Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | 0.77x | — | — | — | — |
| Interest burden | 0.78x | — | — | — | — |
| Operating margindriver | 9.8% | -4.9% | -1.3% | -3.2% | -8.4% |
| Asset turnover | 0.52x | 0.48x | 0.38x | 0.32x | 0.57x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 1.70x | 1.75x | 1.88x | 1.93x | 2.65x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 5.2% | — | — | — | — |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 6.6% | — | — | — | — |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 3.14x | 3.75x | 3.47x | 3.02x | 2.49x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 2.74x | 3.21x | 2.95x | 2.57x | 1.91x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 1.69x | 2.31x | 1.76x | 1.66x | 1.25x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | $ 2.0 B | $ 1.7 B | $ 2.0 B | $ 1.7 B | $ 3.2 B |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 0.37x | 0.52x | 0.58x | 0.68x | 1.16x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 0.70x | 0.75x | 0.88x | 0.93x | 1.65x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.22x | 0.30x | 0.31x | 0.35x | 0.44x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | -$ 503 M | $ 67 M | $ 301 M | $ 634 M | $ 2.7 B |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 4.56x | -1.65x | -0.24x | -0.21x | -1.28x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 1.70x | 1.75x | 1.88x | 1.93x | 2.65x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 13.4% | -0.5% | 3.8% | 8.6% | -0.8% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 9.8% | -4.9% | -1.3% | -3.2% | -8.4% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 5.9% | -6.3% | -1.6% | -3.8% | 15.5% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | $ 351 M | -$ 21 M | $ 82 M | $ 55 M | -$ 416 M |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 13.6% | -0.9% | 3.8% | 3.1% | -5.9% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 3.0% | -3.0% | -0.6% | -1.2% | 8.8% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 5.2% | -5.3% | -1.2% | -2.6% | 29.2% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 0.77x | — | — | — | — |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 0.78x | — | — | — | — |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 6.6% | — | — | — | — |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.52x | 0.48x | 0.38x | 0.32x | 0.57x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 5.95x | 7.27x | 4.86x | 4.35x | 5.64x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 14.70x | 22.66x | 14.05x | 8.55x | 10.73x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 2.90x | 5.41x | 3.14x | 3.16x | 7.75x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 61.4 days | 50.2 days | 75.1 days | 83.9 days | 64.7 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 24.8 days | 16.1 days | 26.0 days | 42.7 days | 34.0 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 126.0 days | 67.4 days | 116.3 days | 115.5 days | 47.1 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | -39.8 days | -1.1 days | -15.2 days | 11.1 days | 51.6 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | $ 141 M | -$ 364 M | $ 36 M | -$ 564 M | -$ 387 M |
Price Rp 2,160 · market cap Rp 187 T ($ 10 B at the cited rate; statements are filed in USD)
| Multiple | TPIA | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 9.49x | 15.16x | -37% |
| P/B | 2.77x | 2.77x | 0% |
| P/S | 1.47x | 1.47x | 0% |
| EV/EBITDA | NM | 127.69x(2/3) | — |
| EV/EBIT | NM | 8.79x(1/3) | — |
| EV/Sales | 1.99x | 2.11x | -6% |
| FCF Yield | -3.74% | -3.74% | 0% |
| Dividend Yield | 0.26% | 0.26% | 0% |
Only 3 peers are covered here, so the median is itself one of the members. A 0% gap can simply mean TPIA sits at the median.
EV = mkt cap $ 10 B + debt $ 5.4 B − cash $ 2.7 B + minority interest $ 927 M = $ 14 B
not computable: negative or zero base-year FCF. Shown as-is rather than estimated.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 9.3–13.3% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
Mechanical DCF suppressed: mean EBIT margin over the full window is negative (-1.6%), so a mechanical FCFF perpetuity is not meaningful for a pre-profit record. The reverse DCF above shows what the price implies, and the sliders below let you impose a path-to-margin scenario (a target, not history).
