Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | — | 12.24x | 0.38x | 1.82x | 0.72x |
| Interest burdendriver | -0.67x | 0.21x | 0.56x | 0.64x | 0.81x |
| Operating margin | 12.6% | 11.2% | 3.1% | 4.3% | 9.7% |
| Asset turnover | 0.24x | 0.41x | 0.40x | 0.33x | 0.34x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 6.53x | 1.59x | 1.51x | 1.45x | 1.46x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | — | 18.6% | 0.4% | 2.4% | 2.8% |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | — | 6.8% | 0.6% | 1.9% | 3.1% |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 0.27x | 0.84x | 0.90x | 1.01x | 1.25x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 0.26x | 0.80x | 0.87x | 0.95x | 1.17x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 0.08x | 0.07x | 0.10x | 0.07x | 0.20x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | -$ 2.1 B | -$ 150 M | -$ 80 M | $ 4.2 M | $ 148 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 2.43x | 0.09x | 0.11x | 0.11x | 0.15x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 5.53x | 0.59x | 0.51x | 0.45x | 0.46x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.37x | 0.05x | 0.07x | 0.08x | 0.10x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | $ 1.3 B | $ 178 M | $ 230 M | $ 260 M | $ 316 M |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 0.60x | 1.27x | 2.28x | 2.76x | 5.20x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 6.53x | 1.59x | 1.51x | 1.45x | 1.46x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 20.0% | 20.3% | 8.1% | 12.2% | 17.1% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 12.6% | 11.2% | 3.1% | 4.3% | 9.7% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 16.7% | 28.7% | 0.7% | 5.0% | 5.7% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | $ 141 M | $ 216 M | $ 67 M | $ 77 M | $ 160 M |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 14.0% | 11.8% | 4.0% | 5.7% | 11.2% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 4.0% | 11.7% | 0.3% | 1.6% | 1.9% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | -35.0% | 33.3% | 0.7% | 4.2% | 5.0% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | — | 12.24x | 0.38x | 1.82x | 0.72x |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | -0.67x | 0.21x | 0.56x | 0.64x | 0.81x |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | — | 6.8% | 0.6% | 1.9% | 3.1% |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.24x | 0.41x | 0.40x | 0.33x | 0.34x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 26.47x | 37.34x | 71.47x | 29.20x | 25.06x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 5.33x | 11.80x | 10.41x | 11.95x | 13.77x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 4.72x | 12.92x | 8.54x | 5.59x | 8.70x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 13.8 days | 9.8 days | 5.1 days | 12.5 days | 14.6 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 68.4 days | 30.9 days | 35.1 days | 30.6 days | 26.5 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 77.4 days | 28.2 days | 42.7 days | 65.3 days | 42.0 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 4.9 days | 12.5 days | -2.5 days | -22.3 days | -0.9 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | -$ 313 M | -$ 723 M | -$ 168 M | -$ 30 M | -$ 41 M |
Price Rp 165 · market cap Rp 61 T ($ 3.4 B at the cited rate; statements are filed in USD)
| Multiple | BUMI | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 41.88x | 16.25x(15/16) | +158% |
| P/B | 2.10x | 1.68x | +25% |
| P/S | 2.38x | 1.92x | +24% |
| EV/EBITDA | 31.23x | 10.31x | +203% |
| EV/EBIT | 35.91x | 14.25x | +152% |
| EV/Sales | 3.50x | 2.27x | +54% |
| FCF Yield | -1.21% | 0.01% | -11,614% |
| Dividend Yield | — | 5.27%(11/16) | — |
EV = mkt cap $ 3.4 B + debt $ 435 M − cash $ 119 M + minority interest $ 1.3 B = $ 5.0 B
not computable: negative or zero base-year FCF. Shown as-is rather than estimated.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 9.3–13.3% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
Mechanical DCF suppressed: on these default assumptions the modelled enterprise value falls BELOW net debt and minority interests, so the equity residual is negative. Equity cannot be worth less than nothing, so no per-share figure is published here: read it as the model saying the debt claims consume the whole enterprise at this discount rate and growth path, which is itself the signal. The components are shown below so the arithmetic stays checkable, and the sliders let you test what it would take to change the answer.
