Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | 0.87x | 0.66x | 0.66x | 0.75x | 0.46x |
| Interest burden | 0.70x | 0.80x | 0.82x | 0.87x | 0.89x |
| Operating margin | 16.5% | 17.4% | 14.1% | 13.8% | 13.2% |
| Asset turnoverdriver | 0.40x | 0.50x | 0.55x | 0.59x | 0.64x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 2.29x | 2.09x | 1.86x | 1.75x | 1.73x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 9.2% | 9.5% | 7.9% | 9.2% | 6.0% |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 9.2% | 9.9% | 8.8% | 10.6% | 6.7% |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 2.54x | 2.23x | 1.29x | 1.75x | 1.77x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 2.45x | 2.16x | 1.24x | 1.67x | 1.62x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 1.74x | 1.46x | 0.85x | 1.22x | 1.14x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | $ 1.3 B | $ 1.2 B | $ 430 M | $ 852 M | $ 904 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 0.90x | 0.62x | 0.44x | 0.35x | 0.30x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 1.29x | 1.09x | 0.86x | 0.75x | 0.73x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.39x | 0.30x | 0.23x | 0.20x | 0.18x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | $ 1.4 B | $ 702 M | $ 301 M | -$ 112 M | -$ 237 M |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 3.32x | 4.93x | 5.65x | 7.67x | 9.41x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 2.29x | 2.09x | 1.86x | 1.75x | 1.73x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 19.3% | 21.9% | 20.1% | 20.0% | 17.6% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 16.5% | 17.4% | 14.1% | 13.8% | 13.2% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 10.0% | 9.1% | 7.6% | 9.0% | 5.4% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | $ 878 M | $ 1.1 B | $ 942 M | $ 913 M | $ 850 M |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 28.9% | 31.3% | 25.8% | 24.1% | 21.4% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 4.0% | 4.5% | 4.2% | 5.3% | 3.5% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 12.0% | 12.4% | 10.3% | 12.0% | 7.9% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 0.87x | 0.66x | 0.66x | 0.75x | 0.46x |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 0.70x | 0.80x | 0.82x | 0.87x | 0.89x |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 9.2% | 9.9% | 8.8% | 10.6% | 6.7% |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.40x | 0.50x | 0.55x | 0.59x | 0.64x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 31.46x | 40.08x | 38.72x | 34.05x | 18.06x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 7.35x | 6.28x | 8.14x | 9.66x | 9.93x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 14.80x | 11.80x | 11.88x | 12.77x | 11.64x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 11.6 days | 9.1 days | 9.4 days | 10.7 days | 20.2 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 49.7 days | 58.1 days | 44.9 days | 37.8 days | 36.7 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 24.7 days | 30.9 days | 30.7 days | 28.6 days | 31.4 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 36.6 days | 36.3 days | 23.6 days | 19.9 days | 25.6 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | $ 360 M | $ 837 M | $ 601 M | $ 646 M | $ 449 M |
Price Rp 1,500 · market cap Rp 36 T ($ 2.0 B at the cited rate; statements are filed in USD)
| Multiple | PGAS | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 9.35x | 17.40x | -46% |
| P/B | 0.73x | 1.15x | -36% |
| P/S | 0.51x | 3.91x | -87% |
| EV/EBITDA | 3.11x | 7.19x | -57% |
| EV/EBIT | 5.05x | 11.64x | -57% |
| EV/Sales | 0.66x | 4.30x | -85% |
| FCF Yield | 22.32% | 9.78% | +128% |
| Dividend Yield | 12.14% | 4.16% | +192% |
EV = mkt cap $ 2.0 B + debt $ 1.1 B − cash $ 1.3 B + minority interest $ 867 M = $ 2.6 B
At today’s price, the market is paying for -7.8%/yr FCF growth (-10.7% at 9.3% to -5.1% at 13.3% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: 5.7% FCF · 7.0% revenue.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 9.3–13.3% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 4.66% | US 10Y Treasury, 10 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.47 → 0.64 | Oil/Gas Distribution (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.55 |
