Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | 0.76x | 0.76x | 0.80x | 0.80x | 0.76x |
| Interest burden | 1.00x | 1.00x | 1.00x | 0.99x | 0.96x |
| Operating margindriver | 30.3% | 43.5% | 26.3% | 20.3% | 13.8% |
| Asset turnover | 1.25x | 1.38x | 1.09x | 0.96x | 0.78x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 1.39x | 1.35x | 1.22x | 1.24x | 1.26x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 39.6% | 61.5% | 28.0% | 19.3% | 10.0% |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 39.7% | 61.6% | 28.1% | 19.5% | 10.4% |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 2.71x | 3.26x | 4.35x | 4.48x | 3.76x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 2.54x | 3.09x | 4.02x | 4.21x | 3.43x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 1.89x | 2.44x | 2.89x | 3.16x | 2.35x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | $ 623 M | $ 1.3 B | $ 986 M | $ 1.1 B | $ 951 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 0.04x | 0.03x | 0.03x | 0.04x | 0.05x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 0.39x | 0.35x | 0.22x | 0.24x | 0.26x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.03x | 0.02x | 0.02x | 0.03x | 0.04x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | -$ 639 M | -$ 1.4 B | -$ 797 M | -$ 918 M | -$ 719 M |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 278.28x | 532.65x | 290.73x | 128.92x | 28.31x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 1.39x | 1.35x | 1.22x | 1.24x | 1.26x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 45.7% | 53.6% | 33.7% | 31.4% | 27.0% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 30.3% | 43.5% | 26.3% | 20.3% | 13.8% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 22.9% | 33.0% | 21.1% | 16.2% | 10.2% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | $ 701 M | $ 1.7 B | $ 689 M | $ 514 M | $ 299 M |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 33.7% | 45.6% | 29.0% | 22.3% | 15.9% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 28.5% | 45.5% | 22.9% | 15.5% | 7.9% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 39.3% | 61.4% | 28.0% | 19.4% | 10.1% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 0.76x | 0.76x | 0.80x | 0.80x | 0.76x |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 1.00x | 1.00x | 1.00x | 0.99x | 0.96x |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 39.7% | 61.6% | 28.1% | 19.5% | 10.4% |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 1.25x | 1.38x | 1.09x | 0.96x | 0.78x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 18.04x | 17.56x | 16.07x | 18.69x | 12.20x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 11.12x | 12.96x | 12.02x | 12.54x | 12.12x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 13.21x | 11.70x | 14.32x | 11.88x | 8.70x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 20.2 days | 20.8 days | 22.7 days | 19.5 days | 29.9 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 32.8 days | 28.2 days | 30.4 days | 29.1 days | 30.1 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 27.6 days | 31.2 days | 25.5 days | 30.7 days | 42.0 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 25.4 days | 17.7 days | 27.6 days | 17.9 days | 18.1 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | $ 606 M | $ 1.3 B | $ 167 M | $ 384 M | $ 206 M |
Price Rp 24,685 · market cap Rp 27 T ($ 1.5 B at the cited rate; statements are filed in USD)
| Multiple | ITMG | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 7.95x | 16.25x(15/16) | -51% |
| P/B | 0.80x | 1.68x | -53% |
| P/S | 0.81x | 1.92x | -58% |
| EV/EBITDA | 2.70x | 10.31x | -74% |
| EV/EBIT | 3.11x | 14.25x | -78% |
| EV/Sales | 0.43x | 2.27x | -81% |
| FCF Yield | 13.61% | 0.01% | +129,117% |
| Dividend Yield | 6.59% | 5.27%(11/16) | +25% |
EV = mkt cap $ 1.5 B + debt $ 89 M − cash $ 808 M + minority interest $ 9.9 M = $ 808 M
At today’s price, the market is paying for -14.5%/yr FCF growth (-17.0% at 9.3% to -12.2% at 13.3% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: -23.6% FCF · -2.4% revenue.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 9.3–13.3% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
