Equal · Financial Report

Citra Marga Nusaphala Persada

CMNP/FY2021–FY2025/Educational Analysis/IDR/Data source · 2026-07-06

ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Tax burden	0.89x	0.78x	0.72x	0.83x	0.88x
Interest burden	0.84x	0.95x	0.82x	0.74x	0.72x
Operating margindriver	22.3%	27.7%	22.6%	41.8%	28.1%
Asset turnover	0.29x	0.24x	0.35x	0.17x	0.22x
Leverage (equity mult.)	1.46x	1.56x	1.66x	1.64x	1.61x
= Return on Equity (consolidated)	7.0%	7.8%	7.9%	7.2%	6.3%
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)	7.9%	6.7%	6.9%	6.8%	6.5%

Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.

Liquidity

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities)	0.67x	0.47x	0.37x	1.08x	0.96x
Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities)	0.67x	0.47x	0.37x	1.08x	0.96x
Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities)	0.29x	0.09x	0.05x	0.05x	0.35x
Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities)	-Rp 1.2 T	-Rp 2.1 T	-Rp 2.2 T	Rp 194 M	-Rp 142 M

Leverage & Solvency

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity)	0.15x	0.24x	0.41x	0.46x	0.42x
Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity)	0.46x	0.56x	0.66x	0.64x	0.61x
Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets)	0.10x	0.16x	0.25x	0.28x	0.26x
Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash)	Rp 501 M	Rp 2.5 T	Rp 5.2 T	Rp 6.5 T	Rp 5.8 T
Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense)	6.26x	19.86x	5.46x	3.82x	3.55x
Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity)	1.46x	1.56x	1.66x	1.64x	1.61x

Profitability

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue)	25.8%	32.7%	25.2%	47.2%	33.6%
Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue)	22.3%	27.7%	22.6%	41.8%	28.1%
Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue)	16.6%	20.5%	13.4%	25.6%	17.9%
EBITDA(EBIT + D&A)	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 1.4 T	Rp 1.9 T	Rp 2.0 T	Rp 1.9 T
EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue)	24.9%	31.5%	25.1%	47.7%	33.0%
Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets)	4.8%	5.0%	4.7%	4.4%	3.9%
Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners))	7.7%	8.8%	8.9%	8.0%	7.0%
Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax)	0.89x	0.78x	0.72x	0.83x	0.88x
Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT)	0.84x	0.95x	0.82x	0.74x	0.72x
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)	7.9%	6.7%	6.9%	6.8%	6.5%

Operations & Efficiency

Turnover	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets)	0.29x	0.24x	0.35x	0.17x	0.22x
Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory)inventory is zero	—	—	—	—	—
Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables)	11.57x	12.28x	42.80x	11.13x	12.56x
Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables)	23.00x	14.12x	3.77x	2.14x	4.32x

Conversion Period	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS)	0.0 days	0.0 days	0.0 days	0.0 days	0.0 days
Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue)	31.5 days	29.7 days	8.5 days	32.8 days	29.1 days
Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS)	15.9 days	25.8 days	96.8 days	170.3 days	84.5 days
Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO)	15.7 days	3.9 days	-88.3 days	-137.6 days	-55.5 days

Cash Flow

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex)	Rp 1.3 T	Rp 1.2 T	Rp 1.3 T	Rp 813 M	Rp 1.2 T

Valuation

price as-of 2026-07-31fundamentals: FY2025

Price Rp 1,339 · market cap Rp 9.0 T

Multiple	CMNP	Peer median	vs median
P/E	8.65x	8.65x	0%
P/B	0.61x	0.87x	-30%
P/S	1.55x	1.76x	-12%
EV/EBITDA	8.64x	9.19x	-6%
EV/EBIT	10.14x	12.25x	-17%
EV/Sales	2.85x	5.11x	-44%
FCF Yield	12.97%	12.97%	0%
Dividend Yield	—	4.48%(4/5)	—

EV = mkt cap Rp 9.0 T + debt Rp 7.0 T − cash Rp 1.1 T + minority interest Rp 1.7 T = Rp 17 T

What the price implies

At today’s price, the market is paying for 9.7%/yr FCF growth (6.5% at 12.0% to 12.7% at 16.0% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: -3.1% FCF · 6.9% revenue.

Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 12.0–16.0% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.

