…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | 0.98x | 1.58x | 0.90x | 1.02x | 1.14x |
| Interest burden | 0.92x | 0.97x | 0.91x | 0.89x | 0.92x |
| Operating margin | 43.6% | 40.3% | 28.9% | 26.1% | 28.6% |
| Asset turnover | 0.39x | 0.28x | 0.53x | 0.52x | 0.48x |
| Leverage (equity mult.)driver | 2.20x | 2.43x | 1.60x | 1.43x | 1.32x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 34.2% | 41.6% | 19.8% | 17.5% | 19.1% |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 26.0% | 16.6% | 18.4% | 17.3% | 16.9% |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 0.55x | 0.62x | 1.26x | 2.30x | 2.13x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 0.40x | 0.22x | 0.67x | 1.42x | 1.24x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 0.30x | 0.13x | 0.42x | 1.11x | 0.90x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | -Rp 3.9 T | -Rp 3.9 T | Rp 2.5 T | Rp 7.6 T | Rp 7.5 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 0.69x | 0.73x | 0.33x | 0.30x | 0.20x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 1.20x | 1.43x | 0.60x | 0.43x | 0.32x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.32x | 0.30x | 0.20x | 0.21x | 0.15x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | Rp 4.0 T | Rp 9.1 T | Rp 5.3 T | Rp 4.3 T | Rp 3.4 T |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 12.99x | 34.47x | 10.81x | 8.84x | 12.90x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 2.20x | 2.43x | 1.60x | 1.43x | 1.32x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 54.7% | 48.8% | 34.6% | 31.3% | 32.7% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 43.6% | 40.3% | 28.9% | 26.1% | 28.6% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 39.6% | 61.8% | 23.6% | 23.7% | 30.2% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | Rp 4.3 T | Rp 4.4 T | Rp 8.2 T | Rp 8.8 T | Rp 10 T |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 51.8% | 45.8% | 34.3% | 32.6% | 35.0% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 15.5% | 17.1% | 12.4% | 12.2% | 14.5% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 34.9% | 49.2% | 23.9% | 20.9% | 23.2% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 0.98x | 1.58x | 0.90x | 1.02x | 1.14x |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 0.92x | 0.97x | 0.91x | 0.89x | 0.92x |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 26.0% | 16.6% | 18.4% | 17.3% | 16.9% |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.39x | 0.28x | 0.53x | 0.52x | 0.48x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 2.87x | 1.20x | 2.83x | 3.59x | 3.39x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 55.30x | 52.74x | 19.20x | 17.49x | 15.29x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 29.78x | 4.05x | 8.33x | 14.87x | 11.03x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 127.3 days | 304.6 days | 128.8 days | 101.6 days | 107.5 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 6.6 days | 6.9 days | 19.0 days | 20.9 days | 23.9 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 12.3 days | 90.1 days | 43.8 days | 24.5 days | 33.1 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 121.7 days | 221.4 days | 104.0 days | 98.0 days | 98.3 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | -Rp 5.0 T | -Rp 2.9 T | Rp 2.3 T | Rp 4.4 T | Rp 7.7 T |
Price Rp 895 · market cap Rp 56 T
| Multiple | NCKL | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 6.30x | 16.25x(15/16) | -61% |
| P/B | 1.46x | 1.68x | -13% |
| P/S | 1.90x | 1.92x | -1% |
| EV/EBITDA | 6.54x | 10.31x | -37% |
| EV/EBIT | 8.00x | 14.25x | -44% |
| EV/Sales | 2.29x | 2.27x | +1% |
| FCF Yield | 13.59% | 0.01% | +128,963% |
| Dividend Yield | 4.76% | 5.27%(11/16) | -10% |
EV = mkt cap Rp 56 T + debt Rp 9.4 T − cash Rp 6.0 T + minority interest Rp 8.1 T = Rp 68 T
At today’s price, the market is paying for 2.4%/yr FCF growth (-0.5% at 12.0% to 5.1% at 16.0% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: FCF n/m (sign flip) · 37.8% revenue.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 12.0–16.0% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
Cyclical normalization: Commodity/cyclical name: the trailing years are a sample drawn from the price cycle, not a trend. Defaults are therefore normalized, using the full-window mean margin with no cycle-position growth extrapolation. That normalized margin is itself the embedded commodity-price assumption.
