Equal
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| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)(Capital / RWA) | 130.6% | 61.8% | 44.4% | 31.6% |
| Leverage Ratio(Tier 1 / Total Exposure)not disclosed | — | — | — | — |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross NPL(NPL / Total Loans) | 1.5% | 0.8% | 0.2% | 0.6% |
| Net NPL((NPL − Reserves) / Loans) | 0.4% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.1% |
| Non-Performing Assets(NPA / Total Assets) | 1.0% | 1.0% | 0.5% | 0.7% |
| Non-Performing Productive Assets(NP Earning / Earning Assets) | 0.8% | 0.5% | 0.1% | 0.4% |
| Allowance for Impairment (CKPN)(CKPN / Earning Assets) | 1.5% | 1.3% | 1.2% | 1.7% |
| Cost of Credit(Provision Expense / Gross Loans)insufficient source figures | — | — | — | — |
| NPL Coverage(Allowance for Impairment (CKPN) / Gross NPL) | — | 228.9% | 1,022.6% | 373.9% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR)(Loans / Deposits) | 145.7% | 107.8% | 94.1% | 94.0% |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)(ASF / RSF)not disclosed | — | — | — | — |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)(HQLA / Net Cash Outflows (30d))not disclosed | — | — | — | — |
| CASA Ratio((Demand + Savings) / Total Deposits) | — | 65.3% | 53.0% | 49.6% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 0.8% | 0.5% | 0.7% | 1.1% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 1.0% | 1.0% | 2.0% | 4.3% |
| Net Interest Margin (NIM)(NII / Avg Earning Assets) | 11.1% | 9.5% | 7.3% | 8.4% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Expense to Income (BOPO)(Opex / Operating Income) | 93.3% | 95.8% | 92.4% | 90.9% |
| Cost-to-Income Ratio (CIR)(Opex (ex-provisions) / Income) | 74.3% | 72.3% | 73.7% | 58.2% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan Growth (YoY)(Gross Loans / Prior Year − 1) | — | — | 40.1% | 37.3% |
| Deposit Growth (YoY)(Total Deposits / Prior Year − 1) | — | — | 55.8% | 37.7% |
Price Rp 1,220 · market cap Rp 17 T
| Multiple | ARTO | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 61.22x | 8.04x | +661% |
| P/B | 1.92x | 0.78x | +145% |
| Dividend Yield | — | 7.46%(14/15) | — |
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
A bank cannot be valued on operating cash flow the way a factory can, because for a bank debt is raw material rather than financing. So this model values the equity directly: start from book value, then add the present value of everything the bank earns above its cost of equity. A bank that earns exactly its cost of equity is worth exactly its book value (P/B 1.0).
| Assumption | Default | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Book equity (BV₀) | Rp 8.8 T | audited Individual-basis equity, FY2025 publication |
| ROE, start of fade | 4.33% | FY2025 disclosed ROE (OJK ratio table) |
| ROE, terminal | 1.48% | median disclosed ROE, FY2022–FY2025: the bank's own demonstrated through-cycle level, fading linearly |
| Fade horizon | 5 yrs | linear fade; final year pins to terminal |
| Retention (explicit phase) | 100.0% | implied from delivered equity growth FY2023–FY2025 (CAGR 2.8%) ÷ average ROE 2.1%. An approximation: equity growth also carries OCI effects (FVOCI marks, revaluations), not only retention |
| Cost of equity | 11.27% | Regional development banks (BPD) and small/niche franchises. The EM cohort averages are nearly identical across the two buckets: company-specific risk (e.g. a digital bank pre-scale) is NOT captured by a sector beta; the panel slider is the adjustment surface. |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | house terminal growth 2.5% (capped at terminal ROE by the engine when binding) |
Equity = BV₀ Rp 8.8 T + PV(excess, yrs 1–5) -Rp 2.9 T + PV(terminal) -Rp 6.0 T = Rp 0
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 4.33% | 3.62% | 2.91% | 2.20% | 1.48% | 1.48% |
| Book (start) | Rp 8.8 T | Rp 9.2 T | Rp 9.5 T | Rp 9.8 T | Rp 10 T | Rp 10 T |
| Net income | Rp 382 M | Rp 333 M | Rp 277 M | Rp 216 M | Rp 149 M | Rp 151 M |