Forward DCF (glass-box)

This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.

Assumption	Value	Basis
Rf (risk-free)	7.26%	Indonesia 10Y government bond, re-verified 31 Jul 2026
ERP (Rm − Rf)	6.69%	Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%)
β	0.68 → 1.12	Transportation (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.78
Cost of equity	14.74%	Rf + β × ERP
Cost of debt	8.04%	median interest coverage 5.5x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a A2/A synthetic rating and a 0.78% default spread, over a 7.26% base (Indonesia 10Y 7.26%, already the sovereign rate). Its BOOK rate is 6.6%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms)
Tax rate	17.2%	median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest)
WACC	11.20%	56% E × CoE + 44% D × Kd × (1 − t)
Revenue growth (yr 1, fading)	6.9%	delivered 4-yr revenue CAGR 6.9%, fading linearly to terminal
EBIT margin	30.8%	mean EBIT margin, last 3 FYs
D&A / revenue	4.4%	mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs
Capex / revenue	0.8%	mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 11.2% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 22.3% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 10.6% of revenue against depreciation of 4.4%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral
ΔNWC / Δrevenue	-19.6%	median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP)
Terminal growth	2.5%	BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%)

Growth path

year 1 → fading to terminal over 5 yrs6.9%

EBIT margin30.8%

WACC11.2%

Terminal growth2.5%

Explicit years5

FCFF drivers

FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − capex − ΔNWC

Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.

Capex

% of revenue0.8%

D&A

% of revenue4.4%

ΔNWC

% of the CHANGE in revenue-19.6%

Year	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	T∞
Growth	6.9%	5.8%	4.7%	3.6%	2.5%	2.5%
Revenue	Rp 6.2 T	Rp 6.6 T	Rp 6.9 T	Rp 7.1 T	Rp 7.3 T	Rp 7.5 T
EBIT	Rp 1.9 T	Rp 2.0 T	Rp 2.1 T	Rp 2.2 T	Rp 2.3 T	Rp 2.3 T
NOPAT	Rp 1.6 T	Rp 1.7 T	Rp 1.8 T	Rp 1.8 T	Rp 1.9 T	Rp 1.9 T
+ D&A	Rp 275 M	Rp 291 M	Rp 305 M	Rp 316 M	Rp 324 M	Rp 332 M
− Capex	Rp 50 M	Rp 53 M	Rp 56 M	Rp 58 M	Rp 59 M	Rp 795 M
− ΔNWC	-Rp 79 M	-Rp 71 M	-Rp 61 M	-Rp 49 M	-Rp 35 M	-Rp 36 M
FCFF	Rp 1.9 T	Rp 2.0 T	Rp 2.1 T	Rp 2.1 T	Rp 2.2 T	Rp 1.5 T
PV	Rp 1.7 T	Rp 1.6 T	Rp 1.5 T	Rp 1.4 T	Rp 1.3 T	Rp 10 T

Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding

EV = PV(explicit) Rp 7.5 T + PV(TV) Rp 10 T = Rp 18 T · TV 57% of EV · − net debt Rp 5.8 T − minority Rp 1.7 T = equity Rp 9.9 T ÷ shares outstanding

Model output: Rp 1,483/share (+11% vs price Rp 1,339)· exit-multiple check (9.2x): Rp 2,063

Under these assumptions the model lands 11% above today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for slower growth, a thinner margin, or a higher discount rate than the inputs here assume.

Sensitivity (per share, Rp)

g \ WACC	10.2%	11.2%	12.2%
2.0%	1,634	1,364	1,146
2.5%	1,785	1,483	1,241
3.0%	1,955	1,615	1,347

Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.

Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.

Macro backdropfull backdrop + sensitivity map →

BI Rate 5.75%IDR/USD 18,05810Y government bond yield 7.26%Inflation 3.34%(as-of 2026-07-31)

BI rate ↑(M)GDP/consumption ↑(M)