Base year contains named one-off item(s): FY2022: Net income above EBIT: an unidentified below-the-line gain. The EBIT basis screens out most non-operating items, but read the Earnings Quality section before trusting the base margin.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 7.26% | Indonesia 10Y government bond, re-verified 31 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.96 → 1.11 | Metals & Mining (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.17 |
| Cost of equity | 14.69% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 7.66% | median interest coverage 12.9x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a Aaa/AAA synthetic rating and a 0.40% default spread, over a 7.26% base (Indonesia 10Y 7.26%, already the sovereign rate). Its BOOK rate is 7.0%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms) |
| Tax rate | 5.8% | median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest) |
| WACC | 13.62% | 86% E × CoE + 14% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 2.5% | terminal growth from year 1, cyclical normalization: the delivered 4-yr CAGR (37.8%) reflects cycle position, not a trend |
| EBIT margin | 33.5% | full-cycle mean EBIT margin, FY2021–FY2025 (cyclical normalization: this margin is the embedded commodity-price assumption) |
| D&A / revenue | 6.1% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 8.9% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 13.6% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 18.4% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 11.4% of revenue against depreciation of 6.1%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | 19.6% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | Rp 30 T | Rp 31 T | Rp 32 T | Rp 33 T | Rp 34 T | Rp 34 T |
| EBIT | Rp 10 T | Rp 10 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 12 T |
| NOPAT | Rp 9.6 T | Rp 9.8 T | Rp 10 T | Rp 10 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 11 T |
| + D&A | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 2.1 T |
| − Capex | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 2.8 T | Rp 2.9 T | Rp 2.9 T | Rp 3.0 T | Rp 3.9 T |
| − ΔNWC | Rp 146 M | Rp 149 M | Rp 153 M | Rp 157 M | Rp 161 M | Rp 165 M |
| FCFF | Rp 8.6 T | Rp 8.8 T | Rp 9.0 T | Rp 9.2 T | Rp 9.5 T | Rp 8.9 T |
| PV | Rp 7.5 T | Rp 6.8 T | Rp 6.1 T | Rp 5.5 T | Rp 5.0 T | Rp 42 T |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding
EV = PV(explicit) Rp 31 T + PV(TV) Rp 42 T = Rp 73 T · TV 58% of EV · − net debt Rp 3.4 T − minority Rp 8.1 T = equity Rp 62 T ÷ shares outstanding
Model output: Rp 978/share (+9% vs price Rp 895)· exit-multiple check (10.3x): Rp 1,457
Under these assumptions the model lands close to today's price. The market and these inputs are telling broadly the same story.
| g \ WACC | 12.6% | 13.6% | 14.6% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | 1,042 | 939 | 852 |
| 2.5% | 1,089 | 978 | 885 |
| 3.0% | 1,141 | 1,020 | 919 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | Rp 8.2 T | Rp 9.6 T | Rp 24 T | Rp 27 T | Rp 30 T |
| Cost of Goods Sold | Rp 3.7 T | Rp 4.9 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 19 T | Rp 20 T |
| Gross Profit | Rp 4.5 T | Rp 4.7 T | Rp 8.3 T | Rp 8.4 T | Rp 9.7 T |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | Rp 3.6 T | Rp 3.9 T | Rp 6.9 T | Rp 7.0 T | Rp 8.5 T |
| Interest Expense | Rp 276 M | Rp 112 M | Rp 638 M | Rp 797 M | Rp 658 M |
| Net Income | Rp 3.3 T | Rp 5.9 T | Rp 5.6 T | Rp 6.4 T | Rp 9.0 T |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 4.7 T | Rp 5.6 T | Rp 6.4 T | Rp 9.0 T |
| Depreciation & Amortization | Rp 673 M | Rp 524 M | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 1.9 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | Rp 2.6 T | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 3.9 T | Rp 6.5 T | Rp 6.0 T |
| Accounts Receivable | Rp 149 M | Rp 181 M | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 1.9 T |
| Inventory | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 4.1 T | Rp 5.5 T | Rp 5.2 T | Rp 5.9 T |
| Current Assets | Rp 4.8 T | Rp 6.3 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 14 T |
| Total Assets | Rp 21 T | Rp 35 T | Rp 45 T | Rp 52 T | Rp 62 T |
| Accounts Payable | Rp 125 M | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.8 T |
| Current Liabilities | Rp 8.7 T | Rp 10 T | Rp 9.3 T | Rp 5.9 T | Rp 6.7 T |
