Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | 0.79x | 0.85x | 0.88x | 0.91x | 0.89x |
| Interest burden | 1.00x | 1.00x | 1.00x | 1.00x | 1.00x |
| Operating margin | 24.6% | 19.7% | 18.2% | 18.5% | 21.2% |
| Asset turnoverdriver | 0.73x | 1.02x | 1.10x | 1.10x | 1.23x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 1.19x | 1.18x | 1.19x | 1.21x | 1.29x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 16.8% | 20.2% | 20.9% | 22.5% | 30.0% |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 16.9% | 20.2% | 20.9% | 22.5% | 30.0% |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 5.72x | 4.39x | 4.28x | 3.16x | 2.23x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 5.12x | 3.27x | 3.42x | 2.47x | 1.51x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 4.33x | 2.36x | 2.07x | 0.92x | 0.50x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | Rp 4.0 T | Rp 3.1 T | Rp 3.5 T | Rp 3.0 T | Rp 2.3 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 0.01x | 0.01x | 0.00x | 0.00x | 0.00x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 0.19x | 0.18x | 0.19x | 0.21x | 0.29x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.01x | 0.01x | 0.00x | 0.00x | 0.00x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | -Rp 3.6 T | -Rp 2.1 T | -Rp 2.2 T | -Rp 1.3 T | -Rp 947 M |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 518.57x | 486.98x | 1,477.61x | 15,611.95x | 29,550.40x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 1.19x | 1.18x | 1.19x | 1.21x | 1.29x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 48.1% | 41.7% | 41.5% | 45.2% | 45.2% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 24.6% | 19.7% | 18.2% | 18.5% | 21.2% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 19.3% | 16.6% | 16.0% | 16.8% | 19.0% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 2.5 T |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 26.1% | 21.1% | 20.2% | 20.6% | 23.2% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 14.1% | 17.0% | 17.6% | 18.5% | 23.3% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 16.8% | 20.2% | 20.9% | 22.5% | 30.0% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 0.79x | 0.85x | 0.88x | 0.91x | 0.89x |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 1.00x | 1.00x | 1.00x | 1.00x | 1.00x |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 16.9% | 20.2% | 20.9% | 22.5% | 30.0% |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.73x | 1.02x | 1.10x | 1.10x | 1.23x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 4.19x | 3.62x | 4.99x | 5.15x | 4.37x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 6.46x | 8.27x | 8.84x | 10.01x | 10.30x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 6.31x | 8.79x | 8.19x | 7.54x | 5.94x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 87.1 days | 100.9 days | 73.1 days | 70.9 days | 83.6 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 56.5 days | 44.1 days | 41.3 days | 36.4 days | 35.4 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 57.9 days | 41.5 days | 44.6 days | 48.4 days | 61.5 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 85.8 days | 103.5 days | 69.8 days | 59.0 days | 57.5 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | Rp 433 M | -Rp 243 M | Rp 934 M | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 1.3 T |
Price Rp 4,603 · market cap Rp 37 T
| Multiple | CMRY | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 17.96x | 11.30x | +59% |
| P/B | 5.38x | 1.86x | +189% |
| P/S | 3.40x | 1.09x | +213% |
| EV/EBITDA | 14.32x | 6.93x | +107% |
| EV/EBIT | 15.62x | 7.67x | +104% |
| EV/Sales | 3.32x | 1.40x | +137% |
| FCF Yield | 3.45% | 7.97% | -57% |
| Dividend Yield | 4.35% | 3.80% | +14% |
EV = mkt cap Rp 37 T + debt Rp 427 jt − cash Rp 948 M + minority interest Rp 183 jt = Rp 36 T
At today’s price, the market is paying for 20.0%/yr FCF growth (16.4% at 12.0% to 23.3% at 16.0% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: 30.6% FCF · 27.2% revenue.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 12.0–16.0% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 7.26% | Indonesia 10Y government bond, re-verified 31 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.46 → 0.46 | Food Processing (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.00 |
| Cost of equity | 10.34% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 7.66% | median interest coverage 1477.6x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a Aaa/AAA synthetic rating and a 0.40% default spread, over a 7.26% base (Indonesia 10Y 7.26%, already the sovereign rate). Its BOOK rate is 18.0%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms) |
| Tax rate | 12.1% | median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest) |
