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| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)(Capital / RWA) | 19.3% | 22.0% | 21.4% | 20.7% |
| Leverage Ratio(Tier 1 / Total Exposure) | 11.7% | 12.4% | 12.9% | 11.7% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross NPL(NPL / Total Loans) | 2.8% | 2.1% | 2.0% | 1.9% |
| Net NPL((NPL − Reserves) / Loans) | 0.5% | 0.6% | 0.7% | 0.7% |
| Non-Performing Assets(NPA / Total Assets) | 2.0% | 1.6% | 1.5% | 1.4% |
| Non-Performing Productive Assets(NP Earning / Earning Assets) | 1.9% | 1.5% | 1.4% | 1.3% |
| Allowance for Impairment (CKPN)(CKPN / Earning Assets) | 6.0% | 5.2% | 3.9% | 3.1% |
| Cost of Credit(Provision Expense / Gross Loans) | 1.7% | 1.3% | 1.0% | 1.0% |
| NPL Coverage(Allowance for Impairment (CKPN) / Gross NPL) | 277.9% | 318.8% | 255.5% | 205.9% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR)(Loans / Deposits) | 84.3% | 85.8% | 96.1% | 86.4% |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)(ASF / RSF) | 124.2% | 146.3% | 132.5% | 141.9% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)(HQLA / Net Cash Outflows (30d)) | 207.6% | 175.4% | 148.0% | 171.9% |
| CASA Ratio((Demand + Savings) / Total Deposits) | 72.9% | 71.6% | 70.4% | 70.4% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 2.5% | 2.6% | 2.5% | 2.1% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 16.4% | 16.8% | 15.8% | 14.0% |
| Net Interest Margin (NIM)(NII / Avg Earning Assets) | 4.8% | 4.6% | 4.2% | 3.8% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Expense to Income (BOPO)(Opex / Operating Income) | 68.6% | 68.4% | 70.1% | 72.9% |
| Cost-to-Income Ratio (CIR)(Opex (ex-provisions) / Income) | 42.6% | 42.9% | 44.6% | 46.5% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan Growth (YoY)(Gross Loans / Prior Year − 1) | — | 7.0% | 10.7% | 15.9% |
| Deposit Growth (YoY)(Total Deposits / Prior Year − 1) | — | 5.1% | -1.1% | 28.9% |
Price Rp 3,530 · market cap Rp 132 T
| Multiple | BBNI | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 6.46x | 8.04x | -20% |
| P/B | 0.78x | 0.78x | 0% |
| Dividend Yield | 10.60% | 7.46%(14/15) | +42% |
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
A bank cannot be valued on operating cash flow the way a factory can, because for a bank debt is raw material rather than financing. So this model values the equity directly: start from book value, then add the present value of everything the bank earns above its cost of equity. A bank that earns exactly its cost of equity is worth exactly its book value (P/B 1.0).
| Assumption | Default | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Book equity (BV₀) | Rp 168 T | audited Individual-basis equity, FY2025 publication |
| ROE, start of fade | 13.97% | FY2025 disclosed ROE (OJK ratio table) |
| ROE, terminal | 16.10% | median disclosed ROE, FY2022–FY2025: the bank's own demonstrated through-cycle level, fading linearly |
| Fade horizon | 5 yrs | linear fade; final year pins to terminal |
| Retention (explicit phase) | 53.5% | implied from delivered equity growth FY2022–FY2025 (CAGR 8.4%) ÷ average ROE 15.8%. An approximation: equity growth also carries OCI effects (FVOCI marks, revaluations), not only retention |
| Cost of equity | 11.21% | National-footprint franchises (KBMI 3–4 and large private banks). |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | house terminal growth 2.5% (capped at terminal ROE by the engine when binding) |
Equity = BV₀ Rp 168 T + PV(excess, yrs 1–5) Rp 27 T + PV(terminal) Rp 82 T = Rp 277 T
