Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | 0.73x | 0.74x | 0.77x | 0.77x | 0.77x |
| Interest burden | 0.99x | 1.00x | 1.00x | 0.99x | 0.99x |
| Operating margindriver | 58.8% | 62.6% | 44.9% | 35.2% | 29.2% |
| Asset turnover | 1.17x | 1.19x | 1.04x | 0.98x | 1.02x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 1.31x | 1.98x | 1.74x | 1.52x | 1.25x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 65.1% | 109.2% | 62.6% | 39.9% | 28.5% |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 66.0% | 109.3% | 62.9% | 40.5% | 28.7% |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 3.13x | 1.31x | 1.42x | 1.64x | 2.66x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 2.92x | 1.25x | 1.27x | 1.41x | 2.23x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 2.16x | 1.00x | 0.69x | 0.85x | 1.06x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | $ 965 M | $ 569 M | $ 563 M | $ 689 M | $ 904 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 0.00x | 0.00x | 0.20x | 0.15x | 0.00x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 0.31x | 0.98x | 0.74x | 0.52x | 0.25x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.00x | 0.00x | 0.12x | 0.10x | 0.00x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | -$ 981 M | -$ 1.8 B | -$ 520 M | -$ 575 M | -$ 575 M |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 69.79x | 1,100.31x | 242.39x | 67.99x | 115.23x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 1.31x | 1.98x | 1.74x | 1.52x | 1.25x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 61.3% | 67.4% | 47.4% | 39.5% | 32.7% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 58.8% | 62.6% | 44.9% | 35.2% | 29.2% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 42.5% | 46.3% | 34.6% | 26.8% | 22.4% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | $ 1.7 B | $ 3.0 B | $ 1.7 B | $ 1.3 B | $ 1.1 B |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 60.9% | 63.9% | 46.9% | 38.2% | 32.8% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 49.8% | 55.2% | 36.0% | 26.2% | 22.8% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 67.4% | 115.0% | 65.8% | 41.9% | 29.9% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 0.73x | 0.74x | 0.77x | 0.77x | 0.77x |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 0.99x | 1.00x | 1.00x | 0.99x | 0.99x |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 66.0% | 109.3% | 62.9% | 40.5% | 28.7% |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 1.17x | 1.19x | 1.04x | 0.98x | 1.02x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 11.64x | 12.97x | 9.33x | 8.41x | 9.86x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 13.24x | 11.74x | 11.22x | 11.23x | 13.27x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 13.41x | 13.37x | 10.52x | 11.95x | 11.20x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 31.4 days | 28.1 days | 39.1 days | 43.4 days | 37.0 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 27.6 days | 31.1 days | 32.5 days | 32.5 days | 27.5 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 27.2 days | 27.3 days | 34.7 days | 30.5 days | 32.6 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 31.7 days | 31.9 days | 37.0 days | 45.4 days | 31.9 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | $ 1.3 B | $ 1.9 B | $ 516 M | $ 880 M | $ 807 M |
Price Rp 12,026 · market cap Rp 401 T ($ 22 B at the cited rate; statements are filed in USD)
| Multiple | BYAN | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 28.91x | 16.25x(15/16) | +78% |
| P/B | 8.63x | 1.68x | +413% |
| P/S | 6.48x | 1.92x | +237% |
| EV/EBITDA | 19.35x | 10.31x | +88% |
| EV/EBIT | 21.69x | 14.25x | +52% |
| EV/Sales | 6.34x | 2.27x | +179% |
| FCF Yield | 3.63% | 0.01% | +34,407% |
| Dividend Yield | 2.22% | 5.27%(11/16) | -58% |
EV = mkt cap $ 22 B + debt $ 0 − cash $ 575 M + minority interest $ 123 M = $ 22 B
At today’s price, the market is paying for 14.4%/yr FCF growth (10.3% at 9.3% to 18.1% at 13.3% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: -11.8% FCF · 4.7% revenue.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 9.3–13.3% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
Cyclical normalization: Commodity/cyclical name: the trailing years are a sample drawn from the price cycle, not a trend. Defaults are therefore normalized, using the full-window mean margin with no cycle-position growth extrapolation. That normalized margin is itself the embedded commodity-price assumption.
