Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burdendriver | 0.57x | 1.39x | — | — | -2.80x |
| Interest burden | 0.70x | 0.37x | -0.06x | -0.01x | 0.15x |
| Operating margin | 23.5% | 12.9% | 5.7% | 5.3% | 7.7% |
| Asset turnover | 0.30x | 0.22x | 0.34x | 0.43x | 0.33x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 1.64x | 1.91x | 1.80x | 1.80x | 1.95x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 4.6% | 2.9% | — | — | -2.1% |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 5.3% | 3.8% | — | — | — |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 1.38x | 1.48x | 1.33x | 1.10x | 1.25x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 0.94x | 1.07x | 0.84x | 0.70x | 0.87x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 0.62x | 0.73x | 0.57x | 0.41x | 0.32x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | $ 114 M | $ 291 M | $ 297 M | $ 115 M | $ 280 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 0.48x | 0.70x | 0.57x | 0.60x | 0.71x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 0.64x | 0.91x | 0.80x | 0.80x | 0.95x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.30x | 0.36x | 0.32x | 0.34x | 0.36x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | $ 192 M | $ 968 M | $ 1.1 B | $ 1.3 B | $ 1.7 B |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 3.37x | 1.60x | 0.95x | 0.99x | 1.18x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 1.64x | 1.91x | 1.80x | 1.80x | 1.95x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 31.5% | 18.9% | 8.5% | 7.9% | 11.4% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 23.5% | 12.9% | 5.7% | 5.3% | 7.7% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 9.5% | 6.7% | -1.2% | -2.5% | -3.3% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | $ 197 M | $ 228 M | $ 238 M | $ 328 M | $ 372 M |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 51.6% | 26.2% | 14.0% | 14.6% | 19.6% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 2.8% | 1.5% | -0.4% | -1.1% | -1.1% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 4.8% | 5.8% | -2.2% | -6.0% | -7.8% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 0.57x | 1.39x | — | — | -2.80x |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 0.70x | 0.37x | -0.06x | -0.01x | 0.15x |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 5.3% | 3.8% | — | — | — |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.30x | 0.22x | 0.34x | 0.43x | 0.33x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 1.98x | 2.81x | 3.52x | 4.54x | 3.98x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 642.94x | 13.20x | 14.15x | 12.45x | 5.69x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 8.81x | 6.43x | 5.14x | 8.63x | 7.79x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 183.9 days | 129.8 days | 103.7 days | 80.3 days | 91.7 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 0.6 days | 27.6 days | 25.8 days | 29.3 days | 64.1 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 41.4 days | 56.7 days | 71.1 days | 42.3 days | 46.8 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 143.0 days | 100.7 days | 58.4 days | 67.4 days | 109.0 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | $ 22 M | -$ 286 M | -$ 554 M | -$ 272 M | -$ 292 M |
Price Rp 2,719 · market cap Rp 66 T ($ 3.7 B at the cited rate; statements are filed in USD)
| Multiple | MDKA | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | NM | 16.25x(15/16) | — |
| P/B | 4.65x | 1.68x | +176% |
| P/S | 1.94x | 1.92x | +1% |
| EV/EBITDA | 20.26x | 10.31x | +96% |
| EV/EBIT | 51.38x | 14.25x | +261% |
| EV/Sales | 3.98x | 2.27x | +75% |
| FCF Yield | -7.93% | 0.01% | -75,369% |
| Dividend Yield | 0.45% | 5.27%(11/16) | -91% |
EV = mkt cap $ 3.7 B + debt $ 2.1 B − cash $ 355 M + minority interest $ 2.1 B = $ 7.5 B
not computable: negative or zero base-year FCF. Shown as-is rather than estimated.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 9.3–13.3% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
Mechanical DCF suppressed: on these default assumptions the modelled enterprise value falls BELOW net debt and minority interests, so the equity residual is negative. Equity cannot be worth less than nothing, so no per-share figure is published here: read it as the model saying the debt claims consume the whole enterprise at this discount rate and growth path, which is itself the signal. The components are shown below so the arithmetic stays checkable, and the sliders let you test what it would take to change the answer.
