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| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)(Capital / RWA) | 22.2% | 24.0% | 23.3% | 24.8% |
| Leverage Ratio(Tier 1 / Total Exposure) | 13.2% | 13.3% | 13.8% | 14.8% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross NPL(NPL / Total Loans) | 2.8% | 2.0% | 1.8% | 1.8% |
| Net NPL((NPL − Reserves) / Loans) | 0.8% | 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.7% |
| Non-Performing Assets(NPA / Total Assets) | 1.7% | 1.2% | 1.0% | 1.0% |
| Non-Performing Productive Assets(NP Earning / Earning Assets) | 1.6% | 1.1% | 0.9% | 1.0% |
| Allowance for Impairment (CKPN)(CKPN / Earning Assets) | 5.1% | 4.1% | 3.2% | 2.5% |
| Cost of Credit(Provision Expense / Gross Loans)insufficient source figures | — | — | — | — |
| NPL Coverage(Allowance for Impairment (CKPN) / Gross NPL) | 324.2% | 400.8% | 374.9% | 257.7% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR)(Loans / Deposits) | 85.6% | 89.3% | 86.3% | 86.8% |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)(ASF / RSF) | 119.4% | 114.6% | 116.9% | 115.0% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)(HQLA / Net Cash Outflows (30d)) | 231.4% | 252.7% | 229.2% | 206.3% |
| CASA Ratio((Demand + Savings) / Total Deposits) | 63.6% | 64.0% | 66.1% | 70.1% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 2.2% | 2.6% | 2.5% | 2.4% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 12.6% | 15.0% | 14.3% | 13.0% |
| Net Interest Margin (NIM)(NII / Avg Earning Assets) | 4.7% | 4.4% | 4.1% | 4.0% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Expense to Income (BOPO)(Opex / Operating Income) | 74.1% | 71.5% | 74.0% | 72.4% |
| Cost-to-Income Ratio (CIR)(Opex (ex-provisions) / Income) | — | — | 44.3% | 45.9% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan Growth (YoY)(Gross Loans / Prior Year − 1) | — | 5.1% | 4.5% | 9.0% |
| Deposit Growth (YoY)(Total Deposits / Prior Year − 1) | — | 4.0% | 10.5% | 3.8% |
Price Rp 1,650 · market cap Rp 41 T
| Multiple | BNGA | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 6.12x | 8.04x | -24% |
| P/B | 0.74x | 0.78x | -5% |
| Dividend Yield | 9.44% | 7.46%(14/15) | +27% |
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
A bank cannot be valued on operating cash flow the way a factory can, because for a bank debt is raw material rather than financing. So this model values the equity directly: start from book value, then add the present value of everything the bank earns above its cost of equity. A bank that earns exactly its cost of equity is worth exactly its book value (P/B 1.0).
| Assumption | Default | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Book equity (BV₀) | Rp 56 T | audited Individual-basis equity, FY2025 publication |
| ROE, start of fade | 13.03% | FY2025 disclosed ROE (OJK ratio table) |
| ROE, terminal | 13.68% | median disclosed ROE, FY2022–FY2025: the bank's own demonstrated through-cycle level, fading linearly |
| Fade horizon | 5 yrs | linear fade; final year pins to terminal |
| Retention (explicit phase) | 61.4% | implied from delivered equity growth FY2022–FY2025 (CAGR 8.4%) ÷ average ROE 13.7%. An approximation: equity growth also carries OCI effects (FVOCI marks, revaluations), not only retention |
| Cost of equity | 11.21% | National-footprint franchises (KBMI 3–4 and large private banks). |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | house terminal growth 2.5% (capped at terminal ROE by the engine when binding) |
Equity = BV₀ Rp 56 T + PV(excess, yrs 1–5) Rp 5.1 T + PV(terminal) Rp 14 T = Rp 75 T
At today's price the market pays 56% of this model's equity value. The price embeds less than these inputs produce, which amounts to assuming a higher cost of equity or a lower terminal ROE than the defaults here.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 13.03% | 13.19% | 13.36% | 13.52% | 13.69% | 13.69% |
| Book (start) | Rp 56 T | Rp 60 T | Rp 65 T | Rp 70 T | Rp 76 T | Rp 83 T |
| Net income | Rp 7.3 T | Rp 8.0 T | Rp 8.7 T | Rp 9.5 T | Rp 10 T | Rp 11 T |
| Retained | Rp 4.5 T | Rp 4.9 T | Rp 5.3 T | Rp 5.8 T | Rp 6.4 T | — |
| Excess return | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 2.0 T |
| PV | Rp 915 M | Rp 968 M | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 14 T |
Check it yourself: NI = ROE × book · ER = (ROE − COE) × book · PV = ER ÷ (1+COE)^yr · next book = book + NI × retention · TV = ER(T∞) ÷ (COE − g), discounted from year 5
| ROE_T \ COE | 10.21% | 11.21% | 12.21% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 11.68% | 1.26x | 1.10x | 0.96x |
| 13.68% | 1.55x | 1.34x | 1.17x |
| 15.68% | 1.85x | 1.59x | 1.39x |
Model output under the stated assumptions, never a target. ROE record: FY2022 12.59% · FY2023 15.02% · FY2024 14.34% · FY2025 13.03%
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interest income | Rp 18 T | Rp 21 T | Rp 23 T | Rp 23 T |
| Interest expense | Rp 5.4 T | Rp 8.7 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 11 T |
| Net interest income | Rp 13 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 12 T |
| Operating profit | Rp 6.2 T | Rp 7.9 T | Rp 7.9 T | Rp 8.5 T |
| Profit before tax | Rp 6.2 T | Rp 7.9 T | Rp 8.2 T | Rp 8.6 T |
| Net profit | Rp 4.8 T | Rp 6.2 T | Rp 6.5 T | Rp 6.8 T |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash | Rp 5.4 T | Rp 3.9 T | Rp 3.6 T | Rp 3.7 T |
| Placement with Bank Indonesia | Rp 23 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 15 T | Rp 23 T |
| Placement with other banks | Rp 3.1 T | Rp 2.8 T | Rp 2.6 T | Rp 2.3 T |
| Securities | Rp 59 T | Rp 59 T | Rp 82 T | Rp 73 T |
| Loans (gross) | Rp 144 T | Rp 152 T | Rp 158 T | Rp 173 T |
| Allowance for impairment: loans (CKPN) | -Rp 13 T | -Rp 12 T | -Rp 10 T | -Rp 8.1 T |
| Fixed assets & equipment | Rp 9.6 T | Rp 9.4 T | Rp 9.2 T | Rp 9.5 T |
| Total assets | Rp 302 T | Rp 328 T | Rp 351 T | Rp 362 T |
| Demand deposits (Giro) | Rp 71 T | Rp 74 T | Rp 93 T | Rp 104 T |
| Savings deposits (Tabungan) | Rp 74 T | Rp 77 T | Rp 80 T | Rp 86 T |
| Time deposits (Deposito) | Rp 83 T | Rp 85 T | Rp 89 T | Rp 81 T |
| Total liabilities | Rp 258 T | Rp 280 T | Rp 300 T | Rp 306 T |
| Total equity | Rp 44 T | Rp 47 T | Rp 51 T | Rp 56 T |
CIMB Niaga is the largest private bank after BBCA, a universal franchise spanning consumer, SME, commercial, corporate, treasury and Sharia, backed by Malaysia’s CIMB Group. Returns are solid but mid-pack (ROE ~13–15%), helped by improving asset quality (gross NPL 2.80%→1.81%) and a rising CASA (~70%, FY25); the drags are a NIM that has compressed steadily (4.69%→3.97%) and middling efficiency (BOPO ~72%, CIR ~46%). Capital is strong (CAR ~25%). It is a well-run, regionally-connected second-tier bank that lacks the funding-cost and scale advantages of the big-four, so its lever is digital (OCTO) plus CASA to defend a margin that keeps compressing.
Current accounts grew 47% (Rp70.7tn → Rp104.0tn) and savings 17% (Rp74.1tn → Rp86.4tn), while time deposits were allowed to shrink 2% (Rp82.8tn → Rp81.1tn). CASA therefore climbed 63.6% → 70.1%, helped by the OCTO digital platform pulling transactional balances.
EconomicsA current account is transactional money that sits at near-zero cost because the customer keeps it there to operate, not to earn. Growing it is slow, unglamorous work and it is the most durable advantage a bank can build. Danamon began FY2022 with the same 63.6% CASA and ended at 42.5%, which is why these two banks are worth reading as a pair.
Interest expense rose 95% (Rp5.45tn → Rp10.65tn) while interest income rose 25% (Rp18.15tn → Rp22.78tn). Net interest income fell in every year: −1.6%, −2.8%, −0.2%. NIM went 4.69% → 3.97%.
EconomicsThis is the lesson most readers miss. Niaga did the right thing on funding and still lost 72bp of margin, because when policy rates rise the whole deposit book reprices, not just the expensive part. The mix decides how MUCH you lose, not whether you lose. Compare the damage: Niaga −72bp with CASA rising, Danamon −71bp with CASA collapsing, MEGA −124bp with CASA under 30%. In FY2025 Niaga hands 47% of what its assets earn back to depositors, against 30% in FY2022.
Loans grew 19.8% across the window (Rp144.2tn → Rp172.7tn, yearly 5.1%, 4.5%, 9.0%), securities grew Rp58.8tn → Rp73.3tn, and the loan-to-deposit ratio stayed in a narrow 85.6% to 89.3% band.
EconomicsCompare Danamon, which grew loans 42% in the same window and earned no extra profit for it. Niaga grew half as fast and its profit rose 41.5%. Growth is not the variable that decides bank returns; the price of the funding and the cost of the risk are.
Gross NPL improved 2.80% → 1.81% and the impairment allowance on the balance sheet fell from Rp13.09tn to Rp8.05tn, with coverage still 258% of non-performing loans at FY2025. Pretax profit rose Rp2.39tn while net interest income fell Rp0.58tn, so roughly Rp3.0tn of improvement came from outside the margin line.
EconomicsPost-pandemic, a large part of Indonesian bank earnings growth came from provisions falling rather than revenue rising, and Niaga is a textbook case. Note the honest limit of what these figures show: the OJK ratio table for this bank does not disclose cost of credit, so the exact provisioning charge is not visible here, only its direction through the allowance balance and the NPL ratio. Check the bank’s own income statement for the charge itself.
Equity grew Rp43.8tn → Rp55.8tn (+27.5%) and CAR 22.19% → 24.83%, while the bank still distributed about 57% of earnings (DPS Rp155.73).
EconomicsPaying out more than half your profit and still lifting the capital ratio is only possible when the balance sheet grows slower than earnings, which is exactly the trade Niaga chose. It is the opposite of BRIS, which pays about 13% and grows financing 15% a year. Neither is right in the abstract, they are different answers to the same question: is another rupiah of loans worth more inside the bank or in the shareholder’s pocket?
Cost structureFunding first, operations second. Interest paid was Rp10.65tn against Rp22.78tn earned in FY2025, so 47% of what the assets produce goes back to depositors, up from 30% in FY2022, and that single shift is larger than anything on the operating-expense line. Operating efficiency itself is middling rather than poor: BOPO ran 74.1%, 71.5%, 74.0%, 72.4%, and cost-to-income is disclosed only for the last two years at 44.3% and 45.9%, against roughly 31% for BBCA and 34% for BMRI in their best years. A corporate-and-consumer universal bank carries branch, technology and relationship costs that a narrower franchise does not.
Cash cycleFunding cost → margin → credit cost → capital. Niaga strengthened link one (CASA to 70.1%), still lost link two (NIM to 3.97%), and won decisively on link three as the post-pandemic credit cycle turned (NPL 2.80% → 1.81%, allowance Rp13.09tn → Rp8.05tn). Link four then works properly, which is the contrast with Danamon: profit accumulates as capital here (equity +27.5%, CAR 22.19% → 24.83%) even while 57% is paid out. One disclosure wrinkle worth knowing: the engine’s implied retention for Niaga is 61%, higher than the 43% you would infer from a 57% payout, because equity growth also carries other-comprehensive-income marks on the Rp73.3tn securities book. The engine documents that approximation rather than hiding it.
Unit economicsFor BRIS and MEGA the sharpest unit test was margin minus cost of credit, but that subtraction cannot be run here because cost of credit is not disclosed for this bank. So use the identity that still closes: return on assets rose 2.16% → 2.43% in the same four years that NIM fell 4.69% → 3.97%. If the margin per rupiah of assets shrank and the return per rupiah of assets grew, the difference must have come from lines other than the margin, and the only one visibly improving is credit. That reasoning, using what IS disclosed to bound what is not, is the most transferable habit on this page.
Diversified depositor base; CASA improved to ~70%, keeping funding power contained.
Implication → Rising CASA partly offsets the NIM squeeze, but funding cost lacks BBCA’s edge.
Consumer and corporate customers shop on rate and digital experience; competition with bigger banks is intense.
Implication → Pressures pricing: visible in the steady NIM decline to 3.97%.
Scale, licensing and an established franchise are barriers; CIMB’s network reinforces them.
Implication → Defensible as a second-tier universal bank, though without big-four dominance.
Fintech, capital markets and digital banks substitute for parts of credit and payments.
Implication → Adds margin and fee pressure; the OCTO digital push is the counter.
Caught between the dominant big-four and nimble digital banks for CASA and prime credit.
Implication → Squeezes NIM and efficiency (CIR ~46%); CASA and digital are the defence.
Sound, with one composition question a reader should hold in mind. The credit improvement is real and conservatively carried: gross NPL fell in three of four years to 1.81% and coverage still ended at 258% of non-performing loans, so this is not a bank that emptied its reserves to make a number. But the composition of the profit growth matters. Net interest income fell every single year (Rp12.70tn → Rp12.12tn) while pretax profit rose Rp2.39tn, so approximately Rp3.0tn of the improvement came from outside the margin, and the credit cycle is the visible source. That lever is finite by nature: the allowance balance has already been drawn down 38% (Rp13.09tn → Rp8.05tn) and coverage has come off its 401% peak in FY2023. Two disclosure limits belong in the same breath, because honest analysis names what it cannot see: the OJK table for this bank does not disclose cost of credit in any year, and discloses cost-to-income only for FY2024 and FY2025. The direction is unambiguous from the balance sheet, the magnitude of the provisioning charge is not, so verify it in the bank’s own income statement before relying on it.
Checked: no material one-offs found in the reviewed window.
Cash conversionThe profit-to-capital link works cleanly, which is exactly what Danamon failed at over the same four years. Equity grew Rp43.8tn → Rp55.8tn while assets grew 20%, so CAR still improved 22.19% → 24.83% with 57% of earnings distributed. Liquidity is unstretched: a loan-to-deposit ratio of 86.8%, Rp73.3tn of securities and Rp22.9tn placed at the central bank. Nothing about this balance sheet forces the bank to grow expensively.
A deliberately balanced allocator, and the balance is the point. Niaga grew loans a modest 19.8% over four years, distributed about 57% of earnings, and still lifted both equity (+27.5%) and CAR (22.19% → 24.83%). That combination is only available to a bank whose balance sheet grows slower than its profit, and it is the mirror of both extremes in this roster: BRIS pays 13% and grows financing 15% a year, Danamon grew loans 42% and ended with less book value than it started with. Judged on the only test that matters, whether the retained rupiah earns more than it costs, Niaga passes: ROE 13.03% against a cost of equity of 11.21%.
DeploymentIn: loans +Rp28.5tn and securities +Rp14.6tn. Funded by: CASA +Rp45.6tn (current accounts +Rp33.3tn, savings +Rp12.3tn) with time deposits −Rp1.7tn, which is the cheapest possible way to fund an expansion. Out: dividends at about 57% of earnings (DPS Rp155.73). Left behind: Rp12.0tn of additional equity and a capital ratio 264bp higher than four years earlier. There is no capital raise anywhere in this record, and no hidden leverage either, since the asset growth of 20% roughly matched the equity growth of 27.5%.
Returns trendROE 12.59% → 15.02% → 14.34% → 13.03% against a cost of equity of 11.21% (risk-free 7.26% plus a 0.59 emerging-market money-centre bank beta on a 6.69% equity risk premium). The spread was positive in all four years, peaking near 3.8pp in FY2023 and narrowing to 1.82pp as the margin compressed. The excess-return model therefore values the bank above book at 1.34×, while the market pays 0.73×, roughly 54% of modeled value. Put plainly, the price implies the spread over the cost of equity disappears; the record says it has survived four years, a full rate cycle and a 72bp margin squeeze. That is the disagreement to research, and the honest counter-case is on the record’s side only if the credit-cycle tailwind is replaced by something durable, because net interest income has now fallen three years running.
NIM of 3.97% is among the thinnest in the roster: of the banks analysed alongside it only BBNI (3.80%), BJBR (3.84%) and NISP (3.94%) are thinner, against BRIS 5.60%, BDMN 4.47%, BBTN 4.20% and MEGA 4.18%. Net interest income has now fallen three years in a row. A corporate-weighted book earns less per rupiah by construction, so the franchise depends on volume, fees and credit discipline rather than on spread.
Roughly Rp3.0tn of the Rp2.39tn pretax improvement plus the Rp0.58tn margin decline came from outside the margin line, with the credit cycle the visible driver. The allowance balance is already 38% lower (Rp13.09tn → Rp8.05tn) and coverage has fallen from a 401% peak to 258%, so the same lever has less left to give. Watch whether net interest income stops falling.
BOPO has sat in a 71.5% to 74.1% band for four years with no trend improvement, and cost-to-income, where disclosed, is 44.3% (FY2024) and 45.9% (FY2025) against roughly 31% for BBCA. On a thin margin, operating cost is the lever that most needs to move and it has not.
No concern on any of the three: CAR 24.83% and rising, loan-to-deposit ratio 86.8% with Rp73.3tn of securities behind it, gross NPL 1.81% covered 258%. The risks at this bank are about earning power, not about survival.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Large, well-capitalised and concentrated among a few systemic players, with ASEAN-leading profitability: though margins and efficiency are now under late-cycle pressure.