Equal · Financial Report

Agung Podomoro Land

APLN/FY2021–FY2025/Educational Analysis/IDR/Data source · 2026-07-09

ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Tax burden	—	0.65x	3.55x	0.76x	4.69x
Interest burdendriver	-0.34x	0.81x	0.32x	0.60x	0.05x
Operating margin	13.0%	43.5%	20.2%	25.2%	13.1%
Asset turnover	0.14x	0.30x	0.17x	0.21x	0.14x
Leverage (equity mult.)	2.81x	2.30x	2.11x	1.89x	1.83x
= Return on Equity (consolidated)	—	16.0%	8.0%	4.6%	0.8%
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)	—	12.4%	4.7%	5.8%	2.6%

Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.

Liquidity

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities)	1.63x	1.96x	1.30x	2.43x	1.99x
Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities)	0.57x	0.71x	0.43x	0.87x	0.73x
Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities)	0.15x	0.19x	0.09x	0.22x	0.16x
Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities)	Rp 4.6 T	Rp 5.5 T	Rp 2.6 T	Rp 6.4 T	Rp 5.1 T

Leverage & Solvency

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity)	0.96x	0.68x	0.56x	0.41x	0.39x
Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity)	1.81x	1.30x	1.11x	0.89x	0.83x
Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets)	0.34x	0.30x	0.27x	0.22x	0.21x
Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash)	Rp 9.0 T	Rp 7.4 T	Rp 6.7 T	Rp 4.7 T	Rp 4.5 T
Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense)	0.74x	5.34x	1.48x	2.48x	1.05x
Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity)	2.81x	2.30x	2.11x	1.89x	1.83x

Profitability

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue)	33.1%	55.9%	41.5%	43.5%	40.8%
Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue)	13.0%	43.5%	20.2%	25.2%	13.1%
Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue)	-15.3%	23.0%	23.2%	11.4%	3.2%
EBITDA(EBIT + D&A)	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 4.3 T	Rp 1.4 T	Rp 1.8 T	Rp 637 M
EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue)	26.2%	49.7%	30.7%	33.2%	17.9%
Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets)	-2.2%	7.0%	3.8%	2.4%	0.5%
Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners))	-8.3%	20.8%	10.1%	5.6%	1.0%
Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax)	—	0.65x	3.55x	0.76x	4.69x
Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT)	-0.34x	0.81x	0.32x	0.60x	0.05x
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)	—	12.4%	4.7%	5.8%	2.6%

Operations & Efficiency

Turnover	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets)	0.14x	0.30x	0.17x	0.21x	0.14x
Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory)	0.37x	0.53x	0.37x	0.45x	0.32x
Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables)	6.65x	14.66x	10.25x	15.95x	11.04x
Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables)	2.96x	4.11x	3.44x	5.51x	4.22x

Conversion Period	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS)	997.0 days	686.2 days	995.0 days	810.7 days	1,125.2 days
Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue)	54.9 days	24.9 days	35.6 days	22.9 days	33.1 days
Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS)	123.4 days	88.8 days	106.1 days	66.3 days	86.6 days
Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO)	928.5 days	622.3 days	924.6 days	767.3 days	1,071.7 days

Cash Flow

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex)	Rp 291 M	Rp 2.5 T	Rp 963 M	Rp 1.4 T	-Rp 256 M

Valuation

price as-of 2026-07-31fundamentals: FY2025

Price Rp 124 · market cap Rp 2.8 T

Multiple	APLN	Peer median	vs median
P/E	24.90x	6.24x	+299%
P/B	0.24x	0.45x	-46%
P/S	0.79x	0.89x	-11%
EV/EBITDA	14.86x	6.25x	+138%
EV/EBIT	20.19x	7.32x	+176%
EV/Sales	2.65x	2.34x	+13%
FCF Yield	-9.11%	-1.14%	+696%
Dividend Yield	—	3.47%(4/6)	—

EV = mkt cap Rp 2.8 T + debt Rp 5.4 T − cash Rp 844 M + minority interest Rp 2.1 T = Rp 9.5 T

What the price implies

not computable: negative or zero base-year FCF. Shown as-is rather than estimated.

Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 12.0–16.0% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.

