Equal
…
…
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)(Capital / RWA) | 25.4% | 26.2% | 25.8% | 30.5% |
| Leverage Ratio(Tier 1 / Total Exposure) | 14.0% | 15.5% | 14.5% | 16.7% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross NPL(NPL / Total Loans) | 1.2% | 1.6% | 1.7% | 1.7% |
| Net NPL((NPL − Reserves) / Loans) | 0.9% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 1.1% |
| Non-Performing Assets(NPA / Total Assets) | 1.1% | 1.6% | 2.1% | 1.6% |
| Non-Performing Productive Assets(NP Earning / Earning Assets) | 0.8% | 1.0% | 1.0% | 1.0% |
| Allowance for Impairment (CKPN)(CKPN / Earning Assets) | 0.5% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.7% |
| Cost of Credit(Provision Expense / Gross Loans) | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.7% |
| NPL Coverage(Allowance for Impairment (CKPN) / Gross NPL) | 66.2% | 58.1% | 60.9% | 72.6% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR)(Loans / Deposits) | 68.0% | 74.0% | 70.3% | 64.5% |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)(ASF / RSF) | 110.0% | 116.3% | 125.2% | 127.0% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)(HQLA / Net Cash Outflows (30d)) | 145.0% | 153.6% | 215.0% | 179.1% |
| CASA Ratio((Demand + Savings) / Total Deposits) | 26.8% | 28.8% | 30.1% | 27.0% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 4.0% | 3.5% | 2.6% | 3.1% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 23.2% | 17.6% | 13.6% | 15.5% |
| Net Interest Margin (NIM)(NII / Avg Earning Assets) | 5.4% | 5.2% | 4.6% | 4.2% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Expense to Income (BOPO)(Opex / Operating Income) | 56.8% | 65.4% | 73.6% | 69.1% |
| Cost-to-Income Ratio (CIR)(Opex (ex-provisions) / Income) | 38.5% | 42.1% | 51.1% | 42.1% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan Growth (YoY)(Gross Loans / Prior Year − 1) | — | -5.7% | -2.5% | 4.0% |
| Deposit Growth (YoY)(Total Deposits / Prior Year − 1) | — | -13.1% | 2.5% | 13.6% |
Price Rp 1,970 · market cap Rp 46 T
| Multiple | MEGA | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 13.75x | 8.04x | +71% |
| P/B | 1.84x | 0.78x | +136% |
| Dividend Yield | 2.27% | 7.46%(14/15) | -69% |
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
A bank cannot be valued on operating cash flow the way a factory can, because for a bank debt is raw material rather than financing. So this model values the equity directly: start from book value, then add the present value of everything the bank earns above its cost of equity. A bank that earns exactly its cost of equity is worth exactly its book value (P/B 1.0).
| Assumption | Default | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Book equity (BV₀) | Rp 25 T | audited Individual-basis equity, FY2025 publication |
| ROE, start of fade | 15.54% | FY2025 disclosed ROE (OJK ratio table) |
| ROE, terminal | 16.58% | median disclosed ROE, FY2022–FY2025: the bank's own demonstrated through-cycle level, fading linearly |
| Fade horizon | 5 yrs | linear fade; final year pins to terminal |
| Retention (explicit phase) | 38.4% | implied from delivered equity growth FY2022–FY2025 (CAGR 6.7%) ÷ average ROE 17.5%. An approximation: equity growth also carries OCI effects (FVOCI marks, revaluations), not only retention |
| Cost of equity | 11.21% | National-footprint franchises (KBMI 3–4 and large private banks). |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | house terminal growth 2.5% (capped at terminal ROE by the engine when binding) |
Equity = BV₀ Rp 25 T + PV(excess, yrs 1–5) Rp 5.0 T + PV(terminal) Rp 12 T = Rp 42 T
At today's price the market pays 109% of this model's equity value. That is roughly in line with the stated assumptions.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 15.54% | 15.80% | 16.06% | 16.32% | 16.58% | 16.58% |
| Book (start) | Rp 25 T | Rp 27 T | Rp 28 T | Rp 30 T | Rp 32 T | Rp 34 T |
