.0 B | $ 927 M | $ 922 M | $ 791 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $ 133 M | $ 463 M | $ 57 M | $ 149 M | $ 264 M |
| Capital Expenditure | $ 111 M | $ 749 M | $ 611 M | $ 421 M | $ 555 M |
MDKA gross margin: 31.5 % (2021) → 18.9 % (2022) → 8.5 % (2023) → 7.9 % (2024) → 11.4 % (2025). OPM: 23.5 % → 12.9 % → 5.7 % → 5.3 % → 7.7 %. Net margin: 9.5 % → 6.7 % → −1.2 % → −2.5 % → −3.3 %. ROE: 4.8 % → 5.8 % → −2.2 % → −6.0 % → −7.8 %. EBITDA margin: 51.6 % → 26.2 % → 14.0 % → 14.6 % → 19.6 %. D/E: 0.49 → 0.70 → 0.58 → 0.60 → 0.71. Interest coverage: 3.4× → 1.6× → 0.95× → 0.99× → 1.2×. FCF (USD): +22 M → −286 M → −554 M → −272 M → −292 M; negative for four straight years. Net debt (USD): 0.19 B → 0.97 B → 1.07 B → 1.30 B → 1.73 B. Revenue (USD): 0.38 B → 0.87 B → 1.71 B → 2.24 B → 1.90 B. The tension is stark: MDKA built a large, diversified, revenue-generating platform, but the nickel/downstream ramp landed straight into the 2023–2025 nickel-price crash, so EBITDA (still positive, ~14–20 % margin) is consumed by depreciation and interest, leaving net losses and sub-1×-to-1.2× interest coverage. This is a balance-sheet-stress-plus-execution story, not a quality-compounding one; the investment case is entirely forward-looking: Pani gold (first pour 1Q26, high-margin), the AIM nickel project ramp, and a nickel-price recovery must lift EBITDA enough to cover the now-USD 1.73 B net-debt service and restore positive net income.
Tujuh Bukit oxide heap leach produces gold doré and Wetar produces copper cathode through SX-EW. These are the legs that were profitable before the nickel build began.
EconomicsThe shape of FY2021 shows what these assets alone can do: gross margin 31.53%, operating margin 23.53%, and the only positive free cash flow of the five years at USD 21.9m. Every year since has mixed that economics with something structurally thinner.
The nickel and battery-materials leg runs through MBMA, a separately listed subsidiary that MDKA consolidates in full.
EconomicsThis step now dominates the income statement. MBMA’s own reported revenue equals 52.39%, 77.83%, 82.39% and 75.71% of MDKA’s consolidated revenue across FY2022 to FY2025. Three-quarters of what the consolidated top line reports is a leg whose own gross margin ran between 5.83% and 11.61%, against 31.53% for the consolidated group in FY2021 before MBMA scaled, and that arithmetic is most of the reason consolidated gross margin fell from 31.53% to 11.42%.
The expansion was paid for with debt at the parent and with equity sold at the subsidiaries rather than at MDKA itself.
EconomicsTotal assets rose 4.46 times, from USD 1,278.6m to USD 5,707.4m. Total debt rose 5.51 times, from USD 377.8m to USD 2,080.6m. Equity attributable to MDKA owners rose 4.75%, from USD 755.6m to USD 791.5m. The asset base multiplied; the owners’ book claim on it did not.
Interest is paid ahead of shareholders, and the interest bill grew faster than the operating profit funding it.
EconomicsInterest expense rose 4.68 times, from USD 26.6m to USD 124.5m, while EBIT rose from USD 89.6m to USD 146.7m. In FY2025 interest consumed 84.89% of EBIT. In FY2023 and FY2024 it consumed more than all of it: interest coverage printed 0.945 and 0.995 times. This step, not the mining, is where the shareholder return currently goes.
Cost structureCost of goods sold absorbed 68.47% of revenue in FY2021 and 88.58% in FY2025, peaking at 92.12% in FY2024. The deterioration is a mix effect more than a cost effect: the group did not become worse at mining gold, it became mostly a nickel-conversion business, and nickel conversion carries the margins visible at MBMA (gross margin 5.83% to 11.61%). Consolidated gross margin of 31.53%, 18.93%, 8.54%, 7.88% and 11.42% is the weighted average of two very different businesses, and the weights moved.
Cash cycleCash conversion cycle: 143.02 days (FY2021), then 100.68, 58.45, 67.37 and 109.01 days (FY2025). The FY2025 widening is receivables: receivable days more than doubled from 29.32 to 64.12, the same deterioration visible at MBMA over the same year, which is expected given MBMA sits inside these numbers. Inventory days of 91.72 remain the largest single component, consistent with a group carrying ore, doré and cathode across several sites.
