Equal
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| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)(Capital / RWA) | 21.4% | 23.5% | 23.4% | 24.4% |
| Leverage Ratio(Tier 1 / Total Exposure)not disclosed | — | — | — | — |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross NPL(NPL / Total Loans) | 2.4% | 1.6% | 1.6% | 1.9% |
| Net NPL((NPL − Reserves) / Loans) | 1.0% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.8% |
| Non-Performing Assets(NPA / Total Assets) | 1.6% | 1.4% | 1.2% | 1.3% |
| Non-Performing Productive Assets(NP Earning / Earning Assets) | 1.4% | 1.1% | 1.0% | 1.1% |
| Allowance for Impairment (CKPN)(CKPN / Earning Assets) | 3.2% | 3.4% | 3.0% | 2.6% |
| Cost of Credit(Provision Expense / Gross Loans) | 0.6% | 1.1% | -0.2% | 0.1% |
| NPL Coverage(Allowance for Impairment (CKPN) / Gross NPL) | 228.2% | 332.8% | 316.4% | 231.2% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR)(Loans / Deposits) | 77.2% | 83.8% | 81.8% | 70.3% |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)(ASF / RSF)not disclosed | — | — | — | — |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)(HQLA / Net Cash Outflows (30d))not disclosed | — | — | — | — |
| CASA Ratio((Demand + Savings) / Total Deposits) | 54.6% | 55.8% | 55.3% | 58.0% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 1.9% | 2.1% | 2.3% | 2.2% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 10.6% | 12.1% | 13.5% | 12.4% |
| Net Interest Margin (NIM)(NII / Avg Earning Assets) | 4.0% | 4.4% | 4.5% | 3.9% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Expense to Income (BOPO)(Opex / Operating Income) | 71.1% | 71.0% | 71.0% | 69.6% |
| Cost-to-Income Ratio (CIR)(Opex (ex-provisions) / Income) | 44.0% | 44.2% | 50.9% | 47.0% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan Growth (YoY)(Gross Loans / Prior Year − 1) | — | 11.1% | 10.6% | 2.0% |
| Deposit Growth (YoY)(Total Deposits / Prior Year − 1) | — | 3.3% | 13.3% | 18.3% |
Price Rp 1,290 · market cap Rp 30 T
| Multiple | NISP | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 5.85x | 8.04x | -27% |
| P/B | 0.68x | 0.78x | -14% |
| Dividend Yield | 3.49% | 7.46%(14/15) | -53% |
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
A bank cannot be valued on operating cash flow the way a factory can, because for a bank debt is raw material rather than financing. So this model values the equity directly: start from book value, then add the present value of everything the bank earns above its cost of equity. A bank that earns exactly its cost of equity is worth exactly its book value (P/B 1.0).
| Assumption | Default | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Book equity (BV₀) | Rp 44 T | audited Individual-basis equity, FY2025 publication |
| ROE, start of fade | 12.35% | FY2025 disclosed ROE (OJK ratio table) |
| ROE, terminal | 12.23% | median disclosed ROE, FY2022–FY2025: the bank's own demonstrated through-cycle level, fading linearly |
| Fade horizon | 5 yrs | linear fade; final year pins to terminal |
| Retention (explicit phase) | 71.1% | implied from delivered equity growth FY2022–FY2025 (CAGR 8.6%) ÷ average ROE 12.1%. An approximation: equity growth also carries OCI effects (FVOCI marks, revaluations), not only retention |
| Cost of equity | 11.21% | National-footprint franchises (KBMI 3–4 and large private banks). |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | house terminal growth 2.5% (capped at terminal ROE by the engine when binding) |
Equity = BV₀ Rp 44 T + PV(excess, yrs 1–5) Rp 2.0 T + PV(terminal) Rp 4.6 T = Rp 50 T
At today's price the market pays 59% of this model's equity value. The price embeds less than these inputs produce, which amounts to assuming a higher cost of equity or a lower terminal ROE than the defaults here.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 12.35% | 12.32% | 12.29% | 12.26% | 12.23% | 12.23% |
| Book (start) | Rp 44 T | Rp 48 T | Rp 52 T | Rp 56 T | Rp 61 T | Rp 67 T |
| Net income | Rp 5.4 T | Rp 5.9 T | Rp 6.4 T | Rp 6.9 T | Rp 7.5 T | Rp 8.2 T |
| Retained | Rp 3.9 T | Rp 4.2 T | Rp 4.5 T | Rp 4.9 T | Rp 5.3 T | — |
| Excess return | Rp 501 M | Rp 531 M | Rp 562 M | Rp 594 M | Rp 627 M | Rp 682 M |
| PV | Rp 451 M | Rp 429 M | Rp 409 M | Rp 388 M | Rp 369 M | Rp 4.6 T |
Check it yourself: NI = ROE × book · ER = (ROE − COE) × book · PV = ER ÷ (1+COE)^yr · next book = book + NI × retention · TV = ER(T∞) ÷ (COE − g), discounted from year 5
| ROE_T \ COE | 10.21% | 11.21% | 12.21% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10.23% | 1.05x | 0.91x | 0.79x |
| 12.23% | 1.34x | 1.15x | 1.01x |
| 14.23% | 1.64x | 1.41x | 1.23x |
Model output under the stated assumptions, never a target. ROE record: FY2022 10.59% · FY2023 12.11% · FY2024 13.45% · FY2025 12.35%
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interest income | Rp 13 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 19 T | Rp 19 T |
| Interest expense | Rp 4.0 T | Rp 6.5 T | Rp 7.7 T | Rp 8.0 T |
| Net interest income | Rp 8.7 T | Rp 9.9 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 11 T |
| Fees & commissions | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 1.1 T |
| Impairment/provision expense | Rp 864 M | Rp 1.6 T | -Rp 369 M | Rp 251 M |
| Personnel expenses | Rp 2.8 T | Rp 2.6 T | Rp 3.3 T | Rp 3.5 T |
| Operating profit | Rp 4.2 T | Rp 5.2 T | Rp 5.7 T | Rp 6.4 T |
| Profit before tax | Rp 4.2 T | Rp 5.2 T | Rp 6.0 T | Rp 6.4 T |
| Net profit | Rp 3.3 T | Rp 4.1 T | Rp 4.9 T | Rp 5.1 T |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 973 M | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.1 T |
| Placement with Bank Indonesia | Rp 11 T | Rp 7.8 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 12 T |
| Placement with other banks | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 911 M | Rp 3.1 T |
| Securities | Rp 40 T | Rp 52 T | Rp 69 T | Rp 115 T |
| Loans (gross) | Rp 133 T | Rp 148 T | Rp 164 T | Rp 167 T |
| Allowance for impairment: loans (CKPN) | -Rp 7.4 T | -Rp 8.1 T | -Rp 8.0 T | -Rp 7.5 T |
| Fixed assets & equipment | Rp 5.2 T | Rp 5.6 T | Rp 6.2 T | Rp 6.4 T |
| Total assets | Rp 239 T | Rp 250 T | Rp 281 T | Rp 308 T |
| Demand deposits (Giro) | Rp 56 T | Rp 55 T | Rp 60 T | Rp 84 T |
| Savings deposits (Tabungan) | Rp 40 T | Rp 46 T | Rp 54 T | Rp 57 T |
| Time deposits (Deposito) | Rp 80 T | Rp 80 T | Rp 92 T | Rp 102 T |
| Borrowings | Rp 4.9 T | Rp 2.9 T | Rp 2.9 T | Rp 167 M |
| Total liabilities | Rp 204 T | Rp 213 T | Rp 240 T | Rp 265 T |
| Total equity | Rp 34 T | Rp 37 T | Rp 41 T | Rp 44 T |
NISP is OCBC Group's Indonesia banking platform; a universal franchise (consumer, SME, commercial, corporate, wealth) with a fortress balance sheet (CAR 21.4%→24.4%, FY22–25) and net profit up 52.0% cumulatively (Rp3.33tn→Rp5.06tn). But the most recent year is where the real story is: NIM compressed to 3.94% (from a 4.47% FY24 peak), gross/net NPL both reversed higher after two years of improvement (1.55%/0.56%→1.94%/0.76%), and, the sharpest single fact, net interest income actually fell 0.9% YoY in FY2025 even as total assets grew 9.7%. The mechanism is visible in the balance sheet itself: securities holdings nearly tripled (+185.1% cumulative, Rp40.3tn→Rp115.0tn) while loan growth was far more modest (+25.4%, Rp133.3tn→Rp167.2tn), pulling LDR down from an 83.75% FY23 peak to 70.32%; balance-sheet growth has shifted toward a lower-yielding, securities-heavy mix. A FY2024 CIR spike (44.24%→50.87%) traces to personnel costs growing more than double the pace of net interest income that year (+25.4% vs +11.4%); FY2025's partial retrace to 47.03% did not fully reverse it. In the end, OCBC's capital and wealth-management backing (Group Indonesia wealth AUM +29% CAGR since 2022, past Rp120tn by Dec 2025) is real, but the standalone lending franchise is showing more margin and asset-quality strain than the strong CAR headline implies.
Deposits grew 38.4% (Rp176.1tn → Rp243.7tn) with every category rising: current accounts +51%, savings +41%, time deposits +28%, so CASA improved 54.6% → 58.0%. The Bank Commonwealth acquisition and merger sits inside this window, and management attributes roughly 4 percentage points of deposit growth and 5 of credit growth to it, with 1.2 million customers transferred. Borrowings were retired almost entirely (Rp4.88tn → Rp0.17tn).
EconomicsA deposit franchise that outgrows its lending franchise is a nice problem, but it is still a problem. Money that arrives has to be put somewhere, and if it cannot go into loans it goes into securities at a market yield rather than a lending spread.
Loans grew 25.4% (Rp133.3tn → Rp167.2tn) but almost all of that came early: +11.1%, +10.6%, then just +2.0% in FY2025. Securities grew 185.1% (Rp40.3tn → Rp115.0tn). In FY2025 alone deposits rose about Rp37.6tn while loans rose about Rp3.3tn and securities about Rp45.7tn, and the loan-to-deposit ratio fell 81.8% → 70.3%.
EconomicsThis is the single most important fact about NISP today, and it is a balance-sheet fact rather than a profit fact. The bank is becoming a securities holder as much as a lender. That is genuinely safer, and it is also why the margin fell 53bp in FY2025: a government bond does not pay what a corporate loan pays.
Interest income rose 49.0% (Rp12.71tn → Rp18.94tn) and interest expense rose 100.8% (Rp3.98tn → Rp7.99tn), yet net interest income still grew 25.2% (Rp8.74tn → Rp10.94tn). NIM went 4.04% → 4.36% → 4.47% → 3.94%.
EconomicsPut NISP beside the other banks analysed here and the contrast is the lesson: net interest income grew 25% at NISP, fell 4.6% at BNGA and fell 16% at MEGA over the same rate cycle. NISP got the direction right for three years because its asset book grew faster than its funding cost, then FY2025 turned as the new money landed in lower-yielding securities.
Provisions ran Rp0.86tn, Rp1.63tn, then MINUS Rp0.37tn in FY2024 (a net release, cost of credit −0.23%), then Rp0.25tn in FY2025. Gross NPL improved 2.42% → 1.64% → 1.55% and then reversed to 1.94%, with coverage 228% → 333% → 316% → 231%.
EconomicsA negative provision charge means the bank took money back OUT of its reserve and into profit. It is legitimate when recoveries genuinely beat expectations, but it makes FY2024 a flattered comparison base and it cannot repeat indefinitely. FY2025 shows the normalisation: the charge is positive again, non-performing loans are higher and coverage is 85 percentage points lower than its peak.
Equity grew 28.2% (Rp34.2tn → Rp43.9tn) and CAR 21.39% → 24.39%, with the engine implying about 71% retention. Two disclosure details matter for this bank: the OJK table reports ROA on a PRE-TAX basis and ROE against AVERAGE equity, which is the same convention as BMRI and BBNI but not universal across the fifteen banks here.
EconomicsNever compare a pre-tax ROA with a post-tax one and call it a like-for-like ranking. NISP’s 2.19% pre-tax ROA is not the same measure as an after-tax figure elsewhere, and the honest way to compare across banks is to use ROE against each bank’s own cost of equity, which is exactly what the valuation section does.