At today's price the market pays 48% of this model's equity value. The price embeds less than these inputs produce, which amounts to assuming a higher cost of equity or a lower terminal ROE than the defaults here.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 13.97% | 14.50% | 15.03% | 15.57% | 16.10% | 16.10% |
| Book (start) | Rp 168 T | Rp 181 T | Rp 195 T | Rp 210 T | Rp 228 T | Rp 247 T |
| Net income | Rp 23 T | Rp 26 T | Rp 29 T | Rp 33 T | Rp 37 T | Rp 40 T |
| Retained | Rp 13 T | Rp 14 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 20 T | — |
| Excess return | Rp 4.6 T | Rp 5.9 T | Rp 7.4 T | Rp 9.2 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 12 T |
| PV | Rp 4.2 T | Rp 4.8 T | Rp 5.4 T | Rp 6.0 T | Rp 6.5 T | Rp 82 T |
Check it yourself: NI = ROE × book · ER = (ROE − COE) × book · PV = ER ÷ (1+COE)^yr · next book = book + NI × retention · TV = ER(T∞) ÷ (COE − g), discounted from year 5
| ROE_T \ COE | 10.21% | 11.21% | 12.21% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 14.10% | 1.61x | 1.40x | 1.23x |
| 16.10% | 1.90x | 1.65x | 1.45x |
| 18.10% | 2.20x | 1.90x | 1.67x |
Model output under the stated assumptions, never a target. ROE record: FY2022 16.39% · FY2023 16.84% · FY2024 15.81% · FY2025 13.97%
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interest income | Rp 54 T | Rp 61 T | Rp 65 T | Rp 67 T |
| Interest expense | Rp 13 T | Rp 20 T | Rp 25 T | Rp 28 T |
| Net interest income | Rp 41 T | Rp 41 T | Rp 39 T | Rp 39 T |
| Fees & commissions | Rp 10 T | Rp 10 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 11 T |
| Impairment/provision expense | Rp 11 T | Rp 9.2 T | Rp 7.6 T | Rp 9.2 T |
| Personnel expenses | Rp 12 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 14 T |
| Operating profit | Rp 23 T | Rp 25 T | Rp 26 T | Rp 25 T |
| Profit before tax | Rp 23 T | Rp 25 T | Rp 26 T | Rp 25 T |
| Net profit | Rp 19 T | Rp 21 T | Rp 21 T | Rp 20 T |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash | Rp 13 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 14 T | Rp 13 T |
| Placement with Bank Indonesia | Rp 130 T | Rp 103 T | Rp 60 T | Rp 104 T |
| Placement with other banks | Rp 17 T | Rp 37 T | Rp 26 T | Rp 29 T |
| Securities | Rp 134 T | Rp 142 T | Rp 148 T | Rp 192 T |
| Loans (gross) | Rp 643 T | Rp 688 T | Rp 762 T | Rp 883 T |
| Allowance for impairment: loans (CKPN) | -Rp 50 T | -Rp 47 T | -Rp 38 T | -Rp 35 T |
| Fixed assets & equipment | Rp 41 T | Rp 43 T | Rp 47 T | Rp 49 T |
| Total assets | Rp 998 T | Rp 1,049 T | Rp 1,084 T | Rp 1,306 T |
| Demand deposits (Giro) | Rp 314 T | Rp 343 T | Rp 301 T | Rp 434 T |
| Savings deposits (Tabungan) | Rp 242 T | Rp 231 T | Rp 257 T | Rp 286 T |
| Time deposits (Deposito) | Rp 207 T | Rp 228 T | Rp 234 T | Rp 302 T |
| Borrowings | Rp 35 T | Rp 30 T | Rp 39 T | Rp 36 T |
| Total liabilities | Rp 866 T | Rp 903 T | Rp 926 T | Rp 1,138 T |
| Total equity | Rp 132 T | Rp 146 T | Rp 158 T | Rp 168 T |
BNI is the turnaround story among the Himbara state banks. A multi-year clean-up pulled gross NPL down to 1.93% and cost of credit to about 1.0% (FY25), but the profit side hasn't caught up yet. NIM compressed hard (4.81%→3.80%), CIR climbed to 46.5% and BOPO to 72.9%, and the result is the lowest ROE of the four largest banks (14.0%, FY25), with only BTN lower among the Himbara state banks at 11.6%, still drifting down. Loan growth has re-accelerated (~16%, FY25) and the capital base is solid (CAR ~21%). What you are buying is a cleaned-up balance sheet whose returns now hinge on NIM recovery and efficiency; the distance to peers is both the opportunity and the risk.