Cyclical normalization: Commodity/cyclical name: the trailing years are a sample drawn from the price cycle, not a trend. Defaults are therefore normalized, using the full-window mean margin with no cycle-position growth extrapolation. That normalized margin is itself the embedded commodity-price assumption.
Base year contains named one-off item(s): FY2022: Debt restructuring produced a profit far larger than the operating result; FY2021: Equity attributable to owners was negative. The EBIT basis screens out most non-operating items, but read the Earnings Quality section before trusting the base margin.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 4.66% | US 10Y Treasury, 30 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.96 → 1.05 | Metals & Mining (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.13 |
| Cost of equity | 11.68% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 7.66% | median interest coverage 2.3x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a Ba1/BB+ synthetic rating and a 1.38% default spread, over a 6.28% base (US 10Y 4.66% + Indonesia's 1.62% sovereign spread). Its BOOK rate is 6.1%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms) |
| Tax rate | 27.7% | median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest) |
| WACC | 10.98% | 89% E × CoE + 11% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 2.5% | terminal growth from year 1, cyclical normalization: the delivered 4-yr CAGR (9.0%) reflects cycle position, not a trend |
| EBIT margin | 8.2% | full-cycle mean EBIT margin, FY2021–FY2025 (cyclical normalization: this margin is the embedded commodity-price assumption) |
| D&A / revenue | 1.3% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 4.0% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 11.0% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 22.8% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 1.7% of revenue against depreciation of 1.3%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | 35.9% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.6 B | $ 1.6 B | $ 1.7 B |
| EBIT | $ 119 M | $ 122 M | $ 125 M | $ 129 M | $ 132 M | $ 135 M |
| NOPAT | $ 86 M | $ 88 M | $ 91 M | $ 93 M | $ 95 M | $ 98 M |
| + D&A | $ 18 M | $ 19 M | $ 19 M | $ 20 M | $ 20 M | $ 21 M |
| − Capex | $ 58 M | $ 60 M | $ 61 M | $ 63 M | $ 64 M | $ 29 M |
| − ΔNWC | $ 13 M | $ 13 M | $ 13 M | $ 14 M | $ 14 M | $ 14 M |
| FCFF | $ 34 M | $ 35 M | $ 36 M | $ 37 M | $ 37 M | $ 75 M |
| PV | $ 31 M | $ 28 M | $ 26 M | $ 24 M | $ 22 M | $ 528 M |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding
EV = PV(explicit) $ 131 M + PV(TV) $ 528 M = $ 660 M · TV 80% of EV · − net debt $ 316 M − minority $ 1.3 B = equity -$ 929 M ÷ shares outstanding · per share is in USD, shown in IDR at 18,058
Model output: Rp -45/share (-127% vs price Rp 165)· exit-multiple check (10.3x): Rp -26
Under these assumptions the model lands 127% below today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for faster growth, a fatter margin, or a lower discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 10.0% | 11.0% | 12.0% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | -41 | -46 | -50 |
| 2.5% | -40 | -45 | -49 |
| 3.0% | -39 | -44 | -49 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $ 1.0 B | $ 1.8 B | $ 1.7 B | $ 1.4 B | $ 1.4 B |
| Cost of Goods Sold | $ 807 M | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.2 B | $ 1.2 B |
| Gross Profit | $ 201 M | $ 371 M | $ 137 M | $ 165 M | $ 244 M |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | $ 127 M | $ 205 M | $ 51 M | $ 58 M | $ 139 M |
