Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | 0.83x | 0.69x | 0.71x | 0.70x | 0.76x |
| Interest burden | 0.79x | 0.75x | 0.59x | 0.84x | 0.88x |
| Operating margindriver | 6.9% | 5.6% | 4.3% | 9.2% | 9.9% |
| Asset turnover | 1.57x | 1.50x | 1.50x | 1.61x | 1.52x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 2.18x | 2.39x | 2.41x | 2.09x | 2.00x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 15.4% | 10.4% | 6.6% | 18.2% | 20.0% |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 11.6% | 7.6% | 6.1% | 13.9% | 16.0% |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 2.00x | 1.81x | 1.61x | 1.85x | 1.29x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 0.71x | 0.63x | 0.55x | 0.64x | 0.57x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 0.15x | 0.19x | 0.14x | 0.15x | 0.21x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | Rp 7.1 T | Rp 7.6 T | Rp 6.5 T | Rp 7.9 T | Rp 4.9 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 0.78x | 0.94x | 0.91x | 0.65x | 0.59x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 1.18x | 1.39x | 1.41x | 1.09x | 1.00x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.36x | 0.39x | 0.38x | 0.31x | 0.30x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | Rp 9.1 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 9.4 T | Rp 8.3 T |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 4.67x | 4.04x | 2.45x | 6.22x | 8.41x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 2.18x | 2.39x | 2.41x | 2.09x | 2.00x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 17.3% | 15.2% | 14.1% | 19.5% | 21.1% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 6.9% | 5.6% | 4.3% | 9.2% | 9.9% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 4.5% | 2.9% | 1.8% | 5.4% | 6.6% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | Rp 4.3 T | Rp 3.7 T | Rp 3.2 T | Rp 6.2 T | Rp 7.2 T |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 9.6% | 7.5% | 6.3% | 11.1% | 11.8% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 7.1% | 4.3% | 2.7% | 8.7% | 10.0% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 16.5% | 11.1% | 7.0% | 19.5% | 21.5% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 0.83x | 0.69x | 0.71x | 0.70x | 0.76x |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 0.79x | 0.75x | 0.59x | 0.84x | 0.88x |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 11.6% | 7.6% | 6.1% | 13.9% | 16.0% |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 1.57x | 1.50x | 1.50x | 1.61x | 1.52x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 4.04x | 3.77x | 3.87x | 4.01x | 4.00x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 19.11x | 20.36x | 20.84x | 20.84x | 19.42x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 15.83x | 12.07x | 10.67x | 12.28x | 12.92x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 90.2 days | 96.9 days | 94.3 days | 91.1 days | 91.2 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 19.1 days | 17.9 days | 17.5 days | 17.5 days | 18.8 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 23.1 days | 30.3 days | 34.2 days | 29.7 days | 28.3 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 86.3 days | 84.6 days | 77.7 days | 78.8 days | 81.7 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | -Rp 622 M | -Rp 656 M | Rp 354 M | Rp 3.2 T | Rp 2.5 T |
Price Rp 2,150 · market cap Rp 25 T
| Multiple | JPFA | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 6.24x | 6.24x | 0% |
| P/B | 1.34x | 1.34x | 0% |
| P/S | 0.41x | 0.41x | 0% |
| EV/EBITDA | 4.82x | 4.82x | 0% |
| EV/EBIT | 5.76x | 5.76x | 0% |
| EV/Sales | 0.57x | 0.57x | 0% |
| FCF Yield | 10.18% | 10.18% | 0% |
| Dividend Yield | 6.51% | 6.51% | 0% |
Only 3 peers are covered here, so the median is itself one of the members. A 0% gap can simply mean JPFA sits at the median.
