Equal · Financial Report

Jasa Marga

JSMR/FY2021–FY2025/Educational Analysis/IDR/Data source · 2026-06-20

ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Tax burden	5.00x	2.54x	2.02x	0.90x	0.63x
Interest burdendriver	0.07x	0.22x	0.49x	0.56x	0.62x
Operating margin	31.6%	29.6%	32.5%	28.4%	31.2%
Asset turnover	0.15x	0.18x	0.16x	0.21x	0.19x
Leverage (equity mult.)	3.97x	3.56x	3.32x	2.53x	2.57x
= Return on Equity (consolidated)	6.3%	10.7%	17.5%	7.7%	5.9%
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)	5.9%	7.2%	6.7%	6.8%	4.5%

Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.

Liquidity

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities)	0.86x	1.02x	0.35x	0.33x	0.58x
Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities)	0.85x	1.01x	0.34x	0.33x	0.57x
Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities)	0.52x	0.69x	0.19x	0.24x	0.42x
Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities)	-Rp 1.7 T	Rp 229 M	-Rp 15 T	-Rp 14 T	-Rp 6.7 T

Leverage & Solvency

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity)	2.43x	2.00x	1.77x	1.10x	1.21x
Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity)	2.97x	2.56x	2.32x	1.53x	1.57x
Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets)	0.61x	0.56x	0.53x	0.44x	0.47x
Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash)	Rp 56 T	Rp 43 T	Rp 64 T	Rp 60 T	Rp 68 T
Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense)	1.07x	1.28x	1.94x	2.27x	2.62x
Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity)	3.97x	3.56x	3.32x	2.53x	2.57x

Profitability

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue)	45.8%	48.4%	44.6%	37.4%	41.5%
Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue)	31.6%	29.6%	32.5%	28.4%	31.2%
Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue)	10.6%	16.6%	31.9%	14.3%	12.2%
EBITDA(EBIT + D&A)	Rp 6.7 T	Rp 7.3 T	Rp 9.0 T	Rp 12 T	Rp 12 T
EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue)	44.4%	43.9%	42.4%	36.9%	41.6%
Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets)	1.6%	3.0%	5.3%	3.0%	2.3%
Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners))	7.8%	12.6%	24.4%	13.3%	10.1%
Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax)	5.00x	2.54x	2.02x	0.90x	0.63x
Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT)	0.07x	0.22x	0.49x	0.56x	0.62x
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)	5.9%	7.2%	6.7%	6.8%	4.5%

Operations & Efficiency

Turnover	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets)	0.15x	0.18x	0.16x	0.21x	0.19x
Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory)	58.98x	86.77x	98.76x	134.24x	104.54x
Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables)	7.46x	13.54x	16.83x	27.13x	21.38x
Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables)	18.99x	63.52x	65.84x	131.32x	243.03x

Conversion Period	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS)	6.2 days	4.2 days	3.7 days	2.7 days	3.5 days
Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue)	48.9 days	27.0 days	21.7 days	13.5 days	17.1 days
Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS)	19.2 days	5.7 days	5.5 days	2.8 days	1.5 days
Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO)	35.9 days	25.4 days	19.8 days	13.4 days	19.1 days

Cash Flow

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex)	Rp 2.7 T	Rp 4.0 T	Rp 4.1 T	Rp 5.8 T	Rp 5.5 T

Valuation

price as-of 2026-07-31fundamentals: FY2025

Price Rp 2,740 · market cap Rp 20 T

Multiple	JSMR	Peer median	vs median
P/E	5.44x	8.65x	-37%
P/B	0.55x	0.87x	-37%
P/S	0.67x	1.76x	-62%
EV/EBITDA	9.19x	9.19x	0%
EV/EBIT	12.25x	12.25x	0%
EV/Sales	3.83x	5.11x	-25%
FCF Yield	27.84%	12.97%	+115%
Dividend Yield	5.70%	4.48%(4/5)	+27%

EV = mkt cap Rp 20 T + debt Rp 75 T − cash Rp 6.8 T + minority interest Rp 26 T = Rp 114 T

What the price implies

At today’s price, the market is paying for 15.3%/yr FCF growth (11.9% at 12.0% to 18.5% at 16.0% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: 20.2% FCF · 18.5% revenue.

Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 12.0–16.0% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.

Forward DCF (glass-box)

This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.

Assumption	Value	Basis
Rf (risk-free)	7.26%	Indonesia 10Y government bond, re-verified 31 Jul 2026
ERP (Rm − Rf)	6.69%	Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%)
β	0.68 → 2.65	Transportation (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 3.78
Cost of equity	25.01%	Rf + β × ERP
Cost of debt	10.01%	median interest coverage 1.9x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a B1/B+ synthetic rating and a 2.75% default spread, over a 7.26% base (Indonesia 10Y 7.26%, already the sovereign rate). Its BOOK rate is 4.7%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms)
Tax rate	23.3%	median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest)
WACC	11.30%	21% E × CoE + 79% D × Kd × (1 − t)
Revenue growth (yr 1, fading)	18.5%	delivered 4-yr revenue CAGR 18.5%, fading linearly to terminal
EBIT margin	30.7%	mean EBIT margin, last 3 FYs
D&A / revenue	9.6%	mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs
Capex / revenue	0.4%	mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 11.3% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 22.1% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 15.0% of revenue against depreciation of 9.6%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral
ΔNWC / Δrevenue	-8.9%	median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP)
Terminal growth	2.5%	BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%)

Growth path

year 1 → fading to terminal over 5 yrs18.5%

EBIT margin30.7%

WACC11.3%

Terminal growth2.5%

Explicit years5

FCFF drivers

FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − capex − ΔNWC

Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.

Capex

% of revenue0.4%

D&A

% of revenue9.6%

ΔNWC

% of the CHANGE in revenue-8.9%

Year	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	T∞
Growth	18.5%	14.5%	10.5%	6.5%	2.5%	2.5%
Revenue	Rp 35 T	Rp 41 T	Rp 45 T	Rp 48 T	Rp 49 T	Rp 50 T
EBIT	Rp 11 T	Rp 12 T	Rp 14 T	Rp 15 T	Rp 15 T	Rp 15 T
NOPAT	Rp 8.3 T	Rp 9.6 T	Rp 11 T	Rp 11 T	Rp 12 T	Rp 12 T
+ D&A	Rp 3.4 T	Rp 3.9 T	Rp 4.3 T	Rp 4.6 T	Rp 4.7 T	Rp 4.8 T
− Capex	Rp 137 M	Rp 156 M	Rp 173 M	Rp 184 M	Rp 189 M	Rp 7.5 T
− ΔNWC	-Rp 494 M	-Rp 458 M	-Rp 380 M	-Rp 260 M	-Rp 107 M	-Rp 109 M
FCFF	Rp 12 T	Rp 14 T	Rp 15 T	Rp 16 T	Rp 16 T	Rp 9.2 T
PV	Rp 11 T	Rp 11 T	Rp 11 T	Rp 10 T	Rp 9.4 T	Rp 61 T

Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding

EV = PV(explicit) Rp 53 T + PV(TV) Rp 61 T = Rp 114 T · TV 54% of EV · − net debt Rp 68 T − minority Rp 26 T = equity Rp 19 T ÷ shares outstanding

Model output: Rp 2,673/share (-2% vs price Rp 2,740)· exit-multiple check (9.2x): Rp 8,862

Under these assumptions the model lands close to today's price. The market and these inputs are telling broadly the same story.

Sensitivity (per share, Rp)

g \ WACC	10.3%	11.3%	12.3%
2.0%	3,574	2,034	780
2.5%	4,386	2,673	1,296
3.0%	5,307	3,386	1,864

Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.

Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.

