Equal
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| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)(Capital / RWA) | 24.7% | 25.7% | 23.5% | 25.4% |
| Leverage Ratio(Tier 1 / Total Exposure) | 9.8% | 10.5% | 10.5% | 11.7% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross NPL(NPL / Total Loans) | 2.8% | 2.5% | 3.5% | 3.9% |
| Net NPL((NPL − Reserves) / Loans) | 1.0% | 1.2% | 1.5% | 1.9% |
| Non-Performing Assets(NPA / Total Assets) | 1.6% | 1.7% | 2.6% | 2.6% |
| Non-Performing Productive Assets(NP Earning / Earning Assets) | 1.6% | 1.6% | 2.6% | 2.6% |
| Allowance for Impairment (CKPN)(CKPN / Earning Assets) | 1.6% | 1.7% | 2.5% | 2.8% |
| Cost of Credit(Provision Expense / Gross Loans) | 0.8% | 1.2% | 2.0% | 2.6% |
| NPL Coverage(Allowance for Impairment (CKPN) / Gross NPL) | 100.9% | 100.1% | 90.0% | 102.2% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR)(Loans / Deposits) | 56.5% | 70.0% | 82.1% | 85.4% |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)(ASF / RSF) | 177.9% | 149.9% | 129.7% | 121.9% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)(HQLA / Net Cash Outflows (30d)) | 319.7% | 192.2% | 177.8% | 212.0% |
| CASA Ratio((Demand + Savings) / Total Deposits) | 61.1% | 63.6% | 65.1% | 66.5% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 2.0% | 1.9% | 1.6% | 1.9% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 16.2% | 14.0% | 11.9% | 13.4% |
| Net Interest Margin (NIM)(NII / Avg Earning Assets) | 5.1% | 5.6% | 5.9% | 6.2% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Expense to Income (BOPO)(Opex / Operating Income) | 76.1% | 77.3% | 81.9% | 79.9% |
| Cost-to-Income Ratio (CIR)(Opex (ex-provisions) / Income) | 38.4% | 39.6% | 39.2% | 36.9% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan Growth (YoY)(Gross Loans / Prior Year − 1) | — | 18.5% | 17.0% | 5.0% |
| Deposit Growth (YoY)(Total Deposits / Prior Year − 1) | — | -4.4% | -0.9% | 1.4% |
Price Rp 520 · market cap Rp 7.8 T
| Multiple | BJTM | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 5.05x | 8.04x | -37% |
| P/B | 0.57x | 0.78x | -27% |
| Dividend Yield | 10.52% | 7.46%(14/15) | +41% |
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
A bank cannot be valued on operating cash flow the way a factory can, because for a bank debt is raw material rather than financing. So this model values the equity directly: start from book value, then add the present value of everything the bank earns above its cost of equity. A bank that earns exactly its cost of equity is worth exactly its book value (P/B 1.0).
| Assumption | Default | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Book equity (BV₀) | Rp 14 T | audited Individual-basis equity, FY2025 publication |
| ROE, start of fade | 13.35% | FY2025 disclosed ROE (OJK ratio table) |
| ROE, terminal | 13.66% | median disclosed ROE, FY2022–FY2025: the bank's own demonstrated through-cycle level, fading linearly |
| Fade horizon | 5 yrs | linear fade; final year pins to terminal |
| Retention (explicit phase) | 43.8% | implied from delivered equity growth FY2022–FY2025 (CAGR 6.1%) ÷ average ROE 13.9%. An approximation: equity growth also carries OCI effects (FVOCI marks, revaluations), not only retention |
| Cost of equity | 11.27% | Regional development banks (BPD) and small/niche franchises. The EM cohort averages are nearly identical across the two buckets: company-specific risk (e.g. a digital bank pre-scale) is NOT captured by a sector beta; the panel slider is the adjustment surface. |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | house terminal growth 2.5% (capped at terminal ROE by the engine when binding) |
Equity = BV₀ Rp 14 T + PV(excess, yrs 1–5) Rp 1.2 T + PV(terminal) Rp 2.9 T = Rp 18 T
At today's price the market pays 44% of this model's equity value. The price embeds less than these inputs produce, which amounts to assuming a higher cost of equity or a lower terminal ROE than the defaults here.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 13.35% | 13.43% | 13.50% | 13.58% | 13.66% | 13.66% |
