Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | 0.59x | 0.74x | 0.68x | 0.72x | 0.42x |
| Interest burden | 0.66x | 0.70x | 0.71x | 0.46x | 0.36x |
| Operating margindriver | 14.2% | 12.6% | 11.7% | 6.0% | 3.6% |
| Asset turnover | 0.45x | 0.44x | 0.47x | 0.47x | 0.46x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 1.91x | 1.76x | 1.71x | 1.59x | 1.60x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 4.8% | 5.0% | 4.5% | 1.5% | 0.4% |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 5.1% | 5.8% | 5.4% | 2.8% | 1.0% |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 1.11x | 1.45x | 1.23x | 1.25x | 1.10x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 0.77x | 1.02x | 0.91x | 0.85x | 0.79x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 0.20x | 0.46x | 0.43x | 0.28x | 0.29x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 5.8 T | Rp 3.7 T | Rp 3.3 T | Rp 1.6 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 0.48x | 0.36x | 0.33x | 0.22x | 0.22x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 0.91x | 0.76x | 0.71x | 0.59x | 0.60x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.25x | 0.20x | 0.19x | 0.14x | 0.14x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | Rp 17 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 8.9 T | Rp 7.2 T | Rp 5.8 T |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 2.97x | 3.35x | 3.45x | 1.87x | 1.57x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 1.91x | 1.76x | 1.71x | 1.59x | 1.60x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 31.5% | 28.9% | 25.9% | 21.4% | 19.7% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 14.2% | 12.6% | 11.7% | 6.0% | 3.6% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 5.6% | 6.5% | 5.6% | 2.0% | 0.5% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | Rp 8.1 T | Rp 7.4 T | Rp 7.4 T | Rp 5.0 T | Rp 4.1 T |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 22.2% | 20.3% | 19.1% | 13.9% | 11.6% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 2.5% | 2.9% | 2.7% | 0.9% | 0.2% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 5.3% | 5.5% | 5.0% | 1.6% | 0.4% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 0.59x | 0.74x | 0.68x | 0.72x | 0.42x |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 0.66x | 0.70x | 0.71x | 0.46x | 0.36x |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 5.1% | 5.8% | 5.4% | 2.8% | 1.0% |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.45x | 0.44x | 0.47x | 0.47x | 0.46x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 5.19x | 4.61x | 5.58x | 5.48x | 5.76x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 6.45x | 6.59x | 6.68x | 7.06x | 6.19x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 3.20x | 3.20x | 3.54x | 3.65x | 3.61x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 70.3 days | 79.1 days | 65.4 days | 66.7 days | 63.3 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 56.6 days | 55.4 days | 54.7 days | 51.7 days | 58.9 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 114.0 days | 114.2 days | 103.2 days | 100.1 days | 101.0 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 13.0 days | 20.3 days | 16.9 days | 18.2 days | 21.2 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | Rp 5.2 T | Rp 4.2 T | Rp 4.0 T | Rp 2.8 T | Rp 2.6 T |
Price Rp 1,458 · market cap Rp 9.8 T
| Multiple | SMGR | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 51.51x | 29.16x | +77% |
| P/B | 0.23x | 0.44x | -49% |
| P/S | 0.28x | 0.57x | -51% |
| EV/EBITDA | 4.83x | 4.36x | +11% |
| EV/EBIT | 15.75x | 10.80x | +46% |
| EV/Sales | 0.56x | 0.63x | -10% |
| FCF Yield | 26.66% | 22.48% | +19% |
| Dividend Yield | 6.60% | 6.07% | +9% |
Only 2 peers are covered here, so the median is itself one of the members. A 0% gap can simply mean SMGR sits at the median.
