…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burdendriver | 4.60x | 27.26x | — | 2.25x | 9.04x |
| Interest burden | 0.92x | 0.72x | — | 0.86x | 0.84x |
| Operating margin | 10.4% | 2.8% | -0.3% | 6.2% | 4.7% |
| Asset turnover | 0.34x | 0.22x | 0.22x | 0.27x | 0.31x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 1.13x | 1.11x | 1.12x | 1.16x | 1.14x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 16.8% | 13.6% | — | 3.7% | 12.7% |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 4.0% | 0.7% | — | 1.9% | 1.7% |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 4.03x | 5.27x | 4.93x | 3.08x | 6.08x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 3.61x | 4.53x | 4.42x | 2.74x | 5.76x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 2.30x | 2.78x | 2.25x | 1.53x | 3.93x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | Rp 9.7 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 9.9 T | Rp 29 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 0.02x | 0.03x | 0.03x | 0.03x | 0.04x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 0.13x | 0.11x | 0.12x | 0.16x | 0.14x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.02x | 0.03x | 0.02x | 0.03x | 0.04x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | -Rp 6.6 T | -Rp 7.5 T | -Rp 6.2 T | -Rp 6.1 T | -Rp 20 T |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 13.07x | 3.55x | -0.40x | 7.22x | 6.37x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 1.13x | 1.11x | 1.12x | 1.16x | 1.14x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 28.7% | 33.5% | 30.9% | 32.9% | 26.1% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 10.4% | 2.8% | -0.3% | 6.2% | 4.7% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 44.1% | 55.2% | -1.5% | 12.0% | 35.5% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 793 M | Rp 501 M | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.6 T |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 14.4% | 8.0% | 5.4% | 11.4% | 8.6% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 14.8% | 12.2% | -0.3% | 3.2% | 11.2% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 19.9% | 15.2% | -0.4% | 4.1% | 17.9% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 4.60x | 27.26x | — | 2.25x | 9.04x |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 0.92x | 0.72x | — | 0.86x | 0.84x |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 4.0% | 0.7% | — | 1.9% | 1.7% |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.34x | 0.22x | 0.22x | 0.27x | 0.31x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 6.76x | 2.82x | 3.90x | 5.16x | 7.83x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 5.62x | 3.71x | 3.43x | 4.34x | 6.21x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 12.44x | 8.55x | 8.47x | 8.29x | 16.37x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 54.0 days | 129.5 days | 93.5 days | 70.7 days | 46.6 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 64.9 days | 98.5 days | 106.4 days | 84.1 days | 58.8 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 29.3 days | 42.7 days | 43.1 days | 44.0 days | 22.3 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 89.6 days | 185.3 days | 156.9 days | 110.8 days | 83.1 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | Rp 1.2 T | -Rp 1.3 T | Rp 250 M | Rp 875 M | Rp 1.3 T |
Price Rp 530 · market cap Rp 32 T
| Multiple | EMTK | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 4.78x | 4.78x(3/4) | 0% |
| P/B | 0.86x | 1.27x | -32% |
| P/S | 1.70x | 2.30x | -26% |
| EV/EBITDA | 16.83x | 156.66x(2/4) | -89% |
| EV/EBIT | 31.09x | 196.82x(2/4) | -84% |
| EV/Sales | 1.45x | 1.80x | -19% |
| FCF Yield | 4.01% | 1.27% | +215% |
| Dividend Yield | 1.89% | 1.89%(1/4) | 0% |
EV = mkt cap Rp 32 T + debt Rp 2.1 T − cash Rp 22 T + minority interest Rp 16 T = Rp 28 T
At today’s price, the market is paying for 15.8%/yr FCF growth (12.3% at 12.0% to 19.0% at 16.0% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: 2.7% FCF · 10.5% revenue.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 12.0–16.0% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 7.26% | Indonesia 10Y government bond, 8 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 1.55 → 1.63 | Software (Internet) (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.07 |
| Cost of equity | 18.16% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 6.53% | FY2025 interest expense ÷ total debt |
