Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | 0.60x | 0.59x | 0.85x | 1.11x | 0.77x |
| Interest burden | 0.95x | 0.98x | 0.95x | 0.94x | 0.95x |
| Operating margin | 33.3% | 45.9% | 24.1% | 21.8% | 21.2% |
| Asset turnoverdriver | 0.62x | 0.97x | 0.84x | 0.89x | 0.86x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 1.71x | 1.77x | 1.47x | 1.78x | 1.56x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 20.2% | 45.8% | 23.9% | 36.0% | 20.8% |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 21.4% | 46.6% | 25.1% | 34.5% | 21.9% |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 2.22x | 2.04x | 1.82x | 2.54x | 1.95x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 2.15x | 1.99x | 1.78x | 2.46x | 1.85x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 1.37x | 1.60x | 1.41x | 1.74x | 1.00x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | $ 1.3 B | $ 2.2 B | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.3 B | $ 874 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 0.36x | 0.27x | 0.20x | 0.44x | 0.23x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 0.71x | 0.77x | 0.47x | 0.78x | 0.56x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.21x | 0.15x | 0.14x | 0.25x | 0.14x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | -$ 205 M | -$ 2.2 B | -$ 1.6 B | -$ 33 M | -$ 99 M |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 18.63x | 55.76x | 19.78x | 15.85x | 20.21x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 1.71x | 1.77x | 1.47x | 1.78x | 1.56x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 38.7% | 51.1% | 29.2% | 27.6% | 25.7% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 33.3% | 45.9% | 24.1% | 21.8% | 21.2% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 19.0% | 26.7% | 19.3% | 22.8% | 15.5% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | $ 1.6 B | $ 3.9 B | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.3 B | $ 1.2 B |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 42.3% | 50.2% | 25.7% | 23.6% | 23.6% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 11.8% | 25.9% | 16.2% | 20.2% | 13.3% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 22.0% | 50.2% | 26.2% | 40.4% | 22.8% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 0.60x | 0.59x | 0.85x | 1.11x | 0.77x |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 0.95x | 0.98x | 0.95x | 0.94x | 0.95x |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 21.4% | 46.6% | 25.1% | 34.5% | 21.9% |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.62x | 0.97x | 0.84x | 0.89x | 0.86x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 32.65x | 31.45x | 64.32x | 56.22x | 42.69x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 9.33x | 12.69x | 14.21x | 13.25x | 9.78x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 8.98x | 13.60x | 10.86x | 8.23x | 6.97x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 11.2 days | 11.6 days | 5.7 days | 6.5 days | 8.5 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 39.1 days | 28.8 days | 25.7 days | 27.5 days | 37.3 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 40.6 days | 26.8 days | 33.6 days | 44.3 days | 52.4 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 9.7 days | 13.5 days | -2.3 days | -10.3 days | -6.5 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | $ 989 M | $ 3.0 B | $ 324 M | $ 828 M | $ 535 M |
Price Rp 9,221 · market cap Rp 72 T ($ 4.0 B at the cited rate; statements are filed in USD)
| Multiple | AADI | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 5.23x | 16.25x(15/16) | -68% |
| P/B | 1.19x | 1.68x | -29% |
| P/S | 0.81x | 1.92x | -58% |
| EV/EBITDA | 3.62x | 10.31x | -65% |
| EV/EBIT | 4.03x | 14.25x | -72% |
| EV/Sales | 0.85x | 2.27x | -62% |
| FCF Yield | 13.46% | 0.01% | +127,702% |
| Dividend Yield | 11.67% | 5.27%(11/16) | +121% |
EV = mkt cap $ 4.0 B + debt $ 826 M − cash $ 925 M + minority interest $ 316 M = $ 4.2 B
At today’s price, the market is paying for -3.3%/yr FCF growth (-6.5% at 9.3% to -0.5% at 13.3% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: -14.2% FCF · 6.2% revenue.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 9.3–13.3% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
Cyclical normalization: Commodity/cyclical name: the trailing years are a sample drawn from the price cycle, not a trend. Defaults are therefore normalized, using the full-window mean margin with no cycle-position growth extrapolation. That normalized margin is itself the embedded commodity-price assumption.