| Net income | Rp 3.9 T | Rp 4.2 T | Rp 4.5 T | Rp 4.9 T | Rp 5.3 T | Rp 5.6 T |
| Retained | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 2.0 T | — |
| Excess return | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 1.8 T |
| PV | Rp 977 M | Rp 987 M | Rp 995 M | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 12 T |
Check it yourself: NI = ROE × book · ER = (ROE − COE) × book · PV = ER ÷ (1+COE)^yr · next book = book + NI × retention · TV = ER(T∞) ÷ (COE − g), discounted from year 5
| ROE_T \ COE | 10.21% | 11.21% | 12.21% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 14.58% | 1.67x | 1.46x | 1.30x |
| 16.58% | 1.93x | 1.69x | 1.49x |
| 18.58% | 2.20x | 1.92x | 1.70x |
Model output under the stated assumptions, never a target. ROE record: FY2022 23.15% · FY2023 17.62% · FY2024 13.62% · FY2025 15.54%
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interest income | Rp 9.1 T | Rp 10 T | Rp 10 T | Rp 10 T |
| Interest expense | Rp 3.2 T | Rp 4.7 T | Rp 5.2 T | Rp 5.3 T |
| Net interest income | Rp 5.9 T | Rp 5.5 T | Rp 5.1 T | Rp 4.9 T |
| Fees & commissions | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 1.7 T |
| Impairment/provision expense | Rp 147 M | Rp 195 M | Rp 216 M | Rp 485 M |
| Personnel expenses | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.3 T |
| Operating profit | Rp 5.0 T | Rp 4.3 T | Rp 3.2 T | Rp 4.0 T |
| Profit before tax | Rp 5.0 T | Rp 4.3 T | Rp 3.3 T | Rp 4.2 T |
| Net profit | Rp 4.1 T | Rp 3.5 T | Rp 2.6 T | Rp 3.4 T |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash | Rp 902 M | Rp 855 M | Rp 874 M | Rp 873 M |
| Placement with Bank Indonesia | Rp 18 T | Rp 9.2 T | Rp 8.4 T | Rp 15 T |
| Placement with other banks | Rp 759 M | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 955 M | Rp 2.1 T |
| Securities | Rp 25 T | Rp 26 T | Rp 36 T | Rp 39 T |
| Loans (gross) | Rp 70 T | Rp 66 T | Rp 65 T | Rp 67 T |
| Allowance for impairment: loans (CKPN) | -Rp 572 M | -Rp 605 M | -Rp 665 M | -Rp 805 M |
| Fixed assets & equipment (net) | Rp 6.3 T | Rp 6.2 T | Rp 6.0 T | Rp 6.5 T |
| Total assets | Rp 142 T | Rp 132 T | Rp 135 T | Rp 141 T |
| Demand deposits (Giro) | Rp 13 T | Rp 10 T | Rp 10 T | Rp 12 T |
| Savings deposits (Tabungan) | Rp 15 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 16 T |
| Time deposits (Deposito) | Rp 75 T | Rp 64 T | Rp 64 T | Rp 76 T |
| Borrowings | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 2.9 T | Rp 4.0 T | Rp 3.5 T |
| Total liabilities | Rp 121 T | Rp 110 T | Rp 114 T | Rp 116 T |
| Total equity | Rp 21 T | Rp 22 T | Rp 21 T | Rp 25 T |
MEGA is CT Corp's banking arm, structurally different from its retail-card brand recognition; credit is dominated by corporate/wholesale lending (~69%, government strategic projects, downstreaming, natural resources), with a distinctive CT-Corp-linked vehicle joint-financing channel via sister companies Mega Central/Auto Finance (~17%) and credit cards a comparatively minor ~10%. CAR surged from 25.77% to 30.49% (FY2024→25) as capital grew ~19.0% against nearly flat risk-weighted assets (+0.58%): a real capital build, not a risk reduction. But the accompanying "profit recovery" (ROE 13.62%→15.54%, ROA 2.56%→3.10%) leaned heavily on a one-off jump in realized securities-sale gains (Rp1.11tn vs Rp70bn the year before, ~15.7x, 26.6% of pretax profit vs 2.2%) while core net interest income fell for a fourth consecutive year (Rp5.87tn→Rp4.93tn, FY22-25, -16.0% cumulative) and operating profit stayed 19.2% below its FY2022 level. LDR fell to the lowest of the 4-year window (64.48%), consistent with a conservative, capital-building, low-loan-growth FY2025 stance. Management now guides 2026 credit growth of +10.45% (to Rp74tn), corporate-led: a signal of intent to reaccelerate, not yet a result. In the end, the capital strength is real, but FY2025's headline profit improvement is more balance-sheet management than a genuine core-earnings turnaround.
