Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | 0.24x | 0.02x | 0.58x | 4.44x | — |
| Interest burden | 0.72x | 0.29x | 0.13x | 0.04x | — |
| Operating margindriver | 19.8% | 9.1% | 12.7% | 14.2% | -2.6% |
| Asset turnover | 0.34x | 0.32x | 0.27x | 0.23x | 0.44x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 2.16x | 2.48x | 2.47x | 2.51x | 2.87x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 2.6% | 0.0% | 0.6% | 1.3% | — |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 2.7% | 0.1% | 3.1% | 4.7% | — |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 3.15x | 3.70x | 3.19x | 2.44x | 2.34x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 2.81x | 3.27x | 2.82x | 2.16x | 1.86x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 1.66x | 2.10x | 1.58x | 1.12x | 1.13x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | $ 2.4 B | $ 2.1 B | $ 2.5 B | $ 2.1 B | $ 3.6 B |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 0.73x | 1.07x | 1.04x | 1.12x | 1.35x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 1.16x | 1.48x | 1.47x | 1.51x | 1.87x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.34x | 0.43x | 0.42x | 0.44x | 0.47x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | $ 1.2 B | $ 2.4 B | $ 2.5 B | $ 3.1 B | $ 5.1 B |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 3.62x | 1.40x | 1.15x | 1.04x | -0.49x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 2.16x | 2.48x | 2.47x | 2.51x | 2.87x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 24.9% | 15.0% | 20.2% | 30.0% | 7.0% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 19.8% | 9.1% | 12.7% | 14.2% | -2.6% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 3.5% | 0.1% | 0.9% | 2.4% | 6.4% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | $ 785 M | $ 434 M | $ 533 M | $ 538 M | $ 74 M |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 24.9% | 14.7% | 19.3% | 22.5% | 1.0% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 1.2% | 0.0% | 0.3% | 0.5% | 2.8% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 6.2% | 0.1% | 1.5% | 3.3% | 21.8% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 0.24x | 0.02x | 0.58x | 4.44x | — |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 0.72x | 0.29x | 0.13x | 0.04x | — |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 2.7% | 0.1% | 3.1% | 4.7% | — |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.34x | 0.32x | 0.27x | 0.23x | 0.44x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 6.20x | 7.60x | 5.29x | 4.19x | 5.57x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 11.40x | 12.39x | 10.35x | 7.34x | 9.93x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 3.03x | 5.59x | 3.30x | 3.14x | 7.63x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 58.8 days | 48.0 days | 69.0 days | 87.2 days | 65.5 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 32.0 days | 29.4 days | 35.3 days | 49.7 days | 36.8 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 120.4 days | 65.3 days | 110.6 days | 116.2 days | 47.8 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | -29.6 days | 12.2 days | -6.3 days | 20.7 days | 54.4 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | $ 209 M | -$ 312 M | $ 17 M | -$ 594 M | -$ 604 M |
Price Rp 1,845 · market cap Rp 173 T ($ 9.6 B at the cited rate; statements are filed in USD)
| Multiple | BRPT | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 19.55x | 15.16x | +29% |
| P/B | 4.27x | 2.77x | +54% |
| P/S | 1.25x | 1.47x | -15% |
| EV/EBITDA | 250.07x | 127.69x(2/3) | +96% |
| EV/EBIT | NM | 8.79x(1/3) | — |
| EV/Sales | 2.43x | 2.11x | +15% |
| FCF Yield | -6.30% | -3.74% | +69% |
| Dividend Yield | 0.09% | 0.26% | -66% |
Only 3 peers are covered here, so the median is itself one of the members. A 0% gap can simply mean BRPT sits at the median.
EV = mkt cap $ 9.6 B + debt $ 8.2 B − cash $ 3.0 B + minority interest $ 3.8 B = $ 19 B
not computable: negative or zero base-year FCF. Shown as-is rather than estimated.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 9.3–13.3% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
Mechanical DCF suppressed: on these default assumptions the modelled enterprise value falls BELOW net debt and minority interests, so the equity residual is negative. Equity cannot be worth less than nothing, so no per-share figure is published here: read it as the model saying the debt claims consume the whole enterprise at this discount rate and growth path, which is itself the signal. The components are shown below so the arithmetic stays checkable, and the sliders let you test what it would take to change the answer.
