Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | 0.32x | 0.45x | 0.54x | — | — |
| Interest burden | 0.18x | 0.20x | 0.35x | -0.40x | — |
| Operating margindriver | 8.3% | 6.6% | 5.6% | 4.2% | -13.0% |
| Asset turnover | 0.29x | 0.34x | 0.50x | 0.39x | 0.34x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 7.05x | 4.53x | 4.39x | 3.86x | 8.73x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 1.0% | 0.9% | 2.3% | — | — |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 2.3% | 2.7% | 3.6% | — | — |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 1.02x | 1.21x | 1.14x | 1.10x | 0.85x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 0.66x | 0.83x | 0.91x | 0.78x | 0.61x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 0.10x | 0.18x | 0.18x | 0.11x | 0.09x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | Rp 473 M | Rp 5.1 T | Rp 3.6 T | Rp 1.9 T | -Rp 2.8 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 1.86x | 1.19x | 1.31x | 1.01x | 2.49x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 6.05x | 3.53x | 3.39x | 2.86x | 7.73x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.26x | 0.26x | 0.30x | 0.26x | 0.28x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | Rp 7.4 T | Rp 6.2 T | Rp 7.6 T | Rp 6.8 T | Rp 6.5 T |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 1.22x | 1.25x | 1.54x | 0.72x | -1.88x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 7.05x | 4.53x | 4.39x | 3.86x | 8.73x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 15.2% | 13.3% | 11.6% | 12.2% | 10.9% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 8.3% | 6.6% | 5.6% | 4.2% | -13.0% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 0.5% | 0.6% | 1.1% | -0.6% | -55.9% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 687 M | -Rp 1.2 T |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 9.7% | 7.7% | 6.3% | 5.1% | -12.1% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.5% | -0.3% | -18.8% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 1.0% | 1.0% | 2.5% | -1.0% | -188.5% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 0.32x | 0.45x | 0.54x | — | — |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 0.18x | 0.20x | 0.35x | -0.40x | — |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 2.3% | 2.7% | 3.6% | — | — |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.29x | 0.34x | 0.50x | 0.39x | 0.34x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 0.88x | 1.26x | 3.01x | 1.83x | 1.80x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 0.73x | 0.97x | 1.23x | 1.18x | 1.17x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 0.54x | 0.78x | 1.40x | 1.13x | 0.83x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 413.5 days | 288.8 days | 121.1 days | 199.3 days | 202.6 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 501.1 days | 375.0 days | 295.8 days | 309.4 days | 312.3 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 680.3 days | 465.3 days | 260.4 days | 323.1 days | 442.2 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 234.2 days | 198.5 days | 156.6 days | 185.5 days | 72.7 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 1.1 T | -Rp 70 M | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.9 T |
Price Rp 159 · market cap Rp 1.3 T
| Multiple | ADHI | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | NM | —(0/2) | — |
| P/B | 0.47x | 0.43x | +8% |
| P/S | 0.14x | 0.11x | +29% |
| EV/EBITDA | NM | —(0/2) | — |
| EV/EBIT | NM | —(0/2) | — |
| EV/Sales | 0.85x | 0.97x | -12% |
| FCF Yield | 144.91% | 108.70% | +33% |
| Dividend Yield | — | —(0/2) | — |
Only 3 peers are covered here, so the median is itself one of the members. A 0% gap can simply mean ADHI sits at the median.
EV = mkt cap Rp 1.3 T + debt Rp 8.2 T − cash Rp 1.7 T + minority interest Rp 432 M = Rp 8.3 T
At today’s price, the market is paying for -9.9%/yr FCF growth (-12.2% at 12.0% to -7.8% at 16.0% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: 7.4% FCF · -4.3% revenue.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 12.0–16.0% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
Mechanical DCF suppressed: mean EBIT margin over the last 3 FYs is negative (-1.1%), so a mechanical FCFF perpetuity is not meaningful for a pre-profit record. The reverse DCF above shows what the price implies, and the sliders below let you impose a path-to-margin scenario (a target, not history).
