Equal
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| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)(Capital / RWA) | 19.5% | 21.5% | 20.1% | 19.4% |
| Leverage Ratio(Tier 1 / Total Exposure) | 11.0% | 11.8% | 11.6% | 10.0% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross NPL(NPL / Total Loans) | 1.9% | 1.0% | 1.0% | 1.0% |
| Net NPL((NPL − Reserves) / Loans) | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.4% |
| Non-Performing Assets(NPA / Total Assets) | 1.1% | 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.7% |
| Non-Performing Productive Assets(NP Earning / Earning Assets) | 1.1% | 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.7% |
| Allowance for Impairment (CKPN)(CKPN / Earning Assets) | 3.9% | 2.9% | 2.3% | 2.0% |
| Cost of Credit(Provision Expense / Gross Loans)insufficient source figures | — | — | — | — |
| NPL Coverage(Allowance for Impairment (CKPN) / Gross NPL) | 309.5% | 382.2% | 300.9% | 252.5% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR)(Loans / Deposits) | 77.6% | 86.8% | 98.0% | 88.9% |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)(ASF / RSF) | 119.5% | 116.6% | 107.2% | 108.6% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)(HQLA / Net Cash Outflows (30d)) | 191.0% | 176.2% | 139.2% | 137.4% |
| CASA Ratio((Demand + Savings) / Total Deposits) | 77.6% | 79.4% | 80.3% | 70.8% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 3.3% | 4.0% | 3.6% | 3.2% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 22.6% | 27.3% | 24.2% | 23.2% |
| Net Interest Margin (NIM)(NII / Avg Earning Assets) | 5.2% | 5.3% | 4.9% | 4.6% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Expense to Income (BOPO)(Opex / Operating Income) | 57.4% | 51.9% | 56.5% | 60.2% |
| Cost-to-Income Ratio (CIR)(Opex (ex-provisions) / Income) | 38.2% | 34.4% | 35.0% | 41.2% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan Growth (YoY)(Gross Loans / Prior Year − 1) | — | 16.4% | 20.7% | 14.2% |
| Deposit Growth (YoY)(Total Deposits / Prior Year − 1) | — | 4.1% | 6.8% | 26.2% |
Price Rp 4,190 · market cap Rp 391 T
| Multiple | BMRI | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 7.59x | 8.04x | -6% |
| P/B | 1.49x | 0.78x | +91% |
| Dividend Yield | 11.38% | 7.46%(14/15) | +53% |
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
A bank cannot be valued on operating cash flow the way a factory can, because for a bank debt is raw material rather than financing. So this model values the equity directly: start from book value, then add the present value of everything the bank earns above its cost of equity. A bank that earns exactly its cost of equity is worth exactly its book value (P/B 1.0).
| Assumption | Default | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Book equity (BV₀) | Rp 262 T | audited Individual-basis equity, FY2025 publication |
| ROE, start of fade | 23.15% | FY2025 disclosed ROE (OJK ratio table) |
| ROE, terminal | 23.67% | median disclosed ROE, FY2022–FY2025: the bank's own demonstrated through-cycle level, fading linearly |
| Fade horizon | 5 yrs | linear fade; final year pins to terminal |
| Retention (explicit phase) | 30.6% | implied from delivered equity growth FY2022–FY2025 (CAGR 7.4%) ÷ average ROE 24.3%. An approximation: equity growth also carries OCI effects (FVOCI marks, revaluations), not only retention |
| Cost of equity | 11.21% | National-footprint franchises (KBMI 3–4 and large private banks). |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | house terminal growth 2.5% (capped at terminal ROE by the engine when binding) |
