Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | 0.37x | 0.73x | 0.80x | 1.08x | 0.30x |
| Interest burdendriver | 0.36x | 0.74x | 0.60x | 0.52x | 0.51x |
| Operating margin | 28.8% | 43.3% | 31.2% | 27.5% | 28.0% |
| Asset turnover | 0.21x | 0.33x | 0.30x | 0.30x | 0.28x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 4.62x | 3.97x | 3.68x | 3.37x | 3.54x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 3.8% | 30.4% | 16.3% | 15.6% | 4.3% |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 3.3% | 16.1% | 10.6% | 12.2% | 3.5% |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 1.69x | 1.27x | 1.09x | 1.21x | 1.18x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 1.59x | 1.19x | 1.00x | 1.10x | 1.07x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 0.48x | 0.43x | 0.25x | 0.42x | 0.41x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | $ 695 M | $ 372 M | $ 125 M | $ 312 M | $ 244 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 2.61x | 1.91x | 1.74x | 1.52x | 1.65x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 3.62x | 2.97x | 2.68x | 2.37x | 2.54x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.57x | 0.48x | 0.47x | 0.45x | 0.47x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | $ 2.7 B | $ 2.7 B | $ 3.2 B | $ 2.9 B | $ 3.3 B |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 1.57x | 3.79x | 2.50x | 2.10x | 2.03x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 4.62x | 3.97x | 3.68x | 3.37x | 3.54x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 65.6% | 78.0% | 65.4% | 61.0% | 61.3% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 28.8% | 43.3% | 31.2% | 27.5% | 28.0% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 3.9% | 23.4% | 15.0% | 15.6% | 4.3% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | $ 547 M | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.0 B | $ 1.1 B | $ 1.1 B |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 45.1% | 64.4% | 47.2% | 45.0% | 45.9% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 0.8% | 7.7% | 4.4% | 4.6% | 1.2% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 4.4% | 34.1% | 18.1% | 17.3% | 4.7% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 0.37x | 0.73x | 0.80x | 1.08x | 0.30x |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 0.36x | 0.74x | 0.60x | 0.52x | 0.51x |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 3.3% | 16.1% | 10.6% | 12.2% | 3.5% |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.21x | 0.33x | 0.30x | 0.30x | 0.28x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 4.13x | 4.72x | 6.02x | 5.87x | 6.27x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 4.19x | 5.75x | 5.26x | 5.52x | 5.09x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 2.03x | 2.41x | 2.48x | 2.55x | 3.04x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 88.4 days | 77.4 days | 60.7 days | 62.2 days | 58.2 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 87.0 days | 63.5 days | 69.3 days | 66.1 days | 71.6 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 179.7 days | 151.3 days | 147.3 days | 143.1 days | 120.1 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | -4.3 days | -10.4 days | -17.3 days | -14.8 days | 9.8 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | $ 368 M | $ 836 M | $ 453 M | $ 839 M | $ 391 M |
Price Rp 1,285 · market cap Rp 32 T ($ 1.8 B at the cited rate; statements are filed in USD)
| Multiple | MEDC | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 17.40x | 17.40x | 0% |
| P/B | 0.82x | 1.15x | -29% |
| P/S | 0.75x | 3.91x | -81% |
| EV/EBITDA | 4.92x | 7.19x | -32% |
| EV/EBIT | 8.06x | 11.64x | -31% |
| EV/Sales | 2.26x | 4.30x | -48% |
| FCF Yield | 22.26% | 9.78% | +128% |
| Dividend Yield | 4.16% | 4.16% | 0% |
EV = mkt cap $ 1.8 B + debt $ 3.9 B − cash $ 569 M + minority interest $ 207 M = $ 5.3 B
At today’s price, the market is paying for 4.7%/yr FCF growth (1.0% at 9.3% to 7.9% at 13.3% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: 1.5% FCF · 17.9% revenue.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 9.3–13.3% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