| WACC | 10.34% | 100% E × CoE + 0% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 27.2% | delivered 4-yr revenue CAGR 27.2%, fading linearly to terminal |
| EBIT margin | 19.3% | mean EBIT margin, last 3 FYs |
| D&A / revenue | 2.0% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 5.5% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 10.3% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 24.2% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 6.0% of revenue against depreciation of 2.0%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | 4.5% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 27.2% | 21.0% | 14.9% | 8.7% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | Rp 14 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 19 T | Rp 21 T | Rp 21 T | Rp 22 T |
| EBIT | Rp 2.6 T | Rp 3.2 T | Rp 3.7 T | Rp 4.0 T | Rp 4.1 T | Rp 4.2 T |
| NOPAT | Rp 2.3 T | Rp 2.8 T | Rp 3.2 T | Rp 3.5 T | Rp 3.6 T | Rp 3.7 T |
| + D&A | Rp 271 M | Rp 327 M | Rp 376 M | Rp 409 M | Rp 419 M | Rp 429 M |
| − Capex | Rp 752 M | Rp 910 M | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.3 T |
| − ΔNWC | Rp 130 M | Rp 128 M | Rp 110 M | Rp 74 M | Rp 23 M | Rp 24 M |
| FCFF | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 2.1 T | Rp 2.4 T | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 2.8 T | Rp 2.8 T |
| PV | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 22 T |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding
EV = PV(explicit) Rp 8.6 T + PV(TV) Rp 22 T = Rp 30 T · TV 72% of EV · − net debt -Rp 947 M − minority Rp 183 jt = equity Rp 31 T ÷ shares outstanding
Model output: Rp 3,946/share (-14% vs price Rp 4,603)· exit-multiple check (6.9x): Rp 3,610
Under these assumptions the model lands 14% below today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for faster growth, a fatter margin, or a lower discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 9.3% | 10.3% | 11.3% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | 4,250 | 3,739 | 3,338 |
| 2.5% | 4,523 | 3,946 | 3,499 |
| 3.0% | 4,840 | 4,180 | 3,679 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | Rp 4.1 T | Rp 6.4 T | Rp 7.8 T | Rp 9.0 T | Rp 11 T |
| Cost of Goods Sold | Rp 2.1 T | Rp 3.7 T | Rp 4.5 T | Rp 4.9 T | Rp 5.9 T |
| Gross Profit | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 3.2 T | Rp 4.1 T | Rp 4.9 T |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 2.3 T |
| Interest Expense | Rp 1.9 M | Rp 2.6 M | Rp 957 jt | Rp 107 jt | Rp 77 jt |
| Net Income | Rp 790 M | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 2.0 T |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | Rp 790 M | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 2.0 T |
| Depreciation & Amortization | Rp 62 M | Rp 91 M | Rp 153 M | Rp 185 M | Rp 208 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | Rp 3.7 T | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 948 M |
| Accounts Receivable | Rp 634 M | Rp 771 M | Rp 879 M | Rp 901 M | Rp 1.0 T |
| Inventory | Rp 507 M | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 910 M | Rp 961 M | Rp 1.3 T |
| Current Assets | Rp 4.8 T | Rp 4.0 T | Rp 4.5 T | Rp 4.4 T | Rp 4.2 T |
| Total Assets | Rp 5.6 T | Rp 6.2 T | Rp 7.0 T | Rp 8.2 T | Rp 8.7 T |
| Accounts Payable | Rp 337 M | Rp 423 M | Rp 555 M | Rp 656 M | Rp 989 M |
| Current Liabilities | Rp 845 M | Rp 916 M | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.9 T |
| Total Liabilities | Rp 907 M | Rp 965 M | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 2.0 T |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | Rp 42 M | Rp 35 M | Rp 0 | Rp 1.3 M | Rp 427 jt |
| Total Equity | Rp 4.7 T | Rp 5.3 T | Rp 5.9 T | Rp 6.8 T | Rp 6.8 T |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | Rp 4.7 T | Rp 5.3 T | Rp 5.9 T | Rp 6.8 T | Rp 6.8 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | Rp 726 M | Rp 486 M | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 1.9 T |
| Capital Expenditure | Rp 293 M | Rp 729 M | Rp 490 M | Rp 379 M | Rp 646 M |
Cisarua Mountain Dairy (Cimory) is the premium consumer star of the group, selling yogurt, probiotic drinks and UHT milk under Cimory plus protein and processed meats under Kanzler. It stands out in F&B on two counts: the highest gross margin (~45%) and the fastest-rising returns (ROE 20%→30%, FY22–25), both on a net-cash balance sheet. Its edge is premium, health-led positioning combined with a distinctive direct-selling model (the “Miss Cimory” sellers) running alongside modern trade. Because it sits at the premium, discretionary end, it is more consumption-cyclical than a staples name. This is the growth-and-quality leader of Indonesian F&B, and what moves it is premiumisation and health demand on one side and input costs (milk, meat, FX) on the other.
CMRY sources dairy and meat inputs, partly imported, to feed two lines: Cimory dairy and Kanzler protein.