Cyclical normalization: Commodity/cyclical name: the trailing years are a sample drawn from the price cycle, not a trend. Defaults are therefore normalized, using the full-window mean margin with no cycle-position growth extrapolation. That normalized margin is itself the embedded commodity-price assumption.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 4.66% | US 10Y Treasury, 10 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.96 → 1.00 | Metals & Mining (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.06 |
| Cost of equity | 11.37% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 10.34% | FY2025 interest expense ÷ total debt |
| Tax rate | 23.8% | median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest) |
| WACC | 11.18% | 94% E × CoE + 6% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 2.5% | terminal growth from year 1, cyclical normalization: the delivered 4-yr CAGR (-2.4%) reflects cycle position, not a trend |
| EBIT margin | 26.8% | full-cycle mean EBIT margin, FY2021–FY2025 (cyclical normalization: this margin is the embedded commodity-price assumption) |
| D&A / revenue | 2.3% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 3.1% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years; in the terminal year capex falls to replacement level (equal to depreciation, 2.3% of revenue) because holding a build-phase or pause-phase ratio in perpetuity misprices the company in whichever direction that phase points |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | 5.2% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | $ 1.9 B | $ 2.0 B | $ 2.0 B | $ 2.1 B | $ 2.1 B | $ 2.2 B |
| EBIT | $ 518 M | $ 531 M | $ 544 M | $ 557 M | $ 571 M | $ 586 M |
| NOPAT | $ 395 M | $ 404 M | $ 415 M | $ 425 M | $ 436 M | $ 446 M |
| + D&A | $ 44 M | $ 45 M | $ 46 M | $ 47 M | $ 48 M | $ 50 M |
| − Capex | $ 60 M | $ 62 M | $ 64 M | $ 65 M | $ 67 M | $ 50 M |
| − ΔNWC | $ 2.4 M | $ 2.5 M | $ 2.6 M | $ 2.6 M | $ 2.7 M | $ 2.8 M |
| FCFF | $ 376 M | $ 385 M | $ 395 M | $ 404 M | $ 415 M | $ 444 M |
| PV | $ 338 M | $ 311 M | $ 287 M | $ 265 M | $ 244 M | $ 3.0 B |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5
EV = PV(explicit) $ 1.4 B + PV(TV) $ 3.0 B = $ 4.5 B · TV 68% of EV · − net debt -$ 719 M − minority $ 9.9 M
Model output: Rp 84,026/share (+240% vs price Rp 24,685)· exit-multiple check (10.3x): Rp 96,277
Under these assumptions the model lands 240% above today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for slower growth, a thinner margin, or a higher discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 10.2% | 11.2% | 12.2% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | 89,086 | 80,538 | 73,675 |
| 2.5% | 93,578 | 84,026 | 76,454 |
| 3.0% | 98,695 | 87,941 | 79,535 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $ 2.1 B | $ 3.6 B | $ 2.4 B | $ 2.3 B | $ 1.9 B |
| Cost of Goods Sold | $ 1.1 B | $ 1.7 B | $ 1.6 B | $ 1.6 B | $ 1.4 B |
| Gross Profit | $ 950 M | $ 1.9 B | $ 800 M | $ 725 M | $ 508 M |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | $ 629 M | $ 1.6 B | $ 624 M | $ 469 M | $ 260 M |
| Interest Expense | $ 2.3 M | $ 3.0 M | $ 2.1 M | $ 3.6 M | $ 9.2 M |
| Net Income | $ 476 M | $ 1.2 B | $ 500 M | $ 374 M | $ 191 M |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | $ 476 M | $ 1.2 B | $ 500 M | $ 374 M | $ 191 M |
| Depreciation & Amortization | $ 72 M | $ 77 M | $ 65 M | $ 46 M | $ 39 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $ 691 M | $ 1.4 B | $ 851 M | $ 990 M | $ 808 M |
| Accounts Receivable | $ 187 M | $ 280 M | $ 197 M | $ 184 M | $ 155 M |
| Inventory | $ 62 M | $ 96 M | $ 98 M | $ 85 M | $ 113 M |
| Current Assets | $ 988 M | $ 1.9 B | $ 1.3 B | $ 1.4 B | $ 1.3 B |
| Total Assets | $ 1.7 B | $ 2.6 B | $ 2.2 B | $ 2.4 B | $ 2.4 B |
| Accounts Payable | $ 85 M | $ 144 M | $ 110 M | $ 133 M | $ 158 M |
| Current Liabilities | $ 365 M | $ 586 M | $ 294 M | $ 314 M | $ 345 M |
| Total Liabilities | $ 465 M | $ 690 M | $ 399 M | $ 473 M | $ 498 M |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | $ 52 M | $ 50 M | $ 54 M | $ 72 M | $ 89 M |
| Total Equity | $ 1.2 B | $ 2.0 B | $ 1.8 B | $ 1.9 B | $ 1.9 B |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | $ 1.2 B | $ 2.0 B | $ 1.8 B | $ 1.9 B | $ 1.9 B |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $ 618 M | $ 1.3 B | $ 221 M | $ 452 M | $ 285 M |
| Capital Expenditure | $ 12 M | $ 28 M | $ 54 M | $ 68 M | $ 79 M |
ITMG gross margin: 45.7 % (2021) → 53.6 % (2022) → 33.7 % (2023) → 31.4 % (2024) → 27.0 % (2025). OPM: 30.3 % → 43.5 % → 26.3 % → 20.3 % → 13.8 %. Net margin: 22.9 % → 33.0 % → 21.1 % → 16.2 % → 10.2 %. ROE: 39.3 % → 61.4 % → 28.0 % → 19.4 % → 10.1 %. ROIC: 39.7 % → 61.6 % → 28.1 % → 19.5 % → 10.4 %. EBITDA margin: 33.7 % → 45.6 % → 29.0 % → 22.3 % → 15.9 %. D/E: near-zero throughout (0.03–0.05) with net cash of −USD 0.64 B to −1.38 B every year. Interest coverage: 278× → 533× → 291× → 129× → 28×. FCF (USD): 606 M → 1,297 M → 167 M → 384 M → 206 M; positive every year. Revenue (USD): 2.08 B → 3.64 B → 2.37 B → 2.30 B → 1.88 B. The descent from the 2022 peak is the steepest in the coal batch, ROE 61.4 % → 10.1 %, because ITMG’s 2022 was an extreme supercycle print and its cost/volume position is less advantaged than BYAN’s (asset turnover fell 1.38× → 0.78× as mature mines yielded less). But the balance sheet is pristine: net cash every year, minimal debt, and interest coverage still 28× even at the 2025 trough. The investment character is a high-yield cash-return vehicle on a depleting asset base: the key question is whether reserve replacement and diversification (solar, mining services, the NICE nickel stake) can offset mine maturity and the secular thermal-coal demand decline before the cash-cow runs down.
ITMG owns its concessions and self-performs much mining; contractors, fuel and equipment are competitively sourced. Banpu-group procurement and technical support add scale. Mature-mine economics mean rising strip ratios and unit costs over time: a geological, not supplier, pressure.
Implication → Cost pressure comes from within (mine maturity, rising strip) rather than suppliers. This structurally erodes ITMG’s cost-curve position over time versus a low-strip peer like BYAN.
Thermal coal is benchmark-priced (ICI/Newcastle): ITMG is a price-taker. Asian utility buyers have abundant alternatives (Australia, Russia, South Africa, other Indonesian producers); domestic PLN buys under the DMO cap. No customer relationship confers pricing power.
Implication → Revenue is fully cycle-driven; ITMG’s levers are cost discipline and product blending, and, for shareholders, the cash payout. Absolute earnings fall as both price and volume soften.
New thermal-coal entry is deterred by IUP/RKAB/AMDAL barriers and, increasingly, ESG-driven financing constraints post-2030. But this protects incumbents in a shrinking market: the relevant threat to ITMG is not new entrants, it is its own reserve depletion and secular demand decline.
Implication → Barriers to entry are irrelevant comfort: ITMG’s challenge is internal (reserve life) and structural (demand), not competitive supply. Reserve replacement is the make-or-break variable.
Thermal coal faces the sector’s strongest substitution pressure, LNG, solar, wind, hydro, geothermal, with structural demand decline from 2030+ (JETP, coal-retirement targets). ITMG has no met-coal hedge and only nascent clean-energy exposure. Its own rooftop-solar and NICE-nickel moves are an acknowledgement of, not yet a solution to, the substitution risk.
Implication → ITMG is a finite-life cash stream. The bull case is maximising cash return before decline; the diversification must scale meaningfully to change the terminal-value story.
ITMG competes on the seaborne thermal market against Australia, Russia, South Africa and Indonesian peers (PTBA, ADRO/AADI, BYAN, plus unlisted). Its lower-strip, low-ash coal is decent quality, but it lacks BYAN’s extreme cost advantage and ADRO’s met-coal escape. Rivalry is on delivered cost through a normalising price cycle.
Implication → Mid-pack cost position means ITMG’s margins compress faster than BYAN’s as prices normalise (evident in the ROE 61 % → 10 % descent). Cost discipline and reserve quality are the only defences.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Indonesia controls >60 % of global nickel supply and is the world's largest thermal-coal exporter; hilirisasi mandates in-country ore processing, reshaping value chains from raw ore to battery-grade products.