EV = mkt cap Rp 9.8 T + debt Rp 10 T − cash Rp 4.6 T + minority interest Rp 4.3 T = Rp 20 T
At today’s price, the market is paying for -0.1%/yr FCF growth (-2.8% at 12.0% to 2.5% at 16.0% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: -15.6% FCF · -1.0% revenue.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 12.0–16.0% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 7.26% | Indonesia 10Y government bond, re-verified 31 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 1.02 → 1.75 | Construction Supplies (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 1.06 |
| Cost of equity | 18.97% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 8.37% | median interest coverage 3.0x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a Baa2/BBB synthetic rating and a 1.11% default spread, over a 7.26% base (Indonesia 10Y 7.26%, already the sovereign rate). Its BOOK rate is 7.7%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms) |
| Tax rate | 32.3% | median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest) |
| WACC | 12.13% | 49% E × CoE + 51% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | -1.0% | delivered 4-yr revenue CAGR -1.0%, fading linearly to terminal |
| EBIT margin | 7.1% | mean EBIT margin, last 3 FYs |
| D&A / revenue | 7.8% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 3.9% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 12.1% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 20.6% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 9.0% of revenue against depreciation of 7.8%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | -9.3% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | -1.0% | -0.1% | 0.7% | 1.6% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | Rp 35 T | Rp 35 T | Rp 35 T | Rp 36 T | Rp 37 T | Rp 37 T |
| EBIT | Rp 2.5 T | Rp 2.5 T | Rp 2.5 T | Rp 2.5 T | Rp 2.6 T | Rp 2.7 T |
| NOPAT | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 1.8 T |
| + D&A | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 2.8 T | Rp 2.9 T | Rp 2.9 T |
| − Capex | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 3.4 T |
| − ΔNWC | Rp 33 M | Rp 4.2 M | -Rp 24 M | -Rp 53 M | -Rp 83 M | -Rp 85 M |
| FCFF | Rp 3.0 T | Rp 3.0 T | Rp 3.1 T | Rp 3.2 T | Rp 3.3 T | Rp 1.4 T |
| PV | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 2.4 T | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 8.3 T |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding
EV = PV(explicit) Rp 11 T + PV(TV) Rp 8.3 T = Rp 19 T · TV 43% of EV · − net debt Rp 5.8 T − minority Rp 4.3 T = equity Rp 9.4 T ÷ shares outstanding
Model output: Rp 1,399/share (-4% vs price Rp 1,458)· exit-multiple check (4.4x): Rp 2,144
Under these assumptions the model lands close to today's price. The market and these inputs are telling broadly the same story.
| g \ WACC | 11.1% | 12.1% | 13.1% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | 1,519 | 1,294 | 1,105 |
| 2.5% | 1,648 | 1,399 | 1,194 |
| 3.0% | 1,793 | 1,516 | 1,290 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | Rp 37 T | Rp 36 T | Rp 39 T | Rp 36 T | Rp 35 T |
| Cost of Goods Sold | Rp 25 T | Rp 26 T | Rp 29 T | Rp 28 T | Rp 28 T |
| Gross Profit | Rp 12 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 10 T | Rp 7.8 T | Rp 6.9 T |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | Rp 5.2 T | Rp 4.6 T | Rp 4.5 T | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 1.3 T |
| Interest Expense | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 802 M |
| Net Income | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 2.4 T | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 720 M | Rp 191 M |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 2.4 T | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 720 M | Rp 191 M |
| Depreciation & Amortization | Rp 2.9 T | Rp 2.8 T | Rp 2.9 T | Rp 2.9 T | Rp 2.8 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | Rp 3.0 T | Rp 6.0 T | Rp 6.9 T | Rp 3.7 T | Rp 4.6 T |
| Accounts Receivable | Rp 5.7 T | Rp 5.5 T | Rp 5.8 T | Rp 5.1 T | Rp 5.7 T |
| Inventory | Rp 4.8 T | Rp 5.6 T | Rp 5.1 T | Rp 5.2 T | Rp 4.9 T |
| Current Assets | Rp 16 T | Rp 19 T | Rp 20 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 17 T |
| Total Assets | Rp 82 T | Rp 83 T | Rp 82 T | Rp 77 T | Rp 77 T |
| Accounts Payable | Rp 7.9 T | Rp 8.1 T | Rp 8.1 T | Rp 7.8 T | Rp 7.8 T |
| Current Liabilities | Rp 15 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 16 T |
| Total Liabilities | Rp 39 T | Rp 36 T | Rp 34 T | Rp 29 T | Rp 29 T |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | Rp 20 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 10 T |
| Total Equity | Rp 43 T | Rp 47 T | Rp 48 T | Rp 48 T | Rp 48 T |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | Rp 39 T | Rp 43 T | Rp 43 T | Rp 44 T | Rp 43 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | Rp 6.9 T | Rp 6.0 T | Rp 5.7 T | Rp 4.2 T | Rp 3.7 T |
| Capital Expenditure | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 1.1 T |
SMGR gross margin: 31.5 % (2021) → 28.9 % (2022) → 25.9 % (2023) → 21.4 % (2024) → 19.7 % (2025). Operating margin: 14.2 % → 12.6 % → 11.7 % → 6.0 % → 3.6 %. Net margin: 5.6 % → 6.5 % → 5.6 % → 2.0 % → 0.5 %. ROE: 5.3 % → 5.5 % → 5.0 % → 1.6 % → 0.4 %. Interest coverage declined from 3.45× (2023) to 1.57× (2025): approaching distress territory for an operating business. D/E moderated from 0.48 (2021) to 0.22 (2025) as debt was paid down; FCF still positive but declining (IDR 5.2 T → 2.6 T). Net margin of 0.5 % in 2025 leaves essentially no buffer for any demand or cost deterioration. SOE status (65.7 % owned by Inalum/Ministry of SOEs) provides implicit government backstop but does not resolve the structural oversupply.