Cyclical normalization: Commodity/cyclical name: the trailing years are a sample drawn from the price cycle, not a trend. Defaults are therefore normalized, using the full-window mean margin with no cycle-position growth extrapolation. That normalized margin is itself the embedded commodity-price assumption.
Base year contains named one-off item(s): FY2025: TPIA's $1,772.2M non-cash gain from bargain purchase, reaching BRPT through full consolidation of a partly-owned subsidiary; FY2024: Profit sustained by non-operating income rather than operations. The EBIT basis screens out most non-operating items, but read the Earnings Quality section before trusting the base margin.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 4.66% | US 10Y Treasury, 30 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.58 → 0.90 | Chemical (Basic) (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.85 |
| Cost of equity | 10.69% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 15.13% | median interest coverage 1.1x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a Caa/CCC synthetic rating and a 8.85% default spread, over a 6.28% base (US 10Y 4.66% + Indonesia's 1.62% sovereign spread). Its BOOK rate is 5.0%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms) |
| Tax rate | 35.0% | median effective rate FY2021–FY2025 computed to 42.4%, CLAMPED to 35%: above that ceiling the pretax approximation is carrying minority interests, which are already deducted separately from enterprise value, rather than tax |
| WACC | 10.30% | 54% E × CoE + 46% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 2.5% | terminal growth from year 1, cyclical normalization: the delivered 4-yr CAGR (24.7%) reflects cycle position, not a trend |
| EBIT margin | 10.6% | full-cycle mean EBIT margin, FY2021–FY2025 (cyclical normalization: this margin is the embedded commodity-price assumption) |
| D&A / revenue | 6.2% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 12.2% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 10.3% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 24.3% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 8.2% of revenue against depreciation of 6.2%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | -14.9% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | $ 7.8 B | $ 8.0 B | $ 8.2 B | $ 8.4 B | $ 8.6 B | $ 8.8 B |
| EBIT | $ 831 M | $ 852 M | $ 873 M | $ 895 M | $ 918 M | $ 941 M |
| NOPAT | $ 540 M | $ 554 M | $ 568 M | $ 582 M | $ 596 M | $ 611 M |
| + D&A | $ 482 M | $ 494 M | $ 506 M | $ 519 M | $ 532 M | $ 545 M |
| − Capex | $ 957 M | $ 981 M | $ 1.0 B | $ 1.0 B | $ 1.1 B | $ 726 M |
| − ΔNWC | -$ 28 M | -$ 29 M | -$ 30 M | -$ 31 M | -$ 31 M | -$ 32 M |
| FCFF | $ 93 M | $ 96 M | $ 98 M | $ 101 M | $ 103 M | $ 463 M |
| PV | $ 85 M | $ 79 M | $ 73 M | $ 68 M | $ 63 M | $ 3.6 B |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding
EV = PV(explicit) $ 367 M + PV(TV) $ 3.6 B = $ 4.0 B · TV 91% of EV · − net debt $ 5.1 B − minority $ 3.8 B = equity -$ 4.9 B ÷ shares outstanding · per share is in USD, shown in IDR at 18,058
Model output: Rp -952/share (-152% vs price Rp 1,845)· exit-multiple check (127.7x): Rp 20,200
Under these assumptions the model lands 152% below today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for faster growth, a fatter margin, or a lower discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 9.3% | 10.3% | 11.3% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | -893 | -1,016 | -1,112 |
| 2.5% | -809 | -952 | -1,061 |