Base year contains named one-off item(s): FY2024: Separation from the former parent, funded out of this balance sheet; FY2022: Supercycle peak that no later year should be measured against. The EBIT basis screens out most non-operating items, but read the Earnings Quality section before trusting the base margin.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 4.66% | US 10Y Treasury, 30 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.96 → 1.10 | Metals & Mining (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.21 |
| Cost of equity | 12.00% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 6.68% | median interest coverage 19.8x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a Aaa/AAA synthetic rating and a 0.40% default spread, over a 6.28% base (US 10Y 4.66% + Indonesia's 1.62% sovereign spread). Its BOOK rate is 6.2%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms) |
| Tax rate | 31.5% | median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest) |
| WACC | 10.72% | 83% E × CoE + 17% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 2.5% | terminal growth from year 1, cyclical normalization: the delivered 4-yr CAGR (6.2%) reflects cycle position, not a trend |
| EBIT margin | 29.3% | full-cycle mean EBIT margin, FY2021–FY2025 (cyclical normalization: this margin is the embedded commodity-price assumption) |
| D&A / revenue | 1.9% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 6.0% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 10.7% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 23.3% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 6.3% of revenue against depreciation of 1.9%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | 10.8% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | $ 5.0 B | $ 5.2 B | $ 5.3 B | $ 5.4 B | $ 5.6 B | $ 5.7 B |
| EBIT | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.6 B | $ 1.6 B | $ 1.7 B |
| NOPAT | $ 1.0 B | $ 1.0 B | $ 1.1 B | $ 1.1 B | $ 1.1 B | $ 1.1 B |
| + D&A | $ 97 M | $ 99 M | $ 102 M | $ 104 M | $ 107 M | $ 110 M |
| − Capex | $ 304 M | $ 312 M | $ 320 M | $ 328 M | $ 336 M | $ 361 M |
| − ΔNWC | $ 13 M | $ 14 M | $ 14 M | $ 14 M | $ 15 M | $ 15 M |
| FCFF | $ 788 M | $ 808 M | $ 828 M | $ 848 M | $ 870 M | $ 875 M |
| PV | $ 712 M | $ 659 M | $ 610 M | $ 565 M | $ 523 M | $ 6.4 B |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding
EV = PV(explicit) $ 3.1 B + PV(TV) $ 6.4 B = $ 9.5 B · TV 68% of EV · − net debt -$ 99 M − minority $ 316 M = equity $ 9.2 B ÷ shares outstanding · per share is in USD, shown in IDR at 18,058
Model output: Rp 21,439/share (+133% vs price Rp 9,221)· exit-multiple check (10.3x): Rp 31,508
Under these assumptions the model lands 133% above today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for slower growth, a thinner margin, or a higher discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 9.7% | 10.7% | 11.7% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | 23,072 | 20,377 | 18,236 |
| 2.5% | 24,464 | 21,439 | 19,070 |
| 3.0% | 26,062 | 22,638 | 19,999 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $ 3.9 B | $ 7.7 B | $ 5.9 B | $ 5.3 B | $ 4.9 B |
| Cost of Goods Sold | $ 2.4 B | $ 3.8 B | $ 4.2 B | $ 3.9 B | $ 3.6 B |
