Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | — | — | — | — | — |
| Interest burden | -0.40x | -0.03x | — | — | — |
| Operating margindriver | 4.6% | 6.2% | -13.6% | -13.4% | -36.2% |
| Asset turnover | 0.26x | 0.29x | 0.34x | 0.30x | 0.27x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 3.98x | 4.29x | 6.89x | 5.35x | 29.76x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | — | — | — | — | — |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 1.01x | 1.10x | 0.80x | 1.59x | 1.29x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 0.71x | 0.77x | 0.50x | 0.98x | 0.80x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 0.19x | 0.16x | 0.08x | 0.18x | 0.18x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | Rp 217 M | Rp 3.7 T | -Rp 7.6 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 4.6 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 1.63x | 1.91x | 3.86x | 2.99x | 19.85x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 2.98x | 3.29x | 5.89x | 4.35x | 28.76x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.41x | 0.44x | 0.56x | 0.56x | 0.67x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | Rp 21 T | Rp 28 T | Rp 34 T | Rp 32 T | Rp 31 T |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 0.71x | 0.97x | -0.96x | -0.92x | -2.16x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 3.98x | 4.29x | 6.89x | 5.35x | 29.76x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 9.5% | 10.3% | 8.3% | 7.9% | 29.6% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 4.6% | 6.2% | -13.6% | -13.4% | -36.2% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 0.7% | -0.3% | -31.6% | -11.8% | -72.9% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.8 T | -Rp 2.5 T | -Rp 2.2 T | -Rp 4.5 T |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 6.5% | 8.6% | -11.0% | -11.3% | -33.4% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 0.2% | -0.1% | -10.8% | -3.6% | -19.4% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 0.9% | -0.5% | -124.0% | -25.6% | 1,097.4% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax)pretax income not positive | — | — | — | — | — |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | -0.40x | -0.03x | — | — | — |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)EBIT or pretax not positive | — | — | — | — | — |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.26x | 0.29x | 0.34x | 0.30x | 0.27x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 1.47x | 1.60x | 1.81x | 1.54x | 1.23x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 1.22x | 1.31x | 1.86x | 2.05x | 2.06x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 1.26x | 1.50x | 2.21x | 2.93x | 2.20x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 247.7 days | 227.4 days | 201.5 days | 237.0 days | 297.7 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 300.2 days | 278.3 days | 196.1 days | 177.9 days | 177.2 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 290.5 days | 242.7 days | 164.9 days | 124.7 days | 166.0 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 257.4 days | 263.1 days | 232.6 days | 290.2 days | 309.0 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | -Rp 4.5 T | -Rp 3.2 T | -Rp 3.3 T | -Rp 232 M | -Rp 362 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | Rp 18 T | Rp 21 T | Rp 23 T | Rp 19 T | Rp 13 T |
| Cost of Goods Sold | Rp 16 T | Rp 19 T | Rp 21 T | Rp 18 T | Rp 9.4 T |
| Gross Profit | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 3.9 T |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | Rp 827 M | Rp 1.3 T | -Rp 3.1 T | -Rp 2.6 T | -Rp 4.8 T |
| Interest Expense | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 3.2 T | Rp 2.8 T | Rp 2.2 T |
| Net Income | Rp 118 M | -Rp 60 M | -Rp 7.1 T | -Rp 2.3 T | -Rp 9.7 T |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | Rp 118 M | -Rp 60 M | -Rp 7.1 T | -Rp 2.3 T | -Rp 9.7 T |
| Depreciation & Amortization | Rp 331 M | Rp 512 M | Rp 600 M | Rp 411 M | Rp 375 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | Rp 7.0 T | Rp 5.7 T | Rp 3.2 T | Rp 3.4 T | Rp 2.8 T |
| Accounts Receivable | Rp 15 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 9.4 T | Rp 6.5 T |