Cyclical normalization: Commodity/cyclical name: the trailing years are a sample drawn from the price cycle, not a trend. Defaults are therefore normalized, using the full-window mean margin with no cycle-position growth extrapolation. That normalized margin is itself the embedded commodity-price assumption.
Base year contains named one-off item(s): FY2025: Gain from bargain purchase on CAPGC's 1 April 2025 acquisition of 100% of Aster Chemicals and Energy; FY2025: Aster's own trading result in its first three months inside the group. The EBIT basis screens out most non-operating items, but read the Earnings Quality section before trusting the base margin.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 4.66% | US 10Y Treasury, 30 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.58 → 0.81 | Chemical (Basic) (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.52 |
| Cost of equity | 10.10% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 25.28% | median interest coverage -0.2x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a D2/D synthetic rating and a 19.00% default spread, over a 6.28% base (US 10Y 4.66% + Indonesia's 1.62% sovereign spread). Its BOOK rate is 8.5%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms) |
| Tax rate | 23.2% | median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest) |
| WACC | 13.30% | 66% E × CoE + 34% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 2.5% | terminal growth from year 1, cyclical normalization: the delivered 4-yr CAGR (28.4%) reflects cycle position, not a trend |
| EBIT margin | -1.6% | full-cycle mean EBIT margin, FY2021–FY2025 (cyclical normalization: this margin is the embedded commodity-price assumption) |
| D&A / revenue | 4.6% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 12.5% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 13.3% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 0.0% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 4.6% of revenue against depreciation of 4.6%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | -11.0% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | $ 7.2 B | $ 7.4 B | $ 7.6 B | $ 7.7 B | $ 7.9 B | $ 8.1 B |
| EBIT | -$ 115 M | -$ 117 M | -$ 120 M | -$ 123 M | -$ 126 M | -$ 130 M |
| NOPAT | -$ 88 M | -$ 90 M | -$ 92 M | -$ 95 M | -$ 97 M | -$ 99 M |
| + D&A | $ 332 M | $ 340 M | $ 349 M | $ 358 M | $ 367 M | $ 376 M |
| − Capex | $ 903 M | $ 925 M | $ 948 M | $ 972 M | $ 996 M | $ 376 M |
| − ΔNWC | -$ 19 M | -$ 20 M | -$ 20 M | -$ 21 M | -$ 21 M | -$ 22 M |
| FCFF | -$ 639 M | -$ 655 M | -$ 672 M | -$ 688 M | -$ 706 M | -$ 78 M |
| PV | -$ 564 M | -$ 510 M | -$ 462 M | -$ 418 M | -$ 378 M | -$ 385 M |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding
EV = PV(explicit) -$ 2.3 B + PV(TV) -$ 385 M = -$ 2.7 B · TV 14% of EV · − net debt $ 2.7 B − minority $ 927 M = equity -$ 6.3 B ÷ shares outstanding · per share is in USD, shown in IDR at 18,058
Model output: Rp -1,319/share (-161% vs price Rp 2,160)· exit-multiple check (127.7x): Rp 2,192
Under these assumptions the model lands 161% below today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for faster growth, a fatter margin, or a lower discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 12.3% | 13.3% | 14.3% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | -1,342 | -1,318 | -1,296 |
| 2.5% | -1,344 | -1,319 | -1,298 |
| 3.0% | -1,346 | -1,321 | -1,299 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $ 2.6 B | $ 2.4 B | $ 2.2 B | $ 1.8 B | $ 7.0 B |
| Cost of Goods Sold | $ 2.2 B | $ 2.4 B | $ 2.1 B | $ 1.6 B | $ 7.1 B |