EconomicsInputs (milk, meat, FX) are the main cost swing; the premium positioning is what lets CMRY price well above that cost.
It turns those inputs into premium yogurt, probiotic drinks and UHT milk (Cimory) and sausages and nuggets (Kanzler), aimed at health-conscious, protein-seeking consumers.
EconomicsPremium, health positioning commands the highest gross margin in F&B (~45%): the consumer pays for the brand and the health claim, not the milk.
Alongside supermarkets, CMRY runs a direct-selling force, the "Miss Cimory" sellers, reaching neighbourhoods door to door.
EconomicsThe direct channel is a distribution asset few can copy: it reaches consumers modern trade misses, drives volume, and deepens the brand, all at high margin.
Revenue more than doubled in five years (Rp4.1tn→Rp10.7tn) on light capex and a net-cash balance sheet.
EconomicsRising margins on a small, net-cash equity base is what drove ROE from 20% to 30%: growth funded internally, not by leverage.
CMRY distributes around 94% of earnings as dividends while still growing.
EconomicsAn unusual signal: a fast grower that funds expansion from cash flow yet returns nearly all profit, only possible because the model needs so little reinvested capital.
Cost structureInput in, premium brand out. The cost base is milk and meat (some imported, so FX-linked); the margin comes from premium, health-positioned branding that prices well above input cost, which is why gross margin is the highest in F&B at ~45%. The distinctive "Miss Cimory" direct-selling channel adds reach at high margin rather than paying it away to retailers.
Cash cycleFast and improving. As CMRY scaled, receivables fell from ~15% of revenue to under 10%, so growth released rather than consumed working capital, and operating cash flow broadly tracks net income (OCF/NI around 1.0 across the window). Net cash throughout, so expansion and a very high dividend are both funded from operations.
Unit economicsPer product, the milk or meat is a modest share of a premium shelf price and the rest is brand and health-claim margin. Because the asset base and working capital are light and shrinking relative to sales, rising margins compound into a fast-rising ROE (20%→30%), and the model still spins off enough cash to pay out ~94%.
Milk and meat inputs (some imported, FX-linked) drive the cost base; scale is still growing.
Implication → Input and FX costs are a margin variable, but premium pricing absorbs them well (gross ~45%).
Premium, health-positioned brands with loyal consumers; direct selling deepens the relationship.
Implication → Strong pricing power: the foundation of sector-leading margins.
Premium dairy/protein is attractive and replicable by larger players, though the brand and “Miss Cimory” model are hard to copy.
Implication → Success invites competition; the direct-selling moat and innovation are the defence.
Many dairy, snack and protein alternatives; premium positioning is discretionary.
Implication → More substitution risk than staples: premiumisation must keep justifying the price.
Competes with dairy and processed-meat players, but its premium/health niche and direct model differentiate it.
Implication → Differentiation limits direct price wars; growth attracts new entrants.
High-quality and cash-backed. Net income roughly triples across the window (Rp0.8tn→Rp2.0tn) and operating cash flow keeps pace (OCF/NI around 1.0 on average), with margins rising rather than being flattered by one-offs. The FY22 dip in cash conversion (0.46x) was working-capital build during rapid scaling, not an earnings issue, and it reversed.
Checked: no material one-offs found in the reviewed window.
Cash conversionOCF averages roughly 1x net income and improved as receivables fell from ~15% to under 10% of revenue, growth funded its own working capital rather than consuming cash.
An unusual and enviable combination: fast growth AND near-full payout. CMRY grew revenue ~18% a year yet distributed ~94% of earnings, only possible because growth is capital-light, receivables fell as it scaled and capex is modest, so it funds expansion from operating cash flow while still returning almost all profit.
DeploymentModest capex (~Rp0.3–0.7tn) into capacity and the Miss Cimory network, working capital that releases as it grows, and a very high (~94%) dividend. No leverage (net cash).
Returns trendROE climbed every year, 20%→30%, as rising premium margins met a small, net-cash equity base, returns are high and rising, not levered, though the premium and discretionary mix makes them more consumption-cyclical than a staple.
Premium, discretionary positioning is more exposed to a consumer downturn than a staples name, volume could soften faster in a weak cycle.
Success in an attractive premium niche invites larger F&B players; the moat (brand plus Miss Cimory) is building, not yet fortress-grade.
Milk and meat inputs, partly imported, are the main margin swing; a weak rupiah or input spike would compress the sector-leading margin.
A ~94% payout leaves a thin retention buffer; it works while growth is capital-light and net-cash, but a capex step-up would force a payout rethink. Not a current risk.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Indonesia’s largest non-commodity manufacturing sector at ~USD 88.7B: riding demographic tailwinds and the world’s #2 instant-noodle appetite, but raw-material cycles compress margins.