Equal
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| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)(Capital / RWA) | 52.1% | 50.0% | 51.7% | 56.2% |
| Leverage Ratio(Tier 1 / Total Exposure)not disclosed | — | — | — | — |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross NPL(NPL / Total Loans) | 2.7% | 2.9% | 3.8% | 2.6% |
| Net NPL((NPL − Reserves) / Loans) | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Non-Performing Assets(NPA / Total Assets) | 1.6% | 1.7% | 1.9% | 1.2% |
| Non-Performing Productive Assets(NP Earning / Earning Assets) | 1.6% | 1.7% | 1.9% | 1.2% |
| Allowance for Impairment (CKPN)(CKPN / Earning Assets) | 4.0% | 6.0% | 4.6% | 4.0% |
| Cost of Credit(Provision Expense / Gross Loans) | 8.2% | 16.7% | 13.4% | 8.0% |
| NPL Coverage(Allowance for Impairment (CKPN) / Gross NPL) | 253.0% | 362.6% | 242.3% | 328.7% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR)(Loans / Deposits) | 95.7% | 93.8% | 86.8% | 84.8% |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)(ASF / RSF)not disclosed | — | — | — | — |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)(HQLA / Net Cash Outflows (30d))not disclosed | — | — | — | — |
| CASA Ratio((Demand + Savings) / Total Deposits) | 24.6% | 25.6% | 26.5% | 25.9% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 11.4% | 6.3% | 6.4% | 7.3% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 24.7% | 13.6% | 13.3% | 13.9% |
| Net Interest Margin (NIM)(NII / Avg Earning Assets) | 27.3% | 26.0% | 24.3% | 22.7% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Expense to Income (BOPO)(Opex / Operating Income) | 58.1% | 76.4% | 74.9% | 69.3% |
| Cost-to-Income Ratio (CIR)(Opex (ex-provisions) / Income) | 36.7% | 38.4% | 44.9% | 48.8% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan Growth (YoY)(Gross Loans / Prior Year − 1) | — | -0.7% | -10.7% | 1.8% |
| Deposit Growth (YoY)(Total Deposits / Prior Year − 1) | — | 0.8% | -3.4% | 4.1% |
Price Rp 991 · market cap Rp 7.6 T
| Multiple | BTPS | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 6.11x | 8.04x | -24% |
| P/B | 0.76x | 0.78x | -3% |
| Dividend Yield | 9.32% | 7.46%(14/15) | +25% |
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
A bank cannot be valued on operating cash flow the way a factory can, because for a bank debt is raw material rather than financing. So this model values the equity directly: start from book value, then add the present value of everything the bank earns above its cost of equity. A bank that earns exactly its cost of equity is worth exactly its book value (P/B 1.0).
| Assumption | Default | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Book equity (BV₀) | Rp 10.0 T | audited Individual-basis equity, FY2025 publication |
| ROE, start of fade | 13.92% | FY2025 disclosed ROE (OJK ratio table) |
| ROE, terminal | 13.77% | median disclosed ROE, FY2022–FY2025: the bank's own demonstrated through-cycle level, fading linearly |
| Fade horizon | 5 yrs | linear fade; final year pins to terminal |
| Retention (explicit phase) | 36.7% | implied from delivered equity growth FY2022–FY2025 (CAGR 6.0%) ÷ average ROE 16.4%. An approximation: equity growth also carries OCI effects (FVOCI marks, revaluations), not only retention |
| Cost of equity | 11.27% | Regional development banks (BPD) and small/niche franchises. The EM cohort averages are nearly identical across the two buckets: company-specific risk (e.g. a digital bank pre-scale) is NOT captured by a sector beta; the panel slider is the adjustment surface. |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | house terminal growth 2.5% (capped at terminal ROE by the engine when binding) |
Equity = BV₀ Rp 10.0 T + PV(excess, yrs 1–5) Rp 1.0 T + PV(terminal) Rp 2.1 T = Rp 13 T
At today's price the market pays 58% of this model's equity value. The price embeds less than these inputs produce, which amounts to assuming a higher cost of equity or a lower terminal ROE than the defaults here.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 13.92% | 13.88% | 13.85% | 13.81% | 13.77% | 13.77% |
| Book (start) | Rp 10.0 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 13 T |
| Net income | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 1.8 T |
| Retained | Rp 510 M | Rp 535 M | Rp 561 M | Rp 588 M | Rp 616 M | — |
| Excess return | Rp 265 M | Rp 274 M | Rp 284 M | Rp 294 M | Rp 305 M | Rp 320 M |
| PV | Rp 238 M | Rp 222 M | Rp 206 M | Rp 192 M | Rp 179 M | Rp 2.1 T |