| Total Liabilities | Rp 11 T | Rp 20 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 15 T |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | Rp 6.6 T | Rp 10 T | Rp 9.2 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 9.4 T |
| Total Equity | Rp 9.5 T | Rp 14 T | Rp 28 T | Rp 36 T | Rp 47 T |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | Rp 5.6 T | Rp 9.5 T | Rp 23 T | Rp 30 T | Rp 39 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 3.5 T | Rp 6.8 T | Rp 5.7 T | Rp 8.6 T |
| Capital Expenditure | Rp 6.9 T | Rp 6.4 T | Rp 4.5 T | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 939 M |
NCKL gross margin: 54.7 % (2021) → 48.8 % (2022) → 34.6 % (2023) → 31.3 % (2024) → 32.7 % (2025). OPM: 43.6 % → 40.3 % → 28.9 % → 26.1 % → 28.6 %. Net margin: 39.6 % → 61.8 % → 23.6 % → 23.7 % → 30.2 %. ROE: 34.9 % → 49.2 % → 23.9 % → 20.9 % → 23.2 %. ROIC: 26.0 % → 16.6 % → 18.4 % → 17.3 % → 16.9 %. EBITDA margin: 51.8 % → 45.8 % → 34.3 % → 32.6 % → 35.0 %. D/E: 0.69 → 0.73 → 0.33 → 0.30 → 0.20 (steadily deleveraging). Interest coverage: 13.0× → 34.5× → 10.8× → 8.8× → 12.9×. FCF (Rp): −5.0 T → −2.9 T → +2.3 T → +4.4 T → +7.7 T; a textbook capex-to-cash-generation inflection. Revenue (Rp): 8.2 T → 9.6 T → 23.9 T → 27.0 T → 29.6 T. The 2022 net margin (61.8 %) sits well above that year’s 40.3 % operating margin: a large non-operating/associate contribution above the line, not a repeatable operating result. Strip that, and the through-cycle picture is still excellent: even after nickel’s 2023–2025 price crash, NCKL held ~20–23 % ROE and ~17–18 % ROIC, comfortably value-creating, because vertical integration (ore → NPI → MHP → sulfates) captures processing and battery-grade margin that a matte-only seller like INCO cannot. Early liquidity was tight (current ratio 0.55–0.62 in 2021–2022 during the first-HPAL build) but normalised to 2.1–2.3× as FCF turned strongly positive and debt fell. This is the highest-quality fundamental profile of the mining batch.
Obi Island yields both saprolite (higher grade) and limonite (lower grade). Each feeds a different processing route, so a single mining operation supplies two product chains.
EconomicsThe limonite is the point. In a matte-only or NPI-only model that low-grade material is waste; here it is HPAL feed. Monetising the whole ore body rather than half of it is the structural reason NCKL earns what it earns.
Saprolite goes through RKEF smelters into ferronickel and NPI for stainless steel. Limonite goes through HPAL into MHP, then on to battery-grade nickel and cobalt sulfate.
EconomicsGross margin fell from 54.73% (FY2021) to 32.69% (FY2025) as volume scaled roughly 3.6 times, so the added tonnes came in at lower unit margin than the first tonnes. The trade was accepted deliberately: absolute gross profit still rose from Rp 4.50 T to Rp 9.69 T.
MHP is refined on site into nickel sulfate and cobalt sulfate rather than shipped out as intermediate, keeping the downstream margin inside the group.
EconomicsIntegration on one island removes a logistics leg at every stage. It is also why NCKL reports in rupiah while INCO, MBMA and MDKA report in US dollars: much of the chain settles domestically. That reporting choice has a direct valuation consequence, set out under returns below.
Inventory dominates the working-capital cycle: 107.52 inventory days in FY2025 against 23.87 receivable days and 33.09 payable days.
EconomicsThe cash cycle of 98.30 days is an ore-stockpile cycle, not a credit cycle. Customers pay quickly; the capital is tied up in material sitting in the chain. That is the working-capital cost of running two processing routes off one mine.
Cost structureCost of goods sold absorbed 45.27% of revenue in FY2021 and 67.31% in FY2025, the mirror image of the gross-margin path from 54.73% to 32.69%. Operating margin fell less far, 43.61% to 28.63%, meaning overheads grew slower than revenue and gave back part of the gross-margin loss. Compare the shape with INCO: NCKL lost margin because it added lower-grade volume by choice, while INCO lost margin because its cost base would not move when the price did. Falling margin is not one diagnosis.
Cash cycleCash conversion cycle: 121.68 days (FY2021), a spike to 221.41 days (FY2022) when inventory days reached 304.60 during the HPAL ramp, then 104.05, 97.96 and 98.30 days. The FY2022 spike is the build showing up in working capital: material accumulated in a chain that was not yet running at rate. Since FY2023 the cycle has been stable near 98 to 104 days, which is the steady-state cost of the integrated model.