| 3.0% | -712 | -878 | -1,003 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $ 3.2 B | $ 3.0 B | $ 2.8 B | $ 2.4 B | $ 7.6 B |
| Cost of Goods Sold | $ 2.4 B | $ 2.5 B | $ 2.2 B | $ 1.7 B | $ 7.1 B |
| Gross Profit | $ 785 M | $ 446 M | $ 557 M | $ 717 M | $ 531 M |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | $ 623 M | $ 269 M | $ 350 M | $ 340 M | -$ 200 M |
| Interest Expense | $ 172 M | $ 192 M | $ 305 M | $ 327 M | $ 408 M |
| Net Income | $ 109 M | $ 1.8 M | $ 26 M | $ 56 M | $ 490 M |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | $ 109 M | $ 1.8 M | $ 26 M | $ 56 M | $ 490 M |
| Depreciation & Amortization | $ 162 M | $ 165 M | $ 183 M | $ 198 M | $ 274 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $ 1.9 B | $ 1.6 B | $ 1.8 B | $ 1.6 B | $ 3.0 B |
| Accounts Receivable | $ 277 M | $ 239 M | $ 267 M | $ 325 M | $ 769 M |
| Inventory | $ 382 M | $ 331 M | $ 417 M | $ 399 M | $ 1.3 B |
| Current Assets | $ 3.6 B | $ 2.9 B | $ 3.6 B | $ 3.5 B | $ 6.2 B |
| Total Assets | $ 9.2 B | $ 9.2 B | $ 10 B | $ 11 B | $ 17 B |
| Accounts Payable | $ 782 M | $ 450 M | $ 668 M | $ 532 M | $ 931 M |
| Current Liabilities | $ 1.1 B | $ 779 M | $ 1.1 B | $ 1.4 B | $ 2.7 B |
| Total Liabilities | $ 5.0 B | $ 5.5 B | $ 6.0 B | $ 6.3 B | $ 11 B |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | $ 3.1 B | $ 4.0 B | $ 4.3 B | $ 4.7 B | $ 8.2 B |
| Total Equity | $ 4.3 B | $ 3.7 B | $ 4.1 B | $ 4.2 B | $ 6.0 B |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | $ 1.7 B | $ 1.6 B | $ 1.7 B | $ 1.7 B | $ 2.2 B |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $ 367 M | -$ 133 M | $ 141 M | -$ 110 M | $ 310 M |
| Capital Expenditure | $ 159 M | $ 179 M | $ 124 M | $ 484 M | $ 913 M |
BRPT is a holding company controlled by the Prajogo Pangestu group, best understood through what it actually consolidates rather than its own "diversified energy and chemicals" framing. As of H1 2025, BRPT's consolidated revenue was 90.6% petrochemical (via its ~34.63% stake in and full consolidation of TPIA) and 9.3% energy (via its separate 64.67% stake in BREN, geothermal power): despite local media coverage describing BRPT as "no longer dependent on petrochemicals," the actual revenue mix says otherwise. FY2025 consolidated revenue was $7.63B (+232% 9-month YoY), reconciling almost exactly to TPIA's own $7.02B revenue plus BRPT's reported $605M energy segment. But BRPT's gross margin collapsed from 30.05% (FY2024) to 6.96% and operating margin turned negative (-2.62%) for the first time in the five-year window: while net margin (6.42%) and ROE (21.83%) hit five-year highs, purely because the ~$1.7B Aster bargain-purchase gain flows through TPIA's full consolidation into BRPT's own income statement. A further nuance: BRPT's FY2025 equity attributable to its own owners ($2.24B) is well under half of total consolidated equity ($6.05B); a large non-controlling interest means headline consolidated figures overstate what BRPT shareholders actually own.
BRPT operates no plant and no power station. It owns the companies that do, and because it controls them, accounting requires it to add 100% of their revenue, costs, assets and debt onto its own statements. That is why BRPT's FY2025 revenue of $7,630.7M is essentially TPIA's $7,020.0M plus a much smaller energy business.
EconomicsConsolidation is an accounting rule about control, not a statement about ownership. Understand this one line and the whole page follows: BRPT reports all of the revenue and owns a minority of the equity behind it.