| Book (start) | Rp 14 T | Rp 14 T | Rp 15 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 18 T |
| Net income | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 2.1 T | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 2.3 T | Rp 2.5 T |
| Retained | Rp 798 M | Rp 849 M | Rp 904 M | Rp 963 M | Rp 1.0 T | — |
| Excess return | Rp 284 M | Rp 311 M | Rp 341 M | Rp 374 M | Rp 409 M | Rp 433 M |
| PV | Rp 255 M | Rp 251 M | Rp 248 M | Rp 244 M | Rp 240 M | Rp 2.9 T |
Check it yourself: NI = ROE × book · ER = (ROE − COE) × book · PV = ER ÷ (1+COE)^yr · next book = book + NI × retention · TV = ER(T∞) ÷ (COE − g), discounted from year 5
| ROE_T \ COE | 10.27% | 11.27% | 12.27% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 11.66% | 1.24x | 1.08x | 0.96x |
| 13.66% | 1.49x | 1.30x | 1.15x |
| 15.66% | 1.75x | 1.53x | 1.35x |
Model output under the stated assumptions, never a target. ROE record: FY2022 16.24% · FY2023 13.96% · FY2024 11.89% · FY2025 13.35%
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interest income | Rp 6.8 T | Rp 7.3 T | Rp 8.0 T | Rp 8.6 T |
| Interest expense | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 2.3 T | Rp 2.5 T | Rp 2.4 T |
| Net interest income | Rp 4.8 T | Rp 5.0 T | Rp 5.5 T | Rp 6.1 T |
| Fees & commissions | Rp 515 M | Rp 500 M | Rp 547 M | Rp 563 M |
| Impairment/provision expense | Rp 387 M | Rp 671 M | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.7 T |
| Personnel expenses | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 1.9 T |
| Operating profit | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 2.0 T |
| Profit before tax | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 2.0 T |
| Net profit | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 1.5 T |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 2.4 T | Rp 2.3 T |
| Placement with Bank Indonesia | Rp 14 T | Rp 9.1 T | Rp 5.2 T | Rp 4.3 T |
| Placement with other banks | Rp 4.5 T | Rp 4.6 T | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 1.8 T |
| Securities | Rp 23 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 18 T | Rp 18 T |
| Loans (gross, incl. Sharia financing) | Rp 46 T | Rp 55 T | Rp 64 T | Rp 67 T |
| Allowance for impairment: loans & Sharia financing (CKPN) | -Rp 1.3 T | -Rp 1.4 T | -Rp 2.0 T | -Rp 2.7 T |
| Fixed assets & equipment (net) | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 1.3 T |
| Total assets | Rp 103 T | Rp 104 T | Rp 102 T | Rp 106 T |
| Demand deposits (Giro) | Rp 24 T | Rp 21 T | Rp 19 T | Rp 21 T |
| Savings deposits (Tabungan) | Rp 26 T | Rp 29 T | Rp 31 T | Rp 31 T |
| Time deposits (Deposito) | Rp 32 T | Rp 28 T | Rp 27 T | Rp 26 T |
| Debt securities issued | Rp 0 | Rp 0 | Rp 0 | Rp 2.0 T |
| Total liabilities | Rp 92 T | Rp 92 T | Rp 90 T | Rp 92 T |
| Total equity | Rp 11 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 14 T |
BJTM (Bank Jatim), majority-owned by the Provincial Government of East Java (51.13%, a genuine controlling majority; cleaner than fellow-BPD BJBR's fragmented plurality) alongside East Java regency/city governments (28.35%) and public float (20.52%), is a "dormant capital finally deployed" story, not a growth-at-any-cost one. FY2022 balance sheet was sitting on an extreme liquidity surplus: LCR 319.65%, NSFR 177.87%, LDR just 56.50% (a bank barely lending relative to its own deposit base). Over the following 4 years, BJTM deliberately redeployed that surplus into loans: LDR climbed every year to 85.39% by FY2025, funded almost entirely by running down BI placements (-68.3%, Rp13.53tn→Rp4.28tn) and securities holdings (-21.7%) rather than raising new deposits (total deposits actually fell 3.9% over the same span); total assets grew just 2.7% cumulative while the loan book (conventional + Sharia combined) grew 45.5%. This is