Equal · Financial Report

XL Axiata

EXCL/FY2021–FY2025/Educational Analysis/IDR/Data source · 2026-06-19

ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Tax burden	1.06x	0.94x	0.85x	0.72x	—
Interest burden	0.34x	0.30x	0.34x	0.45x	—
Operating margindriver	13.3%	13.4%	13.5%	16.2%	-0.5%
Asset turnover	0.37x	0.33x	0.37x	0.40x	0.37x
Leverage (equity mult.)	3.62x	3.39x	3.31x	3.29x	3.84x
= Return on Equity (consolidated)	6.4%	4.3%	4.7%	6.9%	—
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)	6.7%	5.7%	5.2%	5.7%	—

Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.

Liquidity

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities)	0.37x	0.39x	0.36x	0.40x	0.47x
Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities)	0.36x	0.38x	0.34x	0.39x	0.47x
Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities)	0.13x	0.20x	0.05x	0.07x	0.08x
Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities)	-Rp 13 T	-Rp 16 T	-Rp 13 T	-Rp 13 T	-Rp 17 T

Leverage & Solvency

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity)	1.77x	1.71x	1.73x	1.76x	2.09x
Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity)	2.62x	2.39x	2.31x	2.29x	2.84x
Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets)	0.49x	0.50x	0.52x	0.53x	0.54x
Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash)	Rp 33 T	Rp 39 T	Rp 45 T	Rp 45 T	Rp 60 T
Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense)	1.52x	1.43x	1.51x	1.82x	-0.06x
Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity)	3.62x	3.39x	3.31x	3.29x	3.84x

Profitability

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue)	65.5%	62.6%	64.5%	64.4%	54.9%
Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue)	13.3%	13.4%	13.5%	16.2%	-0.5%
Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue)	4.8%	3.8%	3.9%	5.3%	-10.4%
EBITDA(EBIT + D&A)	Rp 9.2 T	Rp 9.6 T	Rp 11 T	Rp 13 T	Rp 11 T
EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue)	34.5%	33.0%	33.8%	36.6%	25.8%
Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets)	1.8%	1.3%	1.4%	2.1%	-3.8%
Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners))	6.4%	4.3%	4.8%	7.0%	-14.8%
Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax)	1.06x	0.94x	0.85x	0.72x	—
Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT)	0.34x	0.30x	0.34x	0.45x	—
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)	6.7%	5.7%	5.2%	5.7%	—

Operations & Efficiency

Turnover	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets)	0.37x	0.33x	0.37x	0.40x	0.37x
Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory)	58.92x	26.72x	30.33x	63.34x	100.96x
Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables)	45.52x	36.87x	22.49x	17.95x	8.37x
Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables)	14.52x	21.41x	20.77x	11.14x	23.08x

Conversion Period	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS)	6.2 days	13.7 days	12.0 days	5.8 days	3.6 days
Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue)	8.0 days	9.9 days	16.2 days	20.3 days	43.6 days
Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS)	25.1 days	17.0 days	17.6 days	32.8 days	15.8 days
Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO)	-10.9 days	6.5 days	10.7 days	-6.7 days	31.4 days

Cash Flow

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex)	Rp 4.7 T	Rp 5.3 T	Rp 5.7 T	Rp 8.3 T	Rp 8.2 T

Valuation

price as-of 2026-07-31fundamentals: FY2025

Price Rp 2,440 · market cap Rp 44 T

Multiple	EXCL	Peer median	vs median
P/E	NM	12.86x(2/3)	—
P/B	1.49x	1.69x	-12%
P/S	1.05x	1.08x	-4%
EV/EBITDA	9.56x	5.44x	+76%
EV/EBIT	NM	9.83x(2/3)	—
EV/Sales	2.47x	2.18x	+13%
FCF Yield	18.46%	15.76%	+17%
Dividend Yield	10.03%	8.08%	+24%

Only 3 peers are covered here, so the median is itself one of the members. A 0% gap can simply mean EXCL sits at the median.

EV = mkt cap Rp 44 T + debt Rp 63 T − cash Rp 2.7 T + minority interest Rp 174 M = Rp 105 T

What the price implies

At today’s price, the market is paying for 8.1%/yr FCF growth (5.0% at 12.0% to 11.0% at 16.0% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: 15.1% FCF · 12.2% revenue.

Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 12.0–16.0% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.

Forward DCF (glass-box)

This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.

Mechanical DCF suppressed: on these default assumptions the modelled enterprise value falls BELOW net debt and minority interests, so the equity residual is negative. Equity cannot be worth less than nothing, so no per-share figure is published here: read it as the model saying the debt claims consume the whole enterprise at this discount rate and growth path, which is itself the signal. The components are shown below so the arithmetic stays checkable, and the sliders let you test what it would take to change the answer.

Assumption	Value	Basis
Rf (risk-free)	7.26%	Indonesia 10Y government bond, 8 Jul 2026
ERP (Rm − Rf)	6.69%	Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%)
β	0.37 → 0.81	Telecom. Services (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 1.41
Cost of equity	12.71%	Rf + β × ERP
Cost of debt	6.28%	FY2025 interest expense ÷ total debt
Tax rate	15.0%	median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest)
WACC	8.39%	41% E × CoE + 59% D × Kd × (1 − t)
Revenue growth (yr 1, fading)	12.2%	delivered 4-yr revenue CAGR 12.2%, fading linearly to terminal
EBIT margin	9.7%	mean EBIT margin, last 3 FYs
D&A / revenue	22.3%	mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs
Capex / revenue	27.3%	mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years; in the terminal year capex falls to replacement level (equal to depreciation, 22.3% of revenue) because holding a build-phase or pause-phase ratio in perpetuity misprices the company in whichever direction that phase points
ΔNWC / Δrevenue	21.2%	median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP)
Terminal growth	2.5%	BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%)

Growth path

year 1 → fading to terminal over 5 yrs12.2%

EBIT margin9.7%

WACC8.4%

Terminal growth2.5%

Explicit years5

Year	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	T∞
Growth	12.2%	9.8%	7.4%	4.9%	2.5%	2.5%
Revenue	Rp 48 T	Rp 52 T	Rp 56 T	Rp 59 T	Rp 60 T	Rp 62 T
EBIT	Rp 4.6 T	Rp 5.1 T	Rp 5.5 T	Rp 5.7 T	Rp 5.9 T	Rp 6.0 T
NOPAT	Rp 3.9 T	Rp 4.3 T	Rp 4.7 T	Rp 4.9 T	Rp 5.0 T	Rp 5.1 T
+ D&A	Rp 11 T	Rp 12 T	Rp 13 T	Rp 13 T	Rp 13 T	Rp 14 T
− Capex	Rp 13 T	Rp 14 T	Rp 15 T	Rp 16 T	Rp 16 T	Rp 14 T
− ΔNWC	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 988 M	Rp 815 M	Rp 586 M	Rp 312 M	Rp 320 M
FCFF	Rp 487 M	Rp 753 M	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 1.4 T	Rp 1.7 T	Rp 4.8 T
PV	Rp 450 M	Rp 641 M	Rp 828 M	Rp 997 M	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 55 T

Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5

EV = PV(explicit) Rp 4.1 T + PV(TV) Rp 55 T = Rp 59 T · TV 93% of EV · − net debt Rp 60 T − minority Rp 174 M

Model output: Rp -93/share (-104% vs price Rp 2,440)· exit-multiple check (5.4x): Rp 779

Under these assumptions the model lands 104% below today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for faster growth, a fatter margin, or a lower discount rate than the inputs here assume.

Sensitivity (per share, Rp)

g \ WACC	7.4%	8.4%	9.4%
2.0%	339	-334	-821
2.5%	700	-93	-650
3.0%	1,143	194	-453

Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.

Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.

Macro backdropfull backdrop + sensitivity map →

BI Rate 5.75%IDR/USD 18,05810Y government bond yield 7.26%Inflation 3.34%(as-of 2026-07-31)

GDP/consumption ↑(M)Rupiah weaker(M)BI rate ↑(L)