| Gross Profit | $ 1.5 B | $ 3.9 B | $ 1.7 B | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.3 B |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | $ 1.3 B | $ 3.5 B | $ 1.4 B | $ 1.2 B | $ 1.0 B |
| Interest Expense | $ 69 M | $ 64 M | $ 72 M | $ 73 M | $ 51 M |
| Net Income | $ 732 M | $ 2.1 B | $ 1.1 B | $ 1.2 B | $ 760 M |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | $ 732 M | $ 2.1 B | $ 1.1 B | $ 1.2 B | $ 760 M |
| Depreciation & Amortization | $ 345 M | $ 335 M | $ 93 M | $ 97 M | $ 117 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $ 1.5 B | $ 3.4 B | $ 2.5 B | $ 1.5 B | $ 925 M |
| Accounts Receivable | $ 414 M | $ 609 M | $ 416 M | $ 402 M | $ 502 M |
| Inventory | $ 73 M | $ 120 M | $ 65 M | $ 69 M | $ 85 M |
| Current Assets | $ 2.4 B | $ 4.3 B | $ 3.3 B | $ 2.2 B | $ 1.8 B |
| Total Assets | $ 6.2 B | $ 8.0 B | $ 7.1 B | $ 6.0 B | $ 5.7 B |
| Accounts Payable | $ 264 M | $ 278 M | $ 386 M | $ 468 M | $ 523 M |
| Current Liabilities | $ 1.1 B | $ 2.1 B | $ 1.8 B | $ 873 M | $ 923 M |
| Total Liabilities | $ 2.6 B | $ 3.5 B | $ 2.3 B | $ 2.6 B | $ 2.1 B |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | $ 1.3 B | $ 1.2 B | $ 959 M | $ 1.5 B | $ 826 M |
| Total Equity | $ 3.6 B | $ 4.5 B | $ 4.8 B | $ 3.4 B | $ 3.6 B |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | $ 3.3 B | $ 4.1 B | $ 4.4 B | $ 3.0 B | $ 3.3 B |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $ 1.1 B | $ 3.1 B | $ 595 M | $ 1.2 B | $ 859 M |
| Capital Expenditure | $ 77 M | $ 118 M | $ 271 M | $ 370 M | $ 324 M |
AADI gross margin: 38.7 % (2021) → 51.1 % (2022) → 29.2 % (2023) → 27.6 % (2024) → 25.7 % (2025). OPM: 33.3 % → 45.9 % → 24.1 % → 21.8 % → 21.2 %. Net margin: 19.0 % → 26.7 % → 19.3 % → 22.8 % → 15.5 %; 2024's net margin actually rose despite lower gross/operating margins, a divergence not fully explained by the ratios alone (possibly a one-off gain or tax item; not asserted as fact here). ROE: 22.0 % → 50.2 % (2022 peak) → 26.2 % → 40.4 % → 22.8 %. Asset turnover: 0.62× → 0.97× (peak) → 0.84× → 0.89× → 0.86×. D/E: 0.36× → 0.27× → 0.20× → 0.44× (highest) → 0.23×; L/E: 0.71× → 0.77× → 0.47× → 0.78× → 0.56×. Net debt stayed NEGATIVE (net cash) every single year: −$205.3 M (2021) → −$2,180.1 M (2022, huge peak) → −$1,575.3 M → −$32.5 M (2024, thinnest) → −$99.3 M (2025); AADI never flipped to net debt, unlike INDY or HRUM. Interest coverage: 18.6× → 55.8× (2022 peak) → 19.8× → 15.9× (2024 low) → 20.2×; never dropped below 15.9× in five years. FCF (USD): $988.7 M → $3,016.9 M (2022, an exceptional peak) → $324.2 M → $828.5 M → $535.4 M; positive every year. Current ratio stayed comfortably above 1.8× throughout (1.82×–2.54×). Revenue (USD): $3.86 B → $7.73 B (2022 peak) → $5.92 B → $5.32 B → $4.91 B. The shape: the same 2022 coal-supercycle peak every peer shows, but a far more orderly, never-net-debt, double-digit-interest-coverage normalisation afterward; the healthiest post-peak trajectory of the coal names added in recent batches.
AADI holds the thermal coal pillar separated out of the former Adaro Energy group, which retained the minerals and renewables businesses. Revenue was USD 4,910.3m in FY2025.