| Inventory | Rp 11 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 7.7 T |
| Current Assets | Rp 37 T | Rp 40 T | Rp 31 T | Rp 30 T | Rp 20 T |
| Total Assets | Rp 69 T | Rp 75 T | Rp 66 T | Rp 63 T | Rp 50 T |
| Accounts Payable | Rp 13 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 9.3 T | Rp 6.1 T | Rp 4.3 T |
| Current Liabilities | Rp 37 T | Rp 36 T | Rp 38 T | Rp 19 T | Rp 16 T |
| Total Liabilities | Rp 52 T | Rp 58 T | Rp 56 T | Rp 52 T | Rp 48 T |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | Rp 28 T | Rp 33 T | Rp 37 T | Rp 36 T | Rp 33 T |
| Total Equity | Rp 17 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 9.6 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 1.7 T |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | Rp 13 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 5.7 T | Rp 8.9 T | -Rp 885 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -Rp 3.7 T | -Rp 2.9 T | -Rp 3.2 T | Rp 68 M | -Rp 348 M |
| Capital Expenditure | Rp 752 M | Rp 289 M | Rp 165 M | Rp 300 M | Rp 14 M |
WIKA is the most severe of the three BUMN Karya names tracked here, and the numbers say so without needing interpretation. Revenue has fallen for two straight years (Rp22.53tn FY2023 → Rp13.33tn FY2025, −40.8%), net margin has been negative for four straight years, and FY2025’s owner equity is outright negative (−Rp884.7bn): total assets (Rp50.15tn) now exceed what shareholders can claim by more than liabilities alone (Rp48.46tn) once non-controlling interest is stripped out, a textbook technical-insolvency signal at the parent level. D/E of ~19.9x and an ROE of +1,097% are both artifacts of that near-zero/negative equity base, not meaningful ratios: read them as NM, not as leverage comfort or a spectacular return. The seeded FY2025 gross margin (29.6%) is also unreliable: independent reporting puts WIKA’s real FY2025 gross profit at ~Rp1.13tn (≈8.5% margin, down from a genuine ~10% in FY2022), meaning even the “less bad” read is still a real decline, not the seeded number’s apparent improvement. The company is suspended from trading (since February 2025, delayed bond interest) and is being absorbed into Hutama Karya alongside WSKT under Danantara’s restructuring: WIKA’s own standalone future, as a listed entity, may not exist past this process. What would change the picture: finalized, fair merger terms that clear the negative-equity overhang; anything short of that leaves WIKA the clearest distress case in this dataset.
Prequalified tenders for government/state-enterprise civil-engineering and EPC scopes, often executed via KSO joint operations with peer BUMN Karya or foreign partners.
EconomicsMargin is set at the bid stage; WIKA’s shrinking new-work intake (revenue down 40.8% from its FY2023 peak) means less of the cost base is currently covered by active projects.
Site execution, materials procurement, subcontractor management; billed via progress certificates against physical completion.
EconomicsReal FY2025 gross margin ~8.5% (independently sourced): thin, and down from ~10% in FY2022, before the current distress deepened.
Toll-road and power-plant stakes accumulated during 2014-2024 sit on the balance sheet as investment assets, financed substantially by debt.
Economics~Rp33.5tn of interest-bearing debt against Rp1.68tn of total equity (Rp884.7bn negative at the owner level): the legacy investment book is now the balance sheet’s central problem.
Equity-method income or loss from joint ventures and associates flows below the operating line.
EconomicsRp1.44tn of FY2025 losses came from JVs specifically: a real, separately-disclosed drag, not a core-contracting failure.
Merger into Hutama Karya alongside WSKT, government-directed, terms not yet finalized.
EconomicsThe outcome of this process, not operating execution, is now the dominant driver of any value WIKA shareholders retain.
Cost structureMaterials and subcontractor costs dominate direct project costs; financial charges (~Rp2.97tn, FY2025) and JV losses (Rp1.44tn) plus a large "other charges" line (Rp6.37tn, up from Rp3.73tn) sit below gross profit and are the actual drivers of the net loss, not a deterioration in core contracting economics alone.
Cash cycleFY2025 operating cash flow was negative (-Rp348.0bn) despite a large net loss that would normally include big non-cash add-backs (D&A only Rp374.5bn): a sign that cash collection from a state-dominated client base, not just accounting losses, is genuinely strained.
Materials (steel, cement) are commodity inputs with multiple suppliers; but a distressed, cash-constrained WIKA has weaker negotiating leverage on payment terms than a healthy peer would.
Implication → Distress compounds itself here: weaker supplier terms tighten working capital further.
The government client sets contract and payment terms; Danantara now also controls WIKA’s corporate fate directly via the merger process: an unusually total form of buyer/owner power.
Implication → WIKA has essentially no independent negotiating position left on its own future.
Bonding capacity and prequalification remain real barriers, but they protect the BUMN Karya group collectively, not WIKA’s individual standing within it: WIKA is currently the weakest of the four on every balance-sheet metric.
Implication → A structural barrier that doesn’t translate into WIKA-specific protection.
No real substitute for large-scale civil infrastructure delivery; the risk to WIKA specifically is losing share to peers or foreign EPC firms, not the category being substituted away.
Implication → Demand risk is really execution/financial-capacity risk for WIKA at this point.
WIKA competes with PTPP, ADHI and WSKT for the same shrinking pool of profitable new work, and is currently losing that competition on every financial metric even as it still wins some new contracts.
Implication → Being merged away, rather than competing WIKA out directly, is how this rivalry is actually being resolved.
Not a one-off-driven loss so much as a structural one: WIKA has posted negative net margin for four consecutive years (FY2022-25), with FY2023 already showing a -124% ROE before this year’s further deterioration. The seeded FY2025 gross margin (29.6%) and EBIT figures are unreliable: independent reporting implies a real gross margin near 8.5%, well below the seeded number, meaning even a "corrected" read still shows a genuine, multi-year decline rather than a single bad year.
| Period | One-off item | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| FY2025 | JV/associate losses | Rp1.44tn, disclosed separately from core contracting results |
Cash conversionNegative operating cash flow (-Rp348.0bn) alongside a Rp9.71tn net loss and minimal D&A (Rp374.5bn): accrual and cash losses are both real here, not a case of paper losses masking healthy cash generation.
Not a builder by choice at this point: WIKA is in balance-sheet survival mode, with no capital being deployed into growth (FY2025 capex just Rp14.5bn against Rp13.33tn revenue). What remains of the group’s capital is being consumed by legacy debt service and losses, not allocated toward any return-generating activity; "harvester" here describes a forced wind-down posture, not a deliberate cash-return strategy.
DeploymentFY2025 capex was negligible (Rp14.5bn); cash generated (or borrowed) is being absorbed by financial charges (~Rp2.97tn) and operating cash burn (-Rp348.0bn), not reinvested. This is a company managing decline, not allocating for growth.
Returns trendROE has been negative every year since FY2022 (-0.5% -> -124.0% -> -25.6% -> NM/+1,097% in FY2025 as equity turned negative). The FY2025 figure is a sign-flip artifact, not a real return: the honest read is that returns have been destructive for four straight years.
FY2025 equity attributable to owners is -Rp884.7bn: technical insolvency at the parent level. Total consolidated equity stays barely positive (Rp1.68tn) only because of a large non-controlling interest offsetting the negative parent stake.
The Hutama Karya absorption is government-directed and confirmed to be happening, but exact share-exchange and creditor terms are not yet public: a real, unresolved uncertainty directly affecting shareholder value.
The FY2025 seeded gross margin (29.6%) does not match independent reporting (~8.5% real): a source-side categorization issue, disclosed here and corrected via cited external figures throughout this narrative rather than silently used.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
The state-owned contractors (BUMN Karya) that built Indonesia’s decade-long toll-road boom on borrowed money: now all reporting losses at once (a combined ~Rp25tn across WIKA/PTPP/ADHI/WSKT in FY2025) while the government force-merges the survivors into three entities.