Macro backdropfull backdrop + sensitivity map →

BI Rate 5.75%IDR/USD 18,05810Y government bond yield 7.26%Inflation 3.34%(as-of 2026-07-31)

BI rate ↑(M)GDP/consumption ↑(M)

Income Statement

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Revenue	Rp 15 T	Rp 17 T	Rp 21 T	Rp 32 T	Rp 30 T
Cost of Goods Sold	Rp 8.2 T	Rp 8.6 T	Rp 12 T	Rp 20 T	Rp 17 T
Gross Profit	Rp 6.9 T	Rp 8.0 T	Rp 9.5 T	Rp 12 T	Rp 12 T
Operating Income (EBIT)	Rp 4.8 T	Rp 4.9 T	Rp 6.9 T	Rp 9.0 T	Rp 9.3 T
Interest Expense	Rp 4.5 T	Rp 3.8 T	Rp 3.6 T	Rp 4.0 T	Rp 3.6 T
Net Income	Rp 1.6 T	Rp 2.7 T	Rp 6.8 T	Rp 4.5 T	Rp 3.7 T
Net Income Attributable to Owners	Rp 1.6 T	Rp 2.7 T	Rp 6.8 T	Rp 4.5 T	Rp 3.7 T
Depreciation & Amortization	Rp 1.9 T	Rp 2.4 T	Rp 2.1 T	Rp 2.7 T	Rp 3.1 T

Balance Sheet

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Cash & Equivalents	Rp 6.3 T	Rp 8.4 T	Rp 4.4 T	Rp 5.1 T	Rp 6.8 T
Accounts Receivable	Rp 2.0 T	Rp 1.2 T	Rp 1.3 T	Rp 1.2 T	Rp 1.4 T
Inventory	Rp 139 M	Rp 99 M	Rp 119 M	Rp 148 M	Rp 167 M
Current Assets	Rp 10 T	Rp 12 T	Rp 8.0 T	Rp 7.2 T	Rp 9.3 T
Total Assets	Rp 101 T	Rp 91 T	Rp 129 T	Rp 149 T	Rp 160 T
Accounts Payable	Rp 433 M	Rp 135 M	Rp 179 M	Rp 151 M	Rp 72 M
Current Liabilities	Rp 12 T	Rp 12 T	Rp 23 T	Rp 22 T	Rp 16 T
Total Liabilities	Rp 76 T	Rp 66 T	Rp 90 T	Rp 90 T	Rp 98 T
Total Interest-Bearing Debt	Rp 62 T	Rp 51 T	Rp 69 T	Rp 65 T	Rp 75 T
Total Equity	Rp 26 T	Rp 26 T	Rp 39 T	Rp 59 T	Rp 62 T
Equity Attributable to Owners	Rp 21 T	Rp 22 T	Rp 28 T	Rp 34 T	Rp 36 T

Cash Flow Statement

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Operating Cash Flow	Rp 2.8 T	Rp 4.0 T	Rp 4.2 T	Rp 5.9 T	Rp 5.7 T
Capital Expenditure	Rp 112 M	Rp 54 M	Rp 74 M	Rp 125 M	Rp 124 M

Company Deep Analysis

Reviewed: 2026-06-27

Analyst Verdict

Jasa Marga is Indonesia's dominant toll-road SOE, ~65% government-owned and operating ~60% of the national toll-road concession network, including the Trans-Java and Trans-Sumatra segments. The business is a regulated infrastructure concession: build the toll roads, then collect fees set by traffic volume × distance × a regulated tariff (adjusted every 2 years), earning EBITDA margins of ~40–44%. FCF has grown strongly from Rp2.7tn (FY21) to Rp5.5tn (FY25) as mature roads ramp up their traffic, and D/E has fallen from 2.43 to 1.21 through active deleveraging and the divestiture of subsidiary stakes. The 2023 net-margin spike to 31.9% reflects one-off divestiture gains rather than operating performance. ROIC has run inside a narrow single-digit band and now sits at its low (5.9% → 7.2% → 6.7% → 6.8% → 4.5%), which is the signature of the asset-expansion phase of new construction rather than deteriorating economics: toll-road ROIC has to be judged over the full 35–50 year concession, not 5 annual snapshots. This is a quality infrastructure franchise with growing mature-road cash flows, falling debt, and an expanding asset base that will pay off over multi-decade concessions.