Unit economicsRevenue per rupiah of gross fixed investment tells the ramp story better than margin does: asset turnover ran 0.39 times (FY2021), fell to 0.28 times (FY2022) while capacity was being built but not yet sold from, then settled at 0.53, 0.52 and 0.48 times. The asset base began paying only from FY2023.
NCKL owns its Obi laterite reserves and most on-island processing infrastructure, including captive power. Reagents (sulfuric acid, limestone/quicklime) are locally produced or sourced; the JV with Lygend brings HPAL technology. The main external dependencies are coal for captive power and imported reagents/equipment.
Implication → On-island integration and captive power give NCKL a low, controllable cost base: the foundation of its cost-curve resilience through the nickel-price crash.
NPI, MHP and sulfates are LME-linked/benchmark-referenced and sold heavily to Chinese and Korean battery-precursor makers: a concentrated, price-setting buyer base. The Lygend JV both supplies technology and is embedded in the offtake chain. NCKL takes benchmark prices with limited premium power, though battery-grade MHP earns more than raw ore or NPI.
Implication → Pricing power is limited, but moving up to battery-grade MHP/sulfates captures more margin than ore/NPI: the strategic reason integration pays even in a weak-price market.
A fully integrated mine-to-battery-chemical complex requires billions in HPAL/RKEF capex, scarce HPAL operating know-how (NCKL was Indonesia’s first-mover), IUP/RKAB/AMDAL clearances, and years to build. First-mover learning on HPAL (a technically demanding process with a history of cost overruns globally) is a real barrier.
Implication → NCKL’s first-mover HPAL expertise and integrated Obi complex are hard to replicate quickly: a genuine execution/know-how moat within Indonesia’s crowded nickel build.
Battery-grade nickel faces LFP-chemistry substitution (LFP uses no nickel and has taken share versus NMC), softening the long-run high-nickel demand slope. But NMC/NCA high-nickel chemistries retain a durable niche (energy density), and stainless steel demand for NPI is stable. NCKL’s dual RKEF+HPAL output hedges across both stainless and battery demand.
Implication → The RKEF (stainless) + HPAL (battery) split is a natural hedge against LFP eroding one end: NCKL is less single-chemistry-exposed than a pure battery-materials play.
NCKL competes in the Chinese-backed Indonesian nickel build (Tsingshan/IMIP-IWIP, plus INCO, ANTM): the capacity flood that crashed prices. Its edge is being an early, integrated, low-cost HPAL operator with battery-grade output, versus later or NPI-only entrants. Competition is on delivered cost and product quality (battery-grade vs. NPI), not price.
Implication → NCKL wins by being early, integrated and low-cost in battery-grade: the ~20 %+ ROE it held through the crash is the proof its position is differentiated within the oversupplied field.
Good, with one year that must be set aside. FY2022 net income of Rp 5.92 T exceeded EBIT of Rp 3.86 T by Rp 2.06 T, and net margin (61.82%) came in above even gross margin (48.81%). The engine’s tax-burden ratio printed 1.579 that year, above 1.0, which is impossible for a genuine tax factor and is exactly the condition that triggers the ROIC clamp described in the ratio engine. The item is not identified in the seeded statements. Every other year is clean: in FY2025 net income of Rp 8.95 T sits below EBIT of Rp 8.48 T only by the ordinary financing and tax wedge, and operating margin, EBITDA margin and net margin move together. Read the FY2022 ROE of 49.21% as inflated by an unidentified below-the-line item and the surrounding range of 20.93% to 34.90% as the honest one.
| Period | One-off item | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| FY2022 | Net income above EBIT: an unidentified below-the-line gain | Rp 2.06 T, which lifted net margin to 61.82% against a gross margin of 48.81% and made FY2022 the peak ROE year of the five at 49.21%. The tax-burden ratio of 1.579 confirms the item is not a tax effect. Excluding it, FY2022 would not be the best year of the window. |
Cash conversionClean and improving. FY2025 operating cash flow of Rp 8.60 T against net income of Rp 8.95 T is 0.961 times, close to one-for-one, and the ratio against EBIT rose from 80.98% in FY2024 to 101.39% in FY2025. Unlike INCO, the conversion here is not a depreciation artefact: depreciation of Rp 1.89 T is only 0.22 times EBIT of Rp 8.48 T, so the cash is coming from trading profit. Free cash flow has been positive three years running and reached Rp 7.66 T in FY2025.