EconomicsA pure thermal coal producer has no internal hedge. Every margin movement is the coal price, so the accounts read as a price series rather than an operating history.
Output goes to power utilities regionally at benchmark-linked prices, with a domestic market obligation capping the price on the portion sold to Indonesian utilities.
EconomicsThe domestic obligation price has been fixed at USD 70 per tonne for GAR 6,322 kcal/kg since 2018, against a benchmark near USD 124, so the sales mix between export and domestic materially changes realised revenue per tonne.
Capital spending ran USD 76.7m, 118.5m, 271.0m, 370.0m and 323.9m across FY2021 to FY2025, never above 7.6 percent of revenue.
EconomicsLow reinvestment is what makes a mature coal mine a cash machine, and it is also why free cash flow stayed POSITIVE in all five years even as revenue fell 36 percent from the 2022 peak.
AADI listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange on 5 December 2024 at an offer price of IDR 5,550, and on 6 December 2024 the former parent distributed a special dividend of about USD 2.62bn sized so that its own shareholders could buy AADI shares.
EconomicsThe cost landed on this balance sheet. Equity FELL from USD 4,790.5m to USD 3,363.5m during FY2024 while the company EARNED USD 1,210.8m, which implies roughly USD 2.64bn of distributions out, almost exactly the size of that special dividend.
Cost structureSimple and almost entirely variable with price rather than volume. Cost of revenue left a gross margin of 25.7 percent in FY2025, down from 51.1 percent at the 2022 peak, with the sequence running 38.7, 51.1, 29.2, 27.6 and 25.7 percent. Operating margin followed 33.3, 45.9, 24.1, 21.8 and 21.2 percent. Because mining cost per tonne moves far less than the coal price, that halving of margin is very largely price, and it is why a 36 percent revenue decline from the 2022 peak turned into a 63 percent fall in operating profit. Interest is minor at USD 51.5m against USD 1,040.7m of operating profit.
Cash cycleNot the constraint here. Asset turnover ran 62.4 to 97.0 percent and the working capital position is unremarkable for a bulk commodity producer selling to utilities on standard terms. What matters far more on this balance sheet is the cash BALANCE rather than the cycle: cash fell from USD 3,380.3m at the FY2022 peak to USD 2,534.5m, then USD 1,518.7m, then USD 925.4m in FY2025. That decline is not operating deterioration, since free cash flow was positive every year; it is the separation being paid for out of the till.
Unit economicsThe economics are a price pass-through with very little reinvestment, and that combination produces high but violently cyclical returns. Return on equity ran 22.0, 50.2, 26.2, 40.4 and 22.8 percent, with return on invested capital close behind at 21.4, 46.6, 25.1, 34.5 and 21.9 percent, so leverage is not the driver. Note the FY2024 reading carefully: return on equity of 40.4 percent looks like an operating improvement on FY2023, but operating profit FELL that year from USD 1,425.0m to USD 1,160.5m. The ratio rose because the DENOMINATOR shrank, as roughly USD 2.64bn of equity was distributed out during the separation. Read FY2024 returns as a smaller balance sheet, not a better business.
AADI owns its coal properties and, unusually for this cohort, its own logistics chain (barging, shipyard) via Paramitha Cipta Sarana: reducing dependency on third-party logistics providers that most coal peers must use.
Implication → The captive logistics chain is a genuine cost-control and reliability advantage versus peers who must contract barging/shipping separately.
Thermal coal is benchmark-priced: AADI is a price-taker on its mined tonnage, the same dynamic as every listed coal peer.
Implication → Revenue is fully cycle-driven; AADI's lever is cost discipline (helped by captive logistics) and balance-sheet conservatism, not pricing power.
Standard IUP/RKAB/AMDAL barriers for coal mining, plus the captive logistics infrastructure (shipyard, barging fleet) represents its own capital barrier that a pure mining-only entrant would not automatically have.
Implication → The combined mining-plus-logistics structure is somewhat more defensible than a mining-only operation, though the coal side still faces the sector's standard secular risks.