Income Statement

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Revenue	Rp 27 T	Rp 29 T	Rp 32 T	Rp 34 T	Rp 42 T
Cost of Goods Sold	Rp 9.2 T	Rp 11 T	Rp 11 T	Rp 12 T	Rp 19 T
Gross Profit	Rp 18 T	Rp 18 T	Rp 21 T	Rp 22 T	Rp 23 T
Operating Income (EBIT)	Rp 3.6 T	Rp 3.9 T	Rp 4.4 T	Rp 5.6 T	-Rp 233 M
Interest Expense	Rp 2.3 T	Rp 2.7 T	Rp 2.9 T	Rp 3.1 T	Rp 3.9 T
Net Income	Rp 1.3 T	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 1.3 T	Rp 1.8 T	-Rp 4.4 T
Net Income Attributable to Owners	Rp 1.3 T	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 1.3 T	Rp 1.8 T	-Rp 4.4 T
Depreciation & Amortization	Rp 5.7 T	Rp 5.7 T	Rp 6.5 T	Rp 7.0 T	Rp 11 T

Balance Sheet

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Cash & Equivalents	Rp 2.7 T	Rp 5.2 T	Rp 966 M	Rp 1.4 T	Rp 2.7 T
Accounts Receivable	Rp 588 M	Rp 790 M	Rp 1.4 T	Rp 1.9 T	Rp 5.1 T
Inventory	Rp 156 M	Rp 408 M	Rp 378 M	Rp 194 M	Rp 190 M
Current Assets	Rp 7.7 T	Rp 10 T	Rp 7.2 T	Rp 8.4 T	Rp 15 T
Total Assets	Rp 73 T	Rp 87 T	Rp 88 T	Rp 86 T	Rp 115 T
Accounts Payable	Rp 635 M	Rp 509 M	Rp 552 M	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 829 M
Current Liabilities	Rp 21 T	Rp 26 T	Rp 20 T	Rp 21 T	Rp 32 T
Total Liabilities	Rp 53 T	Rp 62 T	Rp 61 T	Rp 60 T	Rp 85 T
Total Interest-Bearing Debt	Rp 36 T	Rp 44 T	Rp 46 T	Rp 46 T	Rp 63 T
Total Equity	Rp 20 T	Rp 26 T	Rp 26 T	Rp 26 T	Rp 30 T
Equity Attributable to Owners	Rp 20 T	Rp 26 T	Rp 26 T	Rp 26 T	Rp 30 T

Cash Flow Statement

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Operating Cash Flow	Rp 12 T	Rp 14 T	Rp 16 T	Rp 18 T	Rp 18 T
Capital Expenditure	Rp 7.3 T	Rp 8.8 T	Rp 10 T	Rp 9.5 T	Rp 9.3 T

Company Deep Analysis

Reviewed: 2026-07-31

Analyst Verdict

XL Axiata is the smallest of the three telcos and the clearest consolidation turnaround bet. Its economics were sub-scale for years (ROE just 4–7%, FY22–24) and then tipped into a FY25 loss (ROE -14.8%, operating margin -0.55%), driven by the XLSmart merger with Smartfren and the integration charges that came with it. The underlying EBITDA engine still runs (~26% margin, FCF ~Rp8tn), and the strategic logic is scale: XLSmart is meant to be a stronger third player against Telkomsel and IOH. This is a high-risk, high-reward consolidation play, and everything rides on the merger delivering its synergies and lifting returns off a low base.

Business Model

Indonesia’s third-largest mobile operator (part of Malaysia’s Axiata Group), now combining with Smartfren to form XLSmart. It provides mobile data/connectivity, fixed broadband (XL Home) and enterprise services. Historically the sub-scale player, its strategy is the Smartfren merger: pooling spectrum, networks and subscribers to reach competitive scale.

Segments

Mobile data is the core, with fixed broadband (convergence) and enterprise growing. The defining event is the XLSmart merger: pre-merger, XL’s smaller scale meant the lowest telco margins and returns; the merger is the bet to fix that. FY25 results absorbed merger/integration effects, swinging to a loss.

Value Chain & Positioning

Spectrum & network → operations → distribution → data monetisation. XL’s margin pool (mobile data) was structurally squeezed by sub-scale and the price war; the XLSmart merger aims to widen it through scale and synergies: the value case is consolidation, not organic momentum.

Competitive Forces (Porter’s 5)

Supplier powerMedium

How much leverage input/funding providers have over pricing.

Equipment vendors and spectrum carry pricing power; sub-scale historically weakened XL’s leverage: the merger should help.

Implication → Scale is the fix; pre-merger, weak buying power compounded thin margins.