Unit economicsDepreciation and amortisation of USD 225.4m exceeded EBIT of USD 146.7m by 1.54 times in FY2025. Read alongside interest of USD 124.5m, the ranking is stark: the asset base consumes more each year in depreciation than the operation earns in EBIT, and the lenders take most of what is left.
MDKA owns its orebodies (Tujuh Bukit, Pani, Wetar; SCM via MBMA). Equipment, reagents (cyanide/acid for leaching), and contractors are competitively sourced. Power and reductant (coal/electricity) for the RKEF nickel smelters are a meaningful input cost tied to energy prices.
Implication → Input side is not the problem: the margin issue is output-price (nickel) and capital cost (interest on the build), not supplier leverage.
Gold (LBMA), copper (LME) and nickel products (LME-linked, plus negotiated payables for NPI/matte to Chinese buyers) are all benchmark-priced: MDKA is a price-taker across the board. Nickel intermediates in particular are sold into a Chinese-buyer-dominated market that set weak terms during the 2023–2025 oversupply.
Implication → No pricing power anywhere. Returns depend on cost position and metal-price decks, and the nickel leg entered service into the worst of the price cycle.
Large gold and copper deposits (Pani, Tujuh Bukit) are geologically scarce and permit-gated; nickel processing requires USD-billion RKEF/HPAL capex. But MDKA competes for capital against better-capitalised nickel players (Tsingshan-linked complexes, Harita/NCKL, Vale/INCO): entry into nickel is well-funded and crowded, which is part of the oversupply pressure.
Implication → MDKA’s gold/copper deposits are defensible; its nickel position sits inside a crowded, well-funded, oversupplied segment where scale and cost leaders (not MDKA) set the pace.
Copper and gold have no viable substitutes (electrification metal; store of value). Nickel faces chemistry substitution risk: LFP batteries (no nickel) have gained share versus NMC, softening the long-run nickel-demand slope that MDKA’s downstream bet relies on.
Implication → The gold/copper legs are on the right side of substitution; the nickel leg carries both a price-cycle and an LFP-chemistry demand risk: a double exposure that the 2023–2025 results made visible.
Gold/copper: MDKA is a mid-tier Indonesian producer among global majors. Nickel (via MBMA): intense competition from Tsingshan/IMIP-IWIP complexes, Harita (NCKL), Vale (INCO) and Chinese-backed HPAL; the segment’s post-2020 capacity flood is exactly what crashed prices and MDKA’s downstream margins. Rivalry is on delivered cost and processing efficiency.
Implication → MDKA is a price- and margin-taker in the most competitive part of its portfolio. The differentiator has to come from the gold assets (Pani scale, Tujuh Bukit grade), not from out-competing the nickel giants.
The losses are real, they are not accounting artefacts, and they are widening: net income of USD 36.1m, USD 58.4m, then negative USD 20.7m, negative USD 55.8m and negative USD 62.1m. What makes this file unusual is that the operating line is not the problem. EBIT was positive in all five years and rose in FY2025 to USD 146.7m. The loss is manufactured below EBIT, by an interest bill that rose 4.68 times to USD 124.5m. The engine states this in its own way: it declines to publish ROIC for FY2023, FY2024 and FY2025, and the two reasons it gives ARE the diagnosis. For FY2023 and FY2024 the stated reason is that EBIT or pretax income was not positive, meaning operating profit did not cover interest. For FY2025 the stated reason is that the net result is a loss caused by non-operating items, so operating profit after tax is not meaningful. An abstention with a reason attached is a more useful disclosure than a number would have been.
| Period | One-off item | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| FY2022 | Step change in the consolidation: MBMA enters the group numbers at scale | Consolidated revenue rose from USD 381.0m to USD 869.9m while MBMA’s own revenue was USD 455.7m, 52.39% of the consolidated total, rising to 82.39% by FY2024. Any FY2021 to FY2025 growth rate for MDKA is measuring a change in what is consolidated as much as a change in trading, and should not be read as organic growth. |
Cash conversionOperating cash flow of USD 263.9m in FY2025 was 179.88% of EBIT, up from 125.31%, and it is not a sign of quality: depreciation of USD 225.4m is 1.54 times EBIT, so most of that cash is the depreciation charge returning rather than profit converting. The test that matters is cash against investment, and there the record is unbroken. Free cash flow was positive once in five years, USD 21.9m in FY2021, then negative USD 285.7m, negative USD 553.7m, negative USD 272.1m and negative USD 291.5m. Cumulative five-year free cash flow is negative USD 1,381.1m against cumulative revenue of USD 7,091.4m, or negative 19.48%. Capital expenditure absorbed 229.55% of operating cash flow across the window.