economically rational (loans yield more than BI placements) and the resulting liquidity ratios remain comfortably above regulatory minimums (LCR 212.00%, NSFR 121.85%, both FY2025), not a reckless drawdown. **The genuine, disclosed cost**: gross NPL improved initially (2.83%→2.49%, FY2022-2023) then rose for two straight years (2.49%→3.45%→3.88%), and provisioning expense more than quadrupled cumulative (Rp386.5bn→Rp1,716.3bn); a real, quantified asset-quality drift accompanying the redeployment, not yet a crisis but worth watching if it continues past FY2025. Net profit dipped twice (FY2023 -4.7%, FY2024 -12.9%) before a sharp FY2025 recovery (+20.65% YoY to Rp1.546tn, matching independent press reporting exactly): ROE followed the same dip-and-partial-recovery arc (16.24%→13.96%→11.89%→13.35%), still comfortably ahead of both BJBR and PNBN's ROE in this dataset. **Uniquely complete disclosure among this dataset's banks**: leverageRatio, NSFR and LCR are all directly disclosed for all 4 years, zero null ratio gaps.
Giro, Tabungan and Deposito from East Java's provincial/local government treasuries and civil-servant payroll relationships form the sticky funding base.
EconomicsLow-cost, low-churn funding -- not BJTM's binding constraint.
The defining 4-year operating choice: LDR climbed from 56.50% to 85.39% as BI placements were run down 68.3% to fund loan growth instead.
EconomicsA rational yield-seeking reallocation (loans > BI placements) that barely grew the total balance sheet (+2.7% over 4 years) while transforming its composition.
NIM expanded from 5.11% (FY2022) to 6.15% (FY2025) as the asset mix shifted toward higher-yielding loans.
EconomicsThe direct payoff of the liquidity-redeployment strategy.
Provisioning expense rose every single year, more than quadrupling cumulative (Rp386.5bn→Rp1,716.3bn) as gross NPL drifted up alongside the growing book.
EconomicsThe single most important cost line to watch -- the real price of the redeployment strategy.
Total equity grew every year (+19.3% cumulative, FY2022-2025) even as net profit fluctuated -- consistent with low or no dividend distribution this window (not independently confirmed this batch).
EconomicsA builder posture -- capital is being kept in the bank to fund continued loan growth, not distributed.
Cost structureInterest expense (Rp2.43tn, FY2025) and personnel expense (Rp1.88tn) are the two largest cost lines below net interest income; provisioning (Rp1.72tn) has grown into a comparably-sized third cost line, from being the smallest of the three back in FY2022. Cost-to-income ratio has stayed in a 36.85-39.56% band across the window -- a relatively efficient level versus this dataset's other private/regional banks.
Cash cycleThe bank funding-cost-to-NIM chain: government/PNS deposits gathered at low cost, redeployed into loans at an expanding net margin (5.11%→6.15%), provisioning taken as the book ages. FY2022-2025's twist is the asset-mix shift itself -- BI placements and securities were drawn down specifically to fund the "deploy" step, rather than new deposits funding incremental growth on top of an already-full balance sheet.
Regional-government and PNS-linked deposits are sticky and naturally low-cost, reinforced by BJTM's designated role as East Java's provincial/local-government banking partner: a structural funding advantage shared with BJBR's equivalent BPD role in West Java/Banten.
Implication → Funding cost is not BJTM's constraint; deploying the resulting liquidity productively is the real lever, and FY2022-2025 shows management actively pulling it.
PNS/civil-servant payroll borrowers are a captive, low-churn segment via payroll-deduction arrangements; commercial/SME borrowers have more negotiating leverage and competition from national banks.
Implication → The payroll-lending core is defensible; growth beyond it (which is where BJTM's loan book has been expanding) faces normal competitive pricing pressure.