Because roughly nine tenths of consolidated revenue is petrochemical, BRPT's margins are TPIA's margins. Cost of revenue was $7,099.4M of $7,630.7M in FY2025, or 93.0%, and gross margin fell from 30.05% to 6.96% in a single year while operating margin turned negative at -2.62% for the first time in the five-year window.
EconomicsThe cash cycle is inherited too, moving from -29.6 days in FY2021 to +54.4 days in FY2025 as days payable fell from 120.4 to 47.9. That is the same swing visible on TPIA's page, arriving here by consolidation rather than by anything BRPT did.
A holding company that buys stakes with borrowed money carries interest at the top of the structure. BRPT's interest expense grew from $172.4M in FY2021 to $408.4M in FY2025 while consolidated debt went from $3,100.8M to $8,150.8M.
EconomicsThis is the single most under-appreciated line on the page. The ratio table's interest burden, meaning the share of operating profit that survives interest, reads 0.72, 0.29, 0.13 and 0.04 for FY2021 to FY2024. Put plainly, interest consumed 28%, then 71%, then 87%, then 96% of operating profit. Interest cover fell 3.62x, 1.40x, 1.15x, 1.04x and then went negative.
Whatever survives interest is still not BRPT's. The outside shareholders of TPIA and of Barito Renewables own their share first. Non-controlling interests were 59.0%, 57.5%, 58.9%, 58.7% and 62.9% of consolidated equity across FY2021 to FY2025.
EconomicsAt end-FY2025 the equity attributable to BRPT's own shareholders was $2,243.4M out of $6,045.6M of consolidated equity. BRPT reports a group of that size and its shareholders own 37.1% of it.
Cost structureTwo layers, and only the second is BRPT's own. The operating layer is inherited from the subsidiaries and is overwhelmingly feedstock: cost of revenue ran 93.0% of consolidated revenue in FY2025. The holding-company layer is interest, which is the cost of the control itself, and it grew 2.4 times over the five years to $408.4M. When judging BRPT rather than its subsidiaries, watch the second layer, because it is the one that management chose.
Cash cycleInherited from the petrochemical business and therefore near-identical in shape to TPIA: -29.6 days in FY2021 to +54.4 days in FY2025, driven by days payable falling from 120.4 to 47.9 while days inventory (58.8 to 65.5) and days sales outstanding (32.0 to 36.8) moved much less. A separate holding-company point sits underneath it: consolidated cash of $3,007.1M is not all reachable by BRPT, because cash sitting inside a partly-owned subsidiary reaches the parent only as a dividend that the subsidiary's own board must declare.
Unit economicsRead BRPT as a funnel and everything becomes legible. Start at operating profit, subtract interest, subtract the minority owners' share, and see what reaches BRPT shareholders. FY2021: $623.5M of operating profit became $109.1M for owners, or 17.5% of it. FY2022: $269.1M became $1.8M, which is 0.7%, a profit of essentially nothing on revenue of $2,961.5M. FY2023: $350.1M became $26.1M, or 7.5%. FY2024: $339.9M became $56.5M, or 16.6%. This funnel, not the petrochemical cycle alone, is why a company reporting billions in revenue delivered owners' returns on equity of 6.2%, 0.1%, 1.6% and 3.3% in those four years. FY2025 inverts it and is discussed under earnings quality.
As a holding company, BRPT inherits TPIA's high supplier power (imported, USD/crude-linked naphtha) directly through consolidation: it has no independent input-cost position of its own.
Implication → BRPT's consolidated margin volatility is, almost entirely, TPIA's margin volatility passed through: BRPT cannot diversify away from it by holding-company structure alone.
Inherited from TPIA (fragmented converters, import-substitutable products) at 90.6% of revenue; BREN's single-buyer PLN exposure is a smaller 9.3% influence on BRPT's blended position.
Implication → BRPT's blended buyer-power profile is overwhelmingly TPIA's, not a diversified mix, despite owning two genuinely different operating businesses.