| Retained | Rp 382 M | Rp 333 M | Rp 277 M | Rp 216 M | Rp 149 M | — |
| Excess return | -Rp 613 M | -Rp 705 M | -Rp 798 M | -Rp 891 M | -Rp 982 M | -Rp 997 M |
| PV | -Rp 551 M | -Rp 569 M | -Rp 579 M | -Rp 581 M | -Rp 576 M | -Rp 6.0 T |
Check it yourself: NI = ROE × book · ER = (ROE − COE) × book · PV = ER ÷ (1+COE)^yr · next book = book + NI × retention · TV = ER(T∞) ÷ (COE − g), discounted from year 5
| ROE_T \ COE | 10.27% | 11.27% | 12.27% |
|---|---|---|---|
| -0.52% | -0.03x | -0.03x | -0.03x |
| 1.48% | 0.00x | 0.00x | 0.00x |
| 3.49% | 0.09x | 0.08x | 0.07x |
Model output under the stated assumptions, never a target. ROE record: FY2022 0.99% · FY2023 1.02% · FY2024 1.95% · FY2025 4.33%
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interest income | — | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 2.1 T | Rp 3.4 T |
| Interest expense | — | Rp 309 M | Rp 499 M | Rp 948 M |
| Net interest income | — | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 2.5 T |
| Personnel expenses | — | Rp 448 M | Rp 515 M | Rp 562 M |
| Operating profit | — | Rp 87 M | Rp 181 M | Rp 351 M |
| Profit before tax | — | Rp 94 M | Rp 179 M | Rp 351 M |
| Net profit | — | Rp 72 M | Rp 129 M | Rp 276 M |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash | — | Rp 8.9 M | Rp 16 M | Rp 18 M |
| Placement with Bank Indonesia | — | Rp 2.4 T | Rp 3.9 T | Rp 5.1 T |
| Placement with other banks | — | Rp 533 M | Rp 272 M | Rp 338 M |
| Securities | — | Rp 2.8 T | Rp 3.8 T | Rp 3.5 T |
| Loans (gross) | — | Rp 13 T | Rp 18 T | Rp 24 T |
| Allowance for impairment: loans (CKPN) | — | -Rp 242 M | -Rp 289 M | -Rp 552 M |
| Intangible assets | — | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 2.4 T | Rp 3.1 T |
| Total assets | — | Rp 21 T | Rp 29 T | Rp 37 T |
| Demand deposits (Giro) | — | Rp 4.1 T | Rp 5.1 T | Rp 4.9 T |
| Savings deposits (Tabungan) | — | Rp 3.8 T | Rp 4.9 T | Rp 8.0 T |
| Time deposits (Simpanan berjangka) | — | Rp 4.2 T | Rp 8.8 T | Rp 13 T |
| Total liabilities | — | Rp 13 T | Rp 20 T | Rp 28 T |
| Total equity | — | Rp 8.4 T | Rp 8.5 T | Rp 8.8 T |
ARTO (Bank Jago, formerly Bank Artos, relaunched as a digital-native bank in 2020) is at a genuine profitability inflection, not merely a story stock. FY2025 (Individual basis): net profit more than doubled to Rp276.2bn (+114.9% YoY, from Rp128.5bn) as net interest income grew 58.8% to Rp2.47tn and the cost-to-income ratio improved sharply (73.73%→58.19%), while gross loans grew 37.3% (Rp17.6tn→Rp24.2tn) and KYC-verified customers grew from 15.3m to 18.2m. This is powered by deliberately spending down an initially enormous capital surplus: CAR has fallen every year since FY2022 (130.60%→61.77%→44.40%→31.63%) as capital raised around listing gets deployed into a fast-growing loan book; still comfortably above the ~26% system average, but the decline has run at a strikingly consistent ~28% per year for the past two years, and unchecked would approach regulatory minimums within a few more years (arithmetic extrapolation, not a forecast). The counter-case: ROE, despite quadrupling off a 2022 low, is still just 4.33%, a young, small-scale bank, not yet a proven structural outperformer, and gross NPL ticked up from 0.16% to 0.61% as the book grew fast, an early-innings signal worth watching rather than a current problem. Ownership is genuinely plural, not GoTo-controlled: PT Metamorfosis Ekosistem Indonesia (the founding group) holds the largest stake (~29.79%), GoTo/Gojek via PT Dompet Karya Anak Bangsa (GoPay) ~21.40%, Wealth Track Technology ~11.68%, GIC (Singapore) ~9.02%, public float ~27.44% (Jun-2025). **Two disclosed data gaps**: leverageRatio/NSFR/LCR are not in the primary Publikasi source (checked, not extractable) and ship null; `feeIncome` is dropped entirely; the source’s narrow "Komisi/provisi/fee dan administrasi" line (~Rp12bn) is ~38x smaller than the ~Rp455bn fee-based income Jago itself discloses to investors, an unreconciled definitional-scope mismatch, not a fabricated fill.