Cyclical normalization: Commodity/cyclical name: the trailing years are a sample drawn from the price cycle, not a trend. Defaults are therefore normalized, using the full-window mean margin with no cycle-position growth extrapolation. That normalized margin is itself the embedded commodity-price assumption.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 4.66% | US 10Y Treasury, 30 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.56 → 1.51 | Oil/Gas (Production and Exploration) (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 2.22 |
| Cost of equity | 14.79% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 8.12% | median interest coverage 2.1x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a Ba2/BB synthetic rating and a 1.84% default spread, over a 6.28% base (US 10Y 4.66% + Indonesia's 1.62% sovereign spread). Its BOOK rate is 8.3%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms) |
| Tax rate | 23.3% | median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest) |
| WACC | 8.89% | 31% E × CoE + 69% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 2.5% | terminal growth from year 1, cyclical normalization: the delivered 4-yr CAGR (17.9%) reflects cycle position, not a trend |
| EBIT margin | 31.8% | full-cycle mean EBIT margin, FY2021–FY2025 (cyclical normalization: this margin is the embedded commodity-price assumption) |
| D&A / revenue | 17.1% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 17.3% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 8.9% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 28.1% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 23.7% of revenue against depreciation of 17.1%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | 10.3% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | $ 2.4 B | $ 2.5 B | $ 2.5 B | $ 2.6 B | $ 2.7 B | $ 2.7 B |
| EBIT | $ 764 M | $ 783 M | $ 802 M | $ 822 M | $ 843 M | $ 864 M |
| NOPAT | $ 586 M | $ 601 M | $ 616 M | $ 631 M | $ 647 M | $ 663 M |
| + D&A | $ 411 M | $ 421 M | $ 431 M | $ 442 M | $ 453 M | $ 465 M |
| − Capex | $ 416 M | $ 427 M | $ 437 M | $ 448 M | $ 459 M | $ 644 M |
| − ΔNWC | $ 6.0 M | $ 6.2 M | $ 6.3 M | $ 6.5 M | $ 6.7 M | $ 6.8 M |
| FCFF | $ 574 M | $ 589 M | $ 603 M | $ 618 M | $ 634 M | $ 476 M |
| PV | $ 527 M | $ 496 M | $ 467 M | $ 440 M | $ 414 M | $ 4.9 B |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding
EV = PV(explicit) $ 2.3 B + PV(TV) $ 4.9 B = $ 7.2 B · TV 68% of EV · − net debt $ 3.3 B − minority $ 207 M = equity $ 3.7 B ÷ shares outstanding · per share is in USD, shown in IDR at 18,058
Model output: Rp 2,693/share (+110% vs price Rp 1,285)· exit-multiple check (7.2x): Rp 3,585
Under these assumptions the model lands 110% above today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for slower growth, a thinner margin, or a higher discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 7.9% | 8.9% | 9.9% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | 3,161 | 2,381 | 1,797 |
| 2.5% | 3,601 | 2,693 | 2,028 |
| 3.0% | 4,130 | 3,058 | 2,293 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $ 1.2 B | $ 2.3 B | $ 2.2 B | $ 2.3 B | $ 2.3 B |
| Cost of Goods Sold | $ 417 M | $ 500 M | $ 763 M | $ 916 M | $ 906 M |
| Gross Profit | $ 796 M | $ 1.8 B | $ 1.4 B | $ 1.4 B | $ 1.4 B |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | $ 349 M | $ 984 M | $ 689 M | $ 647 M | $ 657 M |
| Interest Expense | $ 222 M | $ 259 M | $ 276 M | $ 307 M | $ 324 M |
| Net Income | $ 47 M | $ 531 M | $ 331 M | $ 367 M | $ 101 M |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | $ 47 M | $ 531 M | $ 331 M | $ 367 M | $ 101 M |
| Depreciation & Amortization | $ 198 M | $ 478 M | $ 352 M | $ 410 M | $ 419 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $ 481 M | $ 600 M | $ 354 M | $ 637 M | $ 569 M |
| Accounts Receivable | $ 289 M | $ 395 M | $ 419 M | $ 426 M | $ 460 M |
| Inventory | $ 101 M | $ 106 M | $ 127 M | $ 156 M | $ 144 M |
| Current Assets | $ 1.7 B | $ 1.8 B | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.8 B | $ 1.6 B |
| Total Assets | $ 5.7 B | $ 6.9 B | $ 7.5 B | $ 7.9 B | $ 8.4 B |
| Accounts Payable | $ 205 M | $ 207 M | $ 308 M | $ 359 M | $ 298 M |
| Current Liabilities | $ 1.0 B | $ 1.4 B | $ 1.4 B | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.4 B |
| Total Liabilities | $ 4.5 B | $ 5.2 B | $ 5.4 B | $ 5.6 B | $ 6.0 B |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | $ 3.2 B | $ 3.3 B | $ 3.5 B | $ 3.6 B | $ 3.9 B |