Check it yourself: NI = ROE × book · ER = (ROE − COE) × book · PV = ER ÷ (1+COE)^yr · next book = book + NI × retention · TV = ER(T∞) ÷ (COE − g), discounted from year 5
| ROE_T \ COE | 10.27% | 11.27% | 12.27% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 11.77% | 1.26x | 1.11x | 0.99x |
| 13.77% | 1.50x | 1.32x | 1.17x |
| 15.77% | 1.75x | 1.53x | 1.36x |
Model output under the stated assumptions, never a target. ROE record: FY2022 24.68% · FY2023 13.63% · FY2024 13.28% · FY2025 13.92%
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income from fund distribution | Rp 5.4 T | Rp 5.7 T | Rp 5.4 T | Rp 5.2 T |
| Depositors' profit share | Rp 345 M | Rp 486 M | Rp 504 M | Rp 491 M |
| Net distributable income | Rp 5.0 T | Rp 5.2 T | Rp 4.9 T | Rp 4.7 T |
| Impairment/provision expense | Rp 945 M | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 826 M |
| Personnel expenses | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.5 T |
| Operating profit | Rp 2.3 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.6 T |
| Profit before tax | Rp 2.3 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.6 T |
| Net profit | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.2 T |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash | Rp 730 M | Rp 497 M | Rp 593 M | Rp 628 M |
| Placement with Bank Indonesia | Rp 731 M | Rp 763 M | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 1.5 T |
| Placement with other banks | Rp 10 M | Rp 4.7 M | Rp 2.2 M | Rp 6.2 M |
| Securities | Rp 7.5 T | Rp 8.5 T | Rp 8.8 T | Rp 9.9 T |
| Financing & receivables (gross) | Rp 11 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 10 T | Rp 10 T |
| Allowance for impairment: financing (CKPN) | -Rp 769 M | -Rp 1.2 T | -Rp 924 M | -Rp 881 M |
| Fixed assets & equipment | Rp 379 M | Rp 376 M | Rp 335 M | Rp 334 M |
| Total assets | Rp 21 T | Rp 21 T | Rp 22 T | Rp 23 T |
| Demand deposits (Giro) | Rp 28 M | Rp 24 M | Rp 6.8 M | Rp 43 M |
| Savings deposits (Tabungan) | Rp 2.9 T | Rp 3.1 T | Rp 3.1 T | Rp 3.1 T |
| Time deposits (Deposito) | Rp 9.1 T | Rp 9.0 T | Rp 8.6 T | Rp 9.0 T |
| Total liabilities | Rp 13 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 13 T |
| Total equity | Rp 8.4 T | Rp 8.8 T | Rp 9.3 T | Rp 10.0 T |
BTPS is a genuinely different animal from every other bank in this dataset; a single-product Sharia group-lending microfinance specialist ("Tepat Pembiayaan Syariah," collateral-free financing to ultra-micro women entrepreneurs organized into 10+-member weekly-meeting "sentra" groups), ~20x smaller than fellow Sharia name BRIS by assets, 70%-owned by PT Bank SMBC Indonesia Tbk (formerly Bank BTPN, itself Sumitomo Mitsui-linked). **The now-complete 4-year window (FY2022-2025) reveals a headline finding the original 3-year ship never saw**: FY2022 was BTPS's best year in company history by a wide margin (net profit Rp1.77tn, ROE 24.68%, ROA 11.36%, BOPO just 58.13%, independently confirmed via press coverage), and FY2023 was not a standalone data point but the start of a real, dramatic reversal: net profit fell 39.4% in one year (Rp1.77tn→Rp1.07tn), ROE nearly halved (24.68%→13.63%), ROA more than halved (11.36%→6.30%), and BOPO jumped 18.2 percentage points (58.13%→76.35%). The headline numbers remain extreme by any bank's standard: NIM-equivalent (Net Imbalan) of 22.71-27.32% and CAR of 50.04-56.20%; both multiples of every other name here, though Net Imbalan itself is now a clean 4-year monotonic decline (27.32%→26.00%→24.30%→22.71%). FY2025 (Individual): net profit grew 16.5% to Rp1.25tn as provisioning fell 39.2% (Rp1.36tn→Rp826.3bn), but the real earnings-quality story is underneath: BOPO improved (74.93%→69.34%) purely on that lower credit cost, while CIR (cost-to-income excluding provisions) now shows a clean 4-year MONOTONIC WORSENING (36.71%→38.43%→44.92%→48.81%) as personnel expense kept rising against income that kept falling. The financing book itself shrank 10.7% in FY2024 (tracking a genuine FY2024 asset-quality wobble) before a modest 1.8% FY2025 recovery. The counter-case, stated plainly: CAR has stayed in a 50-56% band across all 4 years (52.05%→50.04%→51.71%→56.20%, not a clean climb once FY2022 is included) even as BTPS paid out real dividends; capital remains enormous and underdeployed relative to the shrunken post-2022 earnings base, and ROE has never come close to recovering its FY2022 peak.