Time deposits were Rp75.4tn of Rp103.0tn total deposits in FY2022 and Rp76.0tn of Rp104.1tn in FY2025, so low-cost current and savings accounts (CASA) are only 27% to 30% of funding. For comparison, BRIS runs CASA between 60.2% and 61.7%, BNGA between 63.6% and 70.1%, and BBCA above 81%.
EconomicsTime deposits reprice quickly when policy rates rise, CASA barely reprices at all. Watch what that did: interest income rose 12% (Rp9.07tn → Rp10.20tn) while interest expense rose 65% (Rp3.20tn → Rp5.27tn), so net interest income FELL 16% (Rp5.87tn → Rp4.93tn) and NIM went 5.42% → 4.18%. The asset side worked; the liability side undid it.
MEGA let its loan book SHRINK, Rp70.3tn (FY2022) → Rp66.3tn → Rp64.7tn, before a 4.0% recovery to Rp67.2tn in FY2025, while the securities portfolio grew 55% (Rp25.4tn → Rp39.3tn). The loan-to-deposit ratio fell to 64.5%, the lowest in the fifteen banks tracked here.
EconomicsA securities book is safer and more liquid than a loan book, but it earns a thinner, market-priced spread and it builds no lending relationship to compound. Choosing securities over loans in a high-funding-cost year protects capital and sacrifices the franchise, which is exactly the trade visible in the margin.
Gross NPL moved 1.23% → 1.65% and cost of credit 0.21% → 0.72%. In money, provisions cost Rp0.15tn in FY2022 and Rp0.48tn in FY2025 against margin income of Rp4.93tn.
EconomicsMEGA’s problem has never been bad loans, which is what makes it a clean teaching case: two banks can both have pristine asset quality and still deliver opposite results, because the margin is set on the funding side.
Personnel expense barely moved (Rp1.36tn → Rp1.32tn), yet cost-to-income went 38.5% (FY2022, lean for a bank of this size) to 51.1% (FY2024) and back to 42.1% (FY2025), with BOPO 56.8% → 73.6% → 69.1%.
EconomicsAn efficiency ratio has income in the denominator, so a bank can look less efficient without spending more. Here both moved: income fell (NII −16%, fee income −13% across the window) and the cost base did not fall with it. When you see a CIR jump, always ask which half moved.
Equity grew Rp20.6tn → Rp25.1tn and CAR rose 25.4% → 30.5%, higher than any other large commercial bank tracked here (BBCA 29.8%, BNGA 24.8%, BDMN 23.8%, BRIS 22.0%); only the small specialists BTPS, PNBN and ARTO carry more.
EconomicsROE has two moving parts, the profit and the equity it is measured against, and at MEGA both moved the wrong way for the ratio. Net profit fell from Rp4.05tn to Rp3.36tn while equity grew from Rp20.6tn to Rp25.1tn, so the balance sheet de-levered from 6.87× assets-to-equity to 5.62×. Part of the ROE slide from 23.15% to 15.54% is therefore a deliberate capital build rather than an earnings failure, and separating the two is the difference between reading MEGA as damaged and reading it as over-capitalised.