The same new petrochemical capacity threatening TPIA (Lotte Merak, Tongkun North Kalimantan) threatens 90.6% of BRPT's revenue base by extension; BREN's geothermal concessions face separate, lower near-term entry threat.
Implication → BRPT's claimed diversification into energy does little to insulate it from petrochemical threat-of-entry risk given the current revenue weighting.
Inherited petrochemical substitution risk (recycled/bio-based polymers) from TPIA at 90.6% weight; BREN's renewable power has no substitute risk of its own: if anything it benefits from substitution away from coal.
Implication → The two subsidiaries actually pull in opposite directions on this force, but the petrochemical weight dominates BRPT's blended exposure today.
Dominated by TPIA's global petrochemical rivalry exposure (90.6% of revenue): BRPT's FY2025 operating margin turning negative (-2.62%) for the first time in five years is direct evidence this force is not being diversified away.
Implication → Owning BREN alongside TPIA has not, so far, prevented BRPT's consolidated operating economics from tracking the petrochemical cycle almost exactly.
FY2025 is the mirror image of the four years before it, and for a reason that has nothing to do with BRPT. Operating profit was NEGATIVE $200.1M, yet profit attributable to owners was a five-year record $489.8M and return on equity a five-year high 21.83%, in the same year the operating margin went negative for the first time. The bridge is $689.9M and it arrives from one level down: TPIA recognised a non-cash gain from bargain purchase of $1,772.2M on its 1 April 2025 acquisition of Aster, and because BRPT consolidates TPIA, that gain lands in BRPT's income statement too. Follow the same event across this site and you see the lesson clearly. One accounting entry of $1,772.2M produced $1,090.1M of reported profit for TPIA's owners and helped produce $489.8M for BRPT's owners. It shrinks at each layer because minority shareholders take their share twice, and at no layer is any of it cash. A second, quieter earnings-quality signal runs through FY2024. The ratio table's tax burden reads 4.44, meaning reported profit was almost four and a half times the operating profit that survived interest. A tax burden above 1 is a flag, not a triumph: it says the profit came from outside operations, from finance income, equity-accounted earnings and other non-operating items, rather than from running the business.
| Period | One-off item | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| FY2025 | TPIA's $1,772.2M non-cash gain from bargain purchase, reaching BRPT through full consolidation of a partly-owned subsidiary | Turned an operating LOSS of $200.1M into record owners' profit of $489.8M and a five-year-high ROE of 21.83%. Strip it out and FY2025 is the worst operating year in the five-year window, not the best. |
| FY2024 | Profit sustained by non-operating income rather than operations | Operating profit of $339.9M was reduced to just $12.7M after interest of $327.2M, yet reported profit was $56.5M, so the tax-burden ratio reads 4.44. Owners earned 0.54% on $10,532.6M of assets that year. |
Cash conversionUnstable, and negative in the two years that matter most. Operating cash flow was $367.4M, then MINUS $132.9M, then $140.5M, then MINUS $110.2M, then $309.6M. Twice in five years the group consumed cash while reporting a profit. Against capital spending that climbed from $158.6M to $913.2M, free cash flow was negative in three of the five years and the last two alone total minus $1,197.5M. In FY2025 operating cash flow of $309.6M covered just 0.63 times the reported owners' profit, which is the arithmetic proof that the year's headline was an accounting event rather than a cash one.
BRPT has spent the window buying and building, financed by debt raised against a group whose operating profit was already going almost entirely to lenders. The strategy is coherent, since geothermal is a genuinely different cycle from petrochemicals, but so far the diversification has changed the asset mix far more than it has changed the earnings that reach BRPT shareholders.
DeploymentCapital expenditure rose from $158.6M in FY2021 to $483.7M in FY2024 and $913.2M in FY2025, a 5.8-fold increase, on top of stake purchases at the holding-company level. Consolidated assets went from $9,241.6M to $17,353.2M. The funding was debt: total debt from $3,100.8M to $8,150.8M, net debt from $1,225.4M to $5,143.7M, and the equity multiplier from 2.16x to 2.87x. Note what leverage means in a holding company specifically. The debt sits against consolidated assets, but only 37.1% of the equity underneath those assets belongs to BRPT shareholders, so the effective leverage on their claim is considerably higher than the consolidated ratios suggest.