Base year contains named one-off item(s): FY2022: The global energy shock: revenue +65% to USD 4,703.6 M and gross margin 67.4%, on a benchmark price set far outside the company’s control.. The EBIT basis screens out most non-operating items, but read the Earnings Quality section before trusting the base margin.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 4.66% | US 10Y Treasury, 30 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.96 → 0.96 | Metals & Mining (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.00 |
| Cost of equity | 11.08% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 6.68% | median interest coverage 115.2x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a Aaa/AAA synthetic rating and a 0.40% default spread, over a 6.28% base (US 10Y 4.66% + Indonesia's 1.62% sovereign spread). Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms) |
| Tax rate | 22.8% | median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest) |
| WACC | 11.08% | 100% E × CoE + 0% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 2.5% | terminal growth from year 1, cyclical normalization: the delivered 4-yr CAGR (4.7%) reflects cycle position, not a trend |
| EBIT margin | 46.1% | full-cycle mean EBIT margin, FY2021–FY2025 (cyclical normalization: this margin is the embedded commodity-price assumption) |
| D&A / revenue | 2.9% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 5.4% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 11.1% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 22.6% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 10.8% of revenue against depreciation of 2.9%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | 5.5% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | $ 3.5 B | $ 3.6 B | $ 3.7 B | $ 3.8 B | $ 3.9 B | $ 4.0 B |
| EBIT | $ 1.6 B | $ 1.7 B | $ 1.7 B | $ 1.7 B | $ 1.8 B | $ 1.8 B |
| NOPAT | $ 1.3 B | $ 1.3 B | $ 1.3 B | $ 1.3 B | $ 1.4 B | $ 1.4 B |
| + D&A | $ 101 M | $ 103 M | $ 106 M | $ 108 M | $ 111 M | $ 114 M |
| − Capex | $ 190 M | $ 195 M | $ 200 M | $ 205 M | $ 210 M | $ 428 M |
| − ΔNWC | $ 4.8 M | $ 4.9 M | $ 5.0 M | $ 5.1 M | $ 5.2 M | $ 5.4 M |
| FCFF | $ 1.2 B | $ 1.2 B | $ 1.2 B | $ 1.2 B | $ 1.3 B | $ 1.1 B |
| PV | $ 1.0 B | $ 962 M | $ 887 M | $ 819 M | $ 755 M | $ 7.6 B |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding
EV = PV(explicit) $ 4.5 B + PV(TV) $ 7.6 B = $ 12 B · TV 63% of EV · − net debt -$ 575 M − minority $ 123 M = equity $ 12 B ÷ shares outstanding · per share is in USD, shown in IDR at 18,058
Model output: Rp 6,757/share (-44% vs price Rp 12,026)· exit-multiple check (10.3x): Rp 8,942
Under these assumptions the model lands 44% below today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for faster growth, a fatter margin, or a lower discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 10.1% | 11.1% | 12.1% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | 7,192 | 6,460 | 5,872 |
| 2.5% | 7,574 | 6,757 | 6,109 |
| 3.0% | 8,011 | 7,091 | 6,371 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $ 2.9 B | $ 4.7 B | $ 3.6 B | $ 3.4 B | $ 3.4 B |
| Cost of Goods Sold | $ 1.1 B | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.9 B | $ 2.1 B | $ 2.3 B |
| Gross Profit | $ 1.7 B | $ 3.2 B | $ 1.7 B | $ 1.4 B | $ 1.1 B |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | $ 1.7 B | $ 2.9 B | $ 1.6 B | $ 1.2 B | $ 1.0 B |
| Interest Expense | $ 24 M | $ 2.7 M | $ 6.6 M | $ 18 M | $ 8.7 M |
| Net Income | $ 1.2 B | $ 2.2 B | $ 1.2 B | $ 923 M | $ 768 M |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | $ 1.2 B | $ 2.2 B | $ 1.2 B | $ 923 M | $ 768 M |