Cost structureFunding is the biggest cost and it doubled: Rp7.99tn of interest paid against Rp18.94tn earned, so 42% of asset income now returns to depositors, up from 31% in FY2022. Operating cost is respectable and the two standard efficiency measures disagree, which is worth understanding rather than glossing over: BOPO IMPROVED every year (71.08% → 69.63%) while cost-to-income DRIFTED UP (43.98% → 47.03%, with a 50.87% spike in FY2024). They use different denominators, so BOPO says total operating income covered total operating expense a little better each year, while CIR says costs grew slightly faster than the income base it measures. Personnel expense rose 24.2% (Rp2.81tn → Rp3.49tn) against net interest income up 25.2%, so staff cost roughly kept pace with the margin engine.
Cash cycleFunding cost → margin → credit cost → capital, and at NISP the interesting break is between the first two links and the deployment decision that sits between them. Deposits arrive in volume and cheaply enough (CASA 58.0%); the bank cannot lend them fast enough (loan growth 2.0% in FY2025), so they land in securities (Rp115.0tn, up 185%) at market yields, which is why the margin fell to 3.94% even though funding improved. Credit cost then swung from a release to a normal charge, and what remains compounds into capital: equity +28.2%, CAR 21.39% → 24.39%, borrowings retired to almost nothing. It is a conservative, self-funding loop. The open question is not safety but yield: how much of that Rp115.0tn eventually becomes lending, and at what spread.
Unit economicsRun the spread-after-risk subtraction that works across all these banks, margin minus cost of credit: FY2022 4.04% − 0.65% = 3.39%; FY2024 4.47% − (−0.23%) = 4.70%, flattered by the provision release; FY2025 3.94% − 0.15% = 3.79%. So even after normalising, the risk-adjusted spread is 40bp better than four years ago, which is a genuinely good outcome, but FY2024 was never the run-rate. Line it up with the batch: BRIS +37bp, NISP +40bp, BDMN flat, MEGA −175bp. Two banks improved, one held, one was hurt, and in every case the decisive variable was the funding mix and the credit charge rather than the loan growth rate.
Deposit base funds a balance sheet growing faster than its loan book; rising time-deposit competition for funding a larger securities book adds cost pressure.
Implication → Contributes to the NIM compression already visible in FY2025 (4.47%→3.94%).
Corporate and affluent consumer clients negotiate rates and shop across banks for wealth products; OCBC's regional brand and Premier Banking help retain them.
Implication → Caps loan pricing power, reinforcing the shift toward securities as an easier source of earning-asset growth.
Capital, licensing and an established franchise are real barriers; OCBC's balance-sheet backing reinforces them further.
Implication → Defensible mid-tier position, though digital banks nibble at the retail edges.
Fintech lending, digital banks and capital markets substitute for parts of credit and payments; OCBC's wealth platform is a partial counter on the fee side.
Implication → Adds pressure to defend loan growth, which has already lagged securities growth by a wide margin.
Competes with the KBMI-4 giants and CIMB Niaga for CASA and prime credit, and with digital banks for younger, fee-light customers.
Implication → Visible in the FY2025 NIM/NII squeeze; OCBC's wealth and cross-border franchise is the differentiator being leaned on.
Good over the window, with one year that must be read carefully and one inflection that must not be ignored. The good: net profit rose 52.0% (Rp3.33tn → Rp5.06tn), operating profit rose the same 52.0%, so the growth is operating rather than financial, and it was achieved while retiring borrowings and lifting CAR every year. The year to read carefully is FY2024, when the provision line went NEGATIVE (a release of Rp0.37tn, cost of credit −0.23%) and ROE peaked at 13.45%: a release is real money but it is not repeatable income, and any comparison drawn from FY2024 inherits that flattery. The inflection is FY2025, and three indicators point the same way at once: gross NPL reversed from 1.55% to 1.94% after two years of improvement, coverage fell from 316% to 231%, and the provision charge turned positive again. None of this is alarming on its own, since NPL under 2% with 231% coverage is a healthy book, but the direction changed and it changed in the same year the margin fell 53bp. Read those two together, not separately.