The sector's standard high substitution risk applies to the coal side (LNG/solar/wind/hydro/geothermal, post-2030 demand decline); the logistics side faces less direct substitution risk as long as coal (or other bulk commodities) continue moving through the same river/port infrastructure.
Implication → AADI's logistics arm provides some diversification of revenue character even without diversifying away from coal-adjacent commodities entirely.
AADI competes on the same seaborne thermal market as Australia, Russia, South Africa and domestic peers (PTBA, ADRO, its former parent, BYAN, ITMG, INDY, HRUM, GEMS).
Implication → Rivalry is on delivered cost through the price cycle; AADI's never-net-debt balance sheet gives it more room to weather a downturn than several peers.
The trading record is clean; the structural events are what require care, and there are two. First, this company was carved out of a larger group, so the pre-2025 figures describe a division rather than the standalone business now listed. AADI began trading on 5 December 2024 at an offer price of IDR 5,550, and on 6 December 2024 the former parent paid a special dividend of about USD 2.62bn explicitly sized to let its shareholders subscribe for AADI shares. The cost is visible in these accounts: equity fell from USD 4,790.5m to USD 3,363.5m during FY2024 while the company earned USD 1,210.8m, implying roughly USD 2.64bn distributed out, and cash fell from USD 2,534.5m to USD 1,518.7m and then to USD 925.4m. Second, and following directly from that, FY2024 ratios are distorted upward. Return on equity of 40.4 percent was higher than FY2023 even though operating profit FELL, because the equity base shrank. Anyone reading FY2024 as the strong year and FY2025 as the disappointment has the sequence backwards: operating profit declined in both. Beyond those two items the earnings look straightforward, with net margin between 15.5 and 26.7 percent and no gains flattering any year, and cash conversion is sound at 1.46, 1.52, 0.52, 0.99 and 1.13 times.
| Period | One-off item | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| FY2024 | Separation from the former parent, funded out of this balance sheet | Listed 5 December 2024 at IDR 5,550; the former parent paid an approximately USD 2.62bn special dividend on 6 December 2024 sized to let its shareholders buy AADI shares. Equity fell USD 4,790.5m to USD 3,363.5m while the company earned USD 1,210.8m, implying about USD 2.64bn of distributions, and cash fell from USD 2,534.5m to USD 1,518.7m. Pre-2025 figures therefore describe a division of a larger group, not the standalone company. |
| FY2022 | Supercycle peak that no later year should be measured against | Revenue reached USD 7,725.9m with a 51.1 percent gross margin and a 50.2 percent return on equity, roughly double the FY2021 revenue. By FY2025 revenue was USD 4,910.3m and gross margin 25.7 percent. Using FY2022 as the base makes every subsequent year look like collapse; it was a price event, and the correct comparison for a thermal coal producer is a full cycle. |
Cash conversionSolid and consistent with a mature, low-capital mine: operating cash flow covered net income 1.46, 1.52, 0.52, 0.99 and 1.13 times, with only FY2023 falling materially short as the price reset worked through receivables and inventory. Free cash flow was POSITIVE in all five years at about USD 988.7m, 3,016.9m, 324.2m, 828.5m and 535.4m, because capital spending never exceeded 7.6 percent of revenue. So the operating business converts profit to cash reliably. The cash DECLINE on the balance sheet, from USD 3,380.3m to USD 925.4m, is a distribution story rather than a generation story, and separating those two is the main reading skill this page asks for.
A harvester by design and by mandate, since a pure thermal coal asset with a finite social licence has limited reason to reinvest heavily. Capital spending stayed between 2.0 and 7.6 percent of revenue while free cash flow was positive every year, and the balance sheet was progressively emptied of cash rather than built up: USD 3,380.3m in FY2022 down to USD 925.4m in FY2025. Debt ended lower too, at USD 826.1m against USD 1,297.8m in FY2021. The pattern is unambiguous, and the honest way to describe it is that this company is designed to distribute rather than to compound.