Base year contains named one-off item(s): FY2025: Inventory net-realizable-value write-down (Adhi Persada Properti, Adhi Commuter Properti); FY2025: Expected credit loss provision. The EBIT basis screens out most non-operating items, but read the Earnings Quality section before trusting the base margin.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 7.26% | Indonesia 10Y government bond, re-verified 31 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.89 → 4.43 | Engineering/Construction (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 6.12 |
| Cost of equity | 36.89% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 16.11% | median interest coverage 1.2x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a Caa/CCC synthetic rating and a 8.85% default spread, over a 7.26% base (Indonesia 10Y 7.26%, already the sovereign rate). Its BOOK rate is 8.2%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms) |
| Tax rate | 35.0% | median effective rate FY2021–FY2025 computed to 50.6%, CLAMPED to 35%: above that ceiling the pretax approximation is carrying minority interests, which are already deducted separately from enterprise value, rather than tax |
| WACC | 14.18% | 14% E × CoE + 86% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | -4.3% | delivered 4-yr revenue CAGR -4.3%, fading linearly to terminal |
| EBIT margin | -1.1% | mean EBIT margin, last 3 FYs |
| D&A / revenue | 0.9% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 0.4% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 14.2% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 0.0% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 0.9% of revenue against depreciation of 0.9%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | 25.7% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | -4.3% | -2.6% | -0.9% | 0.8% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | Rp 9.2 T | Rp 9.0 T | Rp 8.9 T | Rp 9.0 T | Rp 9.2 T | Rp 9.5 T |
| EBIT | -Rp 98 M | -Rp 95 M | -Rp 94 M | -Rp 95 M | -Rp 98 M | -Rp 100 M |
| NOPAT | -Rp 64 M | -Rp 62 M | -Rp 61 M | -Rp 62 M | -Rp 63 M | -Rp 65 M |
| + D&A | Rp 79 M | Rp 77 M | Rp 76 M | Rp 77 M | Rp 79 M | Rp 81 M |
| − Capex | Rp 39 M | Rp 38 M | Rp 38 M | Rp 38 M | Rp 39 M | Rp 81 M |
| − ΔNWC | -Rp 107 M | -Rp 62 M | -Rp 21 M | Rp 18 M | Rp 58 M | Rp 59 M |
| FCFF | Rp 83 M | Rp 39 M | -Rp 2.0 M | -Rp 41 M | -Rp 82 M | -Rp 124 M |
| PV | Rp 73 M | Rp 30 M | -Rp 1.4 M | -Rp 24 M | -Rp 42 M | -Rp 548 M |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding
EV = PV(explicit) Rp 35 M + PV(TV) -Rp 548 M = -Rp 513 M · TV 107% of EV · − net debt Rp 6.5 T − minority Rp 432 M = equity -Rp 7.4 T ÷ shares outstanding
Model output: Rp -884/share (-655% vs price Rp 159)
Under these assumptions the model lands 655% below today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for faster growth, a fatter margin, or a lower discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 13.2% | 14.2% | 15.2% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | -880 | -872 | -866 |
| 2.5% | -893 | -884 | -876 |
| 3.0% | -908 | -896 | -887 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | Rp 12 T | Rp 14 T | Rp 20 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 9.7 T |
| Cost of Goods Sold | Rp 9.8 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 18 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 8.6 T |
| Gross Profit | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 2.3 T | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 1.0 T |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | Rp 953 M | Rp 899 M | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 561 M | -Rp 1.3 T |
| Interest Expense | Rp 779 M | Rp 718 M | Rp 736 M | Rp 784 M | Rp 670 M |
| Net Income | Rp 55 M | Rp 81 M | Rp 214 M | -Rp 87 M | -Rp 5.4 T |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | Rp 55 M | Rp 81 M | Rp 214 M | -Rp 87 M | -Rp 5.4 T |
| Depreciation & Amortization | Rp 168 M | Rp 143 M | Rp 135 M | Rp 126 M | Rp 91 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | Rp 3.2 T | Rp 4.3 T | Rp 4.5 T | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 1.7 T |
| Accounts Receivable | Rp 16 T | Rp 14 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 8.3 T |
| Inventory | Rp 11 T | Rp 9.3 T | Rp 5.9 T | Rp 6.4 T | Rp 4.8 T |