| Depreciation & Amortization | $ 60 M | $ 64 M | $ 73 M | $ 103 M | $ 122 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $ 981 M | $ 1.8 B | $ 917 M | $ 912 M | $ 575 M |
| Accounts Receivable | $ 215 M | $ 401 M | $ 319 M | $ 307 M | $ 258 M |
| Inventory | $ 95 M | $ 118 M | $ 202 M | $ 248 M | $ 234 M |
| Current Assets | $ 1.4 B | $ 2.4 B | $ 1.9 B | $ 1.8 B | $ 1.4 B |
| Total Assets | $ 2.4 B | $ 3.9 B | $ 3.4 B | $ 3.5 B | $ 3.4 B |
| Accounts Payable | $ 82 M | $ 115 M | $ 179 M | $ 175 M | $ 206 M |
| Current Liabilities | $ 453 M | $ 1.8 B | $ 1.3 B | $ 1.1 B | $ 544 M |
| Total Liabilities | $ 571 M | $ 2.0 B | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.2 B | $ 680 M |
| Total Debt | $ 0 | $ 0 | $ 397 M | $ 338 M | $ 0 |
| Total Equity | $ 1.9 B | $ 2.0 B | $ 2.0 B | $ 2.3 B | $ 2.7 B |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | $ 1.8 B | $ 1.9 B | $ 1.9 B | $ 2.2 B | $ 2.6 B |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $ 1.5 B | $ 2.1 B | $ 731 M | $ 1.1 B | $ 978 M |
| Capital Expenditure | $ 177 M | $ 198 M | $ 216 M | $ 180 M | $ 171 M |
BYAN gross margin: 61.3 % (2021) → 67.4 % (2022) → 47.4 % (2023) → 39.5 % (2024) → 32.7 % (2025). OPM: 58.8 % → 62.6 % → 44.9 % → 35.2 % → 29.2 %. Net margin: 42.5 % → 46.3 % → 34.6 % → 26.8 % → 22.4 %. ROE: 67.4 % → 115.0 % → 65.8 % → 41.9 % → 29.9 %. ROA: 49.8 % → 55.2 % → 36.0 % → 26.2 % → 22.8 %. EBITDA margin: 60.9 % → 63.9 % → 46.9 % → 38.2 % → 32.8 %. D/E: near-zero throughout (0.20 in 2023, 0.15 in 2024) with net cash (net debt −USD 0.52 B in 2023, −USD 0.58 B in 2024). Interest coverage: 70× → 1,100× → 242× → 68× → 115×. FCF (USD): 1.33 B → 1.93 B → 0.52 B → 0.88 B → 0.81 B; positive every single year. Revenue (USD): 2.85 B → 4.70 B → 3.58 B → 3.45 B → 3.43 B. This is a textbook low-cost, high-margin single-complex miner: even after a 35 ppt gross-margin descent from the supercycle, 2025 still delivers 30 % ROE and USD 0.8 B FCF on a debt-free balance sheet. The margin compression is entirely price (coal benchmark normalisation), not cost or structural: Tabang’s ~4.3 strip ratio keeps BYAN low on the global cost curve, so it stays cash-generative even at cycle-trough prices where higher-cost peers bleed.
Bayan mines thermal coal, overwhelmingly from the Tabang complex in East Kalimantan, then moves it by haul road and barge to transhipment for export. Production ran about 57 Mt in 2024 and is guided to 69 to 72 Mt for 2025, and the capital going in is logistics: barging and transhipment throughput to carry the extra tonnes.
EconomicsStart with a number that separates this business from most infrastructure: asset turnover is about 1.0× to 1.2×, so every dollar of assets produces roughly a dollar of revenue every year. Compare BREN at 0.156×. That is the whole difference between a volume business and a capital-intensity business, and it means BYAN’s returns are decided by margin per tonne rather than by how many years it takes an asset to pay back.
Revenue went USD 2,852.2 M, 4,703.6 M, 3,581.4 M, 3,446.2 M, 3,427.6 M. The FY2022 spike is the global energy shock, not a Bayan achievement, and the three years since are the unwind, with revenue down 27% from that peak even as guided volume rose.
EconomicsA price-taker does not negotiate; it accepts a benchmark set on the other side of the world and multiplies it by tonnes. So revenue tells you almost nothing about how well the company is run, and everything about where the cycle sits. The only line management genuinely influences is the one below.