| Gross Profit | $ 345 M | -$ 11 M | $ 82 M | $ 154 M | -$ 55 M |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | $ 254 M | -$ 116 M | -$ 28 M | -$ 57 M | -$ 593 M |
| Interest Expense | $ 56 M | $ 71 M | $ 116 M | $ 270 M | $ 463 M |
| Net Income | $ 152 M | -$ 150 M | -$ 34 M | -$ 69 M | $ 1.1 B |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | $ 152 M | -$ 150 M | -$ 34 M | -$ 69 M | $ 1.1 B |
| Depreciation & Amortization | $ 97 M | $ 96 M | $ 110 M | $ 112 M | $ 177 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $ 1.6 B | $ 1.4 B | $ 1.4 B | $ 1.4 B | $ 2.7 B |
| Accounts Receivable | $ 176 M | $ 105 M | $ 154 M | $ 209 M | $ 654 M |
| Inventory | $ 376 M | $ 329 M | $ 427 M | $ 375 M | $ 1.3 B |
| Current Assets | $ 2.9 B | $ 2.3 B | $ 2.8 B | $ 2.5 B | $ 5.4 B |
| Total Assets | $ 5.0 B | $ 4.9 B | $ 5.6 B | $ 5.7 B | $ 12 B |
| Accounts Payable | $ 772 M | $ 442 M | $ 662 M | $ 516 M | $ 913 M |
| Current Liabilities | $ 932 M | $ 608 M | $ 817 M | $ 821 M | $ 2.2 B |
| Total Liabilities | $ 2.1 B | $ 2.1 B | $ 2.6 B | $ 2.7 B | $ 7.7 B |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | $ 1.1 B | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.7 B | $ 2.0 B | $ 5.4 B |
| Total Equity | $ 2.9 B | $ 2.8 B | $ 3.0 B | $ 2.9 B | $ 4.7 B |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | $ 2.9 B | $ 2.8 B | $ 2.7 B | $ 2.6 B | $ 3.7 B |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $ 222 M | -$ 249 M | $ 132 M | -$ 159 M | $ 350 M |
| Capital Expenditure | $ 81 M | $ 114 M | $ 96 M | $ 405 M | $ 736 M |
TPIA is Indonesia's sole integrated naphtha cracker (Cilegon: olefins → polyolefins, styrene, butadiene, MTBE/butene-1, benzene) and, since the 2025 acquisition of Shell's Singapore Energy and Chemicals Park (now "Aster"; a 237,000 bpd refinery + 1.1 million tpa ethylene cracker), a hybrid petrochemical-and-refining major. Revenue nearly quadrupled to $7.02B in FY2025 (+293% YoY) purely from consolidating Aster. But operating margin, the metric that reflects the actual business rather than one-time accounting, was -8.44%: worse than any of the prior four years (which ranged from +9.83% in FY2021 down to -4.87%, -1.29% and -3.18% in FY2022-2024). Net income was positive ($1.09B) only because of a ~$1.7B non-cash bargain-purchase gain on the Aster deal; strip it out and FY2025 was TPIA's worst operating year on record, not its best. The acquisition was debt-funded: net debt flipped from -$502.7M (net cash) in FY2021 to +$2.67B in FY2025, and the debt-to-equity ratio rose from 0.37 to 1.16. TPIA's scale and sole-integrated-producer status are real, but two large financed competitors (Lotte Chemical's ~$3.9B Merak cracker, the planned ~14.3 million tpa Tongkun North Kalimantan complex) are entering within the decade.
TPIA extracts nothing. It buys naphtha on the world market, and since April 2025 crude oil for the Singapore refinery as well, in dollars, at prices linked to global crude. Feedstock is the largest single cost line and the company has no influence over it.
EconomicsThis is why the business is a spread and not a margin. In FY2025 cost of revenue reached 100.8% of revenue ($7,074.9M against $7,020.0M), so input and processing cost consumed more than every dollar of sales before a single operating expense was counted.
The Cilegon cracker heats naphtha until long molecules break into short ones, ethylene and propylene, which are then polymerised into polyethylene and polypropylene or routed into styrene monomer, butadiene, MTBE/butene-1 and benzene. Since April 2025 a second 1.1 million tpa cracker and a 237,000 bpd refinery in Singapore sit alongside it.
