Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | 0.87x | 0.66x | 0.66x | 0.75x | 0.46x |
| Interest burden | 0.70x | 0.80x | 0.82x | 0.87x | 0.89x |
| Operating margin | 16.5% | 17.4% | 14.1% | 13.8% | 13.2% |
| Asset turnoverdriver | 0.40x | 0.50x | 0.55x | 0.59x | 0.64x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 2.29x | 2.09x | 1.86x | 1.75x | 1.73x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 9.2% | 9.5% | 7.9% | 9.2% | 6.0% |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 9.2% | 9.9% | 8.8% | 10.6% | 6.7% |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 2.54x | 2.23x | 1.29x | 1.75x | 1.77x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 2.45x | 2.16x | 1.24x | 1.67x | 1.62x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 1.74x | 1.46x | 0.85x | 1.22x | 1.14x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | $ 1.3 B | $ 1.2 B | $ 430 M | $ 852 M | $ 904 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 0.90x | 0.62x | 0.44x | 0.35x | 0.30x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 1.29x | 1.09x | 0.86x | 0.75x | 0.73x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.39x | 0.30x | 0.23x | 0.20x | 0.18x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | $ 1.4 B | $ 702 M | $ 301 M | -$ 112 M | -$ 237 M |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 3.32x | 4.93x | 5.65x | 7.67x | 9.41x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 2.29x | 2.09x | 1.86x | 1.75x | 1.73x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 19.3% | 21.9% | 20.1% | 20.0% | 17.6% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 16.5% | 17.4% | 14.1% | 13.8% | 13.2% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 10.0% | 9.1% | 7.6% | 9.0% | 5.4% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | $ 878 M | $ 1.1 B | $ 942 M | $ 913 M | $ 850 M |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 28.9% | 31.3% | 25.8% | 24.1% | 21.4% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 4.0% | 4.5% | 4.2% | 5.3% | 3.5% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 12.0% | 12.4% | 10.3% | 12.0% | 7.9% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 0.87x | 0.66x | 0.66x | 0.75x | 0.46x |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 0.70x | 0.80x | 0.82x | 0.87x | 0.89x |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 9.2% | 9.9% | 8.8% | 10.6% | 6.7% |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.40x | 0.50x | 0.55x | 0.59x | 0.64x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 31.46x | 40.08x | 38.72x | 34.05x | 18.06x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 7.35x | 6.28x | 8.14x | 9.66x | 9.93x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 14.80x | 11.80x | 11.88x | 12.77x | 11.64x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 11.6 days | 9.1 days | 9.4 days | 10.7 days | 20.2 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 49.7 days | 58.1 days | 44.9 days | 37.8 days | 36.7 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 24.7 days | 30.9 days | 30.7 days | 28.6 days | 31.4 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 36.6 days | 36.3 days | 23.6 days | 19.9 days | 25.6 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | $ 360 M | $ 837 M | $ 601 M | $ 646 M | $ 449 M |
Price Rp 1,500 · market cap Rp 36 T ($ 2.0 B at the cited rate; statements are filed in USD)
| Multiple | PGAS | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 9.35x | 17.40x | -46% |
| P/B | 0.73x | 1.15x | -36% |
| P/S | 0.51x | 3.91x | -87% |
| EV/EBITDA | 3.11x | 7.19x | -57% |
| EV/EBIT | 5.05x | 11.64x | -57% |
| EV/Sales | 0.66x | 4.30x | -85% |
| FCF Yield | 22.32% | 9.78% | +128% |
| Dividend Yield | 12.14% | 4.16% | +192% |
EV = mkt cap $ 2.0 B + debt $ 1.1 B − cash $ 1.3 B + minority interest $ 867 M = $ 2.6 B
At today’s price, the market is paying for -7.8%/yr FCF growth (-10.7% at 9.3% to -5.1% at 13.3% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: 5.7% FCF · 7.0% revenue.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 9.3–13.3% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