| Total Equity | $ 1.2 B | $ 1.7 B | $ 2.0 B | $ 2.4 B | $ 2.4 B |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | $ 1.1 B | $ 1.6 B | $ 1.8 B | $ 2.1 B | $ 2.2 B |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $ 479 M | $ 1.1 B | $ 753 M | $ 1.2 B | $ 906 M |
| Capital Expenditure | $ 111 M | $ 269 M | $ 300 M | $ 385 M | $ 515 M |
MEDC gross margin: 65.6% (2021) → 78.0% (2022 peak) → 65.4% → 61.0% → 61.3% (2025). OPM: 28.8% → 43.3% (2022 peak) → 31.2% → 27.5% → 28.0% (2025); strong and relatively stable, tracking the oil/gas price supercycle without collapsing afterward. NM: 3.9% → 23.4% (2022 peak) → 15.0% → 15.6% → 4.3% (2025); far more volatile than OPM, and 2025's crash (NM 4.3% vs OPM 28.0%, a ~24-point gap) despite steady operating performance points to a real, large non-operating charge that specific year, not a core-business problem. ROE: 4.4% → 34.1% (2022 peak) → 18.1% → 17.3% → 4.7% (2025). ROIC: 3.3% → 16.1% (2022 peak) → 10.6% → 13.2% → 3.5% (2025). Asset turnover: 0.21× → 0.33× → 0.30× → 0.30× → 0.28×, fairly stable. D/E: 2.61× (2021) → 1.91× → 1.74× → 1.52× (2024 low) → 1.65× (2025); meaningfully leveraged throughout, never below 1.5×, the highest sustained leverage of any name in this industry. Interest coverage: 1.57× (2021, thin) → 3.79× (2022 peak) → 2.50× → 2.10× → 2.03× (2025); the weakest, thinnest coverage of the five companies here, a real structural characteristic of funding E&P plus Power/Mining diversification through debt. Current ratio: 1.09-1.69× range, adequate but not generous. Net debt (USD): 2,730.5 M (2021) → 3,329.8 M (2025), rising overall; real, growing leverage funding the diversification push. FCF positive every year (USD 368-839 M range), a genuine strength even amid the leverage. Revenue (USD): 1,212.2 M (2021) → 2,269.7 M (2022) → 2,204.7 M → 2,349.4 M → 2,343.5 M (2025); roughly doubled from 2021 then plateaued in the USD 2.2-2.35 B range as the price supercycle normalised.
MEDC owns its own E&P working areas and reserves outright: no third-party production dependency for its core business.
Implication → Cost structure is driven by field economics and capex discipline, not supplier leverage.
MEDC sells oil/gas to a mix of domestic and export offtakers at globally-benchmarked prices: a price-taker position common to all E&P producers, though its Power segment sells under more buyer-concentrated PLN-style contracts similar to BREN/PGEO.
Implication → MEDC's blended revenue is more diversified across buyer types than BREN/PGEO's near-total PLN dependence, a real structural advantage.
E&P requires enormous, multi-year, high-risk exploration capital before any revenue: real barriers protecting incumbents with proven reserves and working areas.
Implication → MEDC's 528 MMboe reserve base and established production is a genuine, hard-to-replicate asset base.
MEDC's oil & gas output competes in globally-benchmarked commodity markets against the full range of energy substitutes and alternative supply sources.
Implication → Revenue is directly exposed to the global commodity price cycle, unlike BREN/PGEO/PGAS's more contracted or tariff-regulated models.
MEDC competes with other Indonesian E&P players (many private/unlisted, some foreign-operated) for exploration acreage and production share.
Implication → Rivalry is a function of exploration success and capital deployment more than head-to-head market-share competition.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Indonesia's energy sector spans three genuinely different value chains under one industry here: upstream oil & gas E&P (MEDC; 163 kboe/d production, 528 MMboe reserves, plus real diversification into clean-energy power and copper/gold mining), geothermal power generation (BREN and PGEO together; Indonesia ranks #2 in the world for installed geothermal capacity, 2,742 MW, behind only the US, with a national target of 5.2 GW by 2034), and gas transmission/distribution (PGAS, 92% of domestic gas infrastructure, a Pertamina subholding, joined by RAJA, a far smaller private gas trader/distributor in the same subsegment). All five report in USD: including PGAS and RAJA, whose USD filings (PGAS total assets ~USD 6.3 B; RAJA ~USD 0.5 B) are frequently re-quoted in Rupiah-equivalent terms by Indonesian financial media, a display artifact worth knowing about rather than a sign of dual functional currencies.