EV = mkt cap Rp 25 T + debt Rp 12 T − cash Rp 3.6 T + minority interest Rp 1.4 T = Rp 35 T
At today’s price, the market is paying for 9.1%/yr FCF growth (5.9% at 12.0% to 12.0% at 16.0% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: FCF n/m (sign flip) · 7.8% revenue.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 12.0–16.0% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 7.26% | Indonesia 10Y government bond, re-verified 31 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.81 → 1.08 | Farming/Agriculture (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.47 |
| Cost of equity | 14.51% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 8.04% | median interest coverage 4.7x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a A2/A synthetic rating and a 0.78% default spread, over a 7.26% base (Indonesia 10Y 7.26%, already the sovereign rate). Its BOOK rate is 6.0%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms) |
| Tax rate | 28.9% | median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest) |
| WACC | 11.68% | 68% E × CoE + 32% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 7.8% | delivered 4-yr revenue CAGR 7.8%, fading linearly to terminal |
| EBIT margin | 7.8% | mean EBIT margin, last 3 FYs |
| D&A / revenue | 2.0% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 3.6% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 11.7% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 21.4% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 2.8% of revenue against depreciation of 2.0%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | 15.5% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 7.8% | 6.5% | 5.2% | 3.8% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | Rp 65 T | Rp 70 T | Rp 73 T | Rp 76 T | Rp 78 T | Rp 80 T |
| EBIT | Rp 5.1 T | Rp 5.4 T | Rp 5.7 T | Rp 5.9 T | Rp 6.1 T | Rp 6.2 T |
| NOPAT | Rp 3.6 T | Rp 3.9 T | Rp 4.1 T | Rp 4.2 T | Rp 4.3 T | Rp 4.4 T |
| + D&A | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 1.6 T |
| − Capex | Rp 2.4 T | Rp 2.5 T | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 2.8 T | Rp 2.8 T | Rp 2.2 T |
| − ΔNWC | Rp 740 M | Rp 662 M | Rp 560 M | Rp 437 M | Rp 295 M | Rp 303 M |
| FCFF | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 2.3 T | Rp 2.5 T | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 3.5 T |
| PV | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 22 T |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding
EV = PV(explicit) Rp 8.1 T + PV(TV) Rp 22 T = Rp 30 T · TV 73% of EV · − net debt Rp 8.3 T − minority Rp 1.4 T = equity Rp 20 T ÷ shares outstanding
Model output: Rp 1,742/share (-19% vs price Rp 2,150)· exit-multiple check (4.8x): Rp 1,683
Under these assumptions the model lands 19% below today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for faster growth, a fatter margin, or a lower discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 10.7% | 11.7% | 12.7% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | 1,965 | 1,649 | 1,393 |
| 2.5% | 2,088 | 1,742 | 1,465 |
| 3.0% | 2,227 | 1,846 | 1,545 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | Rp 45 T | Rp 49 T | Rp 51 T | Rp 56 T | Rp 61 T |
| Cost of Goods Sold | Rp 37 T | Rp 42 T | Rp 44 T | Rp 45 T | Rp 48 T |
| Gross Profit | Rp 7.8 T | Rp 7.4 T | Rp 7.2 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 13 T |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | Rp 3.1 T | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 5.1 T | Rp 6.0 T |
| Interest Expense | Rp 664 M | Rp 677 M | Rp 899 M | Rp 824 M | Rp 716 M |
| Net Income | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 930 M | Rp 3.0 T | Rp 4.0 T |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 930 M | Rp 3.0 T | Rp 4.0 T |
| Depreciation & Amortization | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 960 M | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.2 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 3.6 T |
| Accounts Receivable | Rp 2.3 T | Rp 2.4 T | Rp 2.5 T | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 3.1 T |
| Inventory | Rp 9.2 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 12 T |
| Current Assets | Rp 14 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 21 T |
| Total Assets | Rp 29 T | Rp 33 T | Rp 34 T | Rp 35 T | Rp 40 T |
| Accounts Payable | Rp 2.3 T | Rp 3.4 T | Rp 4.1 T | Rp 3.7 T | Rp 3.7 T |
| Current Liabilities | Rp 7.1 T | Rp 9.4 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 9.3 T | Rp 17 T |
| Total Liabilities | Rp 15 T | Rp 19 T | Rp 20 T | Rp 18 T | Rp 20 T |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | Rp 10 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 12 T |
| Total Equity | Rp 13 T | Rp 14 T | Rp 14 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 20 T |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | Rp 12 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 15 T | Rp 19 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | Rp 701 M | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 2.4 T | Rp 4.9 T | Rp 5.0 T |
| Capital Expenditure | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 2.1 T | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 2.5 T |
JPFA gross margin: 17.3 % (2021) → 15.2 % (2022) → 14.1 % (2023) → 19.5 % (2024) → 21.1 % (2025). OPM: 6.9 % → 5.6 % → 4.3 % → 9.2 % → 9.9 %. Net margin: 4.5 % → 2.9 % → 1.8 % → 5.4 % → 6.6 %. ROE: 16.5 % → 11.1 % → 7.0 % → 19.5 % → 21.5 %. ROIC: 11.6 % → 7.6 % → 6.1 % → 13.9 % → 16.0 %. D/E: 0.78 → 0.94 → 0.91 → 0.65 → 0.59. FCF (T IDR): −0.62 → −0.66 → +0.35 → +3.23 → +2.54. Interest coverage: 4.7× → 4.0× → 2.5× → 6.2× → 8.4×. Asset turnover: 1.57 → 1.50 → 1.50 → 1.61 → 1.52×. The 2023 nadir (NM 1.8 %, IC 2.5×, FCF barely positive) was the stress test: high corn prices (40–50 % YoY) + DOC oversupply (depressed farm-gate prices) hit simultaneously. The 2025 recovery (ROE 21.5 %, ROIC 16.0 %) was driven by supply rationalisation (industry-wide flock culling restoring DOC/broiler prices) + normalising corn. D/E of 0.59 remains elevated vs. CPIN's 0.20: JPFA's leverage amplifies both the cycle upside and downside.