Business Model

Jasa Marga constructs, operates and maintains toll roads in Indonesia under long-term government concessions (typically 35–50 years). Revenue = vehicle traffic × distance × regulated tariff. Tariffs are adjusted every 2 years (inflation-linked, requires Ministry of Works approval). Business phases: construction (capex-heavy, cash-consuming) → ramp-up (traffic builds, EBITDA positive but below mature) → mature cash cow (stable high-EBITDA, strong FCF). JSMR manages a portfolio of roads at different lifecycle stages. ~65% owned by the state; subsidiary stakes have been selectively divested to recycle capital.

Segments

Toll road operations (dominant: traffic-based revenue from mature roads) and construction/investment (new road sections and expansions). EBITDA margin ~40–44% from mature roads. The declining ROIC (5.9%→4.5%, FY21→FY25, inside a 4.5–7.2% band) is a phase effect: new capex-heavy roads joined the asset base but are still ramping traffic, depressing aggregate ROIC in the snapshot period; economic returns materialize over the full concession life.

Value Chain & Positioning

Concession award (government) → financing (project bonds, bank loans, equity) → construction (EPC contractors) → toll gate operation → traffic ramp-up → maintenance → tariff revision → mature cash-cow phase → concession end / renewal. Value creation happens over the full 35–50 year concession period; the investment phase looks poor on annual return metrics but is essential to earn the long-term cash flows.

Competitive Forces (Porter’s 5)

Supplier powerMedium

How much leverage input/funding providers have over pricing.

EPC contractors (for road construction) are competitive but large projects require specialized civil engineering capability; land acquisition from landowners/government can be costly and delayed.

Implication → Construction cost overruns and land acquisition delays are recurring risk factors; regulated tariffs don't automatically compensate for cost inflation.

Buyer powerLow

How much leverage customers have to push prices down.

Drivers using JSMR's toll roads have limited alternatives: alternative routes are slower or non-existent; toll costs are a small fraction of vehicle operating costs.

Implication → Captive traffic base; tariff increases face political sensitivity (government approval needed) but drivers have little practical substitute for Trans-Java / Trans-Sumatra expressways.

Threat of new entryLow

How easily new competitors can enter the market.

Toll road concessions in Indonesia are government-awarded; JSMR has first-mover advantage on the highest-traffic corridors. New entrants require government concession and multi-trillion capex.

Implication → Existing concession corridors are effectively monopolistic; competition is for new corridors awarded through government tender, not for existing traffic.

Threat of substitutesMedium

Risk that alternative products/services replace demand.

Railways (KAI HSR, intercity train) substitute for long-distance travel; free national roads substitute for price-sensitive short-distance travellers; flight for intercity.

Implication → The Jakarta-Bandung HSR is a real substitute on that corridor. On Trans-Java, the toll road remains fastest for freight/logistics; intercity auto travel is semi-captive.

Competitive rivalryLow

Intensity of competition among existing players.

JSMR faces no head-to-head rivals on its specific concession corridors; indirect competition from Waskita Toll Road (privatized portions) and CPI/private concessions on different routes.

Implication → Low ongoing rivalry; the strategic competition is upstream: winning new government concession tenders before they are awarded.

Moat / Competitive Edge

Wide on existing concessions. Each JSMR toll road corridor is a geographic monopoly for its route life (35–50 year concession). The Trans-Java and Trans-Sumatra networks are irreplaceable national infrastructure. Incumbent advantages: existing operator relationships, operating know-how, government trust as the SOE flagship. The constraint: returns depend on government tariff policy (2-year revision cycle), and new concessions require capital-intensive construction phases where returns are deferred multi-decade.