Cyclical normalization: Commodity/cyclical name: the trailing years are a sample drawn from the price cycle, not a trend. Defaults are therefore normalized, using the full-window mean margin with no cycle-position growth extrapolation. That normalized margin is itself the embedded commodity-price assumption.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 4.66% | US 10Y Treasury, 10 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.96 → 1.31 | Metals & Mining (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.57 |
| Cost of equity | 13.44% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 5.99% | FY2025 interest expense ÷ total debt |
| Tax rate | 35.0% | median effective rate FY2021–FY2025 computed to 42.7%, CLAMPED to 35%: above that ceiling the pretax approximation is carrying minority interests, which are already deducted separately from enterprise value, rather than tax |
| WACC | 9.99% | 64% E × CoE + 36% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 2.5% | terminal growth from year 1, cyclical normalization: the delivered 4-yr CAGR (49.3%) reflects cycle position, not a trend |
| EBIT margin | 11.0% | full-cycle mean EBIT margin, FY2021–FY2025 (cyclical normalization: this margin is the embedded commodity-price assumption) |
| D&A / revenue | 9.8% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 28.0% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years; in the terminal year capex falls to replacement level (equal to depreciation, 9.8% of revenue) because holding a build-phase or pause-phase ratio in perpetuity misprices the company in whichever direction that phase points |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | 13.9% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | $ 1.9 B | $ 2.0 B | $ 2.0 B | $ 2.1 B | $ 2.1 B | $ 2.2 B |
| EBIT | $ 214 M | $ 220 M | $ 225 M | $ 231 M | $ 236 M | $ 242 M |
| NOPAT | $ 139 M | $ 143 M | $ 146 M | $ 150 M | $ 154 M | $ 158 M |
| + D&A | $ 191 M | $ 196 M | $ 201 M | $ 206 M | $ 211 M | $ 216 M |
| − Capex | $ 543 M | $ 557 M | $ 571 M | $ 585 M | $ 600 M | $ 216 M |
| − ΔNWC | $ 6.6 M | $ 6.7 M | $ 6.9 M | $ 7.1 M | $ 7.3 M | $ 7.4 M |
| FCFF | -$ 220 M | -$ 225 M | -$ 231 M | -$ 236 M | -$ 242 M | $ 150 M |
| PV | -$ 200 M | -$ 186 M | -$ 173 M | -$ 162 M | -$ 151 M | $ 1.2 B |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5
EV = PV(explicit) -$ 871 M + PV(TV) $ 1.2 B = $ 373 M · TV 333% of EV · − net debt $ 1.7 B − minority $ 2.1 B
Model output: Rp -2,578/share (-195% vs price Rp 2,719)· exit-multiple check (10.3x): Rp -1,379
Under these assumptions the model lands 195% below today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for faster growth, a fatter margin, or a lower discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 9.0% | 10.0% | 11.0% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | -2,486 | -2,637 | -2,750 |
| 2.5% | -2,403 | -2,578 | -2,706 |
| 3.0% | -2,306 | -2,509 | -2,655 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $ 381 M | $ 870 M | $ 1.7 B | $ 2.2 B | $ 1.9 B |
| Cost of Goods Sold | $ 261 M | $ 705 M | $ 1.6 B | $ 2.1 B | $ 1.7 B |
| Gross Profit | $ 120 M | $ 165 M | $ 146 M | $ 176 M | $ 216 M |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | $ 90 M | $ 112 M | $ 97 M | $ 119 M | $ 147 M |
| Interest Expense | $ 27 M | $ 70 M | $ 102 M | $ 120 M | $ 125 M |
| Net Income | $ 36 M | $ 58 M | -$ 21 M | -$ 56 M | -$ 62 M |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | $ 36 M | $ 58 M | -$ 21 M | -$ 56 M | -$ 62 M |
| Depreciation & Amortization | $ 107 M | $ 116 M | $ 141 M | $ 209 M | $ 225 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $ 185 M | $ 444 M | $ 519 M | $ 451 M | $ 355 M |
| Accounts Receivable | $ 593 K | $ 66 M | $ 121 M | $ 180 M | $ 333 M |
| Inventory | $ 131 M | $ 251 M | $ 444 M | $ 454 M | $ 422 M |
| Current Assets | $ 411 M | $ 896 M | $ 1.2 B | $ 1.2 B | $ 1.4 B |
| Total Assets | $ 1.3 B | $ 3.9 B | $ 5.0 B | $ 5.2 B | $ 5.7 B |
| Accounts Payable | $ 30 M | $ 110 M | $ 304 M | $ 239 M | $ 215 M |
| Current Liabilities | $ 297 M | $ 605 M | $ 909 M | $ 1.1 B | $ 1.1 B |
| Total Liabilities | $ 499 M | $ 1.9 B | $ 2.2 B | $ 2.3 B | $ 2.8 B |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | $ 378 M | $ 1.4 B | $ 1.6 B | $ 1.8 B | $ 2.1 B |