Base year contains named one-off item(s): FY2025: Collapse in the tax-burden ratio, from 0.7488 to 0.4600, with no identified cause in the seeded statements. The EBIT basis screens out most non-operating items, but read the Earnings Quality section before trusting the base margin.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 4.66% | US 10Y Treasury, 30 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.47 → 0.64 | Oil/Gas Distribution (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.55 |
| Cost of equity | 8.94% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 6.98% | median interest coverage 5.7x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a A1/A+ synthetic rating and a 0.70% default spread, over a 6.28% base (US 10Y 4.66% + Indonesia's 1.62% sovereign spread). Its BOOK rate is 5.1%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms) |
| Tax rate | 34.0% | median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest) |
| WACC | 7.41% | 65% E × CoE + 35% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 7.0% | delivered 4-yr revenue CAGR 7.0%, fading linearly to terminal |
| EBIT margin | 13.7% | mean EBIT margin, last 3 FYs |
| D&A / revenue | 10.1% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 4.1% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 7.4% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 33.8% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 13.3% of revenue against depreciation of 10.1%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | -4.9% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 7.0% | 5.9% | 4.7% | 3.6% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | $ 4.3 B | $ 4.5 B | $ 4.7 B | $ 4.9 B | $ 5.0 B | $ 5.1 B |
| EBIT | $ 581 M | $ 615 M | $ 644 M | $ 668 M | $ 684 M | $ 701 M |
| NOPAT | $ 383 M | $ 406 M | $ 425 M | $ 440 M | $ 451 M | $ 463 M |
| + D&A | $ 430 M | $ 455 M | $ 477 M | $ 494 M | $ 506 M | $ 519 M |
| − Capex | $ 174 M | $ 184 M | $ 192 M | $ 199 M | $ 204 M | $ 681 M |
| − ΔNWC | -$ 14 M | -$ 12 M | -$ 10 M | -$ 8.4 M | -$ 6.0 M | -$ 6.1 M |
| FCFF | $ 653 M | $ 689 M | $ 719 M | $ 743 M | $ 759 M | $ 306 M |
| PV | $ 608 M | $ 597 M | $ 581 M | $ 558 M | $ 531 M | $ 4.4 B |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding
EV = PV(explicit) $ 2.9 B + PV(TV) $ 4.4 B = $ 7.2 B · TV 60% of EV · − net debt -$ 237 M − minority $ 867 M = equity $ 6.6 B ÷ shares outstanding · per share is in USD, shown in IDR at 18,058
Model output: Rp 4,928/share (+229% vs price Rp 1,500)· exit-multiple check (7.2x): Rp 6,136
Under these assumptions the model lands 229% above today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for slower growth, a thinner margin, or a higher discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 6.4% | 7.4% | 8.4% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | 5,441 | 4,555 | 3,936 |
| 2.5% | 6,017 | 4,928 | 4,197 |
| 3.0% | 6,761 | 5,385 | 4,506 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $ 3.0 B | $ 3.6 B | $ 3.6 B | $ 3.8 B | $ 4.0 B |
| Cost of Goods Sold | $ 2.4 B | $ 2.8 B | $ 2.9 B | $ 3.0 B | $ 3.3 B |
| Gross Profit | $ 587 M | $ 781 M | $ 734 M | $ 757 M | $ 698 M |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | $ 501 M | $ 621 M | $ 513 M | $ 521 M | $ 524 M |
| Interest Expense | $ 151 M | $ 126 M | $ 91 M | $ 68 M | $ 56 M |
| Net Income | $ 304 M | $ 326 M | $ 278 M | $ 339 M | $ 215 M |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | $ 304 M | $ 326 M | $ 278 M | $ 339 M | $ 215 M |
| Depreciation & Amortization | $ 377 M | $ 495 M | $ 430 M | $ 391 M | $ 326 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.4 B | $ 1.2 B | $ 1.4 B | $ 1.3 B |
| Accounts Receivable | $ 413 M | $ 568 M | $ 448 M | $ 392 M | $ 400 M |
| Inventory | $ 78 M | $ 70 M | $ 75 M | $ 89 M | $ 182 M |
| Current Assets | $ 2.2 B | $ 2.2 B | $ 1.9 B | $ 2.0 B | $ 2.1 B |
| Total Assets | $ 7.5 B | $ 7.2 B | $ 6.6 B | $ 6.4 B | $ 6.2 B |
| Accounts Payable | $ 165 M | $ 236 M | $ 245 M | $ 237 M | $ 282 M |
| Current Liabilities | $ 864 M | $ 993 M | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.1 B | $ 1.2 B |