EconomicsA cracker is a fixed asset that wants to run flat out. Asset turnover was 0.57x in FY2025 and only 0.32x in FY2024, so each dollar of assets produced well under a dollar of sales. Fixed cost per tonne rises the moment utilisation falls, which is why running rate matters more here than any price negotiation.
Polyolefins are commodities. A domestic converter can import the same resin, so TPIA prices at import parity plus freight and duty, not at a captive premium. Being the only integrated domestic producer is a logistics and tariff edge, not pricing power.
EconomicsPrice-taker on the input and price-taker on the output means earnings are the difference between two numbers management does not control. Operating margin ran 9.83% then -4.87%, -1.29%, -3.18% and -8.44% across FY2021 to FY2025 with no change in strategy. Read that series as the spread moving, not as the company deteriorating.
Aster adds crude refining upstream of the cracker, and in October 2025 the group agreed to buy ExxonMobil's network of about 60 Esso service stations in Singapore, placing a retail fuel outlet at the far end of the same chain.
EconomicsIntegration widens the number of places a spread can be captured, and equally the number of spreads that can move against you at once. The first full quarter with the refinery inside the group, Q1 2026, produced revenue of $2,403.7M against $622.1M a year earlier and profit before tax of $230.5M against a $31.9M loss.
Cost structureFeedstock dominated and, in FY2025, more than total. Cost of revenue was $7,074.9M on revenue of $7,020.0M, a gross margin of -0.78%. One caution when reading the cost lines across years: FY2024 and FY2023 comparatives were restated in later filings, and when Aster came in the group moved to reporting expenses by nature, so the Q1 2026 statement shows raw materials and depreciation separately with no cost-of-sales subtotal at all. The operating line is comparable across all five years; the split between cost of revenue and operating expense is not. Read operating margin, not a gross-to-operating bridge.
Cash cycleTPIA used to be financed by its suppliers. The cash conversion cycle was -39.8 days in FY2021, meaning the company collected and sold before it had to pay, and it is now +51.7 days. The 91-day swing is almost entirely days payable falling from 126.0 to 47.1. Days inventory (61.4 to 64.7) and days sales outstanding (24.8 to 34.0) moved far less. Crude cargoes for a refinery do not arrive on 126-day terms, so treat this as a structural change in how the business is funded, not a one-year blip.
Unit economicsThe whole company reduces to one piece of arithmetic: spread per tonne between product and feedstock, multiplied by tonnes, minus fixed cost. Because the spread is set in Singapore and Shanghai rather than Cilegon, the only levers management actually holds are utilisation, feedstock flexibility and how many steps of the chain it owns. That is why FY2025 delivering record revenue and the worst operating margin of the five years is not a contradiction: revenue measures tonnes times price, and neither of those is a decision this company makes.
TPIA imports the majority of its naphtha at global, USD/crude-linked prices; the new Singapore refinery adds crude-oil procurement exposure on top of that.
Implication → TPIA does not control its primary input cost, which is exactly why gross margin swung from +13.37% to -0.78% across five years without any change in sales volume strategy.
Domestic plastics/packaging converters are fragmented and individually small, but TPIA's products are commodities also importable at world prices, capping any premium.
Implication → TPIA effectively prices at import parity, not at a captive-customer premium: its domestic-producer status is a logistics/tariff edge, not a pricing-power edge.
TPIA has been Indonesia's sole integrated cracker for decades, but Lotte Chemical's ~$3.9B Merak cracker and the planned Tongkun Petrochemical complex in North Kalimantan (~14.3 million tpa) are real, financed projects specifically targeting TPIA's domestic market.
Implication → TPIA's near-monopoly domestic pricing position has a visible, financed expiry date within this decade, not just a theoretical long-run risk.
Recycled and bio-based polymers are a slow-building global substitute for virgin polyolefins; refined fuels from Aster face the same long-run EV/electrification demand headwind refiners face globally.
Implication → Not a near-term earnings driver, but a real structural demand question for both halves of TPIA's now-combined business over a multi-decade horizon.