Rp1,022tn of third-party funds (FY2025), ~70% CASA, but the FY2025 deposit push (time deposits Rp234tn→Rp302tn) and system rates drove interest expense Rp13tn→Rp28tn (+115%) across the window.
EconomicsInterest income grew only +24% (Rp54tn→Rp67tn) against that +115%: the whole NIM story in two numbers.
Gross loans Rp643tn→Rp883tn (+37%), corporate-weighted, LDR run to 96.1% (FY2024) then back to 86.4%.
EconomicsNIM 4.81%→3.80%: a full 100bp surrendered, the hardest compression of the big four.
The genuine achievement of the window: gross NPL 2.81%→1.93%, improving every single year.
EconomicsLower credit cost partly funded the profit floor while margins fell.
Implied retention ~53%, the highest of the big four, built equity Rp132tn→Rp168tn (+27%). Yet ROE FELL 16.4%→14.0%.
EconomicsRetained capital is compounding at a falling rate: the inverse of the BBCA pattern, and the central question of the equity story.
Cost structureFunding-cost-dominated: BOPO 68.6%→72.9% and CIR 42.6%→46.5%; the erosion is interest expense and pricing, not opex indiscipline.
Cash cycleFunding-cost→NIM chain: adequate CASA → 3.80% NIM (thinnest of the four) → 2.13% pre-tax ROA → 14.0% ROE. The chain clears the 11.21% COE by under 3pp: the thinnest excess spread among the big four.
Diversified deposit base; CASA ~70% keeps funding power modest.
Implication → Funding power is contained, but NIM (3.80%) shows the asset-mix, not funding, is the margin constraint.
Corporate borrowers negotiate pricing; competition for blue-chips is fierce.
Implication → Caps loan yields and pressures the already-thin NIM.
Scale, corporate and international relationships are barriers; digital entrants lack the franchise.
Implication → The core franchise is defensible while it executes the turnaround.
Bond markets and fintech substitute parts of corporate credit and payments.
Implication → Adds pressure on wholesale volumes and fee pools.
Intense Himbara + private-bank competition for corporates and CASA; CIR rose to 46.5%.
Implication → Squeezes efficiency and margins: the central reason ROE lags peers.
Clean but eroding: profit sat ~Rp19–21tn all four years on a balance sheet 31% larger; flat absolute earnings on a growing base IS the deterioration, delivered through NIM (−100bp) rather than credit losses (NPL improved throughout). No named one-offs; the quality issue is trajectory, not accounting.
Checked: no material one-offs found in the reviewed window.
Cash conversionEquity bridge consistent: ~Rp36tn of build against ~Rp81tn cumulative profit implies ~55% retention with a modest OCI drag; no accrual divergence visible.
The uncomfortable version of building: retains the most of the big four while returns fall toward the cost of equity; capital is accumulating faster than the franchise can employ it at its old rate. The excess-return model puts the record at 1.65x book while the market pays just 0.79x (48% of modeled value); priced below book despite a record that still models well above it: the market is extrapolating the ROE slide further than the model’s own fade does. Either the corporate franchise reprices, or the retention policy is building low-return capital: the price says the market has picked its answer.
DeploymentFY2022→25: loans +37% (Rp643tn→883tn), securities +43% (Rp134tn→192tn), ~45–50% of earnings distributed, remainder retained into the falling-ROE base.
Returns trendROE 16.4→16.8→15.8→14.0%: monotonic decline since FY2023 against a fixed 11.21% COE; the spread halved inside the window. This is the one big-four record where the excess-return fade is not a modeling assumption but the delivered trend.
ROE 14.0% vs COE 11.21%: under 3pp of excess and falling each year. If FY2026 continues the slope, the franchise stops creating value on retained capital.
−100bp in three years (4.81%→3.80%): corporate pricing power has not held against funding costs; the deepest compression of the peer set.
NPL 2.81%→1.93% is real and consistent: checked, genuinely improving every year; the risk is that renewed growth (loans +16% FY2025) re-seasons the book.
Same structural exposure as its state peers: lending priorities and payout set beyond the bank.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Large, well-capitalised and concentrated among a few systemic players, with ASEAN-leading profitability: though margins and efficiency are now under late-cycle pressure.