Giro, Tabungan (wadiah + non-profit-sharing) and Deposito from the general public, a conventional funding base.
EconomicsA standard funding mix: funding cost is not what makes BTPS unusual.
Field officers organize 10+-member women’s groups with mandatory weekly meetings: the real distribution and credit-discipline mechanism.
EconomicsThis step, not marketing or price, is what makes the ultra-micro segment underwritable at BTPS’s margin.
Collateral-free group financing at a Net Imbalan of 22.71-26.00%: extreme by banking standards.
EconomicsThe structural source of BTPS’s entire profitability: everything else in the model exists to make this step work.
Provisioning swung sharply, Rp1.90tn (FY2023) → Rp1.36tn (FY2024) → Rp826.3bn (FY2025), tracking a real FY2024 NPF deterioration and FY2025 recovery.
EconomicsThe single biggest swing factor behind reported profit growth in FY2025, not revenue, not cost control.
CAR climbed every year (50.04%→56.20%) even after real dividend payouts (~45-50% of net profit): capital generation outpaces both growth and distribution.
EconomicsThe clearest evidence of underdeployed capital in this dataset: even generous dividends aren’t enough to hold CAR flat.
Cost structurePersonnel expense (Rp1.51tn, FY2025, +6.5% YoY, +14.3% cumulative since FY2023) is the largest controllable cost line: the field-officer/mentoring model is inherently labor-intensive. Provisioning (Rp826.3bn, down sharply from Rp1.90tn in FY2023) is the most volatile line. Income from fund distribution has fallen for two straight years (-9.2% cumulative): cost discipline has not kept pace, the direct cause of CIR’s deterioration.
Cash cycleDeposits gathered conventionally, deployed via sentra-group formation and weekly-mentored murabahah/wakalah financing at an extreme 22.71-26.00% margin, provisioned against a naturally higher-touch credit-risk profile. The financing book itself contracted 10.7% in FY2024 before a 1.8% FY2025 recovery: a real volatility not seen in this dataset’s conventional banks.
Standard deposit funding (Giro/Tabungan/Deposito) from the general public: depositors have no special leverage; BTPS competes for deposits like any other bank despite its specialized lending side.
Implication → Funding cost is not BTPS’s defining constraint: its extreme margin comes almost entirely from the lending side.
Individual ultra-micro borrowers within a "sentra" group have essentially no pricing leverage: group-based joint liability and BTPS’s specialized underwriting model set the terms.
Implication → Low buyer power underpins the exceptionally wide margin (Net Imbalan 22-26%): the structural source of BTPS’s profitability.
Group-lending microfinance at scale requires a purpose-built field-mentoring/sentra infrastructure (not just capital or a banking license) that took years to build: a real, if narrow, operational moat within this specific niche.
Implication → BTPS’s niche is defensible operationally, but narrow: it does not translate into pricing power over the broader banking system.
Informal lenders, cooperatives (koperasi) and other microfinance/fintech-lending players compete for the same ultra-micro borrower segment, though few match BTPS’s group-mentoring structure exactly.
Implication → A real competitive backdrop for the shrinking-then-recovering financing book, alongside the disclosed asset-quality-driven pullback.
Sits in a different competitive lane from BRIS and the conventional banks in this dataset: direct rivalry is with other microfinance/ultra-micro lenders, not the large-cap peer set Neraca otherwise tracks.
