Equal · Financial Report

ESSA Industries Indonesia

ESSA/FY2021–FY2025/Educational Analysis/USD/Data source · 2026-07-10

ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Tax burden	0.91x	0.51x	0.57x	0.62x	0.60x
Interest burdendriver	0.18x	0.90x	0.79x	0.89x	0.95x
Operating margin	28.5%	41.3%	22.3%	27.2%	24.0%
Asset turnover	0.37x	0.88x	0.50x	0.43x	0.46x
Leverage (equity mult.)	2.69x	1.58x	1.40x	1.25x	1.11x
= Return on Equity (consolidated)	4.6%	26.4%	7.0%	8.2%	6.9%
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)	11.3%	23.9%	7.8%	9.2%	7.2%

Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.

Liquidity

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities)	1.62x	2.24x	1.44x	2.36x	10.55x
Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities)	1.08x	1.93x	1.22x	2.01x	8.49x
Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities)	0.83x	1.21x	0.79x	1.70x	6.50x
Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities)	$ 60 M	$ 151 M	$ 54 M	$ 126 M	$ 185 M

Leverage & Solvency

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity)	1.57x	0.51x	0.32x	0.17x	0.00x
Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity)	1.69x	0.58x	0.40x	0.25x	0.11x
Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets)	0.59x	0.32x	0.23x	0.13x	0.00x
Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash)	$ 393 M	$ 122 M	$ 63 M	-$ 65 M	-$ 126 M
Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense)	1.22x	9.77x	4.71x	8.78x	21.69x
Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity)	2.69x	1.58x	1.40x	1.25x	1.11x

Profitability

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue)	36.3%	46.6%	29.9%	35.8%	33.5%
Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue)	28.5%	41.3%	22.3%	27.2%	24.0%
Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue)	4.6%	19.0%	10.0%	15.0%	13.7%
EBITDA(EBIT + D&A)	$ 134 M	$ 349 M	$ 124 M	$ 128 M	$ 117 M
EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue)	44.0%	47.7%	35.9%	42.6%	39.8%
Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets)	1.7%	16.7%	5.0%	6.5%	6.2%
Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners))	6.5%	39.4%	9.1%	10.8%	9.0%
Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax)	0.91x	0.51x	0.57x	0.62x	0.60x
Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT)	0.18x	0.90x	0.79x	0.89x	0.95x
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)	11.3%	23.9%	7.8%	9.2%	7.2%

Operations & Efficiency

Turnover	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets)	0.37x	0.88x	0.50x	0.43x	0.46x
Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory)	3.70x	10.52x	9.02x	5.93x	4.94x
Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables)	15.27x	11.83x	9.18x	13.99x	9.52x
Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables)	7.97x	16.71x	20.25x	19.36x	17.21x

Conversion Period	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS)	98.6 days	34.7 days	40.5 days	61.6 days	73.9 days
Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue)	23.9 days	30.8 days	39.8 days	26.1 days	38.3 days
Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS)	45.8 days	21.8 days	18.0 days	18.9 days	21.2 days
Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO)	76.7 days	43.7 days	62.2 days	68.8 days	91.0 days

Cash Flow

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex)	$ 90 M	$ 317 M	$ 149 M	$ 138 M	$ 100 M

Valuation

price as-of 2026-07-31fundamentals: FY2025FX 18,058 IDR/USD (2026-07-31)

Price Rp 640 · market cap Rp 11 T ($ 611 M at the cited rate; statements are filed in USD)

Multiple	ESSA	Peer median	vs median
P/E	15.16x	15.16x	0%
P/B	1.37x	2.77x	-51%
P/S	2.07x	1.47x	+40%
EV/EBITDA	5.30x	127.69x(2/3)	-96%
EV/EBIT	8.79x	8.79x(1/3)	0%
EV/Sales	2.11x	2.11x	0%
FCF Yield	16.38%	-3.74%	-539%
Dividend Yield	1.56%	0.26%	+493%

Only 3 peers are covered here, so the median is itself one of the members. A 0% gap can simply mean ESSA sits at the median.

EV = mkt cap $ 611 M + debt $ 179 K − cash $ 126 M + minority interest $ 137 M = $ 622 M

What the price implies

At today’s price, the market is paying for -6.9%/yr FCF growth (-9.8% at 9.3% to -4.2% at 13.3% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: 2.6% FCF · -0.7% revenue.

Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 9.3–13.3% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.

Forward DCF (glass-box)

This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.

Cyclical normalization: Commodity/cyclical name: the trailing years are a sample drawn from the price cycle, not a trend. Defaults are therefore normalized, using the full-window mean margin with no cycle-position growth extrapolation. That normalized margin is itself the embedded commodity-price assumption.

Assumption	Value	Basis
Rf (risk-free)	4.66%	US 10Y Treasury, 30 Jul 2026
ERP (Rm − Rf)	6.69%	Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%)
β	0.58 → 0.58	Chemical (Basic) (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.00
Cost of equity	8.54%	Rf + β × ERP
Cost of debt	6.68%	median interest coverage 8.8x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a Aaa/AAA synthetic rating and a 0.40% default spread, over a 6.28% base (US 10Y 4.66% + Indonesia's 1.62% sovereign spread). Its BOOK rate is 1820.4%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms)
Tax rate	35.0%	median effective rate FY2021–FY2025 computed to 40.3%, CLAMPED to 35%: above that ceiling the pretax approximation is carrying minority interests, which are already deducted separately from enterprise value, rather than tax
WACC	8.54%	100% E × CoE + 0% D × Kd × (1 − t)
Revenue growth (yr 1, fading)	2.5%	terminal growth from year 1, cyclical normalization: the delivered 4-yr CAGR (-0.7%) reflects cycle position, not a trend
EBIT margin	28.7%	full-cycle mean EBIT margin, FY2021–FY2025 (cyclical normalization: this margin is the embedded commodity-price assumption)
D&A / revenue	14.9%	mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs
Capex / revenue	1.3%	mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 8.5% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 29.3% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 20.2% of revenue against depreciation of 14.9%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral
ΔNWC / Δrevenue	6.2%	median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP)
Terminal growth	2.5%	BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%)

Growth path

year 1 → fading to terminal over 5 yrs2.5%

EBIT margin28.7%

WACC8.5%

Terminal growth2.5%

Explicit years5

FCFF drivers

FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − capex − ΔNWC

Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.

Capex

% of revenue1.3%

D&A

% of revenue14.9%

ΔNWC

% of the CHANGE in revenue6.2%

Year	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	T∞
Growth	2.5%	2.5%	2.5%	2.5%	2.5%	2.5%
Revenue	$ 302 M	$ 310 M	$ 318 M	$ 326 M	$ 334 M	$ 342 M
EBIT	$ 87 M	$ 89 M	$ 91 M	$ 93 M	$ 96 M	$ 98 M
NOPAT	$ 56 M	$ 58 M	$ 59 M	$ 61 M	$ 62 M	$ 64 M
+ D&A	$ 45 M	$ 46 M	$ 47 M	$ 49 M	$ 50 M	$ 51 M
− Capex	$ 3.8 M	$ 3.9 M	$ 4.0 M	$ 4.1 M	$ 4.2 M	$ 69 M
− ΔNWC	$ 459 K	$ 470 K	$ 482 K	$ 494 K	$ 507 K	$ 519 K
FCFF	$ 97 M	$ 100 M	$ 102 M	$ 105 M	$ 107 M	$ 45 M
PV	$ 90 M	$ 85 M	$ 80 M	$ 75 M	$ 71 M	$ 495 M

Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding

EV = PV(explicit) $ 401 M + PV(TV) $ 495 M = $ 896 M · TV 55% of EV · − net debt -$ 126 M − minority $ 137 M = equity $ 884 M ÷ shares outstanding · per share is in USD, shown in IDR at 18,058

Model output: Rp 927/share (+45% vs price Rp 640)· exit-multiple check (127.7x): Rp 13,331

Under these assumptions the model lands 45% above today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for slower growth, a thinner margin, or a higher discount rate than the inputs here assume.

Sensitivity (per share, Rp)

g \ WACC	7.5%	8.5%	9.5%
2.0%	1,002	879	787
2.5%	1,071	927	822
3.0%	1,155	984	863

Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.

Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.