| Total Liabilities | $ 4.2 B | $ 3.8 B | $ 3.1 B | $ 2.7 B | $ 2.6 B |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | $ 3.0 B | $ 2.1 B | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.3 B | $ 1.1 B |
| Total Equity | $ 3.3 B | $ 3.4 B | $ 3.5 B | $ 3.7 B | $ 3.6 B |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | $ 2.5 B | $ 2.6 B | $ 2.7 B | $ 2.8 B | $ 2.7 B |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $ 582 M | $ 970 M | $ 724 M | $ 785 M | $ 657 M |
| Capital Expenditure | $ 222 M | $ 133 M | $ 122 M | $ 139 M | $ 208 M |
PGAS gross margin shows 100.0% every year in this dataset: the same synthetic artefact as BREN/PGEO, not a real metric (no cogs/gross-profit breakout exists in the source for utility-template companies). Operating margin (from real EBIT) is the metric that actually describes PGAS's business, and it shows a real, gradual decline: 16.5% (2021) → 17.4% (2022 peak) → 14.1% → 13.8% → 13.2% (2025). NM: 10.0% → 9.1% → 7.6% → 9.0% → 5.4% (2025, weakest year, a real ~8-point gap versus OPM's 13.2% that year, similar to MEDC's 2025 pattern; pointing to a non-operating drag specific to that year). ROE: 12.0% → 12.4% (2022 peak) → 10.3% → 12.0% → 7.9% (2025, weakest). ROIC: 9.18% → 9.88% → 8.80% → 10.63% (2024 peak) → 6.68% (2025). D/E fell every single year: 0.90× (2021) → 0.62× → 0.44× → 0.35× → 0.30× (2025); a clean, genuine 5-year deleveraging trend. Interest coverage improved every single year: 3.32× (2021) → 4.93× → 5.65× → 7.67× → 9.41× (2025); the best, most consistent improving trend of any name in this industry, even as operating margin was declining over the same period. Net debt flipped to net cash in 2024-2025: −111.8 M (2024), −237.5 M (2025); a real, genuine achievement. Current ratio stayed healthy throughout (1.29-2.54× range). Asset turnover improved steadily: 0.40× (2021) → 0.64× (2025); genuinely more capital-efficient over time. FCF positive every year, USD 359.8-837.0 M range. Revenue (USD): 3,036.1 M → 3,568.6 M → 3,646.3 M → 3,788.6 M → 3,975.9 M (2025), growing every year.
PGAS purchases natural gas from upstream producers under contracted terms and does not earn its margin on the commodity itself.
EconomicsCost of goods sold absorbed 80.67% of revenue in FY2021 and 82.44% in FY2025. Because the gas cost passes through, a higher gas price inflates both revenue and cost together and compresses every margin percentage without changing the money earned per unit delivered.
Transmission and distribution pipelines carry the gas to industrial, commercial and household customers, under BPH Migas tariff oversight.
EconomicsThis is the fixed-cost step and the source of the whole investment case. The pipeline is already built, so incremental volume carries little incremental cost, but the tariff is regulated rather than negotiated, which caps what that operating leverage can earn.
The economics behave like a distribution spread per unit rather than a share of the gas price.
EconomicsThe five-year record is the evidence. Revenue rose 30.95%, from USD 3,036.1m to USD 3,975.9m, while EBIT rose 4.53%, from USD 501.2m to USD 523.9m. Thirty-one percent more revenue produced five percent more operating profit. EBITDA margin fell from 28.92% to 21.38% over the same period. A percentage-of-price business would not behave this way; a fixed-spread business would.
Receivable days fell from 49.68 to 36.75 across the window while payable days rose from 24.66 to 31.36.
EconomicsThe cash cycle tightened from 36.63 days to 25.60 days. Inventory days rose from 11.60 to 20.21, the one component moving the wrong way, but gas is a small inventory relative to a pipeline, so the working-capital story is a modest positive rather than a driver.
Cost structureCost of goods sold ran 80.67% of revenue in FY2021 and 82.44% in FY2025, and the 1.77 percentage points of gross margin lost sit alongside a much larger fall further down: EBITDA margin 28.92% to 21.38%, a loss of 7.54 points. The difference between those two says the erosion is not only in the cost of gas but in the operating cost layer above it. Read against volume growth, the shape is unambiguous: this is a business whose revenue line and profit line are not connected the way a percentage-margin business connects them.