TPIA competes on a global commodity curve against far larger, better-feedstock-advantaged Middle Eastern (cheap domestic ethane) and Chinese (massive new capacity) producers.
Implication → This rivalry, not company-specific execution, is the direct cause of TPIA's negative-to-thin operating margins in four of the last five fiscal years.
This page is the clearest lesson in the roster on the difference between profit and cash. FY2025 shows an operating LOSS of $592.7M and, a few lines below it, a profit attributable to owners of $1,090.1M. The distance between the two is $1,682.8M, and it is not a collection of small items. It is one entry. On 1 April 2025 CAPGC, a TPIA subsidiary held together with Glencore, acquired 100% of Aster Chemicals and Energy, the former Shell Energy and Chemicals Park Singapore. The filed note sets out provisional consideration of $672.0M against a fair value of net assets acquired, after deferred tax, of $2,444.1M. When you pay less than the appraised value of what you receive, accounting requires the difference to be recognised as income at once: a gain from bargain purchase of $1,772.2M. Three things deserve a student's attention. First, that gain is non-cash and it is larger than the entire result: $1,772.2M against the $1,682.8M distance from operating loss to owners' profit, so without it there is no profit at all. Second, it rests on an appraisal rather than a market price. An independent appraiser performed the purchase price allocation and fair-valued property, plant and equipment on a reproduction cost new basis, so the gain is the gap between what one valuer thinks the assets would cost to rebuild and what the seller accepted to walk away. Management's own stated explanation in the note is a difference in view with the seller over the strategic direction of the business, and the consideration is still described as provisional with completion adjustments under discussion, so the figure itself is not yet final. Third, the asset that generated the gain was losing money: the same note discloses that from acquisition to 30 June 2025 Aster contributed revenue of $1,712.0M and a LOSS of $79.4M. Note also that owners do not keep all of the gain. Glencore's stake in CAPGC is a non-controlling interest, and the H1 2025 profit of $1,626.2M was split $1,260.8M to owners and $365.4M to non-controlling interests, with NCI equity rising from $299.3M at end-2024 to $927.3M at end-2025. The engine's FY2025 ROE of 29.23% is arithmetically correct and economically meaningless, and that pairing is exactly the point.
| Period | One-off item | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| FY2025 | Gain from bargain purchase on CAPGC's 1 April 2025 acquisition of 100% of Aster Chemicals and Energy | +$1,772.2M of non-cash income, filed in Note 40: provisional consideration $672.0M against $2,444.1M of appraised net assets after deferred tax. Larger than the whole $1,682.8M distance from the FY2025 operating loss to owners' profit, and the consideration is still provisional pending completion adjustments. |
| FY2025 | Aster's own trading result in its first three months inside the group | -$79.4M loss on $1,712.0M of revenue between 1 April and 30 June 2025, disclosed in the same note. The acquired business was loss-making at the same time as the gain on acquiring it was being recognised as income. |
Cash conversionOperating cash flow was $349.9M against owners' profit of $1,090.1M, a conversion of 0.32x, and that cash figure is the honest measure of the year. Capex of $736.4M then took free cash flow to -$386.5M, negative for the third time in five years after -$363.7M in FY2022 and -$564.3M in FY2024. The pattern has not yet broken: in Q1 2026, reporting a profit of $205.1M, the group still used $191.1M of cash in operations. Profit and cash have not re-converged.
TPIA spent five years buying and building scale while its operating economics were negative. For a commodity producer trying to escape a single thin spread that is a defensible strategy rather than an obviously bad one, and it is also why the balance sheet now looks nothing like FY2021. The question to hold management to is not whether the assets are impressive, but whether they earn.