Cost of revenue rose every single year: USD 1,103.3 M, 1,532.9 M, 1,882.7 M, 2,086.2 M, 2,305.1 M. Against falling revenue that took it from 32.6% of sales in FY2022 to 67.3% in FY2025.
EconomicsThis is the part that surprises people. Mining costs are not a percentage of the coal price, they are physical: as a pit deepens the strip ratio rises, so you move more waste rock per tonne of coal, and haul distances lengthen. Fuel, contractors and equipment do not get cheaper because the benchmark fell. A commodity producer’s costs are sticky upward and its price is not, which is exactly why the squeeze compounds.
Gross margin 61.3%, 67.4%, 47.4%, 39.5%, 32.7%. Operating margin 58.8%, 62.6%, 44.9%, 35.2%, 29.2%. Net margin 42.5%, 46.3%, 34.6%, 26.8%, 22.4%.
EconomicsHere is the lesson worth carrying to every commodity name you ever read. Margin is the gap between a price you do not set and a cost you only partly control, so when both move against you the gap closes from both ends and profit falls far faster than sales: revenue −27% from the peak produced net income −65%. That asymmetry is not a warning sign in itself, it is the definition of operating leverage running in reverse, and it works just as violently upward when the benchmark turns.
Roughly USD 3.9 B of dividends over four years, including a USD 300 M interim in January 2025, against cumulative FY2022 to FY2025 profit of USD 5.11 B. Debt-to-equity 0.20 → 0.15 → 0.00, the final USD 340 M of bank loans repaid during FY2025, closing the year with no interest-bearing debt and USD 574.6 M of cash. Capex stayed at just 4% to 6% of revenue throughout.
EconomicsThis is the harvester’s answer to a cyclical asset, and it is a genuine strategic choice rather than a default. A miner that reinvests heavily at the top of a cycle owns expensive capacity at the bottom; a miner that pays the cash out and carries no debt can survive a trough without asking anyone for money. BYAN chose the second. The cost of that choice is that it is not building the thing that outlasts thermal coal, which is the counter-case a reader should hold.
Cost structureCash costs, not depreciation. Cost of revenue is USD 2,305.1 M against USD 3,427.6 M of sales, 67.3% and rising every year of the window, and it is overwhelmingly physical: waste removal, hauling, fuel, contractors and royalties. Depreciation is small for a miner of this size at USD 121.6 M, about 3.5% of revenue, which tells you the asset base is modest relative to throughput and that this is not a business where accounting charges drive the result. Interest is almost nothing (USD 8.7 M, covered 115×) now that the debt is gone, and tax takes a stable 23% to 27% of pretax profit. So the entire earnings story lives in one line, and that line is the one that has been moving against the company.
Cash cycleShort and cash-backed, which is what lets a harvester actually harvest. The cash-conversion cycle ran 31.7, 31.9, 37.0, 45.4 and 31.9 days, made of receivables around 27 to 33 days, inventory 28 to 43 days and payables 27 to 35 days, so cash comes back inside about a month. Operating cash flow covered profit in four of five years (1.25×, 0.98×, 0.59×, 1.15×, 1.27×), and the one weak year, FY2023 at 0.59×, is visible in the same table: the cycle stretched to 37 days and inventory rose from USD 118.2 M to USD 201.8 M as the boom unwound. With capex at only 4% to 6% of revenue, free cash flow stayed strongly positive throughout: USD 1,333 M, 1,932 M, 516 M, 880 M, 807 M.
Unit economicsTake one dollar of FY2025 revenue: 67.3 cents leaves immediately as cash mining cost, 3.5 cents is depreciation, and after selling and administrative costs 29.2 cents is operating profit, of which 22.4 cents reaches the shareholder. Now take one dollar of assets: it produces about 1.02 dollars of revenue and therefore about 22.8 cents of profit, which is the 22.8% return on assets in the table. Set that against BREN on the same page structure, where a dollar of assets makes 15.6 cents of revenue and 3.4 cents of profit. Two commodity-linked businesses, opposite shapes: BYAN earns a modest margin on a fast-turning asset base, BREN earns a spectacular margin on a slow one, and both end up somewhere ordinary once you multiply the two numbers together.