| Interest Expense | $ 213 M | $ 162 M | $ 23 M | $ 21 M | $ 27 M |
| Net Income | $ 168 M | $ 525 M | $ 11 M | $ 67 M | $ 81 M |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | $ 168 M | $ 525 M | $ 11 M | $ 67 M | $ 81 M |
| Depreciation & Amortization | $ 14 M | $ 11 M | $ 15 M | $ 19 M | $ 21 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $ 221 M | $ 68 M | $ 77 M | $ 52 M | $ 119 M |
| Accounts Receivable | $ 189 M | $ 155 M | $ 161 M | $ 114 M | $ 103 M |
| Inventory | $ 30 M | $ 39 M | $ 22 M | $ 41 M | $ 47 M |
| Current Assets | $ 776 M | $ 773 M | $ 705 M | $ 773 M | $ 736 M |
| Total Assets | $ 4.2 B | $ 4.5 B | $ 4.2 B | $ 4.2 B | $ 4.2 B |
| Accounts Payable | $ 171 M | $ 113 M | $ 181 M | $ 214 M | $ 136 M |
| Current Liabilities | $ 2.9 B | $ 923 M | $ 785 M | $ 768 M | $ 588 M |
| Total Liabilities | $ 3.6 B | $ 1.7 B | $ 1.4 B | $ 1.3 B | $ 1.3 B |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | $ 1.6 B | $ 246 M | $ 307 M | $ 312 M | $ 435 M |
| Total Equity | $ 646 M | $ 2.8 B | $ 2.8 B | $ 2.9 B | $ 2.9 B |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | -$ 481 M | $ 1.6 B | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.6 B | $ 1.6 B |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$ 74 M | -$ 594 M | -$ 116 M | -$ 5.1 M | $ 59 M |
| Capital Expenditure | $ 239 M | $ 130 M | $ 52 M | $ 25 M | $ 100 M |
BUMI gross margin: 20.0 % (2021) → 20.3 % (2022) → 8.1 % (2023) → 12.2 % (2024) → 17.1 % (2025). OPM: 12.6 % → 11.2 % → 3.1 % → 4.3 % → 9.7 %. Net margin: 16.7 % → 28.7 % (2022 peak) → 0.65 % (2023 crash) → 5.0 % → 5.7 %. ROE: −35.0 % (2021, negative despite positive net margin; consistent with an equity base still recovering from the company's prior, well-documented debt crisis) → 33.3 % (2022 peak) → 0.71 % → 4.2 % → 5.0 %. Asset turnover: 0.24× → 0.41× → 0.40× → 0.33× → 0.34×. D/E: 2.43× (2021) → 0.09× (2022, post-restructuring) → 0.11× → 0.11× → 0.15×; L/E: 5.53× → 0.59× → 0.51× → 0.45× → 0.46×; equity multiplier: 6.53× → 1.59× → 1.51× → 1.45× → 1.46×. Net debt (USD): 1,349.4 M (2021) → 177.7 M (2022, an ~87 % reduction) → 229.8 M → 259.9 M → 316.3 M (gradually rising again, but far below 2021's level). Interest coverage: 0.60× (2021, below 1×) → 1.27× → 2.28× → 2.76× → 5.20× (2025); improved every single year, the clearest positive trend in the whole profile. Current ratio: 0.27× (2021, severe) → 0.84× → 0.90× → 1.01× (2024, first year above 1×) → 1.25×. FCF (USD): −313.4 M → −723.5 M (2022, worst, despite that year's peak profit, working-capital/capex consumption) → −167.8 M → −30.2 M → −41.1 M, negative every year but the burn narrowed roughly 18-fold from the 2022 trough. Revenue (USD): 1,008.2 M → 1,830.1 M (2022 peak) → 1,679.9 M → 1,359.7 M → 1,424.8 M. The shape: a company that entered this window in real financial distress and has spent five years, via a major 2022 recapitalisation and steady subsequent deleveraging, working its way back to health, without yet reaching a fully comfortable steady state.
BUMI is a holding structure over coal mining operations rather than a single operating mine, and a large part of the economics belongs to other shareholders inside those subsidiaries.
EconomicsNon-controlling interests were 44.0, 44.4, 43.8 and 44.1 percent of consolidated equity from FY2022 to FY2025, so roughly 44 cents of every equity rupiah on this balance sheet is not BUMI shareholders.
Revenue was USD 1,008.2m, 1,830.1m, 1,679.9m, 1,359.7m and 1,424.8m across FY2021 to FY2025, so the operating scale is real and roughly flat since the 2022 price peak.
