Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | 0.70x | 0.68x | 0.66x | 0.70x | 0.74x |
| Interest burden | 0.89x | 0.85x | 0.68x | 0.70x | 0.73x |
| Operating margin | 3.8% | 3.6% | 3.0% | 3.2% | 2.9% |
| Asset turnover | 3.82x | 2.90x | 2.94x | 3.00x | 2.65x |
| Leverage (equity mult.)driver | 1.76x | 2.37x | 2.51x | 2.40x | 2.84x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 15.7% | 14.1% | 10.2% | 11.4% | 11.8% |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 14.1% | 10.9% | 9.3% | 10.6% | 9.4% |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 1.55x | 1.24x | 1.26x | 1.22x | 1.16x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 0.47x | 0.50x | 0.45x | 0.54x | 0.46x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 0.12x | 0.12x | 0.17x | 0.16x | 0.12x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | Rp 2.3 T | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 2.6 T | Rp 2.4 T | Rp 2.7 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 0.34x | 0.67x | 0.81x | 0.72x | 0.92x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 0.76x | 1.37x | 1.51x | 1.40x | 1.84x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.19x | 0.28x | 0.32x | 0.30x | 0.33x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 3.8 T | Rp 4.8 T | Rp 4.7 T | Rp 7.3 T |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 8.86x | 6.46x | 3.17x | 3.39x | 3.67x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 1.76x | 2.37x | 2.51x | 2.40x | 2.84x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 11.0% | 10.8% | 10.6% | 11.1% | 10.8% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 3.8% | 3.6% | 3.0% | 3.2% | 2.9% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 2.3% | 2.0% | 1.4% | 1.6% | 1.6% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 2.1 T | Rp 2.6 T | Rp 2.8 T |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 4.2% | 4.0% | 3.6% | 3.9% | 3.7% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 8.9% | 5.9% | 4.0% | 4.7% | 4.1% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 16.5% | 15.0% | 11.3% | 12.7% | 13.1% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 0.70x | 0.68x | 0.66x | 0.70x | 0.74x |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 0.89x | 0.85x | 0.68x | 0.70x | 0.73x |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 14.1% | 10.9% | 9.3% | 10.6% | 9.4% |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 3.82x | 2.90x | 2.94x | 3.00x | 2.65x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 8.37x | 6.58x | 6.48x | 7.85x | 5.67x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 70.52x | 46.90x | 44.06x | 56.45x | 50.66x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 25.56x | 18.39x | 14.64x | 15.00x | 11.45x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 43.6 days | 55.5 days | 56.4 days | 46.5 days | 64.4 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 5.2 days | 7.8 days | 8.3 days | 6.5 days | 7.2 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 14.3 days | 19.8 days | 24.9 days | 24.3 days | 31.9 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 34.5 days | 43.4 days | 39.7 days | 28.7 days | 39.8 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | -Rp 291 M | -Rp 188 M | -Rp 167 M | Rp 1.5 T | -Rp 571 M |
Price Rp 420 · market cap Rp 6.6 T
| Multiple | ERAA | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 5.49x | 11.17x | -51% |
| P/B | 0.72x | 1.97x | -63% |
| P/S | 0.09x | 0.53x | -84% |
| EV/EBITDA | 5.29x | 6.25x | -15% |
| EV/EBIT | 6.66x | 7.91x | -16% |
| EV/Sales | 0.19x | 0.52x | -63% |
| FCF Yield | -8.69% | 10.69% | -181% |
| Dividend Yield | 5.95% | 3.37% | +76% |
EV = mkt cap Rp 6.6 T + debt Rp 9.4 T − cash Rp 2.1 T + minority interest Rp 1.0 T = Rp 15 T
not computable: negative or zero base-year FCF. Shown as-is rather than estimated.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 12.0–16.0% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 7.26% | Indonesia 10Y government bond, 8 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.95 → 1.90 | Retail (Special Lines) (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 1.43 |
| Cost of equity | 19.97% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 6.47% | FY2025 interest expense ÷ total debt |
| Tax rate | 30.2% | median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest) |
| WACC | 10.87% | 41% E × CoE + 59% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 15.2% | delivered 4-yr revenue CAGR 15.2%, fading linearly to terminal |
| EBIT margin | 3.1% | mean EBIT margin, last 3 FYs |
| D&A / revenue | 0.7% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 1.3% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years; in the terminal year capex falls to replacement level (equal to depreciation, 0.7% of revenue) because holding a build-phase or pause-phase ratio in perpetuity misprices the company in whichever direction that phase points |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | 15.8% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 15.2% | 12.0% | 8.9% | 5.7% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | Rp 88 T | Rp 99 T | Rp 108 T | Rp 114 T | Rp 117 T | Rp 120 T |
| EBIT | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 3.0 T | Rp 3.3 T | Rp 3.5 T | Rp 3.6 T | Rp 3.7 T |
| NOPAT | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 2.1 T | Rp 2.3 T | Rp 2.4 T | Rp 2.5 T | Rp 2.6 T |
| + D&A | Rp 585 M | Rp 655 M | Rp 713 M | Rp 754 M | Rp 773 M | Rp 792 M |
| − Capex | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 792 M |
| − ΔNWC | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 968 M | Rp 450 M | Rp 461 M |
| FCFF | -Rp 543 M | -Rp 223 M | Rp 201 M | Rp 710 M | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 2.1 T |
| PV | -Rp 490 M | -Rp 182 M | Rp 148 M | Rp 470 M | Rp 758 M | Rp 15 T |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5
EV = PV(explicit) Rp 703 M + PV(TV) Rp 15 T = Rp 16 T · TV 95% of EV · − net debt Rp 7.3 T − minority Rp 1.0 T