BYAN owns its concessions (IUP). Mining contractors, fuel, and equipment are competitively sourced; the low strip ratio means fewer inputs per tonne than most peers. The main supplier-side exposure is diesel/fuel price and contractor rates, both commodity-benchmarked.
Implication → Structurally low input intensity is the source of the cost-curve advantage. Fixed-cost leverage amplifies the coal-price cycle: hugely positive in supercycles, still cash-positive in troughs.
Thermal coal is a benchmark commodity (ICI / Newcastle): BYAN is a price-taker. Buyers (Asian power utilities, traders) have multiple sources (Australia, Russia, South Africa, other Kalimantan producers). Domestic PLN buys under the DMO price cap. No individual customer relationship confers pricing power.
Implication → Revenue is fully cycle-driven. BYAN’s only durable lever is cost, which it has in abundance, plus volume growth to defend absolute earnings as prices normalise.
A Tabang-quality deposit (giant, low-strip, near-infrastructure) is geologically scarce. New IUP issuance, RKAB quotas, AMDAL clearance, and the haul-road/barging/transhipment logistics build are multi-year, capital-heavy barriers. Post-2030 ESG financing constraints further deter greenfield thermal-coal entrants.
Implication → Incumbency + a scarce low-cost deposit protect BYAN’s position. The real long-run threat is not entry but demand erosion (energy transition), not competitive supply.
Thermal coal faces the strongest substitution pressure in the sector: LNG, solar, wind, hydro and geothermal increasingly undercut coal-fired power, with a 2030+ structural decline in OECD and eventually developing-Asia demand (JETP, coal-retirement targets). BYAN has no met-coal or clean-energy hedge: it is fully exposed to the thermal-coal demand curve.
Implication → The terminal-value question is real: BYAN’s cash flows are enormous but finite. The bull case is that low-cost Asian thermal coal outlives high-cost supply and monetises the transition’s long tail; the bear case is faster-than-expected demand decline.
BYAN competes on the seaborne thermal market against Australia, Russia, South Africa and hundreds of Indonesian producers (ADRO/AADI, ITMG, PTBA, Berau, plus unlisted). At ~6,900 kcal/kg its coal targets high-efficiency plants, a partly different segment from PTBA’s lower-CV coal. Competition is on delivered cost, not price (all benchmark-priced).
Implication → BYAN’s cost-curve position lets it win volume through the cycle and survive troughs that shut higher-cost supply. Delivered-cost leadership is the entire competitive story.
Clean on the accounting and honest on the cash, with one comparability trap that matters more here than almost anywhere else in this roster. The clean part: operating cash flow exceeded net income in four of the five years, the effective tax rate is stable at 23% to 27% with no unexplained wedge, and there are no acquisition, revaluation or one-off gains propping up any year. The FY2023 dip in cash conversion to 0.59× is a working-capital effect you can see in the same table rather than a quality problem: the cycle stretched to 37 days and inventory rose 71% as the boom unwound, and it reversed. The trap is FY2022. That year shows a 115.0% return on equity and a 67.4% gross margin, both produced by a global energy shock rather than by anything the company did differently, and both are useless as a baseline. Measure any trend from FY2021 or FY2023 instead. A reader who anchors on FY2022 will conclude the business has collapsed; a reader who anchors correctly will see a cyclical business at a low point still earning a 29.9% return on equity.
| Period | One-off item | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| FY2022 | The global energy shock: revenue +65% to USD 4,703.6 M and gross margin 67.4%, on a benchmark price set far outside the company’s control. | Return on equity of 115.0% and net income of USD 2,178.5 M, both the highest of the window by a wide margin. It is a price event, not a run-rate: every subsequent decline is measured against a year that could not repeat, which is why the forward model normalises the cycle rather than extrapolating from it. |
Cash conversionStrong and simple. Operating cash flow ran USD 1,510.1 M, 2,129.6 M, 731.4 M, 1,059.8 M and 977.6 M, against capex of only USD 177.2 M, 198.0 M, 215.8 M, 179.6 M and 170.9 M, so free cash flow was positive in every year including the worst of the unwind. Note one honest limit in the ratio table: return on invested capital and debt-to-equity begin in FY2023 because the seeded debt line does. The pre-2023 picture is not a mystery though, since interest cover of 69.8× in FY2021 and 1,100.3× in FY2022 says borrowings were already immaterial then.