Returns trendOwners' return on equity was 6.2%, 0.1%, 1.6% and 3.3% in FY2021 to FY2024, and return on assets 1.2%, 0.02%, 0.26% and 0.54%. Four consecutive years below any plausible cost of equity, on a growing asset base. Return on invested capital agrees with all of that: 2.74%, 0.10%, 3.05% and 4.68% for FY2021 to FY2024, and omitted for FY2025 because operating profit was negative. BRPT is also the clearest illustration of why this site caps one input to that calculation. Operating profit after tax is estimated by scaling operating profit by reported profit divided by operating profit after interest. In FY2024 that divisor was only $12.7M, so the raw factor came to 4.44, which is impossible for a tax factor, because tax only ever reduces profit. Left uncapped it would print an ROIC of 20.8% here; capped at 1 it reads 4.68%, which is what the funnel above and a 0.54% return on assets would lead you to expect. On valuation, the forward model publishes NO per-share figure here: on cyclically normalized defaults the modelled enterprise value falls BELOW net debt and minority interests, so the equity residual is negative and the page says so rather than printing a number. That suppression is itself the signal, and the EV/EBITDA anchor reads 250.1x against a petrochemical peer median of 127.7x. Both multiples are near-meaningless right now because consolidated EBITDA collapsed to $74.1M in FY2025 from $537.6M, so a small denominator is doing all the work. These are model outputs on trough inputs, not targets.
Non-controlling interests were 62.9% of consolidated equity at end-FY2025, and between 57.5% and 59.0% in the four years before. Equity attributable to BRPT's own shareholders was $2,243.4M of $6,045.6M. Every consolidated headline on this page, revenue, assets, EBITDA and debt, describes a group in which BRPT shareholders hold a 37.1% equity claim. Anyone comparing BRPT's consolidated revenue or asset base against a wholly-owned peer is not comparing like with like.
The share of operating profit surviving interest fell 0.72, 0.29, 0.13, 0.04 across FY2021 to FY2024, so by FY2024 interest took 96% of it, before minority owners took their share of the remainder. Interest cover fell 3.62x, 1.40x, 1.15x, 1.04x and then turned negative in FY2025. Interest expense grew from $172.4M to $408.4M while consolidated debt went from $3,100.8M to $8,150.8M. This is the holding company's own risk, not something inherited, because the borrowing bought the control.
FY2025 shows record owners' profit of $489.8M and a five-year-high ROE of 21.83% in the same year operating profit was NEGATIVE $200.1M. The bridge is TPIA's $1,772.2M non-cash bargain purchase gain arriving through consolidation. Operating cash flow of $309.6M covered only 0.63 times the reported profit, and free cash flow was minus $603.6M.
BRPT, TPIA and BREN are all covered separately here, and BRPT's value is largely its stakes in the other two. Holding all three is holding the same underlying petrochemical and geothermal assets more than once, at different points in the ownership chain and with different amounts of leverage in front of them. Read the three pages as one structure rather than three independent ideas.
In FY2024 reported profit of $56.5M was 4.44 times the $12.7M of operating profit that survived interest, so almost all of it came from finance income, equity-accounted earnings and other non-operating items rather than from running anything. Treat that ratio as a diagnostic: whenever reported profit far exceeds operating profit after interest, the earnings are not being produced by the operations. It is also why the published ROIC of 4.68% for that year is a capped figure, since this site limits the tax factor inside that calculation to 1 and the raw factor here was 4.44.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Dominated by one integrated group (Chandra Asri + parent Barito Pacific) plus one unrelated ammonia/LPG processor: a sector still posting negative operating margins on a like-for-like basis even as 2025 headline profit was lifted by a one-time acquisition gain, not a margin recovery.