Cost structureCheap to run, expensive to fund. Personnel cost is small and flat (Rp1.36tn → Rp1.32tn) and FY2022 cost-to-income of 38.5% is lean by any standard (BBCA, the sector’s efficiency benchmark, has run as low as 30.7%), so this is not an inefficient franchise by design. The dominant cost is interest paid to depositors: Rp5.27tn in FY2025 against Rp10.20tn of interest earned, meaning more than half of what the assets earn is handed back to the funding base. That ratio was 35% in FY2022. Nothing else in the cost structure matters as much.
Cash cycleFunding cost → margin → credit cost → capital, the same loop as any bank, but here the first link dominates. Deposits arrive mostly as time deposits that reprice within months; assets are a mix of loans (Rp67.2tn) and securities (Rp39.3tn) that reprice more slowly; the gap between those two speeds IS the margin. When rates rose, the liabilities repriced first and the spread collapsed from 5.42% to 4.18% even though credit losses stayed tiny. Capital then absorbs the result: retention is roughly 38% of earnings on the engine’s implied estimate, equity grew 6.7% a year, and CAR climbed to 30.5% because the loan book was not consuming it.
Unit economicsPer rupiah of earning assets, take the margin and subtract the credit cost. FY2022: 5.42% − 0.21% = 5.21%. FY2025: 4.18% − 0.72% = 3.46%. The spread after risk fell 175 basis points. Now compare BRIS over the identical four years, where the same calculation IMPROVED by 37bp (4.48% → 4.85%) because its CASA base is above 60% while MEGA’s is below 30%. Same country, same rate cycle, opposite outcome, and the funding mix is the reason. If you learn one thing from a bank page, learn to run this two-line sum before you read anything else.
Deposit funding costs rose faster than asset yields for four straight years, the direct cause of the NII decline.
Implication → The core, unresolved pressure on MEGA's underlying profitability: visible independent of the FY2025 securities-gain boost.
Large corporate/wholesale borrowers (government-linked projects, downstreaming) negotiate terms; card and joint-financing customers have less leverage.
Implication → Caps margin on the ~69% corporate book, reinforcing reliance on fee/card income and treasury for profitability.
Capital, licensing and CT Corp's established group relationships (government-linked deal flow, captive joint-financing pipeline) are real barriers.
Implication → Defensible position in its corporate/wholesale niche, reinforced by group linkages rather than pure scale.
Fintech lending, capital markets and other banks' corporate desks compete for the same wholesale mandates; card substitutes include e-wallets and BNPL.
Implication → Pressures fee/card economics even as the corporate book itself faces fewer direct substitutes for large-ticket project financing.
Competes with the KBMI-4 giants and other private banks for corporate/wholesale mandates, and with a crowded card market for consumer share.
Implication → Visible in the sustained NIM/NII pressure; FY2025's profit relief came from treasury, not from winning this competition on the lending side.
Asset quality is genuinely clean, but the FY2025 recovery is less clean than the headline suggests, and both things are true at once. On the credit side there is nothing to argue with: gross NPL 1.65%, cost of credit 0.72%, provisions of Rp0.48tn against Rp4.93tn of margin income. On the earnings side, be careful: a securities-sale gain of about Rp1.11tn sits inside FY2025 pretax profit of Rp4.16tn, so roughly a quarter of the year’s pretax profit is a portfolio disposal rather than a customer franchise, and core operating profit remained 19.2% below FY2022 (Rp4.04tn versus Rp5.00tn). The improvement in the efficiency ratio (CIR 51.1% → 42.1%) is flattered by the same gain, because that income sits in the denominator. One further caution: reserve coverage runs 58% to 73% of gross NPL, well under the 130% to 198% seen at BRIS and BBTN, so there is less cushion should credit costs keep rising from their current low base.