Income Statement

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Revenue	Rp 4.4 T	Rp 4.5 T	Rp 7.6 T	Rp 4.1 T	Rp 5.8 T
Cost of Goods Sold	Rp 3.3 T	Rp 3.0 T	Rp 5.7 T	Rp 2.2 T	Rp 3.9 T
Gross Profit	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 1.5 T	Rp 1.9 T	Rp 1.9 T	Rp 1.9 T
Operating Income (EBIT)	Rp 991 M	Rp 1.2 T	Rp 1.7 T	Rp 1.7 T	Rp 1.6 T
Interest Expense	Rp 158 M	Rp 62 M	Rp 317 M	Rp 450 M	Rp 459 M
Net Income	Rp 738 M	Rp 914 M	Rp 1.0 T	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 1.0 T
Net Income Attributable to Owners	Rp 738 M	Rp 914 M	Rp 1.0 T	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 1.0 T
Depreciation & Amortization	Rp 116 M	Rp 172 M	Rp 196 M	Rp 241 M	Rp 283 M

Balance Sheet

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Cash & Equivalents	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 357 M	Rp 159 M	Rp 133 M	Rp 1.1 T
Accounts Receivable	Rp 384 M	Rp 363 M	Rp 179 M	Rp 369 M	Rp 462 M
Inventory	Rp 0	Rp 0	Rp 0	Rp 0	Rp 0
Current Assets	Rp 2.5 T	Rp 1.9 T	Rp 1.3 T	Rp 2.7 T	Rp 3.1 T
Total Assets	Rp 15 T	Rp 18 T	Rp 22 T	Rp 24 T	Rp 27 T
Accounts Payable	Rp 143 M	Rp 213 M	Rp 1.5 T	Rp 1.0 T	Rp 892 M
Current Liabilities	Rp 3.7 T	Rp 4.1 T	Rp 3.5 T	Rp 2.5 T	Rp 3.2 T
Total Liabilities	Rp 4.9 T	Rp 6.6 T	Rp 8.6 T	Rp 9.4 T	Rp 10 T
Total Interest-Bearing Debt	Rp 1.6 T	Rp 2.9 T	Rp 5.4 T	Rp 6.6 T	Rp 7.0 T
Total Equity	Rp 11 T	Rp 12 T	Rp 13 T	Rp 15 T	Rp 17 T
Equity Attributable to Owners	Rp 9.6 T	Rp 10 T	Rp 11 T	Rp 13 T	Rp 15 T

Cash Flow Statement

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Operating Cash Flow	Rp 1.3 T	Rp 1.2 T	Rp 1.3 T	Rp 863 M	Rp 1.2 T
Capital Expenditure	Rp 29 M	Rp 23 M	Rp 22 M	Rp 50 M	Rp 52 M

Company Deep Analysis

Reviewed: 2026-07-31

Analyst Verdict

CMNP revenue (T IDR): 4.44 (2021) → 4.46 (2022) → 7.65 (2023, peak) → 4.11 (2024, trough) → 5.80 (2025); lumpy, not a smooth toll-collection curve. Gross margin: 25.8% → 32.7% → 25.2% → 47.2% (2024 high) → 33.6%. OPM: 22.3% → 27.7% → 22.6% → 41.8% → 28.1% (tracks gross margin closely). Net margin: 16.6% → 20.5% → 13.4% → 25.6% → 17.9%. ROE: 7.7% → 8.8% → 8.9% → 8.0% → 7.0%. ROIC: 7.9% → 6.8% → 6.9% → 6.8% → 6.5%. D/E: 0.15× → 0.24× → 0.41× → 0.46× → 0.42×. Net debt (T IDR): 0.50 → 2.51 → 5.23 → 6.51 → 5.83; more than a 10x increase over the window. FCF (T IDR): +1.32 → +1.22 → +1.32 → +0.81 → +1.16; positive every year but not keeping pace with the net-debt build. Current ratio: 0.67× → 0.47× → 0.37× → 1.08× → 0.96×; below 1× (current liabilities exceed current assets) for three of five years. The pattern most likely reflects Indonesian toll-concession (service-concession/ISAK 16 style) accounting, where construction-phase revenue on new sections is booked at cost-like margins alongside high-margin toll-collection revenue: the FY2023 revenue peak (7.65tn) paired with a below-average gross margin (25.2%), and the FY2024 revenue trough (4.11tn) paired with the highest margin of the series (47.2%), are consistent with a heavy-construction year followed by a mostly-toll-collection year; an interpretation, not a disclosed segment split. The dominant, unambiguous fact regardless of that interpretation: net debt grew more than 10x and D/E nearly tripled over five years, funding real capital investment (see recentDevelopments).