DeploymentThree uses, and the largest was not operational. Capital spending rose from USD 76.7m to a peak of USD 370.0m before easing to USD 323.9m, still modest. Debt was reduced from USD 1,297.8m to USD 826.1m. The dominant use was distribution: equity fell USD 1,427.0m during FY2024 while the company earned USD 1,210.8m, implying roughly USD 2.64bn paid out, which matches the scale of the former parent special dividend of about USD 2.62bn announced for 6 December 2024. Cash accordingly fell from USD 2,534.5m to USD 925.4m across two years. Judge the allocation on what it means going forward: the separation is paid for, gearing is low at 22.6 percent of equity, and future free cash flow is no longer committed to a parent transaction.
Returns trendReturns are high across the whole window but the sequence needs decoding rather than reading straight. Return on equity ran 22.0, 50.2, 26.2, 40.4 and 22.8 percent and return on invested capital 21.4, 46.6, 25.1, 34.5 and 21.9 percent. FY2022 is the supercycle peak, and FY2024 is an artefact: the ratio ROSE to 40.4 percent while operating profit FELL from USD 1,425.0m to USD 1,160.5m, purely because the separation shrank the equity base. Strip both and the underlying return is roughly 22 percent at FY2021 and FY2025 coal prices, which is a genuinely good business at the bottom of a cycle. The structural question is not the return but its duration. This is a single-commodity thermal coal asset in a market where Indonesia produced 790 Mt in 2025 and policy has oscillated between cutting the 2026 quota toward 600 Mt to defend price and then reversing on a presidential directive to approve more than 600 Mt. Read the Valuation section for the model output; the judgement this page asks for is how many years of a 22 percent return on a depleting, politically exposed asset are worth paying for.
AADI listed on 5 December 2024, and the former parent paid an approximately USD 2.62bn special dividend the following day, sized so its shareholders could subscribe for AADI shares. Equity fell USD 4,790.5m to USD 3,363.5m in FY2024 while the company earned USD 1,210.8m, implying about USD 2.64bn distributed out, with cash falling from USD 2,534.5m to USD 925.4m over two years. Any per-share or per-equity history spanning that boundary is measuring a corporate reorganisation.
Return on equity was 40.4 percent in FY2024 against 26.2 percent in FY2023, which reads as a strong year. Operating profit over the same period FELL from USD 1,425.0m to USD 1,160.5m. The ratio improved because the separation shrank the denominator, not because the business did. Reading FY2024 as the peak and FY2025 as the decline inverts what actually happened, since operating profit fell in both years.
Gross margin went 38.7, 51.1, 29.2, 27.6 and 25.7 percent while mining cost per tonne moves far less than price, so essentially all of that swing is the coal market. Revenue fell 36 percent from the FY2022 peak and operating profit fell 63 percent, which is the operating leverage working in reverse. The former parent kept the minerals and renewables pillars, so unlike a diversified miner AADI has nothing that moves independently of thermal coal.
The domestic market obligation price has been fixed at USD 70 per tonne for GAR 6,322 kcal/kg since 2018 against a benchmark near USD 124, so the domestic share of sales caps realised revenue. On volume, Indonesia produced 790 Mt in 2025 and the 2026 quota was first cut toward 600 Mt to defend price, then reversed on a presidential directive with more than 600 Mt approved. A producer cannot plan against a quota that moves inside a single quarter.
Cash went from USD 3,380.3m in FY2022 to USD 925.4m in FY2025. Free cash flow was positive every year, so this is distribution rather than deterioration, and gearing remains low at 22.6 percent of equity. But the buffer that a single-commodity producer would normally hold against a price trough is now much thinner, and the next downturn will be met with USD 925.4m of cash rather than USD 3.4bn.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Indonesia controls >60 % of global nickel supply and is the world's largest thermal-coal exporter; hilirisasi mandates in-country ore processing, reshaping value chains from raw ore to battery-grade products.