Diluter is the accurate label, with one precision attached: the dilution happened at the subsidiaries rather than through issuing MDKA shares. Over five years total assets rose 4.46 times and total equity rose 3.75 times, but equity attributable to MDKA owners rose 4.75%, from USD 755.6m to USD 791.5m. The difference went to minorities, whose stake rose from USD 23.8m to USD 2,133.4m, or from 3.06% to 72.94% of consolidated equity. Nearly three-quarters of the book equity underpinning this group is now owned by someone other than an MDKA shareholder. That is the single most important structural fact about this company, and it is invisible in any revenue, EBITDA or asset figure, all of which are reported at 100%.
DeploymentFive years of capital expenditure totalled USD 2,447.1m: USD 111.0m, USD 748.7m, USD 610.8m, USD 421.2m and USD 555.4m, against operating cash flow of USD 1,066.0m. FY2025 spending of USD 555.4m was 29.31% of revenue and 2.46 times depreciation, and it rose year on year rather than tapering, unlike at MBMA. The gap was bridged with debt, which rose from USD 377.8m to USD 2,080.6m, and with subsidiary equity. A dividend was paid at a 0.45% yield while the group ran a net loss.
Returns trendROIC was 5.29% and 3.75% in FY2021 and FY2022, against an engine WACC of 12.14% and a discount band of 9.3% / 11.3% / 13.3%: short of the hurdle by 6.85 and 8.39 percentage points in the two years it can be measured at all. For FY2023 to FY2025 the engine abstains, for the reasons quoted above. Return on equity ran 4.78%, 5.82%, negative 2.23%, negative 6.05% and negative 7.84%. Against that record, MDKA trades at 4.65 times book, the highest price-to-book of the four nickel-complex names tracked here, while NCKL, which cleared its cost of capital in all five years, trades at 1.46 times. The name with the weakest returns of the four carries the highest multiple, and the name with the strongest carries a multiple less than a third as large. That is the comparison this matched set exists to make, and it is stated as an observation about these four companies at this price date, not as a valuation call.
Interest coverage printed 3.369, 1.599, 0.945, 0.995 and 1.178 times. In FY2023 and FY2024 EBIT did not cover the interest bill at all. In FY2025 interest of USD 124.5m took 84.89% of EBIT of USD 146.7m. Interest expense has risen 4.68 times in five years. This is the binding constraint on the equity: until EBIT grows well clear of the interest line, the operating business is working mainly for its lenders.
Total assets rose 4.46 times while equity attributable to MDKA owners rose 4.75%, from USD 755.6m to USD 791.5m. Non-controlling interests went from 3.06% to 72.94% of consolidated equity, USD 23.8m to USD 2,133.4m. The growth was financed by selling equity in the assets rather than at the parent, so consolidated revenue, EBITDA and asset figures materially overstate what accrues to an MDKA shareholder.
Net income of negative USD 20.7m (FY2023), negative USD 55.8m (FY2024) and negative USD 62.1m (FY2025), with return on equity falling to negative 7.84%. The losses widened in each year despite EBIT rising in FY2025, which locates the problem below the operating line rather than in trading.
Free cash flow was negative in four of five years and cumulated to negative USD 1,381.1m, or negative 19.48% of cumulative revenue. Capital expenditure absorbed 229.55% of operating cash flow and rose again in FY2025, to USD 555.4m or 29.31% of revenue, rather than tapering. Total debt rose 5.51 times over the same period. Unlike MBMA, whose capital expenditure has fallen every year, MDKA’s spending has not yet turned down.
The engine publishes no ROIC for FY2023, FY2024 or FY2025. The stated reasons are that EBIT or pretax income was not positive (FY2023, FY2024) and that the net result is a loss caused by non-operating items (FY2025). The abstention is deliberate and is recorded here as information rather than as a gap: a return on operating capital cannot be honestly reported when operating profit did not survive the interest line.
MBMA is consolidated in full into these figures and its own reported revenue equals 75.71% of MDKA’s consolidated revenue in FY2025 (52.39%, 77.83% and 82.39% in the three prior years). MDKA and MBMA are therefore not independent observations, and any peer table in this project that lists both is double-counting the nickel platform. No attempt is made here to strip MBMA out of MDKA’s EBIT or margins, because consolidation eliminations and holding-company costs make that subtraction unreliable from the seeded statements.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Indonesia controls >60 % of global nickel supply and is the world's largest thermal-coal exporter; hilirisasi mandates in-country ore processing, reshaping value chains from raw ore to battery-grade products.