| Total Equity | $ 779 M | $ 2.0 B | $ 2.8 B | $ 2.9 B | $ 2.9 B |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | $ 756 M | $ 1.0 B | $ 927 M | $ 922 M | $ 791 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $ 133 M | $ 463 M | $ 57 M | $ 149 M | $ 264 M |
| Capital Expenditure | $ 111 M | $ 749 M | $ 611 M | $ 421 M | $ 555 M |
MDKA gross margin: 31.5 % (2021) → 18.9 % (2022) → 8.5 % (2023) → 7.9 % (2024) → 11.4 % (2025). OPM: 23.5 % → 12.9 % → 5.7 % → 5.3 % → 7.7 %. Net margin: 9.5 % → 6.7 % → −1.2 % → −2.5 % → −3.3 %. ROE: 4.8 % → 5.8 % → −2.2 % → −6.0 % → −7.8 %. EBITDA margin: 51.6 % → 26.2 % → 14.0 % → 14.6 % → 19.6 %. D/E: 0.49 → 0.70 → 0.58 → 0.60 → 0.71. Interest coverage: 3.4× → 1.6× → 0.95× → 0.99× → 1.2×. FCF (USD): +22 M → −286 M → −554 M → −272 M → −292 M; negative for four straight years. Net debt (USD): 0.19 B → 0.97 B → 1.07 B → 1.30 B → 1.73 B. Revenue (USD): 0.38 B → 0.87 B → 1.71 B → 2.24 B → 1.90 B. The tension is stark: MDKA built a large, diversified, revenue-generating platform, but the nickel/downstream ramp landed straight into the 2023–2025 nickel-price crash, so EBITDA (still positive, ~14–20 % margin) is consumed by depreciation and interest, leaving net losses and sub-1×-to-1.2× interest coverage. This is a balance-sheet-stress-plus-execution story, not a quality-compounding one; the investment case is entirely forward-looking: Pani gold (first pour 1Q26, high-margin), the AIM nickel project ramp, and a nickel-price recovery must lift EBITDA enough to cover the now-USD 1.73 B net-debt service and restore positive net income.
MDKA owns its orebodies (Tujuh Bukit, Pani, Wetar; SCM via MBMA). Equipment, reagents (cyanide/acid for leaching), and contractors are competitively sourced. Power and reductant (coal/electricity) for the RKEF nickel smelters are a meaningful input cost tied to energy prices.
Implication → Input side is not the problem: the margin issue is output-price (nickel) and capital cost (interest on the build), not supplier leverage.
Gold (LBMA), copper (LME) and nickel products (LME-linked, plus negotiated payables for NPI/matte to Chinese buyers) are all benchmark-priced: MDKA is a price-taker across the board. Nickel intermediates in particular are sold into a Chinese-buyer-dominated market that set weak terms during the 2023–2025 oversupply.
Implication → No pricing power anywhere. Returns depend on cost position and metal-price decks, and the nickel leg entered service into the worst of the price cycle.
Large gold and copper deposits (Pani, Tujuh Bukit) are geologically scarce and permit-gated; nickel processing requires USD-billion RKEF/HPAL capex. But MDKA competes for capital against better-capitalised nickel players (Tsingshan-linked complexes, Harita/NCKL, Vale/INCO): entry into nickel is well-funded and crowded, which is part of the oversupply pressure.
Implication → MDKA’s gold/copper deposits are defensible; its nickel position sits inside a crowded, well-funded, oversupplied segment where scale and cost leaders (not MDKA) set the pace.
Copper and gold have no viable substitutes (electrification metal; store of value). Nickel faces chemistry substitution risk: LFP batteries (no nickel) have gained share versus NMC, softening the long-run nickel-demand slope that MDKA’s downstream bet relies on.
Implication → The gold/copper legs are on the right side of substitution; the nickel leg carries both a price-cycle and an LFP-chemistry demand risk: a double exposure that the 2023–2025 results made visible.
Gold/copper: MDKA is a mid-tier Indonesian producer among global majors. Nickel (via MBMA): intense competition from Tsingshan/IMIP-IWIP complexes, Harita (NCKL), Vale (INCO) and Chinese-backed HPAL; the segment’s post-2020 capacity flood is exactly what crashed prices and MDKA’s downstream margins. Rivalry is on delivered cost and processing efficiency.
Implication → MDKA is a price- and margin-taker in the most competitive part of its portfolio. The differentiator has to come from the gold assets (Pani scale, Tujuh Bukit grade), not from out-competing the nickel giants.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Indonesia controls >60 % of global nickel supply and is the world's largest thermal-coal exporter; hilirisasi mandates in-country ore processing, reshaping value chains from raw ore to battery-grade products.