Cash cycleCash conversion cycle: 36.63, 36.31, 23.56, 19.93 and 25.60 days. Receivable days improved from 49.68 to 36.75 and payable days extended from 24.66 to 31.36, both helping; inventory days rose from 11.60 to 20.21, partly offsetting. For a pipeline operator the working-capital cycle is a minor line item next to the asset base, and it is recorded here mainly to show that the margin erosion is not a receivables problem in disguise.
Unit economicsAsset turnover rose from 0.40 to 0.64 times, which looks like improving efficiency and is partly something else: total assets FELL 17.02%, from USD 7,510.9m to USD 6,232.4m, while revenue rose. A rising turnover ratio driven by a shrinking denominator is a different fact from one driven by a growing numerator, and both are happening here at once.
PGAS depends on upstream gas producers (including MEDC and other Indonesian E&P operators, plus its own smaller Oil & Gas segment) for pipeline supply: a real, genuine exposure to upstream production reliability, distinct from BREN/PGEO/MEDC, which each control their own core production/generation assets.
Implication → Gas-supply security is PGAS's most distinct supplier-side risk in this industry, tied to domestic upstream producers' output rather than its own resource ownership.
PGAS's distribution customers (industrial, commercial, household) have limited alternative gas suppliers given PGAS's 92% infrastructure share, giving PGAS real pricing latitude: though regulated tariff-setting (BPH Migas) constrains how much of that latitude PGAS can actually exercise.
Implication → PGAS's buyer relationship is closer to a regulated utility than to BREN/PGEO's PLN-concentrated model or MEDC's commodity-price-taker position.
Gas transmission infrastructure (PGAS's 92% share) is a natural-monopoly-style asset base built over decades, not economically replicable by a new entrant.
Implication → PGAS's infrastructure moat is arguably the strongest and most durable of any name in this industry, immune to the resource-depletion risk that eventually affects E&P (MEDC) or the capacity-buildout execution risk facing BREN/PGEO.
PGAS's piped gas competes against LPG, electricity and (in industrial use) coal as alternative energy sources for its end customers.
Implication → Substitution risk is a real, ongoing consideration for PGAS's distribution volumes, distinct from the generation-capacity substitution risk BREN/PGEO face.
PGAS effectively has no direct rival given its 92% infrastructure share: its competitive dynamic is regulatory (tariff-setting via BPH Migas) rather than market-share-based.
Implication → PGAS's real competitive exposure is regulatory and policy risk, not market-share erosion: a fundamentally different risk profile from the other three names in this industry.
Clean through FY2024, with one year that needs an explanation the statements do not give. Net income fell 36.55% in FY2025, from USD 339.4m to USD 215.4m, while EBIT rose 0.51%, from USD 521.3m to USD 523.9m, and interest expense FELL from USD 68.0m to USD 55.7m. Both of the usual culprits therefore moved in the company’s favour. The engine’s tax-burden ratio locates the cause precisely: it printed 0.7488 in FY2024 and 0.4600 in FY2025, so barely 46 cents of each pretax dollar reached net income against 75 cents the year before. The operating business did not deteriorate in FY2025; the conversion of operating profit into shareholder profit did, and by an amount the seeded statements do not identify.
| Period | One-off item | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| FY2025 | Collapse in the tax-burden ratio, from 0.7488 to 0.4600, with no identified cause in the seeded statements | Roughly USD 124.1m of the year-on-year decline in net income, on an EBIT line that rose USD 2.6m and an interest line that fell USD 12.3m. Held at the FY2024 retention rate, FY2025 net income would have been broadly flat rather than down more than a third. Whether this is a one-off tax settlement or a new run rate changes the earnings base materially, and one year cannot distinguish them. |
Cash conversionStrong and consistent, and it is what makes the harvester strategy described below affordable. Free cash flow was positive in all five years, at USD 359.8m, USD 837.0m, USD 601.4m, USD 646.3m and USD 449.3m, cumulating to USD 2,893.9m. Capital expenditure absorbed only 22.15% of five-year operating cash flow. The FY2025 dip in free cash flow to USD 449.3m came from capital expenditure rising to USD 207.8m, not from the operating line weakening. This is a business that turns its profit into cash rather than into working capital or fixed assets.
A harvester, and an unusually disciplined one. Over five years PGAS cut total debt 62.76%, from USD 2,950.4m to USD 1,098.8m, took debt to equity from 0.90 to 0.30, and lifted interest coverage from 3.32 to 9.41 times. It did this while paying out heavily: the dividend yield is 12.14%. Total assets shrank 17.02%. Nothing here is being built; the cash from an existing pipeline network is being used to retire debt and pay shareholders. That is a legitimate strategy for a mature regulated asset, and the balance-sheet result is not in doubt. The question a reader should press is whether the payout is funded by genuine surplus or by not reinvesting, and that is answered below rather than asserted.