Forward DCF (glass-box)

This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.

Mechanical DCF suppressed: on these default assumptions the modelled enterprise value falls BELOW net debt and minority interests, so the equity residual is negative. Equity cannot be worth less than nothing, so no per-share figure is published here: read it as the model saying the debt claims consume the whole enterprise at this discount rate and growth path, which is itself the signal. The components are shown below so the arithmetic stays checkable, and the sliders let you test what it would take to change the answer.

Assumption	Value	Basis
Rf (risk-free)	7.26%	Indonesia 10Y government bond, re-verified 31 Jul 2026
ERP (Rm − Rf)	6.69%	Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%)
β	0.48 → 1.12	Real Estate (Development) (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 1.91
Cost of equity	14.78%	Rf + β × ERP
Cost of debt	12.35%	median interest coverage 1.5x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a B3/B- synthetic rating and a 5.09% default spread, over a 7.26% base (Indonesia 10Y 7.26%, already the sovereign rate). Its BOOK rate is 8.3%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms)
Tax rate	29.6%	median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest)
WACC	10.79%	34% E × CoE + 66% D × Kd × (1 − t)
Revenue growth (yr 1, fading)	-4.3%	delivered 4-yr revenue CAGR -4.3%, fading linearly to terminal
EBIT margin	19.5%	mean EBIT margin, last 3 FYs
D&A / revenue	7.7%	mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs
Capex / revenue	0.5%	mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 10.8% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 23.2% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 11.2% of revenue against depreciation of 7.7%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral
ΔNWC / Δrevenue	-10.4%	median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP)
Terminal growth	2.5%	BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%)

Growth path

year 1 → fading to terminal over 5 yrs-4.3%

EBIT margin19.5%

WACC10.8%

Terminal growth2.5%

Explicit years5

FCFF drivers

FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − capex − ΔNWC

Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.

Capex

% of revenue0.5%

D&A

% of revenue7.7%

ΔNWC

% of the CHANGE in revenue-10.4%

Year	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	T∞
Growth	-4.3%	-2.6%	-0.9%	0.8%	2.5%	2.5%
Revenue	Rp 3.4 T	Rp 3.3 T	Rp 3.3 T	Rp 3.3 T	Rp 3.4 T	Rp 3.5 T
EBIT	Rp 666 M	Rp 648 M	Rp 642 M	Rp 647 M	Rp 663 M	Rp 680 M
NOPAT	Rp 468 M	Rp 456 M	Rp 452 M	Rp 456 M	Rp 467 M	Rp 479 M
+ D&A	Rp 264 M	Rp 257 M	Rp 254 M	Rp 256 M	Rp 263 M	Rp 269 M
− Capex	Rp 15 M	Rp 15 M	Rp 15 M	Rp 15 M	Rp 15 M	Rp 389 M
− ΔNWC	Rp 16 M	Rp 9.3 M	Rp 3.2 M	-Rp 2.7 M	-Rp 8.7 M	-Rp 8.9 M
FCFF	Rp 700 M	Rp 688 M	Rp 688 M	Rp 700 M	Rp 723 M	Rp 368 M
PV	Rp 632 M	Rp 561 M	Rp 506 M	Rp 464 M	Rp 433 M	Rp 2.7 T

Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding

EV = PV(explicit) Rp 2.6 T + PV(TV) Rp 2.7 T = Rp 5.3 T · TV 51% of EV · − net debt Rp 4.5 T − minority Rp 2.1 T = equity -Rp 1.4 T ÷ shares outstanding

Model output: Rp -61/share (-150% vs price Rp 124)· exit-multiple check (6.3x): Rp -26

Under these assumptions the model lands 150% below today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for faster growth, a fatter margin, or a lower discount rate than the inputs here assume.

Sensitivity (per share, Rp)

g \ WACC	9.8%	10.8%	11.8%
2.0%	-49	-71	-89
2.5%	-36	-61	-81
3.0%	-22	-50	-73

Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.

Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.