Buyer powerHigh

How much leverage customers have to push prices down.

Price-sensitive prepaid base with low switching costs; XL competed hardest on price as the challenger.

Implication → The core reason returns were lowest among the three telcos.

Threat of new entryLow

How easily new competitors can enter the market.

Spectrum and capex barriers; the merger reduces the field and reinforces the three-player structure.

Implication → Consolidation is structurally supportive: fewer, larger players.

Threat of substitutesHigh

Risk that alternative products/services replace demand.

OTT and Wi-Fi substitute for voice/SMS and data.

Implication → Adds pressure; XLSmart must build scale and adjacent services to offset.

Competitive rivalryHigh

Intensity of competition among existing players.

The fiercest competitor historically; the merger aims to convert price competition into a more rational three-player market.

Implication → If consolidation holds, rivalry eases: the central thesis for the merger.

Moat / Competitive Edge

Narrow, widening via the merger. Standalone, XL’s moat was the weakest of the three: sub-scale spectrum and network, the lowest margins and returns. The XLSmart merger with Smartfren is the deliberate move to build a defensible moat through scale (pooled spectrum, combined network, larger subscriber base). Until synergies prove out, the moat, and the returns, remain the thinnest in the sector.

Key Drivers & Sensitivities

XLSmart merger integration
The make-or-break driver. The Smartfren merger must deliver scale and synergies to lift returns from a low base; FY25 absorbed integration charges (a loss year).
Market repair / pricing
A more rational three-player market post-consolidation is the key to ARPU and margin recovery.
Capex / FCF
Despite the FY25 loss, EBITDA and FCF persist (~Rp8tn); capex and integration spend drive the near-term cycle.
Balance sheet / leverage
Leverage rose (D/E ~2.1, FY25) and interest cover turned negative; deleveraging and a return to profit are priorities.
Data monetisation
Converting traffic to revenue, especially via convergence (XL Home) and enterprise, underpins the recovery.

Linkages

Tied to consumer spending, data adoption and, critically, the three-player market structure post-consolidation. Part of Axiata Group’s regional portfolio; capex links it to FX and rates. Its fortunes hinge on whether consolidation repairs telco economics.

Recent Developments

FY2025 broke a stable pattern. Revenue grew 23.4% to Rp42,446.0bn, the largest increase of the window, yet operating margin went from 16.2% to minus 0.5% and the company posted a net loss of Rp4,426.6bn against a Rp1,819.0bn profit the year before. ROE swung from 7.0% to minus 14.8% and interest coverage from 1.82× to minus 0.06×. EBITDA margin did not hold either: it fell from 36.6% to 25.8%, the lowest of the five years. Two structural features predate all of this and matter more than any single year. Debt to equity has been above 1.7× in every year and reached 2.09×, and the current ratio has never exceeded 0.47×, so current liabilities run at roughly twice current assets throughout. Free cash flow remains substantial at Rp8.20tn.

Regulation

Regulated by Komdigi and BRTI on spectrum, licensing, interconnection and tariffs; the XLSmart merger is subject to regulatory and competition approval, including spectrum conditions. Data-protection (the PDP Law) and content rules apply. Axiata Group ownership adds cross-border oversight.

ESG & Sustainability

Governance reflects Axiata Group standards. Environmental focus on network energy; social materiality in digital inclusion and coverage. Data privacy and resilience are material; the merger carries significant workforce/integration considerations.

Risks

Merger-integration failure / synergies not delivered
Sustained low or negative returns (an FY25 loss)
Rising leverage (D/E ~2.1) and negative interest cover
Price-war intensity as the challenger
Regulatory conditions on the XLSmart merger

Outlook & What to Watch

The sector’s turnaround/consolidation bet: sub-scale economics that the XLSmart merger aims to fix through scale and a more rational market. High-risk, high-reward: success lifts returns from a low base; failure leaves the weakest telco economics. (Interpretation, not a forecast.)

Key KPIs

EBITDA margin: EBITDA ÷ revenue: positive (~26%) despite the FY25 loss
ARPU: Average revenue per user: recovery lever
FCF: Free cash flow: persists (~Rp8tn)
ROE: Net income ÷ equity: negative in FY25 (merger charges)
Net debt/EBITDA: Leverage: rose; deleveraging is a priority

Sources

Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.