Model output: Rp 467/share (+11% vs price Rp 420)· exit-multiple check (6.3x): Rp 549
Under these assumptions the model lands 11% above today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for slower growth, a thinner margin, or a higher discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 9.9% | 10.9% | 11.9% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | 613 | 444 | 311 |
| 2.5% | 649 | 467 | 325 |
| 3.0% | 691 | 493 | 340 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | Rp 43 T | Rp 49 T | Rp 60 T | Rp 65 T | Rp 77 T |
| Cost of Goods Sold | Rp 39 T | Rp 44 T | Rp 54 T | Rp 58 T | Rp 68 T |
| Gross Profit | Rp 4.8 T | Rp 5.3 T | Rp 6.4 T | Rp 7.2 T | Rp 8.3 T |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 2.1 T | Rp 2.2 T |
| Interest Expense | Rp 184 M | Rp 273 M | Rp 577 M | Rp 619 M | Rp 608 M |
| Net Income | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 826 M | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 1.2 T |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 826 M | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 1.2 T |
| Depreciation & Amortization | Rp 199 M | Rp 192 M | Rp 318 M | Rp 460 M | Rp 578 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | Rp 521 M | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 2.1 T |
| Accounts Receivable | Rp 616 M | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.5 T |
| Inventory | Rp 4.6 T | Rp 6.7 T | Rp 8.3 T | Rp 7.4 T | Rp 12 T |
| Current Assets | Rp 6.6 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 20 T |
| Total Assets | Rp 11 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 20 T | Rp 22 T | Rp 29 T |
| Accounts Payable | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 2.4 T | Rp 3.7 T | Rp 3.9 T | Rp 6.0 T |
| Current Liabilities | Rp 4.3 T | Rp 9.0 T | Rp 10 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 17 T |
| Total Liabilities | Rp 4.9 T | Rp 9.9 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 19 T |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 4.8 T | Rp 6.6 T | Rp 6.5 T | Rp 9.4 T |
| Total Equity | Rp 6.5 T | Rp 7.2 T | Rp 8.1 T | Rp 9.1 T | Rp 10 T |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | Rp 6.1 T | Rp 6.7 T | Rp 7.3 T | Rp 8.1 T | Rp 9.1 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | Rp 18 M | Rp 427 M | Rp 882 M | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 225 M |
| Capital Expenditure | Rp 309 M | Rp 615 M | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 773 M | Rp 796 M |
ERAA is a high-volume, low-margin distribution model: Indonesia's largest smartphone and consumer-electronics retailer, running Erafone, iBox (the authorised Apple reseller), and Samsung flagship stores. Gross margin is structurally thin at ~11% (2021–2025), because device retailing is fundamentally a volume business. High asset turnover (2.7–3.8×) compensates for those thin margins and lifts ROE to 11–17%. The worry is that ROIC is falling (14.1%→9.4%) while D/E is rising (0.34→0.92), which points to more capital intensity without a matching improvement in returns. FCF is mostly negative, since device inventory ties up heavy working capital; only 2024 threw off meaningful positive FCF (+IDR 1.47 T). The iBox Apple exclusivity and Samsung flagship partnerships are the near-term moats, but structural margin compression in device retailing is a long-term headwind.
Apple, Samsung, and major Android OEMs hold substantial power over ERAA: they set device allocation, retail pricing, and margin terms. The iBox exclusivity with Apple is a double-edged arrangement: it provides differentiation but also concentrates dependency on a single brand owner's commercial decisions.
Implication → High supplier power structurally constrains ERAA's gross margin ceiling (~11%) and leaves the business exposed to changes in Apple/Samsung distribution policy or pricing in Indonesia.
Individual consumers have moderate power via price comparison on e-commerce (Tokopedia, Shopee, Lazada) and competing retail stores. However, for Apple products requiring iBox authorisation (service, warranty) and for in-store financing options, ERAA retains a service moat.
Implication → Consumer price sensitivity limits margin uplift on mass-market Android models; iBox partially insulates Apple volumes through authorised-service stickiness.
E-commerce platforms are effectively a permanent threat and are already significant competitors (official brand stores on Tokopedia/Shopee). Physical retail expansion requires scale, brand agreements, and capital: barriers that deter smaller entrants but do not block major platforms.
Implication → The primary new-entrant risk is not traditional physical retail competitors but deepening brand-direct e-commerce, which could bypass ERAA's store network entirely.
Consumer electronics (smartphones) are not substitutable in any meaningful sense: demand is driven by device replacement cycles and upgrade demand. E-commerce is a channel substitute (different retailer, same product) rather than a product substitute.
Implication → Low product-level substitution ensures category demand; ERAA's risk is channel substitution (store → online), not category erosion.
ERAA competes with iStyle (another Apple reseller), Samsung-owned stores, brand e-commerce flagships, and hundreds of independent phone retailers. E-commerce rivalry is intense: official brand stores on Tokopedia/Shopee compete head-to-head on device pricing.
Implication → Intense rivalry is the primary driver of the structurally thin 11% gross margin; ERAA's only sustainable differentiation is authorised Apple service (iBox) and consumer credit/financing integration.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Indonesia's USD 57 B retail market is the largest in Southeast Asia, anchored by two minimarket giants (Alfamart and Indomaret), with premium lifestyle and specialty chains capturing the middle-class trade-up, and e-commerce reshaping >20 % of transactions.