Macro backdropfull backdrop + sensitivity map →

BI Rate 5.75%IDR/USD 18,05810Y government bond yield 7.26%Inflation 3.34%(as-of 2026-07-31)

BI rate ↑(H)GDP/consumption ↑(M)

Income Statement

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Revenue	Rp 4.3 T	Rp 8.7 T	Rp 4.7 T	Rp 5.6 T	Rp 3.6 T
Cost of Goods Sold	Rp 2.8 T	Rp 3.8 T	Rp 2.7 T	Rp 3.2 T	Rp 2.1 T
Gross Profit	Rp 1.4 T	Rp 4.8 T	Rp 1.9 T	Rp 2.4 T	Rp 1.5 T
Operating Income (EBIT)	Rp 554 M	Rp 3.8 T	Rp 943 M	Rp 1.4 T	Rp 469 M
Interest Expense	Rp 744 M	Rp 705 M	Rp 638 M	Rp 567 M	Rp 445 M
Net Income	-Rp 650 M	Rp 2.0 T	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 634 M	Rp 113 M
Net Income Attributable to Owners	-Rp 650 M	Rp 2.0 T	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 634 M	Rp 113 M
Depreciation & Amortization	Rp 563 M	Rp 538 M	Rp 491 M	Rp 444 M	Rp 168 M

Balance Sheet

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Cash & Equivalents	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 768 M	Rp 984 M	Rp 844 M
Accounts Receivable	Rp 640 M	Rp 591 M	Rp 456 M	Rp 350 M	Rp 323 M
Inventory	Rp 7.8 T	Rp 7.2 T	Rp 7.5 T	Rp 7.0 T	Rp 6.5 T
Current Assets	Rp 12 T	Rp 11 T	Rp 11 T	Rp 11 T	Rp 10 T
Total Assets	Rp 30 T	Rp 29 T	Rp 28 T	Rp 26 T	Rp 25 T
Accounts Payable	Rp 962 M	Rp 929 M	Rp 795 M	Rp 573 M	Rp 500 M
Current Liabilities	Rp 7.3 T	Rp 5.8 T	Rp 8.5 T	Rp 4.5 T	Rp 5.2 T
Total Liabilities	Rp 19 T	Rp 16 T	Rp 15 T	Rp 12 T	Rp 11 T
Total Interest-Bearing Debt	Rp 10 T	Rp 8.5 T	Rp 7.5 T	Rp 5.6 T	Rp 5.4 T
Total Equity	Rp 11 T	Rp 12 T	Rp 13 T	Rp 14 T	Rp 14 T
Equity Attributable to Owners	Rp 7.8 T	Rp 9.6 T	Rp 11 T	Rp 11 T	Rp 12 T

Cash Flow Statement

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Operating Cash Flow	Rp 474 M	Rp 2.5 T	Rp 989 M	Rp 1.4 T	-Rp 240 M
Capital Expenditure	Rp 183 M	Rp 37 M	Rp 26 M	Rp 19 M	Rp 16 M

Company Deep Analysis

Reviewed: 2026-07-31

Analyst Verdict

APLN gross margin: 33.1% (2021) → 55.9% (2022) → 41.5% (2023) → 43.5% (2024) → 40.8% (2025). OPM: 13.0% → 43.5% → 20.2% → 25.2% → 13.1%. Net margin: −15.3% → 23.0% → 23.2% → 11.4% → 3.2%; 2021 was an outright loss year. EBITDA margin: 26.2% → 49.7% → 30.7% → 33.2% → 17.9%. ROE: −8.3% → 20.8% → 10.1% → 5.6% → 1.0%. ROIC: n/a (2021, undefined) → 12.4% → 16.6% → 5.8% → 12.1%. Asset turnover: 0.14× → 0.30× → 0.17× → 0.21× → 0.14×; thin throughout, typical of a land-bank-heavy developer. D/E: 0.96× → 0.68× → 0.56× → 0.41× → 0.39×; L/E: 1.81× → 1.30× → 1.11× → 0.90× → 0.83×; equity multiplier: 2.81× → 2.30× → 2.11× → 1.90× → 1.83×; real, sustained deleveraging every single year. Net debt (IDR): 9.04 T → 7.36 T → 6.74 T → 4.65 T → 4.52 T; nearly halved over 5 years. But interest coverage never became comfortable: 0.74× (2021, below 1×; EBIT didn't cover interest) → 5.34× (2022, a one-off peak) → 1.48× → 2.48× → 1.05× (2025, barely above breakeven again). Current ratio: 1.64× → 1.96× → 1.30× → 2.43× → 1.99×; quick ratio stayed below 1× every year (0.57× → 0.71× → 0.43× → 0.87× → 0.73×); structurally normal for a developer holding land bank as inventory. FCF (IDR): 291.3 B → 2,479.8 B → 962.6 B → 1,397.0 B → −256.0 B; turned negative in the most recent year. Revenue (IDR): 4.26 T → 8.66 T → 4.68 T → 5.58 T → 3.57 T; the 2022 and 2024 spikes both coincide with asset-monetisation events, not organic growth, and 2025 revenue is the lowest in the 5-year window. The shape here is genuine: five years of real balance-sheet deleveraging (debt nearly halved) that has not yet produced durable operating earnings power; coverage and FCF are weaker in 2025 than the 5-year average, not stronger.