Tabungan, Simpanan berjangka and Giro from app-based retail customers, no branch network.
EconomicsA structurally low fixed-cost funding base: the branchless model is the core cost advantage over incumbents.
Distribution leans on partner-app integration (notably GoTo’s Gojek/GoPay/Tokopedia), not physical presence.
EconomicsCustomer growth (15.3m→18.2m) at a lower acquisition cost than branch-based rivals, a real structural edge.
Gross loans grew 37.3% in one year: the most consequential operating choice of FY2025.
EconomicsThe direct driver of both the NII surge (+58.8%) and the early NPL uptick (0.16%→0.61%): same growth, two faces.
Revenue scaled far faster than opex: personnel expense grew just 9.1% against 58.8% NII growth.
EconomicsCIR fell 15.5pp in one year: the single clearest evidence this business model has real economies of scale.
CAR fell from 130.60% (FY2022) to 31.63% (FY2025) as risk-weighted assets grew into the capital raised around listing.
EconomicsThe capital is finite: this step has 2-4 more years of runway at the current pace before it becomes the binding constraint.
Cost structureInterest expense (Rp947.5bn, FY2025, +89.8% YoY as the deposit base scaled with loan growth) is now the largest cost line, ahead of personnel expense (Rp562.0bn, +9.1% YoY: the near-flat growth here, against the loan book’s +37.3%, is the direct source of the CIR improvement). No branch/property cost base to speak of, unlike incumbents.
Cash cycleDeposits gathered app-only at low acquisition cost, redeployed into a fast-growing loan book at an expanding NIM (7.34%→8.37%), provisioning stepped up (ckpnRatio 1.15%→1.71%) as the book seasons. Not independently computable as a cash-flow statement from this disclosed ratio-table format.
App-based depositors are fragmented; a rapidly growing base (18.2m KYC-verified customers, +19% YoY) suggests low friction to gather funding without branch infrastructure.
Implication → Funding growth is not currently ARTO’s constraint: its high, though falling, NIM (8.37%) shows funding cost is well-managed.
Retail/mass-market borrowers have moderate leverage; ARTO’s +37.3% loan growth suggests it is winning volume, plausibly via ecosystem-embedded distribution rather than pure price competition.
Implication → Growth this fast alongside a rising (though still low) NPL trend is worth watching for underwriting discipline as the book scales.
Same sector-wide OJK capital/licensing barriers as incumbents; within the digital-bank cohort itself (~17 OJK-licensed names), ARTO’s multi-year head start (relaunched 2020, already solidly profitable) is a real incumbency advantage over newer digital entrants.
Implication → ARTO is itself now an incumbent within the digital-bank cohort, not merely a threat to traditional banks.
Competes directly with other app-based digital banks (SeaBank, Allo Bank, Neo Commerce and others) for the same digitally-native depositor/borrower pool, alongside fintech lending.