| Period | One-off item | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| FY2024 | A net provision RELEASE of Rp0.37tn (cost of credit −0.23%, the only negative credit charge among the banks analysed here). | ROE peaked at 13.45% and pre-tax ROA at 2.27% that year. Add the release back as a normal charge and the peak substantially flattens, which is why FY2025’s ROE of 12.35% is better read as normalisation than as deterioration. |
| FY2025 | The Bank Commonwealth acquisition and merger, with 1.2 million customers transferred; management attributes roughly 5 percentage points of credit growth and 4 of deposit growth to it. | Part of the deposit surge and the balance-sheet expansion is acquired rather than organic, so year-on-year growth rates in this window are not a clean organic read. The loan-to-deposit collapse to 70.3% is the visible consequence of taking on deposits faster than loans. |
Cash conversionThe profit-to-strength link is the best in this batch. Equity grew 28.2% to Rp43.9tn, CAR rose every single year (21.39% → 23.48% → 23.39% → 24.39%), and borrowings were retired from Rp4.88tn to Rp0.17tn, so the balance sheet now funds itself almost entirely with customer deposits. Liquidity is abundant rather than adequate: a 70.3% loan-to-deposit ratio, Rp115.0tn of securities and Rp11.8tn placed at the central bank. Nothing here constrains the bank; the constraint is finding lending it wants to do.
A builder, but of a balance sheet rather than of a loan book, and the distinction is the whole judgement. NISP retained roughly 71% of earnings on the engine’s implied estimate, grew equity 28.2% with no capital raise, and expanded assets 29.3% while every capital and liquidity measure improved. That is textbook building. The question is what got built: loans grew 25.4% and stalled to 2.0% in the final year, while securities grew 185.1%. Retaining capital to buy government and corporate paper is defensible and safe, but it earns a market yield, not a franchise spread, and a bank that keeps 71% of its profit is implicitly promising to reinvest it at better than the 11.21% cost of equity. On the record it just about does (ROE 12.35%), and the margin of safety is thin.
DeploymentIn, across FY2022 to FY2025: securities +Rp74.7tn and loans +Rp33.9tn. Funded by: deposits +Rp67.6tn (current accounts +Rp28.6tn, savings +Rp16.6tn, time +Rp22.5tn) plus retained profit. Out: borrowings repaid from Rp4.88tn to Rp0.17tn, and a dividend of Rp45 per share. Left behind: Rp9.6tn of extra equity and a capital ratio 300bp higher. Note the ordering, because it is unusual: this bank put more incremental money into securities than into loans, which is the opposite of what a lender is normally built to do.
Returns trendROE 10.59% → 12.11% → 13.45% → 12.35% against a cost of equity of 11.21% (risk-free 7.26% plus a 0.59 emerging-market money-centre bank beta on a 6.69% equity risk premium). The spread turned positive in FY2023 and is 1.14pp in FY2025, so this bank creates value, but modestly, and the FY2024 peak carried a provision release inside it. The excess-return model therefore values NISP a little above book at 1.15×, while the market pays 0.65×, about 56% of modeled value. That gap says the market expects the thin spread to vanish, and the honest counter to the market is not the four-year record but the deployment question: a 70.3% loan-to-deposit ratio can either be re-lent at a better spread or sit in securities earning market rates, and those two futures value very differently.
Securities grew 185.1% to Rp115.0tn while loans grew 25.4% and stalled at +2.0% in FY2025, taking the loan-to-deposit ratio to 70.3%. Earnings are therefore increasingly a market-yield business rather than a lending-spread business, and the FY2025 margin fall of 53bp to 3.94% is the first bill for that. Watch loan growth and the loan-to-deposit ratio ahead of any other number at this bank.
Three signals turned together in FY2025: gross NPL 1.55% → 1.94%, coverage 316% → 231%, and the provision charge back to positive after the FY2024 release of Rp0.37tn. The book is still healthy in absolute terms, but the release means the FY2024 comparison is flattered, so measure the trend from FY2023 instead.
ROE 12.35% against an 11.21% cost of equity leaves only 1.14pp of value creation, and part of the recent peak came from a provision release rather than operations. A 53bp margin decline is larger than the whole spread, so the buffer between creating and destroying value at this bank is one bad year of margin wide.
No concern anywhere: CAR 24.39% after rising every year, CASA 58.0%, borrowings retired to Rp0.17tn, a 70.3% loan-to-deposit ratio and Rp115.0tn of securities. If anything this balance sheet is over-provisioned with safety, which is precisely why the deployment question above is the one that matters.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Large, well-capitalised and concentrated among a few systemic players, with ASEAN-leading profitability: though margins and efficiency are now under late-cycle pressure.