Business Model

APLN develops and manages large-scale, mixed-use ("superblock") township projects combining residential towers, retail malls, offices and hospitality; Podomoro City (Grogol Petamburan, 25 ha: 12 residential towers, 155 shophouses, 2 malls, an office tower and a hotel), Neo Soho/Central Park (2.2 ha within Podomoro City: Neo Soho Mall, SOHO Capital office tower, 618 SOHO residential lofts, Pullman Jakarta Central Park Hotel) and Podomoro Golf View (Cimanggis, 25 ha, affordable-housing-oriented, under the government's One Million Houses program). The model monetises through residential/shophouse presales and mall/office recurring rental income, and, increasingly since its 2023-2024 debt crisis, periodic asset divestment: in November 2024, subsidiary PT Putra Adhi Prima sold the Pullman Hotel Vimala Hills Resort Spa & Convention (Ciawi) to PT Bangun Loka Indah to fund debt repayment and strategic project development.

Segments

Diversified across residential (towers, shophouses), commercial/retail (malls: Central Park, Neo Soho), office (SOHO Capital and others) and hospitality (hotels, partly divested). The 2022 and 2024 margin/revenue spikes both line up with one-off events rather than a broad-based recovery: 2022's extreme 55.9% GM/43.5% OPM print and 2024's revenue bump (coinciding with the Pullman Ciawi divestment process) both look like asset-monetisation years, not organic-demand years. 2025's much thinner margins (GM 40.9%, OPM 13.1%, NM 3.2%) are closer to what the underlying, ongoing township business generates without a one-off boost.

Value Chain & Positioning

Land acquisition/banking → masterplanning of superblock townships → phased construction (residential towers, malls, offices, hotels) → residential/shophouse presales + mall/office leasing + hotel operations → recurring income from completed commercial assets. Since 2023-2024, a parallel deleveraging track: divesting selected assets (the Pullman Ciawi hotel) and executing bond tender/exchange to reduce the debt load taken on during the earlier development buildout.

Competitive Forces (Porter’s 5)

Supplier powerLow

How much leverage input/funding providers have over pricing.

APLN controls its own land bank and contracts construction/materials competitively; no single supplier dependency drives its risk profile.

Implication → Cost pressure is financing-cost and land-carrying-cost driven, not supplier-driven: consistent with interest coverage being the real risk here, not input costs.

Buyer powerHigh

How much leverage customers have to push prices down.

Property buyers have abundant competing township options (Serpong, Bekasi corridors) and mortgage-financing (KPR) sensitivity gives them real bargaining leverage; mall/office tenants likewise have competing Jakarta superblock options.

Implication → APLN cannot price its way out of margin volatility: presale pace and mall occupancy, not price increases, are the real levers, and both are cyclical.

Threat of new entryLow

How easily new competitors can enter the market.

Low for large-scale superblock development (capital intensity, land-assembly difficulty in established corridors), but APLN's own recent history (needing to sell an operating hotel to fund debt service) shows scale alone doesn't guarantee staying power; capital access, not land access, is the binding constraint right now.

Implication → Incumbency protects market position but not solvency: the interest-coverage and FCF numbers are the real test, not competitive threat.

Threat of substitutesMedium

Risk that alternative products/services replace demand.