Corn is ~60–65 % of animal feed COGS. Indonesia imports deficit corn via Bulog/government import quota system: allocation timing and volume controlled by government, creating procurement uncertainty for feed mills. Soybean meal (US/Brazil sourced) is priced at global CBOT. Neither input has domestic price-setting flexibility; both expose JPFA to global commodity shocks.
Implication → Corn import quota policy is an indirect earnings lever: government restriction tightening corn supply raises JPFA feed cost. The 2021–2023 margin compression was largely corn-driven. JPFA has limited ability to pass through corn cost increases to DOC/broiler customers when the market is oversupplied.
Poultry products (DOC, live broiler) sold to fragmented smallholder farms at publicly quoted farm-gate prices: no individual buyer leverage, but pricing is transparent and JPFA is a price-taker in commodity channels. Kanzler branded processed chicken has more pricing power than commodity broiler: a limited but real differentiation advantage. Aquaculture buyers (export processors) have more negotiating leverage given alternative supply options.
Implication → Branded consumer products (Kanzler) are the margin-expansion lever vs. commodity DOC/broiler. JPFA's brand investment must accelerate to reduce earnings cyclicality.
Full vertical integration (feed + breeder + DOC + processing + brand) requires significant capital and takes years to establish. However, smaller integrators (Malindo Feedmill, Sierad Produce) have successfully built partial integration. The main barrier is biosecurity infrastructure and the breeder flock investment timeline. Aquaculture and swine segments have lower barriers: small operators can compete in those sub-markets.
Implication → JPFA's moat from integration is real but not impregnable. Malindo (Malaysian Capital) is a credible #3 with similar model. The integrated structure helps during oversupply cycles (JPFA can adjust output mix) but doesn't prevent price competition in commodity poultry.
Chicken is Indonesia's most affordable primary protein at current income levels (~IDR 35,000–45,000/kg farm gate). Tempe/tahu (soy protein) competes at lower price points. Beef is 3–4× the price. Fish/seafood competes at similar price ranges. No near-term substitution threat to mainstream chicken consumption. However, aquaculture products face more substitution from imported seafood in modern trade.
Implication → Chicken demand is structurally supported by income growth and protein affordability. The risk is supply-side (DOC oversupply), not demand-side (substitution). JPFA does not face existential demand risk in its core poultry business.
CPIN (Charoen Pokphand, parent CP Group) is the dominant integrated player with deeper pockets and more processing brand investment (So Good vs. Kanzler). Malindo Feedmill is the #3 integrated competitor. Sierad Produce competes in feed and broiler. In a DOC-oversupplied market, all integrators compete on price: the cycle periodically destroys margins across all listed players. CPIN's deeper brand (So Good) and lower leverage give it structural advantage in downturns.
Implication → JPFA's higher leverage (D/E 0.59 vs. CPIN 0.20) is a structural disadvantage during downcycles: CPIN can sustain operations through price wars that stress JPFA's balance sheet. The strategic priority is deleveraging while building Kanzler brand equity.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Indonesia's vertically integrated poultry-feed duopoly (CPIN + JPFA) controls grandparent stock, feed, DOC, and live bird, but is caught between import-dependent input costs and commodity-priced chicken output.