EconomicsGross margin ran 20.0, 20.3, 8.1, 12.2 and 17.1 percent, so the coal price passes almost directly into the margin, and FY2023 shows how thin it gets at the bottom.
In FY2021 equity attributable to owners was NEGATIVE at minus USD 480.7m and debt was USD 1,570.3m. By FY2022 owners equity was positive USD 1,578.4m and debt had fallen to USD 245.6m.
EconomicsThat transformation did not come from trading. Debt was converted rather than repaid, which is why reported profit in FY2021 and FY2022 exceeded what the operating line could produce.
Operating cash flow was minus USD 74.4m, minus 593.7m, minus 115.9m, minus 5.1m and finally plus USD 58.6m across the five years.
EconomicsThis is the step that matters most on the page. A balance sheet rescued by restructuring is not the same thing as a business that generates cash, and four consecutive years of negative operating cash flow say the second part had not yet happened.
Cost structureCoal cost dominated and highly geared to price. Cost of revenue was USD 1,181.0m of USD 1,424.8m revenue in FY2025, a 17.1 percent gross margin, recovered from a very thin 8.1 percent in FY2023 but still below the 20.0 to 20.3 percent of FY2021 and FY2022. Operating margin ran 12.6, 11.2, 3.1, 4.3 and 9.7 percent. Interest fell dramatically after the restructuring, from USD 213.3m in FY2021 to USD 26.7m in FY2025, which is the one unambiguous improvement in the cost structure and the direct result of debt falling from USD 1,570.3m to USD 434.9m.
Cash cycleThe engine ratios for working capital are erratic here and should be read with caution rather than precision, because a holding company consolidating partly owned mines produces cycle figures that swing on intercompany positions. What is unambiguous is the cash flow itself. Operating cash flow was NEGATIVE in four of the five years and the cumulative five-year total is about minus USD 730.4m. Cash on the balance sheet fell from USD 221.0m in FY2021 to USD 67.8m in FY2022 and was USD 118.6m at the end of FY2025, so the company has operated on a very thin cash balance throughout, against total assets of about USD 4.2bn.
Unit economicsTwo numbers decide how to read this company and they point the same way. First, return on invested capital was 6.8, 0.6, 1.9 and 3.1 percent for FY2022 to FY2025, and could not be computed for FY2021. Those are not returns that cover any plausible cost of capital, in any year, even at the top of a coal cycle. Second, operating cash flow never once exceeded reported net income: the ratio was minus 0.44, minus 1.13, minus 10.61, minus 0.08 and 0.72. Put together, this is a business whose accounting profit has consistently exceeded both its cash generation and its cost of capital. The restructuring genuinely repaired the balance sheet, cutting debt from USD 1,570.3m to USD 434.9m and turning negative owners equity positive. It did not change the underlying unit economics, and the unit economics are what a valuation has to rest on.
BUMI owns KPC and Arutmin outright through its subsidiaries; no meaningful third-party mining dependency for its core coal operations.
Implication → Cost pressure is financing-cost and geological driven rather than supplier-driven: consistent with the interest-coverage recovery being the real story, not input costs.
Thermal coal is benchmark-priced: BUMI is a price-taker on both KPC and Arutmin tonnage, selling to domestic and international customers across multiple sectors, the same dynamic as every listed coal peer.
Implication → Revenue and margin recovery has come from cost discipline and deleveraging, not pricing power: the same lever available to every peer.
KPC is one of the world's largest open-pit coal mines: an operating asset that is essentially irreplicable at that scale by a new entrant; standard IUP/PKP2B/RKAB/AMDAL barriers apply to both KPC and Arutmin.
Implication → Scale protects BUMI's market position, but did not protect it from the balance-sheet distress seen in 2021: operating-asset moat and financial resilience are separate questions.
The sector's standard high substitution risk applies (LNG/solar/wind/hydro/geothermal, post-2030 demand decline): BUMI's announced mineral diversification (Wolfram, Jubilee Metals, Laman Mining) is an early, still-pending response, not yet material.