Macro backdropfull backdrop + sensitivity map →

BI Rate 5.75%IDR/USD 18,05810Y government bond yield 7.26%Inflation 3.34%(as-of 2026-07-31)

Oil ↑(H)GDP/consumption ↑(M)Rupiah weaker(M)

Income Statement

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Revenue	$ 303 M	$ 731 M	$ 345 M	$ 301 M	$ 295 M
Cost of Goods Sold	$ 193 M	$ 390 M	$ 242 M	$ 193 M	$ 196 M
Gross Profit	$ 110 M	$ 341 M	$ 103 M	$ 108 M	$ 99 M
Operating Income (EBIT)	$ 86 M	$ 302 M	$ 77 M	$ 82 M	$ 71 M
Interest Expense	$ 71 M	$ 31 M	$ 16 M	$ 9.3 M	$ 3.3 M
Net Income	$ 14 M	$ 139 M	$ 35 M	$ 45 M	$ 40 M
Net Income Attributable to Owners	$ 14 M	$ 139 M	$ 35 M	$ 45 M	$ 40 M
Depreciation & Amortization	$ 47 M	$ 47 M	$ 47 M	$ 46 M	$ 47 M

Balance Sheet

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Cash & Equivalents	$ 81 M	$ 148 M	$ 98 M	$ 157 M	$ 126 M
Accounts Receivable	$ 20 M	$ 62 M	$ 38 M	$ 22 M	$ 31 M
Inventory	$ 52 M	$ 37 M	$ 27 M	$ 33 M	$ 40 M
Current Assets	$ 158 M	$ 273 M	$ 179 M	$ 219 M	$ 204 M
Total Assets	$ 809 M	$ 831 M	$ 695 M	$ 694 M	$ 647 M
Accounts Payable	$ 24 M	$ 23 M	$ 12 M	$ 10.0 M	$ 11 M
Current Liabilities	$ 98 M	$ 122 M	$ 125 M	$ 93 M	$ 19 M
Total Liabilities	$ 509 M	$ 306 M	$ 198 M	$ 140 M	$ 63 M
Total Interest-Bearing Debt	$ 474 M	$ 270 M	$ 161 M	$ 93 M	$ 179 K
Total Equity	$ 301 M	$ 525 M	$ 498 M	$ 554 M	$ 584 M
Equity Attributable to Owners	$ 213 M	$ 352 M	$ 379 M	$ 417 M	$ 447 M

Cash Flow Statement

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Operating Cash Flow	$ 92 M	$ 319 M	$ 151 M	$ 143 M	$ 104 M
Capital Expenditure	$ 1.8 M	$ 1.4 M	$ 2.7 M	$ 5.0 M	$ 3.9 M

Company Deep Analysis

Reviewed: 2026-07-10

Analyst Verdict

ESSA (formerly Surya Esa Perkasa) is a small LPG-refining and ammonia-production business near Palembang, with zero ownership or operational link to TPIA/BRPT; it is grouped in this industry purely on business-model grounds. Where TPIA and BRPT's FY2025 headline profitability was an acquisition-accounting event, ESSA's is genuinely operational: FY2025 revenue was $295.0M (matching independently-reported figures almost to the dollar), gross margin 33.47%, operating margin 23.99%, net margin 13.66%; solid, unspectacular, and consistent with a business riding down from its 2022 peak (46.64% gross margin, 39.40% ROE) as global ammonia prices normalized. The real story is balance-sheet quality: debt-to-equity fell from 1.57x (FY2021) to 0.0003x (FY2025), essentially debt-free, with interest coverage rising from 1.22x to 21.69x and net debt flipping to net cash in FY2024. Free cash flow was positive in all five years shown, unlike TPIA and BRPT. ESSA is the cleanest, most self-funding name in this industry, and its 2022 peak margins are a real reference point for how strong (and how cyclical) ammonia pricing can get, not a baseline to extrapolate forward.

Business Model

ESSA Industries Indonesia (formerly Surya Esa Perkasa) refines and processes natural gas into Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG, a propane/butane mix) and condensate near Palembang, South Sumatra, and separately produces ammonia through subsidiary PT Panca Amara Utama (~2,000 tonnes/day) at Kalimantan Timur (Kaltim). The two lines are reported as LPG & Processing Fee, Ammonia, and Others segments.