Standard sector-wide capital/licensing barriers, plus BJTM's own regional-government mandate and majority state ownership (51.13% Pemprov Jatim) are additional, bank-specific incumbency advantages within East Java.
Implication → Entry risk is not what shapes BJTM's current story; its own capital-redeployment execution is.
Fintech lending and larger national banks compete for the commercial/SME and consumer credit BJTM is now pursuing more aggressively as it deploys its former liquidity surplus: a real competitive backdrop to the loan-growth push.
Implication → Substitution pressure is a plausible contributor to the rising NPL trend alongside pure portfolio-aging effects.
Competes with fellow BPD BJBR (a structurally similar peer in this dataset, though with a sharply different recent trajectory) and national banks operating in East Java; BJTM's LDR (85.4%) is still below the ~85-90% system norm, suggesting room to keep growing without necessarily escalating price competition.
Implication → BJTM likely has further deployment runway before LDR itself becomes a binding constraint.
Real and operationally-grounded, with a genuine multi-year wobble disclosed rather than smoothed: net profit fell in FY2023 (-4.7%) and FY2024 (-12.9%) before the FY2025 recovery (+20.65%). The dip years coincide with rising provisioning (a real credit-cost story, not an earnings-manufacturing one), and FY2025's rebound is corroborated by an independent Q3-2025 print (+23.51% YoY cumulative) rather than resting on the full-year figure alone.
Checked: no material one-offs found in the reviewed window.
Cash conversionNot independently computable from the disclosed Publikasi ratio-table format (no operating cash flow statement extracted this batch) -- flagged as a genuine data gap rather than assumed clean.
A clear builder across the full window: the defining allocation choice was redeploying a formerly-idle liquidity surplus into loan growth (LDR 56.50%→85.39%) while retaining capital (equity +19.3% cumulative) rather than distributing it -- growth funded by reallocating the existing balance sheet, not by raising new capital or drawing down equity.
DeploymentCapital grew via retained earnings across all 4 years even as net profit fluctuated, funding continued asset-mix rebalancing toward loans. No dividend distribution was confirmed in the source material reviewed this batch -- a genuine gap, disclosed rather than assumed either way.
Returns trendROE moved 16.24%→13.96%→11.89%→13.35% (FY2022-2025) -- a real dip-and-partial-recovery, not a clean trend in either direction, tracking the same arc as net profit itself. Still meaningfully ahead of BJBR's declining ROE and PNBN's persistently-low ROE elsewhere in this dataset's bank roster.
Gross NPL rose for two straight years after an initial dip (2.49%→3.45%→3.88%, FY2023-2025) and provisioning expense more than quadrupled cumulative (Rp386.5bn→Rp1,716.3bn) -- a real, quantified, disclosed cost of the loan-growth push. Not yet a crisis (NPL stays well below system-concern thresholds and CAR remains healthy at 25.38%), but the clearest trend worth monitoring.
Unlike every other bank in this dataset, BJTM discloses "Kredit yang diberikan" and "Pembiayaan syariah" as two adjacent line items on the SAME balance sheet (not a separately-excluded UUS mini-table) -- combined into a single loansGross/impairmentAllowance figure here. Verified correct, not assumed: the combined FY2025 figure (Rp67.244tn) matches independently-reported credit-disbursement data exactly, and the disclosed LDR ratio recomputes to an exact match using this combined figure for FY2022/2023 (within ~0.6pp for FY2024/2025, expected from LDR's own regulatory-formula nuances).
Both source documents (FY2025/2024 and FY2023/2022) are scanned/image-only with no extractable text layer (confirmed via extract-pdf-pdfjs.mjs, zero ratio-relevant lines in both cases) -- read via render-page.mjs + vision, the same method already validated for MEGA's FY2023/2022 broadsheet. Every figure used here was cross-checked against at least one internal identity (NII=II-IE, both documents) or an independent external source (LDR recomputation, press-reported net profit and growth rate) before being shipped.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Large, well-capitalised and concentrated among a few systemic players, with ASEAN-leading profitability: though margins and efficiency are now under late-cycle pressure.