Implication → BUMI has not yet meaningfully hedged the sector's long-run substitution risk: the 2026-targeted diversification deals, if completed, would be the first real step.
BUMI competes on the same seaborne thermal market as PTBA, ADRO, BYAN, ITMG, INDY, HRUM, GEMS, AADI and CUAN, and by combined KPC+Arutmin volume (~74.5 Mt, 2024) is one of the largest-scale producers of any name tracked in this project.
Implication → BUMI's scale is a genuine competitive strength, but rivalry is still on delivered cost through the price cycle: scale alone did not prevent the 2021 distress or the 2023 earnings crash.
This is the page on this site where reported profit and economic reality diverge most persistently, and it deserves plain language because the stock is widely held by retail investors. Start with the single most important fact: operating cash flow NEVER exceeded reported net income in any of the five years. The ratio was minus 0.44, minus 1.13, minus 10.61, minus 0.08 and 0.72. Operating cash flow itself was NEGATIVE in four of the five years, cumulatively about minus USD 730.4m, while the company reported cumulative net profit of about USD 852.7m over the same period. Free cash flow after capital spending was negative in ALL FIVE years. Second, the two large profits were not operating profits. In FY2021 net margin of 16.7 percent exceeded an operating margin of 12.6 percent, and in FY2022 net margin of 28.7 percent exceeded an operating margin of 11.2 percent, meaning reported profit of USD 525.3m sat on operating profit of only USD 204.6m. A net result above the operating result requires large non-operating items, and this was the period when debt fell from USD 1,570.3m to USD 245.6m and equity attributable to owners went from MINUS USD 480.7m to plus USD 1,578.4m. Restructuring gains are legitimate accounting, but they are not repeatable and they are not cash. Third, the FY2024 engine tax-retention figure of 182.2 percent, meaning reported profit exceeded operating profit after interest, is a further signal that non-operating items were still doing work. Read the operating line and the cash line together on this page, and treat net income as the least informative number of the three.
| Period | One-off item | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| FY2022 | Debt restructuring produced a profit far larger than the operating result | Reported net profit of USD 525.3m sat on operating profit of only USD 204.6m, so net margin of 28.7 percent exceeded operating margin of 11.2 percent. Over FY2021 to FY2022 debt fell from USD 1,570.3m to USD 245.6m and equity attributable to owners went from MINUS USD 480.7m to plus USD 1,578.4m. The balance sheet repair was real; the profit that accompanied it was not operating income and does not recur. |
| FY2021 | Equity attributable to owners was negative | Owners equity was MINUS USD 480.7m while total equity was positive USD 646.4m, which is why the engine reports non-controlling interests at 174.4 percent of equity and a return on equity of minus 35.0 percent for that year. None of those figures are comparable with later years, and no trend line should be drawn through FY2021. |
Cash conversionAmong the weakest in the roster. Operating cash flow was minus USD 74.4m, minus 593.7m, minus 115.9m, minus 5.1m and plus USD 58.6m, so NEGATIVE in four of five years and cumulatively about minus USD 730.4m. Free cash flow after capital spending was negative in all five years, at roughly minus USD 313.4m, 723.5m, 167.8m, 30.2m and 41.1m. Cash conversion never reached 1.0 in any year. FY2025 is the first year operating cash flow turned positive, which is genuine progress worth acknowledging, but one positive year of USD 58.6m against a cumulative shortfall of USD 730.4m is a first data point rather than a trend. Anyone assessing this company should start with the cash flow statement and only then read the income statement.
Labelled a diluter descriptively, because the equity base was rebuilt by converting claims rather than by earning. Total equity went from USD 646.4m in FY2021 to USD 2,818.5m in FY2022, a jump of USD 2,172.1m in one year, while reported profit that year was USD 525.3m and operating cash flow was MINUS USD 593.7m. Equity that grows four times in a year without cash coming in is equity issued, and existing holders were diluted in exchange for the balance sheet being made solvent. That was probably the right trade at the time, given owners equity had been negative. It should not be described as growth.