| Tax rate | 22.0% | statutory 22% (no clean effective-rate year in window) |
| WACC | 17.35% | 94% E × CoE + 6% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 10.5% | delivered 4-yr revenue CAGR 10.5%, fading linearly to terminal |
| EBIT margin | 3.5% | mean EBIT margin, last 3 FYs |
| D&A / revenue | 5.0% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 6.2% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years; in the terminal year capex falls to replacement level (equal to depreciation, 5.0% of revenue) because holding a build-phase or pause-phase ratio in perpetuity misprices the company in whichever direction that phase points |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | 1.7% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 10.5% | 8.5% | 6.5% | 4.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | Rp 21 T | Rp 23 T | Rp 24 T | Rp 25 T | Rp 26 T | Rp 27 T |
| EBIT | Rp 740 M | Rp 803 M | Rp 855 M | Rp 893 M | Rp 916 M | Rp 939 M |
| NOPAT | Rp 577 M | Rp 626 M | Rp 667 M | Rp 697 M | Rp 714 M | Rp 732 M |
| + D&A | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 1.3 T |
| − Capex | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 1.3 T |
| − ΔNWC | Rp 34 M | Rp 31 M | Rp 26 M | Rp 19 M | Rp 11 M | Rp 11 M |
| FCFF | Rp 275 M | Rp 305 M | Rp 332 M | Rp 355 M | Rp 372 M | Rp 721 M |
| PV | Rp 234 M | Rp 221 M | Rp 205 M | Rp 187 M | Rp 167 M | Rp 2.2 T |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5
EV = PV(explicit) Rp 1.0 T + PV(TV) Rp 2.2 T = Rp 3.2 T · TV 68% of EV · − net debt -Rp 20 T − minority Rp 16 T
Model output: Rp 129/share (-76% vs price Rp 530)· exit-multiple check (156.7x): Rp 2,644
Under these assumptions the model lands 76% below today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for faster growth, a fatter margin, or a lower discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 16.4% | 17.4% | 18.4% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | 132 | 128 | 124 |
| 2.5% | 134 | 129 | 125 |
| 3.0% | 136 | 131 | 127 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | Rp 13 T | Rp 9.9 T | Rp 9.2 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 19 T |
| Cost of Goods Sold | Rp 9.1 T | Rp 6.6 T | Rp 6.4 T | Rp 8.2 T | Rp 14 T |
| Gross Profit | Rp 3.7 T | Rp 3.3 T | Rp 2.9 T | Rp 4.0 T | Rp 5.0 T |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 278 M | -Rp 32 M | Rp 759 M | Rp 891 M |
| Interest Expense | Rp 102 M | Rp 78 M | Rp 80 M | Rp 105 M | Rp 140 M |
| Net Income | Rp 5.7 T | Rp 5.4 T | -Rp 141 M | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 6.8 T |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | Rp 5.7 T | Rp 5.4 T | -Rp 141 M | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 6.8 T |
| Depreciation & Amortization | Rp 513 M | Rp 515 M | Rp 533 M | Rp 638 M | Rp 755 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | Rp 7.4 T | Rp 8.7 T | Rp 7.2 T | Rp 7.3 T | Rp 22 T |
| Accounts Receivable | Rp 2.3 T | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 2.8 T | Rp 3.1 T |
| Inventory | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 2.3 T | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 1.8 T |
| Current Assets | Rp 13 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 15 T | Rp 35 T |
| Total Assets | Rp 38 T | Rp 44 T | Rp 43 T | Rp 46 T | Rp 61 T |
| Accounts Payable | Rp 735 M | Rp 766 M | Rp 754 M | Rp 991 M | Rp 863 M |
| Current Liabilities | Rp 3.2 T | Rp 3.1 T | Rp 3.2 T | Rp 4.8 T | Rp 5.7 T |
| Total Liabilities | Rp 4.5 T | Rp 4.6 T | Rp 4.5 T | Rp 6.4 T | Rp 7.4 T |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | Rp 787 M | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 2.1 T |
| Total Equity | Rp 34 T | Rp 40 T | Rp 38 T | Rp 40 T | Rp 53 T |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | Rp 28 T | Rp 36 T | Rp 35 T | Rp 35 T | Rp 38 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | Rp 1.6 T | -Rp 811 M | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 2.1 T |
| Capital Expenditure | Rp 437 M | Rp 518 M | Rp 888 M | Rp 578 M | Rp 842 M |