DeploymentHere is the test, done explicitly. FY2025 capital expenditure was USD 207.8m against depreciation of USD 326.3m, a ratio of 0.64 times, so the company spent USD 118.5m less than the accounting rate at which its assets are being consumed. Free cash flow of USD 449.3m covers the implied dividend of roughly USD 244.4m by 1.84 times. Now stress it: raise capital expenditure to the full depreciation charge and free cash flow falls to about USD 330.8m, which still covers the same dividend 1.35 times. The payout therefore survives a maintenance-capex test on FY2025 numbers. What it does not survive indefinitely is a flat EBIT line and a still-eroding margin, because the coverage narrows from the top.
Returns trendPGAS is a value creator on this record, which not many names in this book are. ROIC ran 9.18%, 9.88%, 8.80%, 10.63% and 6.68% against an engine WACC of 7.41%, clearing the hurdle in four of the five years by 1.78, 2.47, 1.39 and 3.23 percentage points, then missing it in FY2025 by 0.73 points. One methodological caution matters here and is stated rather than glossed: the generic US-dollar discount band shown for the implied-growth sensitivity is 9.3% / 11.3% / 13.3%, which sits ABOVE this company’s own computed WACC of 7.41%, because PGAS carries a low sector beta of 0.639 for oil and gas distribution. The company-specific WACC is the correct hurdle for a return-on-capital test; the band is a sensitivity range for a different purpose. Conflating them would flip the verdict from four years of value creation to none, which is exactly why the two are separated here.
Revenue rose 30.95% across the five years while EBIT rose 4.53% and EBITDA margin fell from 28.92% to 21.38%. Growth in this business is not translating into profit. Any forecast that scales earnings off revenue growth will be wrong in the same direction every year.
Net income fell 36.55% while EBIT rose 0.51% and interest expense fell 18.10%. The tax-burden ratio went from 0.7488 to 0.4600. The cause is below the operating line and is not identified in the seeded statements, so it cannot be classified as recurring or one-off from this data.
FY2025 capital expenditure of USD 207.8m was 0.64 times depreciation of USD 326.3m, and total assets fell 17.02% over the window. On FY2025 numbers the dividend still clears a full maintenance-capex test at 1.35 times cover, so this is not yet a funding problem. It is a duration problem: a network spent below its depreciation rate for long enough eventually needs the catch-up.
After clearing its 7.41% WACC in four consecutive years, ROIC came in at 6.68% in FY2025, short by 0.73 percentage points. One year does not break a four-year record, but it is the first negative reading in the window and it coincides with the margin trend above rather than contradicting it.
Minorities held 23.12% of consolidated equity in FY2021 and 24.04% in FY2025. The share is material and stable rather than growing, so it is a level to adjust for rather than a trend to worry about, but consolidated figures overstate the parent shareholder claim by roughly a quarter.
Checked, no concern. Total debt fell 62.76% to USD 1,098.8m, debt to equity fell from 0.90 to 0.30, and interest coverage rose from 3.32 to 9.41 times. The implied average cost of borrowings, interest expense over year-end debt, was essentially unchanged at 5.11% and 5.07%, so the coverage gain came from repaying debt rather than from cheaper debt.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Indonesia's energy sector spans three genuinely different value chains under one industry here: upstream oil & gas E&P (MEDC; 163 kboe/d production, 528 MMboe reserves, plus real diversification into clean-energy power and copper/gold mining), geothermal power generation (BREN and PGEO together; Indonesia ranks #2 in the world for installed geothermal capacity, 2,742 MW, behind only the US, with a national target of 5.2 GW by 2034), and gas transmission/distribution (PGAS, 92% of domestic gas infrastructure, a Pertamina subholding, joined by RAJA, a far smaller private gas trader/distributor in the same subsegment). All five report in USD: including PGAS and RAJA, whose USD filings (PGAS total assets ~USD 6.3 B; RAJA ~USD 0.5 B) are frequently re-quoted in Rupiah-equivalent terms by Indonesian financial media, a display artifact worth knowing about rather than a sign of dual functional currencies.