Segments

Reportable segments: Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) & Processing Fee, Ammonia, and Others. Production scale: ~190 tonnes/day LPG and ~500 barrels/day condensate near Palembang, plus ~2,000 tonnes/day ammonia via Panca Amara Utama in Kaltim. FY2025 revenue of $295.0M was down slightly from FY2024's $301.4M, both well off the FY2022 peak of $731.5M (a global ammonia-price-spike year) but well above the FY2021 base of $303.4M.

Value Chain & Positioning

Domestic natural gas feedstock → refining/processing (LPG, condensate) and ammonia synthesis (via Panca Amara Utama) → sale to domestic LPG distributors/industrial gas users and to fertilizer producers/industrial ammonia users, with pricing referencing global LPG and ammonia benchmarks rather than a captive domestic price.

Competitive Forces (Porter’s 5)

Supplier powerMedium

How much leverage input/funding providers have over pricing.

ESSA depends on domestic natural gas supply and pricing for its feedstock: a smaller, more regionally-concentrated exposure than TPIA/BRPT's global-naphtha-import dependence.

Implication → Feedstock-cost risk is real but has historically been more manageable for ESSA than for TPIA: reflected in ESSA's consistently positive gross margins across all five years shown, unlike TPIA.

Buyer powerMedium

How much leverage customers have to push prices down.

Ammonia is a globally-traded, fungible commodity, buyers can source elsewhere at world prices, while LPG has more locally-anchored domestic demand.

Implication → ESSA's ammonia pricing tracks the global cycle almost directly (visible in the 2022 price-spike margin jump), limiting any sustained pricing premium.

Threat of new entryLow

How easily new competitors can enter the market.

Gas-processing and ammonia-synthesis plants require significant capital and secured gas-supply agreements: meaningful barriers for a market ESSA's size, and this narrative found no evidence of a comparably-scaled new domestic entrant targeting ESSA's specific niche.

Implication → Lower near-term competitive-entry risk than TPIA faces, consistent with ESSA's steadier (if smaller-scale) margin history.

Threat of substitutesMedium

Risk that alternative products/services replace demand.

Green/blue ammonia production pathways are an emerging long-run alternative to conventional gas-based ammonia globally; LPG faces gradual substitution from grid electricity/gas-network expansion in some use cases.

Implication → A multi-decade structural question, not a near-term margin driver: ESSA's current profitability is not yet threatened by this force.

Competitive rivalryMedium

Intensity of competition among existing players.

ESSA competes in the global ammonia market alongside far larger producers, but at a smaller scale with a more specialized LPG/ammonia niche than TPIA's broad olefins/polyolefins competition.

Implication → Rivalry compresses ESSA's margins during global price downturns (FY2023's 29.89% gross margin vs FY2022's 46.64%) but has not pushed them negative in any of the five years shown, unlike TPIA.

Moat / Competitive Edge

ESSA's moat is modest but real: secured domestic gas-supply arrangements and an established ammonia-production asset (Panca Amara Utama) that would be costly and slow to replicate at its scale. The more distinctive edge is balance-sheet discipline, not market power: debt-to-equity fell from 1.57x (FY2021) to essentially zero (0.0003x, FY2025), net debt flipped to net cash in FY2024 and stayed there in FY2025, and free cash flow was positive in every one of the five years shown; a genuinely self-funding profile that neither TPIA nor BRPT currently share.

Key Drivers & Sensitivities

Global ammonia price cycle
Gross margin peaked at 46.64% in FY2022 (global energy-price spike) and normalized to 29.89-35.83% in FY2023-2025: a ~17-point swing on essentially the same production base, the single biggest driver of ESSA's reported profitability.
Balance-sheet deleveraging
Debt-to-equity fell from 1.57x (FY2021) to 0.0003x (FY2025); net debt flipped from +$392.7M to -$125.6M (net cash) over the same period: a consistent, multi-year trend, not a single-year event.
Q1 2026 growth momentum
Revenue +37% YoY and net profit +131% YoY in Q1 2026, driven by higher ammonia prices and shipment volumes: a real acceleration versus the flat-to-declining FY2023-2025 revenue trend ($345.0M -> $301.4M -> $295.0M).
Ammonia production volume (Panca Amara Utama)
~2,000 tonnes/day nameplate capacity: the physical ceiling on ESSA's ammonia revenue regardless of price; any capacity expansion would be a structural, not cyclical, growth lever.