Mixed is the accurate label because the window contains a completed transition rather than one behaviour. NCKL was a builder in FY2021 and FY2022, spending Rp 6.88 T and Rp 6.41 T of capital expenditure against operating cash flow of Rp 1.83 T and Rp 3.52 T, and running free cash flow of negative Rp 5.05 T and negative Rp 2.89 T. From FY2023 it has been a harvester: free cash flow of positive Rp 2.30 T, Rp 4.40 T and Rp 7.66 T, a dividend yield of 4.76%, and debt to equity down from 0.69 to 0.20. Across the full five years capital expenditure absorbed 75.70% of operating cash flow and cumulative free cash flow was positive Rp 6.43 T, equal to 6.54% of cumulative revenue. Set against the other three nickel-complex names tracked here, that 6.54% compares with INCO at 0.80%, MBMA at negative 22.17% and MDKA at negative 19.48% (MDKA consolidates MBMA, so those two overlap rather than stand apart): NCKL is the only one of the four to have converted its build into cumulative free cash worth more than a rounding error.
DeploymentCapital expenditure fell 86.35% across the window, from Rp 6.88 T (FY2021) to Rp 0.94 T (FY2025), and FY2025 spending was just 3.17% of revenue and 0.50 times depreciation of Rp 1.89 T. The released cash went to two places: the balance sheet, where debt to equity fell from 0.69 to 0.20 and the current ratio rose from 0.55 to 2.13, and shareholders, at a 4.76% dividend yield. Spending below depreciation deserves scepticism rather than applause, and it is recorded as a red flag below.
Returns trendThis is the finding that separates NCKL from its peers, and it survives the currency problem rather than depending on it. ROIC ran 26.00%, 16.56%, 18.37%, 17.28% and 16.92% against an engine WACC of 13.62% and a discount band of 12% / 14% / 16%. NCKL cleared its cost of capital in all five years, by 12.38, 2.94, 4.75, 3.66 and 3.30 percentage points. The comparison must be made this way and not on raw ROIC, because NCKL reports in rupiah and is discounted on a rupiah band, while INCO, MBMA and MDKA report in US dollars and are discounted at 11.08%, 10.95% and 12.14%. NCKL therefore carries the HIGHEST hurdle of the four and is still the only one clearing it: on spread over its own hurdle, FY2025 reads NCKL +3.30 points, INCO negative 9.70 points, MBMA negative 9.82 points, and MDKA not measurable. A raw ROIC comparison across four companies reporting in two currencies would misrank them. One caution about the peer set itself: MDKA consolidates MBMA in full, and MBMA’s own revenue equals 75.71% of MDKA’s consolidated revenue in FY2025, so those two are not independent observations and the same nickel platform is counted twice in any list naming both.
FY2025 capital expenditure of Rp 0.94 T was 0.50 times depreciation of Rp 1.89 T and only 3.17% of revenue, after Rp 6.88 T in FY2021. Two readings fit: a build genuinely finished, or an asset base being harvested faster than it is renewed. Five years of data cannot separate them, and the free-cash-flow and dividend strength depends on which is true.
Net income exceeded EBIT by Rp 2.06 T in FY2022, net margin exceeded gross margin, and the tax-burden ratio printed 1.579. The item is unidentified in the seeded statements and inflates the FY2022 ROE of 49.21%. Any multi-year average that includes FY2022 unadjusted overstates the business.
A data-completeness caveat, recorded rather than interpreted. Non-controlling interests held 40.88% of equity in FY2021 and 17.34% in FY2025, and the income statement attributed Rp 1.29 T (FY2021) and Rp 1.25 T (FY2022) of profit to them. From FY2023 the seeded income statement attributes nothing to minorities even though they still hold 17.34% of consolidated equity. No conclusion about minority economics is drawn here, because the data cannot support one; the balance-sheet share is the figure to rely on.
Inventory days were 107.52 in FY2025 and reached 304.60 in FY2022, driving the cash cycle to 221.41 days that year. Receivables are collected in 23.87 days, so the exposure is stockpiled material rather than customer credit. It is inherent to running two processing routes from one ore body, but it means a demand pause shows up as trapped cash quickly.
Checked, no current concern, but the history is worth stating. Debt to equity fell from 0.69 to 0.20 and interest coverage stands at 12.90 times. The current ratio was 0.55 in FY2021 and 0.62 in FY2022, meaning current liabilities were up to 1.82 times current assets while the HPAL build was running; it has since risen to 2.13. The company that now looks the most solid of the four spent two years in the tightest liquidity position of the four.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Indonesia controls >60 % of global nickel supply and is the world's largest thermal-coal exporter; hilirisasi mandates in-country ore processing, reshaping value chains from raw ore to battery-grade products.