| Period | One-off item | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| FY2025 | Securities-sale gain of about Rp1.11tn (roughly 15.7× the prior year), a portfolio disposal rather than customer income. | About a quarter of FY2025 pretax profit (Rp4.16tn). Strip it and the recovery in ROE (13.62% → 15.54%) and in CIR (51.1% → 42.1%) both shrink substantially; core operating profit was still 19.2% below FY2022. |
| FY2024 | The trough year: cost-to-income spiked to 51.1% from 42.1% and BOPO to 73.6%, while the loan book was still shrinking. | Net profit Rp2.63tn and ROE 13.62%, the low of the window. Both halves of the ratio moved (income down, costs not down with it), so treat FY2024 as the comparison base only if you say which half you mean. |
Cash conversionFor a bank, the test is whether profit becomes capital and liquidity, and here it plainly does. Equity grew Rp20.6tn → Rp25.1tn, CAR reached 30.5%, and the balance sheet is liquid by construction: Rp39.3tn of securities plus Rp14.6tn placed at the central bank against Rp104.1tn of deposits, with a loan-to-deposit ratio of only 64.5%. The problem is not converting profit into strength; it is that the strength is not being converted back into earning assets.
Neither a builder nor a harvester, and the label matters here. MEGA retains roughly 38% of earnings on the engine’s implied estimate, which is real retention, but the retained capital did not go into growing the franchise: the loan book shrank for two years while capital piled up to a 30.5% CAR, above every other large commercial bank tracked here. That is capital accumulation without deployment. It is a defensible response to an expensive funding year, and it leaves the bank with a large, cheap option on the next rate cycle, but until the loans grow again the shareholder is paying for capital that is not being put to work.
DeploymentFollow the money and the choice is unmistakable. Loans Rp70.3tn → Rp64.7tn (FY2024) → Rp67.2tn, securities Rp25.4tn → Rp39.3tn, central-bank placements Rp17.9tn → Rp14.6tn, equity Rp20.6tn → Rp25.1tn. Borrowings stayed trivial (Rp1.9tn → Rp3.5tn). So the incremental rupiah went into securities and capital, not customers. Management has since guided 2026 credit growth of about +10.45% to roughly Rp74tn, corporate-led, which would be the first real redeployment of that capital, and it is the single claim in this analysis most worth checking against the next set of results.
Returns trendROE 23.15% → 17.62% → 13.62% → 15.54% against a cost of equity of 11.21% (risk-free 7.26% plus a 0.59 emerging-market money-centre bank beta on a 6.69% equity risk premium). So MEGA still cleared its required return in every year, but the excess narrowed from roughly 12 percentage points to about 4.3. Decompose it before judging: profit fell (net Rp4.05tn → Rp3.36tn, on a disclosed pre-tax ROA of 4.00% → 3.10%) and the equity it is measured against grew (Rp20.6tn → Rp25.1tn, assets-to-equity 6.87× → 5.62×), so the ratio was squeezed from both ends. The valuation is the unusual part: the excess-return model puts fair value at 1.69× book while the market pays 1.84×, about 109% of modeled value. Most Indonesian banks in this roster trade BELOW their modeled value, so MEGA is one of the few where the market is already paying for a recovery the record has only partly delivered.
This is the central risk, not a side note. CASA is 27% to 30% of deposits while time deposits are about 73%, so the funding base reprices upward fast and downward slowly. It has already cost 124bp of NIM (5.42% → 4.18%) and, at the FY2024 trough, a third of net profit (Rp4.05tn → Rp2.63tn). Nothing in the record suggests the mix is changing: CASA was 26.8% in FY2022 and 27.0% in FY2025.
Allowances cover only 58% to 73% of gross non-performing loans, against 184% to 198% at BRIS and 127% to 175% at BBTN. Low NPLs (1.65%) and collateral practice can justify a lower ratio, but it means less absorption capacity precisely while cost of credit is rising from a very low base (0.21% → 0.72%).
A loan-to-deposit ratio of 64.5% and a 55% larger securities book mean earnings increasingly depend on treasury spread rather than customer lending, and FY2025 showed the consequence: about a quarter of pretax profit came from a securities-sale gain. Redeployment into loans is the stated 2026 plan; until it shows up in the loan balance, the earnings mix stays market-dependent.
No solvency concern at all: CAR 30.5% exceeds every other large commercial bank tracked here, borrowings are trivial (Rp3.5tn), and liquid assets are large. The issue with this balance sheet is opportunity cost, not safety.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Large, well-capitalised and concentrated among a few systemic players, with ASEAN-leading profitability: though margins and efficiency are now under late-cycle pressure.