Equity = BV₀ Rp 262 T + PV(excess, yrs 1–5) Rp 133 T + PV(terminal) Rp 312 T = Rp 707 T
At today's price the market pays 55% of this model's equity value. The price embeds less than these inputs produce, which amounts to assuming a higher cost of equity or a lower terminal ROE than the defaults here.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 23.15% | 23.28% | 23.41% | 23.54% | 23.67% | 23.67% |
| Book (start) | Rp 262 T | Rp 281 T | Rp 300 T | Rp 322 T | Rp 345 T | Rp 370 T |
| Net income | Rp 61 T | Rp 65 T | Rp 70 T | Rp 76 T | Rp 82 T | Rp 88 T |
| Retained | Rp 19 T | Rp 20 T | Rp 22 T | Rp 23 T | Rp 25 T | — |
| Excess return | Rp 31 T | Rp 34 T | Rp 37 T | Rp 40 T | Rp 43 T | Rp 46 T |
| PV | Rp 28 T | Rp 27 T | Rp 27 T | Rp 26 T | Rp 25 T | Rp 312 T |
Check it yourself: NI = ROE × book · ER = (ROE − COE) × book · PV = ER ÷ (1+COE)^yr · next book = book + NI × retention · TV = ER(T∞) ÷ (COE − g), discounted from year 5
| ROE_T \ COE | 10.21% | 11.21% | 12.21% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 21.67% | 2.80x | 2.45x | 2.18x |
| 23.67% | 3.08x | 2.70x | 2.39x |
| 25.67% | 3.38x | 2.95x | 2.61x |
Model output under the stated assumptions, never a target. ROE record: FY2022 22.62% · FY2023 27.31% · FY2024 24.19% · FY2025 23.15%
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interest income | Rp 82 T | Rp 98 T | Rp 112 T | Rp 122 T |
| Interest expense | Rp 17 T | Rp 27 T | Rp 36 T | Rp 44 T |
| Net interest income | Rp 65 T | Rp 71 T | Rp 76 T | Rp 78 T |
| Operating profit | Rp 47 T | Rp 63 T | Rp 63 T | Rp 63 T |
| Profit before tax | Rp 47 T | Rp 63 T | Rp 63 T | Rp 63 T |
| Net profit | Rp 38 T | Rp 51 T | Rp 51 T | Rp 52 T |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash | Rp 21 T | Rp 21 T | Rp 23 T | Rp 25 T |
| Placement with Bank Indonesia | Rp 148 T | Rp 129 T | Rp 99 T | Rp 219 T |
| Placement with other banks | Rp 64 T | Rp 49 T | Rp 57 T | Rp 66 T |
| Securities | Rp 280 T | Rp 242 T | Rp 174 T | Rp 259 T |
| Loans (gross) | Rp 933 T | Rp 1,086 T | Rp 1,311 T | Rp 1,497 T |
| Allowance for impairment: loans (CKPN) | -Rp 54 T | -Rp 42 T | -Rp 38 T | -Rp 36 T |
| Fixed assets & equipment | Rp 66 T | Rp 70 T | Rp 74 T | Rp 82 T |
| Total assets | Rp 1,570 T | Rp 1,689 T | Rp 1,877 T | Rp 2,228 T |
| Demand deposits (Giro) | Rp 498 T | Rp 533 T | Rp 551 T | Rp 640 T |
| Savings deposits (Tabungan) | Rp 428 T | Rp 454 T | Rp 515 T | Rp 546 T |
| Time deposits (Deposito) | Rp 267 T | Rp 256 T | Rp 261 T | Rp 489 T |
| Borrowings | Rp 42 T | Rp 58 T | Rp 98 T | Rp 132 T |
| Total liabilities | Rp 1,359 T | Rp 1,450 T | Rp 1,620 T | Rp 1,966 T |
| Total equity | Rp 211 T | Rp 238 T | Rp 257 T | Rp 262 T |
Bank Mandiri is the wholesale champion of Indonesian banking. It carries the lowest gross NPL among the big-four (0.96%, FY25), draws strong CASA (~71–80%) through its Kopra platform for corporates and Livin’ for retail, and earns an ROE that peaked at 27.3% (FY23) before easing to 23.2% (FY25). It also grew loans the fastest of the Himbara banks, pushing LDR to a spike of ~98% in FY24, which compressed NIM (5.16%→4.59%) and lifted CIR and BOPO in FY25. Capital is adequate (CAR ~19%). This is the highest-quality SOE balance sheet, with a genuine edge in digital transactions; returns are normalising off a cyclical peak, and the balance to watch is NIM against growth.
Rp1,675tn of third-party funds (FY2025), but the mix broke in FY2025: time deposits exploded Rp267tn→Rp489tn (+83%) in a single year after CASA growth could no longer fund the loan engine.
EconomicsInterest expense Rp17tn→Rp44tn (FY2022→25): the price of buying funding to keep growing.
Gross loans Rp933tn→Rp1,497tn (+60% in three years: the fastest big-four expansion), LDR peaking at 98.0% in FY2024 before the deposit purchase brought it back to 88.9%.
EconomicsGrowth arrived with QUALITY: gross NPL halved 1.88%→0.96%; the cleanest big-four book by FY2025.
NIM compressed 5.25%→4.59% (peak FY2023) as corporate pricing and bought funding squeezed both ends; BOPO rose 51.9%→60.2%.
EconomicsThe trade: lower-margin, lower-loss assets at maximum volume; ROA 3.19% still second only to BBCA.
Equity Rp211tn→Rp262tn (+24%) at ~31% implied retention: the middle path between BBCA’s build and BBRI’s full harvest.
EconomicsCAR held ~19–21% through 60% loan growth: capital-efficient, but with the thinnest buffer of the quality trio.
Cost structureFunding-led deterioration: opex is controlled, but bought deposits moved BOPO +8.4pp in two years. The FY2025 time-deposit surge is the single line to watch reversing.
Cash cycleFunding-cost→NIM chain: CASA plus bought time deposits → 4.59% NIM → 3.19% pre-tax ROA → 23.2% ROE. Volume, not margin, carries the chain: the exact inverse of BBRI.
Large, diversified corporate and retail deposit base; transaction banking (Kopra) makes operating balances sticky.
Implication → Strong CASA underpins a competitive cost of funds despite a wholesale tilt.
Large corporates have real negotiating power on lending rates and fees.
Implication → Caps wholesale loan pricing: the main reason NIM (4.59%) sits below micro-led peers.
Scale, corporate relationships and the Kopra/Livin’ platforms are high barriers.
Implication → The wholesale franchise is defensible; digital scale widens the gap.
Capital markets (bonds), fintech and direct funding substitute for parts of corporate credit.
Implication → Pressures wholesale lending volumes and margins in strong capital-market conditions.
Intense competition for blue-chip corporates and CASA among BBCA, BBRI and BBNI.
Implication → Drove the FY24 growth push and FY25 CIR/BOPO rise; scale and quality defend returns.
Genuinely improving beneath a flattered peak: FY2023’s 27.3% ROE rode the NPL cleanup (provision release effect) and normalized to a still-excellent 23.2%. Profit held ~Rp51–52tn for three years on a book 38% larger: margin compression absorbed by volume, transparently visible in the disclosed series.
| Period | One-off item | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| FY2023 | Provisioning normalization after the NPL halving (1.88%→1.02%) flattered the ROE peak | ROE 27.3% that year vs the 23%-handle run-rate on either side: read the trend, not the peak. |
Cash conversionEquity bridge consistent: +Rp51tn build over the window against ~Rp192tn cumulative profit and ~70% payout; no accrual gap visible on the Individual basis.
A growth machine running at its funding constraint: 60% loan growth on a flat-CAR budget is aggressive-but-disciplined capital use; the discipline shows in the NPL line, the aggression in the FY2024 LDR of 98%. The excess-return model prices the franchise at 2.70x book; the market pays 1.49x (55%): the widest big-four discount after BBNI, which pays 48%.
DeploymentFY2022→25: loans +Rp564tn (+60%), securities cycled down then back (Rp280tn→174→259tn; the bond book funded the loan surge mid-window), dividends ~70% of earnings.
Returns trendROE 22.6→27.3→24.2→23.2%: the trend line ex-peak is stable ~23% against an 11.21% COE; an ~12pp spread held while the balance sheet grew 42%.
LDR 98.0% in FY2024, then Rp222tn of time deposits bought in one year to refill: growth ran ahead of the deposit franchise. Watch whether the expensive funding rolls off or becomes structural.
5.25%→4.59% from the FY2023 peak: corporate pricing plus bought funding. The volume offset held profit flat; it cannot do so indefinitely.
CAR 19.4% FY2025 vs BBCA 29.8%/BBRI 21.1%: adequate, but the least room for a policy call or a cycle turn.
State-directed lending priorities and dividend needs sit outside management; the window shows the dividend pull (~70% payout at flat CAR).
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Large, well-capitalised and concentrated among a few systemic players, with ASEAN-leading profitability: though margins and efficiency are now under late-cycle pressure.