For residential, landed housing further from Jakarta and other townships compete; for mall/office, other Jakarta superblocks (PWON's and others) compete directly. Hospitality faces the broadest substitute set (other hotels, serviced apartments): the segment APLN chose to divest first.

Implication → None of APLN's segments have a structural substitute advantage: the moat, if any, is the location/scale of existing completed assets (Central Park/Neo Soho), not a lack of alternatives.

Competitive rivalryHigh

Intensity of competition among existing players.

CTRA, BSDE, PWON, and unlisted Summarecon/Alam Sutera all compete for the same mid-upper buyer pool and, for mall/office, the same Jakarta corporate tenant pool. APLN is a scale peer to these names by land bank but currently the financially weakest of the tracked group by interest coverage and recent FCF.

Implication → APLN must compete on project quality and price in a crowded field while carrying a materially thinner earnings cushion than its listed peers: a genuine competitive disadvantage until coverage improves.

Moat / Competitive Edge

APLN's genuine asset is real: completed, well-located superblocks (Podomoro City, Central Park/Neo Soho) generate real recurring mall/office income, and the company has demonstrated it CAN deleverage; net debt fell from Rp 9.04 T to Rp 4.52 T over five years, and it fully repaid a USD 300 M international bond that briefly put it in real default risk (hence the 2024 Moody's/Fitch downgrades). But this is not a moat in the Porter sense: it is a survival track record. The company has no durable pricing power over CTRA/BSDE/PWON, and, critically, its interest coverage never became comfortable even as leverage fell (1.05× in 2025, barely above breakeven), and 2025 FCF turned negative. The honest read: APLN proved it can shrink its way through a crisis without defaulting, not that it has been restored to financial health. Whether the November 2024 Pullman Ciawi divestment and continued deleveraging are enough to lift interest coverage durably above 2× is the single question that determines whether this is a stabilising credit or a recurring one.

Key Drivers & Sensitivities

Deleveraging Trajectory (Net Debt / D-E)
The clearest positive trend in the whole file: net debt fell every single year, Rp 9.04 T (2021) to Rp 4.52 T (2025), roughly halving; D/E fell from 0.96× to 0.39× and equity multiplier from 2.81× to 1.83× over the same window. Real and sustained, not a one-year blip, but funded partly by asset sales (the Pullman Ciawi hotel divestment, Nov 2024) rather than pure organic cash generation.
Interest Coverage Fragility
The variable that actually determines credit risk, and it has stayed weak throughout: 0.74× in 2021 (below 1×; EBIT didn't cover interest, coinciding with the year's net loss), a 5.34× one-off peak in 2022, then 1.48×, 2.48×, and back down to 1.05× in 2025. Five years of deleveraging have not lifted this durably above 2×: the single most important number to watch for whether APLN is stabilising or merely surviving.
One-Off Asset Monetisation (Revenue/Margin Spikes)
Both 2022 (GM 55.9%, OPM 43.5%, the best year in the window) and 2024 (revenue bump to Rp 5.58 T alongside the Pullman Ciawi divestment process, signed Nov 2024) look like asset-monetisation-driven spikes rather than organic-demand years. 2025's much thinner GM 40.9%/OPM 13.1%/NM 3.2% is closer to the underlying run-rate without a one-off boost: the 2022/2024 prints should not be extrapolated forward.
FCF Turn Negative (2025)
FCF was positive every year 2021-2024 (Rp 291.3 B to Rp 2,479.8 B) but turned negative in 2025 (−Rp 256.0 B): the freshest data point in the file is the weakest one on this metric, even as the company continued asset sales. This is the number that most directly contradicts a "crisis resolved" reading of the 2024 bond repayment.

Linkages

APLN competes directly with CTRA, BSDE, PWON and unlisted Summarecon/Alam Sutera for the same mid-upper residential buyer pool and, via its malls (Central Park/Neo Soho) and offices (SOHO Capital), the same Jakarta commercial-tenant pool as PWON's superblocks. Its 2024 hotel divestment (Pullman Ciawi, to PT Bangun Loka Indah) also links it to Indonesia's hospitality-asset trading market: a channel none of its property-developer peers in this project currently use at scale.