Business Model

Toll-road concessionaire, established April 13, 1987 as a consortium of state-owned enterprises and national private companies; public since January 10, 1995. Operates two flagship concessions: the Ir. Wiyoto Wiyono toll road (Cawang–Tanjung Priok–Ancol Timur–Pluit, "Tol Dalam Kota" / part of the Jakarta Inner Ring Road, operating since 1990, concession contractually running to March 31, 2025) and the Waru–Juanda toll road in Surabaya (operating since 2008, concession to May 21, 2040). Also jointly manages the North-South Link and Harbor Road sections with Jasa Marga (JSMR, an existing comp in this roster) as part of the Jakarta Inner Ring Road system, and founded PT Jakarta Toll Road Development in 2011 to manage six further JORR sections. Five subsidiaries extend the group: Citra Margatama Surabaya, Citra Waspputowa, Citra Persada Infrastruktur, Citra Marga Nusantara Propertindo, and Citra Marga Lintas Jabar.

Segments

Toll-road operation and management across the Jakarta Inner Ring Road system (Tol Dalam Kota plus JORR sections via subsidiaries) and the Waru–Juanda road in Surabaya. Exact revenue split between pure toll-collection and concession construction-phase activity is not independently confirmed here, but the swings in reported revenue (4.1–7.65tn) and gross margin (25.2–47.2%) across the five years are consistent with a mix that shifts year to year: see verdict for the interpretation.

Value Chain & Positioning

Concession award (government BOT-style agreement) → construction/widening of toll sections → toll collection over the concession period → concession expiry/handover (or renewal). CMNP’s revenue mixes the construction and collection phases across its multiple concessions and subsidiaries simultaneously, which is why blended margins swing more than a pure single-road toll collector would.

Competitive Forces (Porter’s 5)

Supplier powerMedium

How much leverage input/funding providers have over pricing.

Construction contractors and materials (asphalt, cement, steel) for widening/new sections carry normal input-cost exposure; financing costs (bank debt funding the capex ramp) are a bigger structural input than physical supplies.

Implication → Rising net debt (10x over five years) and D/E (0.15×→0.42×) show financing cost, not physical input cost, is the more consequential exposure here.

Buyer powerLow

How much leverage customers have to push prices down.

Toll tariffs are government-regulated (periodic inflation-indexed adjustments) rather than negotiated with individual drivers; there is no meaningful buyer concentration.

Implication → Revenue per vehicle is largely policy-set; volume (traffic growth) and tariff-adjustment timing are the real levers, not price negotiation.

Threat of new entryLow

How easily new competitors can enter the market.

Toll concessions are government-awarded, capital-intensive, and geographically fixed: a new entrant cannot simply build a competing road on the same corridor.

Implication → Existing concessions are structurally defended; the real threat is concession non-renewal by the government, not competitive entry.

Threat of substitutesLow

Risk that alternative products/services replace demand.

Arterial (non-toll) roads are the substitute, but congestion and travel-time savings keep toll roads attractive for the routes CMNP operates, especially the dense Jakarta corridor.

Implication → Demand is structurally resilient, tied to overall vehicle-ownership and urban-mobility growth rather than toll-road-specific competition.

Competitive rivalryLow

Intensity of competition among existing players.

Toll roads are geographic monopolies on their own corridors; CMNP does not compete head-to-head with JSMR or other operators on the same route, though all compete for future concession awards from the government.

Implication → The competitive question is less about today’s traffic and more about which operator wins the next concession tender.

Moat / Competitive Edge

Moderate-to-wide on existing concessions (a government-granted geographic monopoly is a real, durable moat while it lasts), but time-limited by construction: the flagship Ir. Wiyoto Wiyono concession contractually ran to March 31, 2025, a date within this narrative’s own FY2025 window, and renewal/handover status is not independently confirmed here. A concession-based moat is only as durable as the concession itself; the capex-funded expansion into JORR sections and Waru–Juanda (running to 2040) is the reinvestment that extends the moat beyond any single expiring concession.