Implication → Ecosystem embedding (the GoTo linkage) is ARTO’s main differentiator against same-format rivals, not a unique technology.
Within the ~17-strong digital-bank cohort, rivalry for customer acquisition is intense (most still spending heavily to grow), but ARTO is already past that phase: 8 of the cohort turned profitable in 2025, and ARTO’s profit growth (+115%) outpaced its own asset growth (+28%), a sign of maturing rather than still-buying growth.
Implication → ARTO’s efficiency gain (CIR -15.5pp) is real evidence of scale economics kicking in, the clearest test of whether a digital-bank model works.
Real and operationally-grounded: the profit surge is fully explained by two disclosed, structural drivers (NII +58.8% from loan growth, CIR -15.5pp from operating leverage), not a one-off gain. One nuance worth flagging: net profit grew faster than pre-tax profit (+114.9% vs +95.8%), consistent with FY2025’s implied effective tax rate (netProfit/pretaxProfit) landing closer to Indonesia’s ~22% statutory rate than FY2024’s higher implied rate; a favorable tax-timing swing the source does not itemize further, disclosed rather than assumed benign.
Checked: no material one-offs found in the reviewed window.
Cash conversionNot independently computable from the disclosed OJK ratio-table format (no operating cash flow statement in this source): flagged as a genuine data gap rather than assumed clean.
A genuine capital builder deploying a surplus, not returning it: every year since FY2022 has funneled the capital raised around listing into faster loan growth rather than dividends or buybacks (none disclosed); the direct opposite of PNBN’s harvester posture elsewhere in this dataset.
DeploymentCapital is being consumed by risk-weighted-asset growth: CAR fell 28 percentage points (proportionally) in FY2025 alone as gross loans grew 37.3%. No dividend or buyback disclosed in the sources reviewed: 100% of the growth is being funded by drawing down the existing capital surplus rather than fresh raises.
Returns trendROE quadrupled off a 2022 low (0.99%→4.33%) as the same capital base is worked harder each year: the clearest evidence the deployment strategy is working, though the absolute level remains far below system incumbents. Whether ROE keeps compounding as CAR normalizes toward system levels, or capital-raise needs interrupt the trajectory, is the central open question for this name.
CAR has fallen every year since FY2022 (130.60%→61.77%→44.40%→31.63%), at a consistent ~28%/year proportional rate for the last two years. Still comfortably above the ~26% system average, but an unchecked continuation would approach system-average territory within roughly a year and regulatory minimums within a further 2-3 years: arithmetic extrapolation, not a forecast, but the single number most worth tracking quarter to quarter.
Gross NPL rose from 0.16% (FY2024) to 0.61% (FY2025) and ckpnRatio from 1.15% to 1.71% as gross loans grew 37.3%: both figures remain low in absolute and system-relative terms, but the direction, paired with rapid growth, is the classic early-innings seasoning pattern worth monitoring for the next 1-2 reporting periods.
leverageRatio/NSFR/LCR are not disclosed in the Individual-basis Publikasi ratio table used as the primary source (checked, not extractable: ship null). feeIncome is dropped entirely: the source’s narrow "Komisi/provisi/fee dan administrasi" line (~Rp12bn FY2025) is ~38x smaller than the ~Rp455bn fee-based income Jago itself discloses to investors (+57% YoY per Bloomberg/DealStreetAsia coverage); an unreconciled definitional-scope mismatch, disclosed rather than forced or silently dropped.
Checked: the largest holder (PT Metamorfosis Ekosistem Indonesia) holds only ~29.79%, with GoTo/GoPay (~21.40%), Wealth Track (~11.68%) and GIC (~9.02%) as other meaningful stakes alongside a genuine ~27.44% public float (Jun-2025). A plural, disclosed structure, not currently a governance friction, but worth monitoring for shareholder-alignment risk given no single party has a clear mandate.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Large, well-capitalised and concentrated among a few systemic players, with ASEAN-leading profitability: though margins and efficiency are now under late-cycle pressure.