EMTK gross margin: 28.7% (2021) → 33.5% → 30.9% → 32.9% → 26.1% (2025); a relatively stable 26-34% range, more mature and less volatile than BUKA's steep decline. OPM: 10.4% (2021) → 2.8% → −0.35% (2023, the loss year) → 6.2% → 4.66%. NM diverges sharply from OPM in most years, 44.1% vs 10.4% (2021), 55.2% vs 2.8% (2022), 35.5% vs 4.66% (2025), a large, recurring gap consistent with EMTK's holding-company structure, where investment/equity-method income from its stakes (including BUKA) materially affects the bottom line most years, not just occasionally. ROE: 19.9% → 15.2% → −0.41% (2023 loss) → 4.14% → 17.9% (2025). ROIC is far thinner than the margin line implies (3.95% → 0.70% → n/a in the 2023 loss year → 1.92% → 1.67%). Leverage stayed very low throughout, D/E never exceeded 0.04×, with a large net cash position every year (net debt negative Rp 6.1-20.3 trillion). Interest coverage swung with profitability: 13.07× (2021) → 3.55× → −0.40× (2023 loss) → 7.22× → 6.37×. Current ratio stayed healthy throughout (3.08-6.08×), never a liquidity concern. FCF: +Rp 1,170.2 B (2021) → −Rp 1,329.2 B (2022) → +Rp 250.1 B → +Rp 875.1 B → +Rp 1,301.6 B (2025); positive in 4 of 5 years. Revenue (Rp): 12,840.7 B → 9,856.1 B → 9,241.4 B → 12,233.5 B → 19,119.7 B (+56.3% in FY2025, matching independently-reported growth almost exactly). The pattern most worth noting: EMTK's 2023 loss year and 2025 profit surge both coincide with BUKA's own worst (2023, −Rp 1.37 T) and best (2025, +Rp 3.14 T) years; a plausible, disclosed linkage given the majority-ownership stake, though the exact consolidation/equity-method mechanism has not been independently confirmed here.
EMTK's media segment sources content internally (own production) and from licensing deals with standard industry terms; its health and aviation-support segments source medical/aviation supplies and equipment from established, competitive vendor markets.
Implication → No single supplier relationship materially constrains EMTK's diversified operating segments: cost pressure, where it exists, comes from segment-specific competitive dynamics, not supplier leverage.
Media advertisers can shift budgets across broadcasters and increasingly toward digital channels; hospital patients have limited real-time price sensitivity in acute care but more choice for elective services; aviation-support clients (airlines) are large, sophisticated negotiators on service contracts.
Implication → Buyer power varies by segment and is manageable overall: no single buyer relationship explains EMTK's real earnings volatility, which is more attributable to its investment portfolio (including BUKA) than to its operating segments' pricing power.
Free-to-air broadcasting requires scarce spectrum licenses; hospital operation requires significant capital and regulatory approval; aviation ground-handling requires airport concessions and certifications: all three operating segments have real, structural entry barriers.
Implication → EMTK's legacy segments are individually well-protected, but this protection does not extend to its digital-investment arm, where competition for the underlying assets (like BUKA) is a function of capital markets, not licensing barriers.
Free-to-air television faces substitution from streaming and digital media (a real, structural pressure on the media segment specifically); hospital and aviation-support services face limited substitution given their essential, licensed nature.
Implication → Substitution risk is concentrated in EMTK's media segment: the digital-products segment's faster growth (~29% of revenue and rising) is partly a rational response to exactly this pressure.
EMTK's media segment competes with other Indonesian free-to-air broadcasters (including MNCN, not tracked in this project); health and aviation-support segments compete in their respective, more fragmented local markets.
Implication → No single rival threatens EMTK's diversified structure as a whole: the more relevant risk to monitor is capital allocation across its portfolio (including BUKA) rather than head-to-head competitive rivalry in any one segment.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Indonesia's ~USD 100 B digital economy (2025, e-Conomy SEA) is Southeast Asia's largest, but its four listed anchors span radically different models: DCII (data-center infrastructure, the physical backbone), GOTO (Gojek on-demand + GoPay fintech, after deconsolidating Tokopedia to TikTok in 2024), BUKA (a former e-commerce marketplace that fully exited physical goods in 2025 to focus on virtual goods, gaming and O2O), and EMTK (a diversified media/health/aviation conglomerate with a real, fast-growing digital arm and majority ownership of BUKA).