Implication → Standard peer-comparison metrics (vs BBCA-class banks) understate how differentiated BTPS’s actual competitive position is.
Real, but the headline masks a genuine underlying deterioration, now visible across a full 4-year window rather than 3: FY2025’s +16.5% profit growth is entirely a provisioning-cycle story (Rp1.36tn→Rp826.3bn, -39.2%), not operating improvement, and it follows a much larger FY2022→2023 step-down (net profit -39.4% in one year) that the original 3-year ship never captured. CIR (cost-to-income excluding provisions), the cleaner efficiency measure, shows a clean 4-year monotonic worsening (36.71%→48.81%) as personnel costs rose against income that fell in 3 of 4 years. BOPO’s FY2025 headline improvement (76.35%→69.34%) is real but provisioning-driven, not a like-for-like efficiency gain; disclosed and quantified here rather than left to the flattering headline number.
Checked: no material one-offs found in the reviewed window.
Cash conversionNot independently computable from the disclosed OJK ratio-table format (no operating cash flow statement in this source): flagged as a genuine data gap rather than assumed clean.
A harvester by outcome, though not by an aggressive choice: BTPS pays real dividends (~45-50% of net profit both years) while its financing book actually shrank over the 3-year window; capital is being both retained AND returned, yet CAR still climbed every year regardless, because capital generation outpaces both channels combined.
DeploymentDividends of ~Rp570bn (FY2025) and ~Rp540bn (FY2024) were paid, real, meaningful payouts, but risk-weighted-asset growth stayed flat-to-negative (the financing book contracted FY2024, only partially recovered FY2025), so capital kept accumulating anyway. Neither growth nor distribution is currently large enough to absorb BTPS’s capital generation.
Returns trendThe full 4-year window reframes this entirely: ROE fell from a 24.68% FY2022 peak (the company's best year ever) to 13.63% in FY2023 and has stayed essentially flat since (13.28%→13.92%), not a steady erosion, but a step-change down that has never recovered. CAR, meanwhile, has stayed in a 50-56% band the whole time (52.05%→50.04%→51.71%→56.20%): the capital base was already enormous even at FY2022's much higher earnings power, and remains so now against a structurally smaller profit base.
Net profit fell 39.4% in a single year (Rp1.77tn FY2022, the company's best year in history, independently confirmed via press coverage, to Rp1.07tn FY2023), ROE nearly halved (24.68%→13.63%), ROA more than halved (11.36%→6.30%), and BOPO jumped 18.2 percentage points (58.13%→76.35%). Not previously visible in the 3-year ship: this is now the single largest, most consequential finding in this bank's tracked history, and the essential context for reading every subsequent-year figure.
CIR (ex-provisions) now shows a clean 4-year monotonic worsening (36.71%→38.43%→44.92%→48.81%), personnel expense rising against income that fell in 3 of 4 years, even as headline BOPO improved in FY2025 purely from a 39.2% drop in provisioning. Confirmed by breaking down both ratios into their disclosed components, not asserted from the headline alone.
The financing book contracted 10.7% in FY2024, tracking a real NPF deterioration that year (2.94%→3.75%), before a modest 1.8% FY2025 recovery: a real, disclosed swing worth distinguishing from a smoothly-growing book.
Originally shipped FY2023-2025 only, after 3 genuine failed attempts (Ikhtisar Consolidated-only, a Mar-2023 doc with a false-positive "RASIO" triage flag, a second wrong-type full audited FS) plus one false lead (BTPS's own "Laporan Keuangan Entitas Induk" site category turned out to host its PARENT company's statements, PT Bank BTPN Tbk, not BTPS's own: caught before use). Resolved by finding a document CLASS not tried before: BTPS's own "Laporan Keuangan Triwulanan" (quarterly) category carries a genuine Q4-2022 filing with the full disclosed ratio table. The CDN serving it required a Referer header (hotlink protection, not a hostile block). Cross-validated via 2 exact-rupiah identities and independent press confirmation of both net profit and total assets. This extension is what surfaced the FY2022-2023 reversal finding above: logged here as a resolved methodology note, not an ongoing limitation.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Large, well-capitalised and concentrated among a few systemic players, with ASEAN-leading profitability: though margins and efficiency are now under late-cycle pressure.