Key Drivers & Sensitivities

Ir. Wiyoto Wiyono concession status (post-March 2025)
The flagship Jakarta concession’s contractual term ended March 31, 2025, per the company’s own materials. Whether it was renewed, extended, or handed over is not independently confirmed here: this is the single biggest open question for CMNP’s forward revenue base and needs a direct check before any forward-looking claim.
Capex ramp / new-section construction
Net debt grew more than 10x (Rp0.5tn→Rp5.8tn) over the five years, funding JORR-section and network expansion; this is the direct driver of the rising D/E (0.15×→0.42×) and the revenue/margin lumpiness described in the verdict.
Traffic volume growth
Vehicle-population and urban-mobility growth in Jakarta and Surabaya directly drive toll-collection revenue on the operating concessions, independent of the construction-phase accounting noise.
Tariff-adjustment timing
Government-set, inflation-indexed periodic tariff increases are a direct revenue lever on operating concessions, though the timing and magnitude are outside company control.
Working-capital / current-ratio position
Current ratio ran below 1× for three of five years (as low as 0.37× in FY2023) before improving to just above and just below 1× in FY2024–25 (1.08×, 0.96×): a tight working-capital position typical of capital-intensive concession businesses, worth monitoring alongside the rising leverage.

Linkages

Tied to vehicle-population growth and urban mobility in Jakarta and Surabaya, government toll-tariff policy, and infrastructure-financing conditions (interest rates, given the rising debt load). Jointly linked to JSMR (an existing comp) via shared management of Jakarta Inner Ring Road sections. A GDP-linked, policy-mediated infrastructure business.

Recent Developments

Revenue is volatile in a way that obscures a steadier business: Rp4.44tn, Rp4.46tn, Rp7.65tn, Rp4.11tn and Rp5.80tn, while net income barely moved after FY2022 at Rp0.91tn, Rp1.02tn, Rp1.05tn and Rp1.04tn. Gross margin swings with revenue, peaking at 47.2% in FY2024 and back to 33.6%. The durable change is leverage: net debt rose from Rp0.50tn in FY2021 to Rp6.51tn in FY2024 before easing to Rp5.83tn, debt to equity from 0.15× to 0.42×, and interest cover fell from 19.86× in FY2022 to 3.55×. Liquidity has been tight throughout, with the current ratio below 1.0 in four of the five years and 0.96× now. ROIC drifted down across the window, 7.9% to 6.5%.

Regulation

Regulated by the Ministry of Public Works (toll-road concession terms, tariff-adjustment formulas) and BPJT (Badan Pengatur Jalan Tol, the toll-road regulatory body). Concession renewal/extension terms are government-negotiated, not market-set. Listed on the IDX.

ESG & Sustainability

Material issues: road-safety management, construction-phase environmental impact (widening/new sections), and community/traffic impact during construction. Governance is shaped by the concession relationship with government regulators (BPJT) and joint management arrangements with JSMR. Infrastructure investment supports urban mobility and economic activity along its corridors.

Risks

Ir. Wiyoto Wiyono concession contractually ended March 31, 2025: renewal/handover status unconfirmed, a material open question for forward revenue
Net debt grew more than 10x over five years (Rp0.5tn→Rp5.8tn), with D/E nearly tripling (0.15×→0.42×)
Current ratio below 1× in three of five years: tight working capital typical of capex-heavy concession businesses
Revenue and margin lumpiness tied to construction-vs-collection revenue mix makes year-to-year comparisons noisy
Government-set tariff and concession-renewal decisions are outside company control

Outlook & What to Watch

Base case depends heavily on the unconfirmed Ir. Wiyoto Wiyono renewal outcome: if renewed/extended, revenue stabilises near FY2025 levels with continued leverage from the capex programme; if not, a material revenue base is lost. Bull: renewal secured plus JORR-section ramp-up drives revenue and margin recovery toward the FY2024 high. Bear: non-renewal combined with continued high capex spending pressures both revenue and leverage simultaneously. This is the clearest case in the current roster where the single most important fact (concession status) is unconfirmed and should be checked before any investment-relevant conclusion. (Interpretation, not a forecast.)

Key KPIs

Ir. Wiyoto Wiyono concession status: Contractually ended March 31, 2025: renewal/handover unconfirmed, the single most important open item
Net debt: Rp0.50tn → Rp5.83tn (FY21–25): more than 10x growth funding the capex ramp
D/E: 0.15× → 0.42×, nearly tripling
Revenue lumpiness: Rp4.1–7.65tn range, likely construction-vs-collection mix (interpretation)
Current ratio: Sub-1× in 3 of 5 years: tight working capital

Sources

Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.