Coal (energy) is SMGR's largest variable cost: ~25–30 % of COGS. Coal price is market-determined (ICI/Newcastle benchmark). Captive power plants mitigate grid tariff risk but increase coal procurement exposure. Gypsum is imported (Pertamina/traders); packaging (cement bags) from local suppliers. SMGR's scale gives it some negotiating leverage on coal procurement (multi-year contracts).
Implication → Coal price spikes (as in 2022) hit SMGR COGS hard without commensurate revenue increase due to price-war environment. This is the primary earnings volatility driver.
Cement is a commodity: buyers (large construction contractors, government infrastructure projects, ready-mix producers) can switch between SMGR/INTP/SIG/Conch based purely on price. The ~40 % utilisation gap (122 Mt capacity vs. 64 Mt demand) means sellers compete for every large contract. Government infrastructure projects (PUPR) are large, sophisticated buyers running competitive tenders. Retail bagged cement (small contractors/individuals) is less price-elastic but accounts for only ~30–40 % of volume.
Implication → High buyer power in a commodity-excess environment is the proximate cause of SMGR's margin collapse. Price discovery is transparent (spot pricing in bulk market); premium positioning is near-impossible in low-end construction segments.
The oversupply crisis IS a product of recent entry: Anhui Conch (Conch Indonesia, ~4–6 Mtpa greenfield in West Java), Siam City Cement/Merah Putih (~6 Mtpa), and expansions by INTP, SIG/Holcim created 30–40 Mt of excess capacity between 2016 and 2022. New greenfield entry is now economically irrational (existing assets earn sub-cost-of-capital returns). Barriers are: clinker plant capex (USD 80–120/T capacity), environmental permits (AMDAL), limestone concession rights.
Implication → No new entry expected, but the damage is done. Excess capacity from prior entrants persists for 15–20 year asset lives. Consolidation (capacity rationalisation or merger) is the structural resolution but politically complex given SOE and foreign ownership.
No viable substitute for Portland cement in mass construction. Steel frame structures partially substitute concrete in high-rise (but still use concrete foundations and floors). Geopolymer cement is niche/nascent. Compressed earth blocks and bamboo for rural construction are marginal. The real substitution risk for SMGR is inter-brand switching (SMGR → INTP/Conch) rather than category substitution.
Implication → Low category substitution is the only structural positive for cement. Demand will grow with construction activity; the issue is per-unit economics in the current oversupply.
Four-player rivalry: SMGR (~48 %) vs. INTP (~30 %) vs. SIG/Holcim (~15–18 %) vs. Conch Indonesia + Merah Putih (~5–8 %). Conch Indonesia (Anhui Conch Cement, world's largest cement company) entered with price-aggressive positioning: forced price discovery lower. SMGR and SIG (which is partly SMGR-affiliated via cross-ownership) have attempted informal price coordination (historically flagged by KPPU), but excess capacity makes sustainable price discipline impossible. Rivalitas highest in Java (most capacity + most competition).
Implication → Structurally unresolvable rivalry until capacity exits the market or demand catches up. SMGR's SOE status prevents voluntary capacity closure; political economy of state asset preservation perpetuates the oversupply.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
A structurally oversupplied market (~122Mt capacity vs ~64Mt demand): stagnant domestic consumption, a price war, and exports + IKN/Nusantara as the relief valves.