One of the purest harvesters in the roster, and unusually disciplined about it. Roughly USD 3.9 B of dividends went out over four years against USD 5.11 B of cumulative FY2022 to FY2025 profit, so something close to four fifths of everything earned was returned rather than reinvested. Capex never exceeded 6% of revenue. And the balance sheet went the right way at the right time: debt-to-equity 0.20 → 0.15 → 0.00, with the final USD 340 M of bank loans repaid during FY2025, so the company enters a soft coal market owing nothing. Equity still grew from USD 1,862.9 M to USD 2,694.6 M despite that payout, because the FY2022 windfall was large enough to fund both. Contrast DCII, which pays nothing and reinvests everything: both are coherent, and which one is right depends entirely on whether the asset in front of you has a future worth building into.
DeploymentFive years of cash in one line each. Out to shareholders: roughly USD 3.9 B of dividends, including USD 300 M in January 2025 alone. Out to lenders: total liabilities fell from USD 1,950.2 M at the FY2022 peak to USD 680.5 M, with interest-bearing debt reaching zero. Into the ground: capex of USD 177.2 M, 198.0 M, 215.8 M, 179.6 M and 170.9 M, aimed at barging and transhipment capacity for the volume ramp rather than at new reserves. Left on the balance sheet: USD 574.6 M of cash, down from USD 1,826.9 M at the peak because the dividends were paid out of it. No equity was ever raised.
Returns trendReturn on equity 67.4%, 115.0%, 65.8%, 41.9%, 29.9%, and return on invested capital 62.9%, 40.5%, 28.7% for the three years the engine can form invested capital. Read the compression correctly: against a cost of capital of 11.08% even the FY2025 trough clears the bar by roughly 18 percentage points, so this is a company earning far above its cost of capital at what looks like the bad end of its cycle. The valuation is where the argument sits. At Rp12,026 the shares trade on 28.9× earnings, 8.6× book and 19.4× EV/EBITDA, which are growth-company multiples on a price-taker whose earnings have fallen three years running, and the cyclically normalised forward DCF sits about 33% BELOW the price. That is the opposite posture to the coal harvesters elsewhere in this roster, where normalised models sit far above the price. Two honest caveats sit on either side of that gap. The normalisation window (FY2021 to FY2025) contains one boom and no genuine trough, so the mid-cycle margins behind it are probably still flattered, which would make the model too generous rather than too harsh. Against that, a debt-free balance sheet and a four-fifths payout are worth a real premium in a cyclical business, and no perpetuity model prices optionality like that well.
Gross margin fell 67.4% → 32.7% in three years because the received price fell while cost of revenue ROSE 50% (USD 1,532.9 M → 2,305.1 M). The cost half is structural rather than cyclical: strip ratios and haul distances only go one way as a pit matures, so a recovery in the coal price restores the revenue side without restoring the cost side. Watch cost of revenue per tonne, not the benchmark price, for whether this stabilises.
Effectively all of the revenue is thermal coal, overwhelmingly from one complex in East Kalimantan, sold into export markets and governed by Indonesian production quotas and domestic-market obligations (RKAB and DMO). There is no second product and no second basin to absorb a shock in the first, and the long-run demand question for thermal coal sits underneath all of it.
28.9× earnings, 8.6× book and 19.4× EV/EBITDA on a company whose net income has fallen three years running, with the normalised DCF about 33% below the price. For a price-taker the combination that hurts most is a high multiple applied to earnings that are themselves cyclical, because the multiple and the earnings can compress together. The dividend yield of 2.2% does not cushion much at this level.
No concern whatsoever, and it is the strongest part of the case. Zero interest-bearing debt after repaying the last USD 340 M in FY2025, USD 574.6 M of cash, a current ratio of 2.66 and interest cover of 115×. A cyclical business that owes nothing at the bottom of its cycle has the one thing that matters most there: time.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Indonesia controls >60 % of global nickel supply and is the world's largest thermal-coal exporter; hilirisasi mandates in-country ore processing, reshaping value chains from raw ore to battery-grade products.