Linkages

ESSA has no ownership or operational relationship with TPIA or BRPT, and this narrative found no evidence linking it to any other name in this industry: it is grouped here purely on business-model grounds (petrochemical/industrial-gas processing). Its closer commodity-price linkage is to global ammonia and LPG benchmarks, not to any domestic peer.

Recent Developments

Q1 2026 revenue grew 37% YoY with net profit up 131% YoY, driven by higher ammonia prices and shipment volumes plus increased production: a marked acceleration after three years (FY2023-2025) of roughly flat-to-slightly-declining revenue as the FY2022 ammonia-price spike normalized.

Regulation

ESSA's domestic natural-gas feedstock cost is influenced by Indonesia's gas-pricing policy environment (including the government's HGBT discounted-gas-price program for designated industrial users); this narrative has not independently verified ESSA's specific HGBT eligibility or terms this batch. As an ammonia producer, ESSA also sits adjacent to Indonesia's fertilizer-subsidy and food-security policy interest, though ESSA itself is a merchant/industrial ammonia producer, not a subsidized fertilizer distributor.

ESG & Sustainability

Ammonia production is, globally, a carbon-intensive process now facing an emerging "green/blue ammonia" transition narrative that could reshape long-run cost curves for conventional gas-based producers like ESSA. This narrative has not independently verified ESSA's specific decarbonization commitments or targets this batch.

Risks

FY2025 revenue ($295.0M) and margins (33.47% gross, 23.99% operating) are well off the FY2022 peak (46.64% gross margin, $731.5M revenue, driven by a global ammonia-price spike) -- FY2022 should not be treated as a sustainable baseline
Ammonia is a globally-traded commodity, so ESSA's pricing and margins are exposed to a cycle it does not control -- the ~17-point gross-margin swing between FY2022 and FY2023 is direct evidence of this sensitivity
ESSA is dependent on domestic natural-gas supply and pricing arrangements for its feedstock; this narrative has not independently verified the specific terms, tenor or renewal risk of those arrangements this batch
The Q1 2026 growth acceleration (+37% revenue, +131% net profit YoY) is recent and has not yet been confirmed across a full fiscal year in the seeded dataset -- treat it as an early signal, not an established trend
ESSA is a small-cap relative to TPIA/BRPT within the same industry, which may mean lower trading liquidity and less analyst/media coverage scrutiny than the two larger names
This narrative found no ESG-target or decarbonization-commitment disclosure to cite for ESSA -- readers requiring that information should consult ESSA's own investor-relations materials directly

Outlook & What to Watch

Base: ESSA's margins continue to track global ammonia prices, currently well off the FY2022 peak but showing renewed strength into Q1 2026; the debt-free balance sheet continues to fund operations and any growth internally. Bull: global ammonia prices firm further, extending the Q1 2026 momentum (+37% revenue, +131% net profit YoY) through a full fiscal year, and ESSA's clean balance sheet allows it to fund capacity expansion without re-leveraging. Bear: ammonia prices normalize lower from current levels, compressing margins back toward the FY2023 trough (29.89% gross margin) rather than extending FY2022's peak. ESSA's investment case is the opposite of TPIA/BRPT's in the same industry: smaller, steadier, self-funding and currently under-levered, with a real but market-cyclical (not acquisition-accounting-driven) profitability swing to watch. (Interpretation, not a forecast.)

Key KPIs

Gross Margin (Ammonia Price Proxy): 46.64% (FY2022 peak) -> 29.89% (FY2023 trough) -> 33.47% (FY2025) -- the clearest read on where global ammonia prices sit relative to ESSA's cycle
Debt-to-Equity: 1.57x (FY2021) -> 0.0003x (FY2025), essentially debt-free -- the standout balance-sheet trend versus TPIA/BRPT's rising leverage in the same industry
Net Cash Position: Net debt flipped from +$392.7M (FY2021) to -$125.6M net cash (FY2025), turning net-cash in FY2024 and staying there
Free Cash Flow: Positive in all 5 fiscal years shown (FY2021-2025) -- unlike both TPIA and BRPT in the same industry, ESSA has not needed external financing to fund operations
Q1 2026 Growth Rate: +37% revenue YoY, +131% net profit YoY -- an early but real acceleration signal not yet reflected in the FY2025 annual figures

Sources

Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.