Recent Developments

Read the five years as one line and the direction is clear. Net income went from a loss of Rp0.65tn in FY2021 to Rp1.99tn in FY2022, then down in each year to Rp0.11tn in FY2025, a fall of 82.2% in the final year alone, on revenue of Rp3.57tn that is the lowest of the window. Margins traced it: net margin minus 15.3%, then 23.0%, 23.2%, 11.4% and 3.2%; ROE minus 8.3% to 20.8% and back to 1.0%. The balance sheet is the counterweight and it genuinely improved, net debt Rp9.04tn down to Rp4.52tn and debt to equity 0.96× to 0.39×. But that improvement has not reached the income statement: interest cover was 0.74× in FY2021, recovered to 5.34×, and is back to 1.05×, meaning operating profit now barely covers the interest bill. Free cash flow turned negative in FY2025 at minus Rp0.26tn.

Regulation

Standard Indonesian property-sector regulation: building permits (PBG, replacing IMB), zoning, environmental clearance (AMDAL) for large superblocks, and KPR/mortgage-financing rules that govern the primary residential purchase mechanism sector-wide. As a company that completed an international bond restructuring, APLN also operates under continued rating-agency and bondholder scrutiny (Moody's B1 / Fitch B, both post-restructuring): any further credit event would be read against that recent history.

ESG & Sustainability

Environmental: large-scale superblock construction carries standard AMDAL environmental-clearance and urban-density considerations; no distinctive environmental profile versus CTRA/BSDE/PWON. Social: large employment footprint across construction, mall/hotel operations and property management; the divested Pullman Ciawi hotel's workforce transitioned with the sale. Governance: the 2023-2024 debt restructuring (tender + exchange, Kroll-advised) and subsequent asset divestment (Pullman Ciawi) are real, disclosed governance actions under real financial pressure; handled without a formal default, but with two rating downgrades. This history is itself the most material governance/credit fact about the company today.

Risks

Interest coverage has never durably exceeded 2.5× across 5 years and fell back to 1.05× in 2025: a further downturn or a single weak project year could push it below 1× again, as it did in 2021
FCF turned negative in 2025 (−Rp 256.0 B) after 4 consecutive positive years: the freshest data point is the weakest on this metric
Two rating downgrades already on record (Moody's B1, Fitch B) from the 2023-2024 restructuring: any further credit stress starts from a lower base
2022 and 2024's strongest results both coincide with one-off asset-monetisation events (the Pullman Ciawi divestment process), not organic demand: the underlying run-rate looks closer to 2025's thinner margins
Quick ratio has stayed below 1× every year (0.43×-0.87×): structurally normal for a land-bank-heavy developer, but near-term liquidity depends on inventory (land/units) being saleable, not just cash and receivables

Outlook & What to Watch

Base: continued gradual deleveraging (net debt trend intact) but interest coverage stays in the 1-2.5× range absent a new one-off; a stable-but-fragile credit, not a recovering one. Bull: a successful new project launch or further asset monetisation lifts coverage durably above 2.5× and FCF back to positive, validating the 2024 restructuring as a genuine turning point. Bear: a weak presale year combines with the already-thin 1.05× coverage and negative FCF to reopen real debt-service stress, echoing 2021's sub-1× coverage and net loss. APLN is best read as a company that survived a real crisis by shrinking (debt nearly halved) rather than one that has been restored to health: the 2026-2027 interest-coverage trend, not the leverage ratios alone, is the number that will settle which reading is correct. (Interpretation, not a forecast.)

Key KPIs

Interest Coverage Trend: 1.05x (2025), never durably above 2.5x in 5 years: the single most important credit signal
Net Debt / Deleveraging Pace: Rp 9.04T -> Rp 4.52T (2021-2025), nearly halved: the clearest positive trend
Free Cash Flow: Turned negative in 2025 (-Rp 256.0B) after 4 positive years: the freshest red flag
One-Off vs Organic Margin: GM 55.9% (2022) and the 2024 revenue bump both coincide with asset sales, not demand: 2025's thinner margins are the real run-rate
Credit Rating Trajectory: Moody's B1 / Fitch B (2024, post-restructuring): the starting point for any future credit event

Sources

Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.