| Current Assets | Rp 32 T | Rp 30 T | Rp 29 T | Rp 22 T | Rp 17 T |
| Total Assets | Rp 40 T | Rp 40 T | Rp 40 T | Rp 35 T | Rp 29 T |
| Accounts Payable | Rp 18 T | Rp 15 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 10 T | Rp 10 T |
| Current Liabilities | Rp 31 T | Rp 25 T | Rp 25 T | Rp 20 T | Rp 19 T |
| Total Liabilities | Rp 34 T | Rp 31 T | Rp 31 T | Rp 26 T | Rp 25 T |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | Rp 11 T | Rp 10 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 9.1 T | Rp 8.2 T |
| Total Equity | Rp 5.7 T | Rp 8.8 T | Rp 9.2 T | Rp 9.0 T | Rp 3.3 T |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | Rp 5.6 T | Rp 8.4 T | Rp 8.6 T | Rp 8.4 T | Rp 2.9 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 84 M | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 2.0 T |
| Capital Expenditure | Rp 55 M | Rp 107 M | Rp 154 M | Rp 36 M | Rp 23 M |
ADHI is the one BUMN Karya name in this dataset both taking a real hit AND getting structurally bigger at the same time. FY2025 net loss (Rp5.40tn, vs just Rp86.75bn in FY2024: a genuine, extraordinary jump) is fully traceable and, unlike WIKA and PTPP, ADHI’s seeded gross-profit and EBIT figures reconcile exactly against independent reporting; this is the one page in this cluster where the ratios can be read at face value. Management has been explicit about the cause: Danantara’s restructuring forced fair-value realism on two property subsidiaries (Adhi Persada Properti, Adhi Commuter Properti), producing a Rp2.24tn inventory net-realizable-value write-down plus a Rp1.44tn expected-credit-loss provision. Real operating margin (-13.0%) is genuinely negative but the least severe of the three companies here: the headline net-margin collapse (-0.65% to -55.9%) overstates the operating deterioration relative to WIKA and PTPP. Owner equity stayed positive (Rp2.87tn) and operating cash flow was strongly positive (+Rp1.94tn) despite the loss: a real distress signal, but not a solvency crisis. The structural twist: under the merger, ADHI is the receiving entity for Nindya Karya and Brantas Abipraya, meaning it emerges from this restructuring larger and more diversified in civil engineering, not diminished; a genuinely different trajectory from WIKA’s absorption into Hutama Karya.
Government/state-enterprise tenders across civil engineering, rail/LRT and building construction; won Rp18.1tn of new contracts in 2025, second only to PTPP.
EconomicsA real forward-revenue base, not yet reflected in FY2025's shrinking (-27.6%) top line.
Site delivery billed on progress; real, verified FY2025 gross margin 10.9%.
EconomicsThe most reliable operating read of the three companies in this cluster -- the seeded data matches independent reporting exactly here.
Adhi Persada Properti and Adhi Commuter Properti develop and sell residential/mixed-use property.
EconomicsThe source of FY2025's Rp3.68tn combined write-down (NRV + ECL) -- a slowing property market and weaker buying power forced fair-value realism here.
Danantara-directed merger designates ADHI as the receiving entity, not the absorbed one.
EconomicsReal structural upside if integration succeeds -- expanded civil-engineering capacity without the equity dilution WIKA/WSKT shareholders face.
D/E rose to 2.49x (from 1.01x FY2024) as the property write-down compressed equity.
EconomicsInterest coverage turned negative (-1.88x) -- real but the mildest of the three companies' FY2025 deterioration.
Cost structureMaterials and subcontractor costs dominate direct construction costs (verified gross margin 10.9%); the Rp3.68tn combined property write-down (NRV + ECL) sits below the operating line and is the primary driver of the net loss, cleanly disclosed by management rather than embedded ambiguously in cost-of-revenue.
Cash cycleFY2025 operating cash flow was strongly positive (+Rp1.94tn) despite the Rp5.40tn net loss: the clearest confirmation across all three companies here that the loss is a non-cash valuation event, not a cash-collection crisis.
Unit economicsADHI does not disclose a per-project or per-unit margin breakdown at the granularity to compute a true unit economic; the segment-level construction-vs-property split is the closest available proxy, and it clearly shows the property arm, not core construction, as the FY2025 problem.
