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1 companies (n=1)
The aggregate figures below cover only the 1 companies Neraca tracks, a peer sample rather than the whole industry. The real industry picture (full scale, regulation, outlook) is in the Deep Analysis section.
| Company | Mkt cap | P/E | EV/EBITDA | P/B | P/S | FCF yield | Div yield | Rev CAGR | EBITDA mgn | ROE | ND/EBITDA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Automotive Distribution & Manufacturing | |||||||||||
| ASII | 203.6T | 6.2x | 5.7x | 0.9x | 0.6x | 13.6% | 7.6% | 8.5% | 17.4% | 14.3% | 1.0x |
| Peer median | — | 6.2x | 5.7x | 0.9x | 0.6x | 13.6% | 7.6% | — | — | — | — |
Multiples pair the snapshot price with each company’s latest audited fiscal year. NM = not meaningful (negative denominator), excluded from medians: counts shown as (usable/total). USD reporters’ market caps convert at the cited rate; the multiples themselves are unitless and comparable.
ASII FY2023 revenue ~IDR 319 T; net profit ~IDR 35 T. ~50 % owned by Jardine Cycle & Carriage (JC&C) / Jardine Matheson group. Automotive: PT Toyota-Astra Motor (TAM, Toyota ~30 % market share) + PT Astra Daihatsu Motor (ADM, Daihatsu ~15 %) = ~45 % of Indonesia's ~1 M unit/yr car market. Financial services: Bank Permata 44.5 % stake (~Rp 100 T assets), FIFGROUP (consumer finance, ~3 M active contracts), Astra Credit Companies (ACC), MSIG insurance JV. Heavy equipment: UNTR 59.5 % owned, see heavy-equipment industry. Agribusiness: AALI 79.7 % owned, CPO and rubber. IT/infrastructure: Astra Graphia (Fuji Xerox JV), Menara Astra. EV disruption is ASII's decade-defining risk: Toyota's hybrid/PHEV strategy buys time but BYD (30 % import duty waiver for EVs) and Wuling (SGMW) are gaining Indonesia market share.
Toyota and Daihatsu are JV manufacturing partners (not pure principals): ASII co-manufactures locally via TAM and ADM, reducing supplier power vs. a pure distributor. However, Toyota/Daihatsu set product line-ups, pricing bands, and feature specifications globally: ASII adapts locally. For UNTR (Komatsu subsidiary), see heavy-equipment industry analysis. Bank Permata's funding cost is market-driven (depositor cost, BI rate).
Implication → ASII's JV co-manufacturing model gives it more pricing control than a pure distributor. The key risk is if Toyota or Daihatsu globally shifts manufacturing strategy in a way that disadvantages Indonesian JV economics.
Retail vehicle buyers are individually weak. However, digital car price comparison (OLX Autos, Mobil123) has increased buyer information parity. FIFGROUP/ACC captive financing reduces effective buyer power in the finance decision. Motorcycle buyers (AHM) face a near-duopoly (Honda ~75 %, Yamaha ~20 %): buyer power structurally low in motorcycles. Mining/fleet buyers (UNTR) are large and sophisticated: buyer power high in heavy equipment (addressed in heavy-equipment narrative).
Implication → ASII's captive finance + insurance flywheel partially neutralises buyer power in automotive. Conglomerate diversification means no single buyer segment dominates group revenue.
EV disruption is the primary entry threat: BYD, Wuling (SGMW), Chery, Neta, and MG (SAIC) entered the Indonesian market with government-backed zero-import-duty incentives for EVs (below USD 40k MSRP, CBU imports duty-free through 2025). BYD Atto 3 and Wuling Air ev took market share in 2023–2024. Chinese OEM manufacturing localisation (TKDN requirement for permanent duty exemption) is a future barrier. Hyundai (Ioniq 5/6, assembled in Karawang) is the serious EV competitor with local production.
Implication → ASII is at the centre of Indonesia's automotive EV disruption. Toyota's delayed EV strategy (strong hybrid first) is a 2–3 year buffer. The decade-long risk is structural market share loss in passenger vehicles to BYD/Hyundai if EV penetration accelerates.
For automotive: public transit (MRT, LRT, KRL Commuter) substitutes car ownership in Jakarta, but only for the commute use case, not weekend/family travel. Ride-hailing (Gojek, Grab) reduces marginal car use in urban areas: may suppress addressable market growth. Motorcycle is a partial substitute for small/economy cars in the sub-IDR 200 M segment (AHM itself captures this via Honda motorcycles). For financial services: digital banks and fintech lenders (Kredivo, Akulaku) compete for consumer credit.
Implication → Substitution risk for ASII is most acute in passenger cars (EV + ride-hailing + transit) and consumer finance (fintech). Motorcycles (AHM) and heavy equipment (UNTR) face lower substitution risk.
Automotive: Indomobil Group (Nissan/Suzuki/Hino), Hyundai Motors Indonesia, BYD (importer Bakrie Auto Parts), Wuling (SGMW), and Kia Korea all compete against Toyota/Daihatsu. Motorcycle: Honda vs. Yamaha duopoly: intense but stable. Financial services: Bank Mandiri, BRI, BCA, CIMB Niaga, all compete for auto loans against FIFGROUP/ACC. Conglomerate rivalry is portfolio-specific: ASII has no true conglomerate peer at its scale in Indonesia (Salim Group is private; Bakrie Group is financially stressed).
Implication → ASII's conglomerate structure creates diversification that no single-sector rival can match. The real competitive threat is EV-native OEMs disrupting the automotive core, which is ~45 % of group revenue.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic.