Equal
…
…
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)(Capital / RWA) | 20.3% | 21.0% | 21.4% | 22.0% |
| Leverage Ratio(Tier 1 / Total Exposure)not disclosed | — | — | — | — |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross NPL(NPL / Total Loans) | 2.4% | 2.1% | 1.9% | 1.8% |
| Net NPL((NPL − Reserves) / Loans) | 0.6% | 0.5% | 0.6% | 0.5% |
| Non-Performing Assets(NPA / Total Assets) | 1.4% | 1.2% | 1.1% | 1.4% |
| Non-Performing Productive Assets(NP Earning / Earning Assets) | 1.8% | 1.5% | 1.4% | 1.4% |
| Allowance for Impairment (CKPN)(CKPN / Earning Assets) | 3.3% | 3.0% | 2.7% | 2.7% |
| Cost of Credit(Provision Expense / Gross Loans) | 1.8% | 1.1% | 0.7% | 0.7% |
| NPL Coverage(Allowance for Impairment (CKPN) / Gross NPL) | 184.1% | 197.5% | 197.7% | 193.6% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR)(Loans / Deposits) | 79.4% | 81.7% | 85.0% | 83.7% |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)(ASF / RSF) | 138.5% | 132.7% | 122.5% | 120.0% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)(HQLA / Net Cash Outflows (30d)) | 173.9% | 147.9% | 145.6% | 144.5% |
| CASA Ratio((Demand + Savings) / Total Deposits) | 61.6% | 60.6% | 60.2% | 61.7% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 2.0% | 2.4% | 2.5% | 2.4% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 16.8% | 16.9% | 17.8% | 16.9% |
| Net Interest Margin (NIM)(NII / Avg Earning Assets) | 6.3% | 5.8% | 5.7% | 5.6% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Expense to Income (BOPO)(Opex / Operating Income) | 75.9% | 71.3% | 69.9% | 71.6% |
| Cost-to-Income Ratio (CIR)(Opex (ex-provisions) / Income) | 51.0% | 49.9% | 50.9% | 52.1% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan Growth (YoY)(Gross Loans / Prior Year − 1) | — | 15.7% | 14.9% | 14.4% |
| Deposit Growth (YoY)(Total Deposits / Prior Year − 1) | — | 12.3% | 11.7% | 16.2% |
Price Rp 1,820 · market cap Rp 84 T
| Multiple | BRIS | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 11.09x | 8.04x | +38% |
| P/B | 1.62x | 0.78x | +106% |
| Dividend Yield | 1.25% | 7.46%(14/15) | -83% |
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
A bank cannot be valued on operating cash flow the way a factory can, because for a bank debt is raw material rather than financing. So this model values the equity directly: start from book value, then add the present value of everything the bank earns above its cost of equity. A bank that earns exactly its cost of equity is worth exactly its book value (P/B 1.0).
| Assumption | Default | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Book equity (BV₀) | Rp 52 T | audited Individual-basis equity, FY2025 publication |
| ROE, start of fade | 16.85% | FY2025 disclosed ROE (OJK ratio table) |
| ROE, terminal | 16.87% | median disclosed ROE, FY2022–FY2025: the bank's own demonstrated through-cycle level, fading linearly |
| Fade horizon | 5 yrs | linear fade; final year pins to terminal |
| Retention (explicit phase) | 92.1% | implied from delivered equity growth FY2022–FY2025 (CAGR 15.7%) ÷ average ROE 17.1%. An approximation: equity growth also carries OCI effects (FVOCI marks, revaluations), not only retention |
| Cost of equity | 11.21% | National-footprint franchises (KBMI 3–4 and large private banks). |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | house terminal growth 2.5% (capped at terminal ROE by the engine when binding) |
Equity = BV₀ Rp 52 T + PV(excess, yrs 1–5) Rp 14 T + PV(terminal) Rp 41 T = Rp 107 T
At today's price the market pays 78% of this model's equity value. The price embeds less than these inputs produce, which amounts to assuming a higher cost of equity or a lower terminal ROE than the defaults here.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 16.85% | 16.85% | 16.86% | 16.86% | 16.87% | 16.87% |
| Book (start) | Rp 52 T | Rp 60 T | Rp 69 T | Rp 80 T | Rp 93 T | Rp 107 T |
| Net income | Rp 8.8 T | Rp 10 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 14 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 18 T |
| Retained | Rp 8.1 T | Rp 9.3 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 14 T | — |
| Excess return | Rp 2.9 T | Rp 3.4 T | Rp 3.9 T | Rp 4.5 T | Rp 5.2 T | Rp 6.1 T |
| PV | Rp 2.6 T | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 2.8 T | Rp 3.0 T | Rp 3.1 T | Rp 41 T |
Check it yourself: NI = ROE × book · ER = (ROE − COE) × book · PV = ER ÷ (1+COE)^yr · next book = book + NI × retention · TV = ER(T∞) ÷ (COE − g), discounted from year 5
| ROE_T \ COE | 10.21% | 11.21% | 12.21% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 14.87% | 2.01x | 1.71x | 1.47x |
| 16.87% | 2.43x | 2.06x | 1.78x |
| 18.87% | 2.87x | 2.44x | 2.10x |
Model output under the stated assumptions, never a target. ROE record: FY2022 16.84% · FY2023 16.88% · FY2024 17.77% · FY2025 16.85%
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income from fund distribution | Rp 20 T | Rp 23 T | Rp 25 T | Rp 28 T |
| Depositors' profit share | Rp 3.8 T | Rp 6.0 T | Rp 7.9 T | Rp 9.1 T |
| Net distributable income | Rp 17 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 19 T |
| Impairment/provision expense | Rp 3.8 T | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 2.4 T |
| Personnel expenses | Rp 4.8 T | Rp 4.9 T | Rp 5.3 T | Rp 5.5 T |
| Operating profit | Rp 5.6 T | Rp 7.6 T | Rp 9.3 T | Rp 10 T |
| Profit before tax | Rp 5.5 T | Rp 7.4 T | Rp 9.3 T | Rp 10 T |
| Net profit | Rp 4.3 T | Rp 5.7 T | Rp 7.0 T | Rp 7.6 T |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash | Rp 5.0 T | Rp 5.3 T | Rp 8.1 T | Rp 8.7 T |
| Placement with Bank Indonesia | Rp 32 T | Rp 32 T | Rp 50 T | Rp 52 T |
| Placement with other banks | Rp 867 M | Rp 2.1 T | Rp 3.9 T | Rp 4.6 T |
| Securities | Rp 59 T | Rp 72 T | Rp 62 T | Rp 60 T |
| Financing & receivables (gross) | Rp 207 T | Rp 240 T | Rp 275 T | Rp 315 T |
| Allowance for impairment: financing (CKPN) | -Rp 9.2 T | -Rp 9.8 T | -Rp 10 T | -Rp 11 T |
| Fixed assets & equipment | Rp 4.9 T | Rp 4.5 T | Rp 7.7 T | Rp 11 T |
| Total assets | Rp 306 T | Rp 354 T | Rp 409 T | Rp 456 T |
| Demand deposits (Giro) | Rp 45 T | Rp 53 T | Rp 56 T | Rp 72 T |
| Savings deposits (Tabungan) | Rp 116 T | Rp 125 T | Rp 141 T | Rp 163 T |
| Time deposits (Deposito) | Rp 100 T | Rp 116 T | Rp 131 T | Rp 146 T |
| Total liabilities & syirkah funds | Rp 272 T | Rp 315 T | Rp 364 T | Rp 404 T |
| Total equity | Rp 34 T | Rp 39 T | Rp 45 T | Rp 52 T |
Bank Syariah Indonesia (BSI) is the country’s dominant Islamic bank, formed from the 2021 merger of three SOE Sharia banks, and it is the cleanest growth story among the SOE banks. Financing has compounded at ~15% a year, the profit margin (the NIM-equivalent) is high at ~5.6%, ROE is stable around ~17%, and asset quality keeps improving (gross NPF 2.42%→1.81%). It rides a large, under-penetrated Sharia-finance market with the weight of SOE backing behind it. The catch is efficiency (CIR ~52%). This is the structural growth compounder of Indonesian banking; its runway is Sharia penetration, and execution and efficiency are the things to watch.
BRIS funds itself with Sharia-compliant deposits. In FY2022 that was Rp116.5tn of savings and Rp44.5tn of current accounts against Rp100.5tn of time deposits, so low-cost accounts (CASA) are 60% to 62% of the funding mix in every year of the window.
EconomicsCASA pays little or nothing, time deposits pay a real rate. That mix is the first and cheapest lever on the margin, and it is why BRIS still earns a 5.60% margin after four years of compression.
The deposits are deployed as Sharia contracts (sale-based murabahah, profit-sharing musharakah and the rest) rather than interest loans. Financing grew 15.7%, 14.9% and 14.4% in FY2023 to FY2025, and the financing-to-deposit ratio moved 79.4% → 83.7%.
EconomicsAn FDR in the low 80s means the deposits are not yet fully lent out. That is spare growth capacity: BRIS can add financing without first buying more deposits, which protects the margin while it grows.
The gross spread between what financing earns and what deposits cost is the revenue engine: NIM 6.31%, 5.82%, 5.66%, 5.60%.
EconomicsThe 71bp decline is not a failure, it is the arithmetic of scale: bigger and safer customers pay less. Every growing bank pays this toll, so the question is never whether the margin narrows but whether something else improves faster.
Provisions against financing fell from 1.83% to 0.75% while gross NPF improved 2.42% → 1.81% and reserve coverage stayed near 194% of bad financing.
EconomicsThe 108bp saved on credit cost more than paid for the 71bp lost on margin, which is exactly why ROA could rise from 1.98% to 2.38% in the same years the margin fell. If you read only NIM you would conclude the bank got worse.
BRIS distributes only about 13% of earnings (DPS Rp22.78), so book value compounded 15.7% a year to Rp52.0tn and CAR rose 20.3% → 22.0%.
EconomicsA bank cannot grow financing faster than its capital permits, so for BRIS retention IS the growth engine: roughly 15% equity growth is what makes roughly 15% financing growth possible year after year without asking shareholders for money.
Cost structurePeople and branches, then provisions. Personnel expense was Rp4.85tn in FY2022 against Rp16.6tn of net interest (margin) income, and Sharia retail banking is a distribution-heavy model, so the operating cost line is largely fixed and only falls as a ratio if income outgrows it. BOPO improved from 75.9% to 69.9% and then slipped back to 71.6%, and cost-to-income drifted 49.9% (FY2023) → 52.1% (FY2025). Efficiency is the one part of this bank that has not compounded.
Cash cycleFor a bank the cycle is funding cost → margin → credit cost → capital, and then round again. Deposits come in at CASA-weighted cost, financing is written at Sharia contract rates, the difference is the margin (Rp16.6tn of net margin income in FY2022), provisions take a slice (Rp3.8tn that year, and a much smaller slice by FY2025), operating cost takes another, and about 87% of what survives is retained. That retained rupiah becomes next year’s capital, which permits next year’s financing growth. Follow that loop and you understand why a bank with a falling margin can still compound: the loop is powered by the spread AFTER risk, not by the headline margin.
Unit economicsTake it down to one rupiah of financing. In FY2022 that rupiah earned a 6.31% margin and lost 1.83% to credit cost, a spread after risk of 4.48%. In FY2025 it earned only 5.60% but lost just 0.75%, a spread after risk of 4.85%. So the risk-adjusted unit economics IMPROVED by 37bp over the very period the headline margin fell 71bp. That single comparison is the most useful number in this analysis, and it is the habit worth copying to any bank you look at.
A broad Sharia depositor base motivated by religious preference; CASA ~61% keeps funding power modest.
Implication → A loyal, faith-aligned deposit base supports stable, reasonably-priced funding.
Sharia-preferring customers have limited like-for-like alternatives; BSI is the dominant Islamic bank.
Implication → Underpins high margins (~5.6%): pricing power in a niche with few full-scale competitors.
Scale (post-merger), SOE parentage and Sharia expertise are high barriers; rivals are sub-scale.
Implication → BSI’s Sharia leadership is highly defensible: a dominant position in a growing niche.
Conventional banks’ Sharia windows and other Islamic banks compete; some customers accept conventional banking.
Implication → Caps pricing at the margin, but BSI’s scale and brand dominate the dedicated Sharia segment.
Competition from conventional banks’ Sharia units and the SOE parents’ own reach; efficiency lags (CIR ~52%).
Implication → Pressures efficiency more than growth; scale keeps BSI ahead in the Sharia market.
Good, and it survives the test that matters most for a fast-growing lender. When provisions fall this hard (1.83% → 0.75% of financing) the first suspicion should always be that the bank is releasing reserves to manufacture profit. The record says otherwise: gross NPF improved in every year (2.42%, 2.08%, 1.90%, 1.81%) while the book grew 14% to 16% a year, and reserve coverage was 184%, 197%, 198%, 194%, so the buffer was rebuilt as fast as the problem shrank. A bank harvesting reserves shows falling coverage against a flat or worsening NPL ratio; BRIS shows the opposite of both. The honest caveat is on the cost side rather than the credit side: BOPO slipped from 69.9% to 71.6% and cost-to-income from 49.9% to 52.1% in FY2025, so the most recent year is a small step back on efficiency even as asset quality kept improving.
Checked: no material one-offs found in the reviewed window.
Cash conversionA bank has no working-capital cycle, so the equivalent test is whether reported profit turns into capital and liquidity. It does. CAR rose 20.3% → 22.0% while the balance sheet grew, which can only happen if profit is genuinely retained rather than absorbed by losses, and the financing-to-deposit ratio at 83.7% leaves the deposit base still not fully lent. Reserve coverage near 194% means the provisions charged were real cash set aside, not a bookkeeping entry waiting to be reversed.
The clearest builder among the fifteen banks tracked here. BRIS keeps almost everything it earns, a payout of about 13% of profit, and turns it straight into financing capacity. Book value compounded 15.7% a year to Rp52.0tn, financing grew 14% to 16% a year, and no rights issue was needed. Compare BBCA, which pays out about 76% of earnings and grows its book slowly: same industry, opposite decision. Neither is wrong, they are answers to different questions, and the way to judge each is whether the retained rupiah earns more than the cost of equity.
DeploymentThe retained capital went into financing rather than into leverage, and you can prove it two ways. First, CAR ROSE (20.3% → 22.0%) while financing grew mid-teens, so the growth was funded by capital, not by thinning the buffer. Second, the financing-to-deposit ratio only moved 79.4% → 83.7%, so the bank has been lending its own deposit base rather than borrowing to grow. Dividends stayed token by design (DPS Rp22.78, about 13% of earnings), which is the choice a bank makes when it believes its own returns beat what shareholders could do with the cash.
Returns trendROE 16.8%, 16.9%, 17.8%, 16.9% against a cost of equity of 11.21% (risk-free 7.26% plus a 0.59 emerging-market money-centre bank beta on a 6.69% equity risk premium). That is a spread of roughly 5.6 percentage points above the required return, sustained for four years, and it is the entire reason the excess-return model puts fair value at 2.06× book while the market pays 1.62×, about 78% of modeled value. Read the assumption before you read the conclusion: the model fades ROE toward the four-year median of 16.87%, so it assumes today’s spread substantially persists. If the margin keeps compressing and credit cost cannot fall any further, that assumption is the part that breaks first.
The last four years were paid for by provision relief: 108bp of credit-cost improvement against 71bp of margin loss. That trade cannot repeat, because cost of credit is already down to 0.69% to 0.75%. Size the risk rather than fear it: financing was about two thirds of assets in FY2022, so a reversion to the FY2022 credit cost of 1.83% would remove roughly 0.7pp of ROA, taking 2.38% toward 1.7%, with the margin still drifting down underneath.
In a bank growing financing 14% a year, cost per unit of income should fall. Here it rose: cost-to-income 49.9% (FY2023) → 52.1% (FY2025) and BOPO 69.9% → 71.6%. Two years is not a trend, but it is the line that decides whether the next four years compound like the last four.
The franchise is weighted to consumer and micro Sharia financing, and the ratio set here reports the book as one number, so segment mix is not visible in these figures. That matters because the credit-cost improvement is a portfolio-level average: judge it against the disclosed segment detail in the bank’s own reports before assuming it is uniform.
No concern. CAR 22.0% sits far above the regulatory minimum plus buffers, reserve coverage is near 194% of non-performing financing, and a financing-to-deposit ratio of 83.7% leaves room to lend without new funding.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Large, well-capitalised and concentrated among a few systemic players, with ASEAN-leading profitability: though margins and efficiency are now under late-cycle pressure.