Standard sector-wide materials exposure (steel, cement, precast inputs); no ADHI-specific supplier concentration identified.
Implication → A shared, not distinguishing, cost pressure.
The government client sets tender and payment terms; ADHI’s LRT/rail track record gives it a specific niche within government infrastructure buyers that WIKA/PTPP don’t directly compete in as heavily.
Implication → A modest specialization edge within an otherwise buyer-dominated market.
Rail/LRT execution track record and standard bonding-capacity barriers protect ADHI’s niche; being the merger’s RECEIVING entity (not the absorbed one) is itself evidence of relatively favored standing.
Implication → ADHI is positioned to consolidate share within the group, not just defend it.
No real substitute for large civil/rail infrastructure delivery; the risk to ADHI is execution and financial capacity, not demand disappearing.
Implication → Demand risk is really execution-capacity risk here, same as the rest of the industry.
ADHI competes with WIKA/PTPP/WSKT for general tenders but holds a relative specialization in rail/LRT; post-merger, it also stops competing with (and starts absorbing) Nindya Karya and Brantas Abipraya, reducing rather than intensifying its rivalry set.
Implication → ADHI’s competitive set is shrinking favorably through the same process that’s straining WIKA’s.
A one-off-dominated loss with unusually clean, management-disclosed attribution: Rp2.24tn inventory NRV write-down + Rp1.44tn ECL provision on two named property subsidiaries account for the large majority of the Rp5.40tn net loss, against a real, verified operating business running at 10.9% gross margin / -13.0% operating margin. This is the most transparent of the three companies here: nothing needed correcting against independent sources.
| Period | One-off item | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| FY2025 | Inventory net-realizable-value write-down (Adhi Persada Properti, Adhi Commuter Properti) | Rp2.24tn, driven by a slowing property market and weaker buying power, KJPP-appraisal-based |
| FY2025 | Expected credit loss provision | Rp1.44tn, on the same two property subsidiaries |
Cash conversionOCF (+Rp1.94tn) strongly exceeds net income (-Rp5.40tn): the widest, cleanest gap of the three companies, confirming the loss is a non-cash property-valuation event rather than an operating cash problem.
A company simultaneously absorbing a real property write-down and structurally growing via the Nindya Karya/Brantas Abipraya merger: a genuinely two-sided capital-allocation year. Capex stayed minimal (Rp22.8bn, FY2025), consistent with an asset-light contracting model; the real capital event was recognizing the property subsidiaries' overstated value, not a deployment decision.
DeploymentFY2025 capex negligible (Rp22.8bn) against Rp9.67tn revenue. The year's real balance-sheet event was recognizing Rp3.68tn of impairment/provision on the property subsidiaries: a write-down of past capital allocation decisions, not a new deployment. Strong operating cash flow (Rp1.94tn) was retained against the deteriorating equity base.
Returns trendROE was consistently thin-but-positive FY2021-23 (1.0-2.5%), turned slightly negative FY2024 (-1.0%) and severely negative FY2025 (-188.5%, on a compressed equity base). Directionally similar to PTPP’s trend, though ADHI’s underlying operating business (verified, not seeded-corrupted) is running less severely negative (-13.0% operating margin vs PTPP’s real ~-9% and WIKA’s real deterioration).
Rp3.68tn combined charge (Rp2.24tn NRV + Rp1.44tn ECL) on Adhi Persada Properti and Adhi Commuter Properti, explicitly linked by management to a slowing property market -- a real, disclosed, macro-linked risk, and the primary driver of the FY2025 loss.
ADHI is set to absorb Nindya Karya and Brantas Abipraya -- neither entity's own financial condition is independently verified here; integration could import problems not visible in ADHI's standalone FY2025 results.
Unlike WIKA and PTPP, ADHI's seeded FY2025 revenue, COGS, gross profit and net income all reconcile exactly against independently-sourced reporting -- checked directly, no correction needed.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
The state-owned contractors (BUMN Karya) that built Indonesia’s decade-long toll-road boom on borrowed money: now all reporting losses at once (a combined ~Rp25tn across WIKA/PTPP/ADHI/WSKT in FY2025) while the government force-merges the survivors into three entities.