DeploymentThere has been very little to allocate, which is itself the finding. Capital spending ran USD 238.9m, 129.8m, 51.9m, 25.0m and 99.8m, so investment collapsed to almost nothing in FY2023 and FY2024 at exactly the point when margins were thinnest, which is what a cash-constrained producer does. Debt was cut from USD 1,570.3m to USD 245.6m through the restructuring and has since crept back up to USD 434.9m. Cash has never been comfortable: USD 221.0m, 67.8m, 76.8m, 52.5m and 118.6m against total assets of about USD 4.2bn. With operating cash flow negative in four of five years, the reinvestment that a depleting mining asset requires has been funded by the balance sheet rather than by the business, and that is the constraint on everything else.
Returns trendReturns have never covered the cost of capital in this window. Return on invested capital was 6.8, 0.6, 1.9 and 3.1 percent for FY2022 to FY2025 and was not computable for FY2021, while return on equity was minus 35.0, 33.3, 0.7, 4.2 and 5.0 percent, with the FY2021 and FY2022 readings both distorted by the restructuring. Take the three clean years, FY2023 to FY2025, and returns on equity of 0.7, 4.2 and 5.0 percent are the honest record. That is the context for the valuation, and the valuation is where this page has to be blunt. The discounted cash flow model is SUPPRESSED here rather than published, because the inputs do not support a defensible per-share figure. Meanwhile the EV/EBITDA multiple is 31.23 times against a mining peer median of 10.31 times, so the market is paying roughly three times the sector multiple. Set that against a market capitalisation of about IDR 61.3tn at IDR 165 per share, for a business with cumulative negative free cash flow across five years and a best-year return on equity of 5.0 percent outside the restructuring. The gap between the price and the operating record is the largest on this site, and no model output closes it. This is a statement about what the accounts show, not a prediction.
Operating cash flow was minus USD 74.4m, minus 593.7m, minus 115.9m, minus 5.1m and plus USD 58.6m, cumulatively about minus USD 730.4m, while the company reported cumulative net profit of about USD 852.7m. Free cash flow after capital spending was negative in ALL FIVE years. Cash conversion never reached 1.0 in any year. This is the first thing to know about the company and it is not visible from the income statement.
In FY2022 reported net profit of USD 525.3m sat on operating profit of only USD 204.6m, and net margin of 28.7 percent exceeded operating margin of 11.2 percent. FY2021 shows the same pattern at 16.7 percent against 12.6 percent. Those were the years debt fell from USD 1,570.3m to USD 245.6m and owners equity went from MINUS USD 480.7m to plus USD 1,578.4m. The balance sheet repair was real and probably necessary; the profit was non-operating, non-cash and non-recurring.
Return on invested capital was 6.8, 0.6, 1.9 and 3.1 percent for FY2022 to FY2025 and not computable for FY2021. In the three years unaffected by restructuring, FY2023 to FY2025, return on equity was 0.7, 4.2 and 5.0 percent. Even at the top of the coal cycle this business has not earned its cost of capital, and that is a structural observation about the assets and the ownership chain rather than a comment on any single year.
Non-controlling interests were 44.0, 44.4, 43.8 and 44.1 percent of consolidated equity from FY2022 to FY2025, because the coal operations sit inside partly owned subsidiaries. So every consolidated figure on this page describes a group in which BUMI shareholders hold roughly a 56 percent equity claim. In FY2021, when owners equity was negative, the engine reports non-controlling interests at 174.4 percent of equity, which is arithmetically correct and economically a warning.
The discounted cash flow model is SUPPRESSED for this company rather than published, because the inputs do not support a defensible per-share value. The EV/EBITDA multiple is 31.23 times against a mining peer median of 10.31 times, so the market pays roughly three times the sector multiple, on a market capitalisation of about IDR 61.3tn at IDR 165 per share. That is being paid for a business with negative cumulative free cash flow over five years and a best clean-year return on equity of 5.0 percent. State it plainly: no figure in these accounts supports that multiple, and anyone holding the shares is relying on something outside them.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Indonesia controls >60 % of global nickel supply and is the world's largest thermal-coal exporter; hilirisasi mandates in-country ore processing, reshaping value chains from raw ore to battery-grade products.