DeploymentThree uses of capital, in order of size. First, the Aster acquisition, which cost far less at the till than its headline suggests: provisional consideration was $672.0M, but $281.3M of that is deferred and $215.4M of cash arrived inside the business, so the net cash outflow at closing was $175.3M. Second, capex, which ran $405.1M in FY2024 and $736.4M in FY2025 after averaging $97M across the three years before. Third, carrying the enlarged business: inventory rose $879.2M and receivables $445.4M year on year, though note the acquired balance sheet by itself brought in $970.3M of inventory and $680.6M of receivables. The funding came from debt. Total debt went from $2,000.6M to $5,414.2M in a single year, and the group moved from $502.7M of net cash in FY2021 to $2,674.4M of net debt. Two smaller facts worth holding: a $30M annual cash dividend was paid through the loss years, and non-controlling shareholders injected $263.1M of fresh capital into subsidiaries in H1 2025.
Returns trendThe ratio table can only compute ROIC for FY2021, at 6.6%. For FY2022 through FY2025 it is omitted because EBIT is not positive, and that omission is itself the finding: you cannot earn a return on invested capital while the operating line is negative, whatever net income says. Interest cover tells the same story from the other side, 4.56x in FY2021 and then negative in all four following years, because the numerator is an operating loss. Over the same stretch interest expense grew from $55.6M to $462.8M, so the cost of the strategy is compounding while the return on it is not yet measurable. This is also why the page shows no discounted cash flow value per share: the model is deliberately withheld when the operating margin is negative, because projecting growth from a negative base produces a figure that looks precise and means nothing. The test is therefore simple and not yet passed. Operating income has to turn positive. Q1 2026 is the first evidence pointing that way, with profit before tax of $230.5M and $146.1M attributable to owners, and no acquisition gain anywhere in it.
FY2025 pairs an operating loss of $592.7M with an owners' profit of $1,090.1M, bridged by a filed non-cash bargain purchase gain of $1,772.2M. That gain rests on an independent appraisal, with property, plant and equipment fair-valued on a reproduction cost new basis, and on a consideration the filing still calls provisional with completion adjustments under discussion. Anyone reading net income, the 29.23% ROE, or the company's headline EBITDA in isolation will overstate the operating health of this business by more than a billion dollars.
Total debt went from $2,000.6M to $5,414.2M in one year and net debt stands at $2,674.4M against $502.7M of net cash in FY2021. Interest expense grew from $55.6M to $462.8M across the five years. Interest cover has been negative for four consecutive years because EBIT is negative, so the ratio cannot be read as merely thin, it has no meaning until operating income turns. A $30M annual dividend was maintained throughout those loss years.
Four consecutive operating losses are mostly not TPIA's doing. China's ethylene capacity in excess of its own demand was forecast to rise by 6.3 million tonnes to an all-time high of 11.5 million tonnes in 2025, and Asian olefin margins reached a five-year low in 2023. TPIA competes against Middle Eastern producers advantaged by cheap domestic ethane and Chinese producers advantaged by scale, while importing naphtha. No change to TPIA's own site plan alters that arithmetic, which is why the recovery case is a spread call rather than a management call.
The cash conversion cycle moved from -39.8 days in FY2021 to +51.7 days in FY2025, a 91-day swing driven mainly by days payable collapsing from 126.0 to 47.1. A business that was financed by its supply chain now finances its supply chain. Because crude cargoes are not bought on 126-day terms, this is likely permanent rather than cyclical, and it permanently raises the working capital the group must carry.
Inside roughly eighteen months the group took on a 237,000 bpd refinery, a second cracker, an agreement for about 60 Esso retail stations in Singapore announced 24 October 2025 and supported by a $750M financing from KKR, and a reconfigured CAP2 that now begins with a CA-EDC plant and has slipped to a 2027 start-up. Each step is defensible alone. Taken together they are a great deal of new operating and financing surface for a group whose core business has not covered its own operating costs since FY2021.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Dominated by one integrated group (Chandra Asri + parent Barito Pacific) plus one unrelated ammonia/LPG processor: a sector still posting negative operating margins on a like-for-like basis even as 2025 headline profit was lifted by a one-time acquisition gain, not a margin recovery.