Key Drivers & Sensitivities

Traffic volume growth (GDP / vehicle penetration)
Toll revenue = traffic × tariff. Traffic tracks GDP and vehicle ownership growth; a 5% GDP growth year typically yields 5–8% traffic growth on mature roads. FCF has grown from Rp2.7tn (FY21) to Rp5.5tn (FY25) largely on this.
Tariff revision (every 2 years, inflation-linked)
Regulated tariff increases every 2 years are linked to CPI; delayed or partial adjustments (requiring Ministry of Works approval) create short-term revenue pressure but are typically granted with catch-up. IC improved from 1.1× to 2.6× as tariff revisions and deleveraging combined.
Subsidiary divestiture / capital recycling
JSMR has divested stakes in subsidiary toll road concessions to recycle capital and reduce leverage; the FY23 NM spike (31.9%) and ROE spike (24.4%) reflect one-off gains from such divestitures, not recurring operating profitability.
New road ramp-up (traffic build on recently-opened sections)
Newly-opened road sections start with low traffic (below breakeven) and ramp up over 3–7 years; each new road temporarily suppresses aggregate ROIC. The Trans-Java network sections opened FY21–24 are now entering the ramp-up phase.
Leverage / interest burden (D/E 2.43→1.21)
High leverage is inherent to infrastructure concession financing; D/E declining from 2.43 to 1.21 reduces interest burden materially: IC improved from 1.1× to 2.6× over FY21–25, unlocking free cash for reinvestment.

Linkages

Closely linked to Indonesian GDP growth (traffic), vehicle penetration rates, CPI inflation (tariff revision inputs), government infrastructure policy (concession pipeline), and interest rates (financing costs for high-leverage infrastructure). Freight logistics demand (e-commerce, manufacturing) is an increasingly important traffic driver on Trans-Java.

Recent Developments

FY21–25: EBITDA margins held ~37–44%; FCF grew from Rp2.7tn to Rp5.5tn. D/E declined from 2.43 to 1.21 through divestiture + deleveraging. IC improved from 1.1× to 2.6×. FY23 NM spike (31.9%) and ROE (24.4%) were divestiture gains. ROIC eased from 5.9% to 4.5% inside a 4.5–7.2% band: phase effect of new-road capex, not deterioration. Asset turnover improved from 0.15 to 0.19× as traffic grew.

Regulation

Heavily regulated: concessions awarded by Ministry of Public Works (PUPR); tariff adjustments require ministerial approval every 2 years; road safety and maintenance standards (Bina Marga). JSMR is majority state-owned, so SOE governance rules (BUMN regulations, GCG) apply. Infrastructure investment decisions are partly strategic/political. Bond financing subject to OJK capital market rules. Listed on IDX.

ESG & Sustainability

Material issues: road safety (accident rates on toll roads, speed-limit enforcement), construction environmental impact (land clearing for new roads), community resettlement (land acquisition for new corridors). Governance: majority SOE with board appointment aligned to government. Carbon: long-distance toll roads enable fuel-efficient highway driving vs stop-start national roads, net environmental benefit contested. Toll road job creation and supply chain are positive social impacts.

Risks

Tariff revision delay / political resistance to toll price hikes
New road section ROIC drag extending longer than expected as ramp-up is slow
High leverage (D/E 1.21) leaves limited buffer if EBITDA contracts
Land acquisition cost overruns and delays on new concessions
Traffic substitution from HSR / rail on key corridors (Jakarta-Bandung, intercity)

Outlook & What to Watch

A quality infrastructure franchise with growing mature-road cash flows (FCF Rp5.5tn and rising), declining leverage (D/E 1.21 from 2.43) and an expanding network that will generate returns over multi-decade concessions. Annual ROIC snapshots (4.5% FY25) understate economic value: the correct frame is total NPV over 35–50 year concession life. Near-term: traffic volume growth and tariff revisions drive organic FCF expansion; deleveraging continues to improve IC and reduce interest burden. (Interpretation, not a forecast.)

Key KPIs

Traffic Volume: Vehicle-km traveled on JSMR roads: GDP proxy
EBITDA Margin: ~37–44%: mature road operational efficiency
FCF: Rp2.7tn→Rp5.5tn (FY21→FY25): growing mature-road cash
D/E: Declining 2.43→1.21: active deleveraging
ROIC: 5.9%→4.5% (band 4.5–7.2%): phase effect (new-road capex), not deterioration

Sources

Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.