| Cost of equity | 8.94% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 5.07% | FY2025 interest expense ÷ total debt |
| Tax rate | 34.0% | median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest) |
| WACC | 6.96% | 65% E × CoE + 35% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 7.0% | delivered 4-yr revenue CAGR 7.0%, fading linearly to terminal |
| EBIT margin | 13.7% | mean EBIT margin, last 3 FYs |
| D&A / revenue | 10.1% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 4.1% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years; in the terminal year capex falls to replacement level (equal to depreciation, 10.1% of revenue) because holding a build-phase or pause-phase ratio in perpetuity misprices the company in whichever direction that phase points |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | -4.9% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 7.0% | 5.9% | 4.7% | 3.6% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | $ 4.3 B | $ 4.5 B | $ 4.7 B | $ 4.9 B | $ 5.0 B | $ 5.1 B |
| EBIT | $ 581 M | $ 615 M | $ 644 M | $ 668 M | $ 684 M | $ 701 M |
| NOPAT | $ 383 M | $ 406 M | $ 425 M | $ 440 M | $ 451 M | $ 463 M |
| + D&A | $ 430 M | $ 455 M | $ 477 M | $ 494 M | $ 506 M | $ 519 M |
| − Capex | $ 174 M | $ 184 M | $ 192 M | $ 199 M | $ 204 M | $ 519 M |
| − ΔNWC | -$ 14 M | -$ 12 M | -$ 10 M | -$ 8.4 M | -$ 6.0 M | -$ 6.1 M |
| FCFF | $ 653 M | $ 689 M | $ 719 M | $ 743 M | $ 759 M | $ 469 M |
| PV | $ 611 M | $ 602 M | $ 588 M | $ 568 M | $ 542 M | $ 7.5 B |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5
EV = PV(explicit) $ 2.9 B + PV(TV) $ 7.5 B = $ 10 B · TV 72% of EV · − net debt -$ 237 M − minority $ 867 M
Model output: Rp 7,291/share (+386% vs price Rp 1,500)· exit-multiple check (7.2x): Rp 6,256
Under these assumptions the model lands 386% above today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for slower growth, a thinner margin, or a higher discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 6.0% | 7.0% | 8.0% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | 8,220 | 6,618 | 5,547 |
| 2.5% | 9,313 | 7,291 | 6,001 |
| 3.0% | 10,774 | 8,132 | 6,546 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $ 3.0 B | $ 3.6 B | $ 3.6 B | $ 3.8 B | $ 4.0 B |
| Cost of Goods Sold | $ 2.4 B | $ 2.8 B | $ 2.9 B | $ 3.0 B | $ 3.3 B |
| Gross Profit | $ 587 M | $ 781 M | $ 734 M | $ 757 M | $ 698 M |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | $ 501 M | $ 621 M | $ 513 M | $ 521 M | $ 524 M |
| Interest Expense | $ 151 M | $ 126 M | $ 91 M | $ 68 M | $ 56 M |
| Net Income | $ 304 M | $ 326 M | $ 278 M | $ 339 M | $ 215 M |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | $ 304 M | $ 326 M | $ 278 M | $ 339 M | $ 215 M |
| Depreciation & Amortization | $ 377 M | $ 495 M | $ 430 M | $ 391 M | $ 326 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.4 B | $ 1.2 B | $ 1.4 B | $ 1.3 B |
| Accounts Receivable | $ 413 M | $ 568 M | $ 448 M | $ 392 M | $ 400 M |
| Inventory | $ 78 M | $ 70 M | $ 75 M | $ 89 M | $ 182 M |
| Current Assets | $ 2.2 B | $ 2.2 B | $ 1.9 B | $ 2.0 B | $ 2.1 B |
| Total Assets | $ 7.5 B | $ 7.2 B | $ 6.6 B | $ 6.4 B | $ 6.2 B |
| Accounts Payable | $ 165 M | $ 236 M | $ 245 M | $ 237 M | $ 282 M |
| Current Liabilities | $ 864 M | $ 993 M | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.1 B | $ 1.2 B |
| Total Liabilities | $ 4.2 B | $ 3.8 B | $ 3.1 B | $ 2.7 B | $ 2.6 B |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | $ 3.0 B | $ 2.1 B | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.3 B | $ 1.1 B |
| Total Equity | $ 3.3 B | $ 3.4 B | $ 3.5 B | $ 3.7 B | $ 3.6 B |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | $ 2.5 B | $ 2.6 B | $ 2.7 B | $ 2.8 B | $ 2.7 B |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $ 582 M | $ 970 M | $ 724 M | $ 785 M | $ 657 M |
| Capital Expenditure | $ 222 M | $ 133 M | $ 122 M | $ 139 M | $ 208 M |
PGAS gross margin shows 100.0% every year in this dataset: the same synthetic artefact as BREN/PGEO, not a real metric (no cogs/gross-profit breakout exists in the source for utility-template companies). Operating margin (from real EBIT) is the metric that actually describes PGAS's business, and it shows a real, gradual decline: 16.5% (2021) → 17.4% (2022 peak) → 14.1% → 13.8% → 13.2% (2025). NM: 10.0% → 9.1% → 7.6% → 9.0% → 5.4% (2025, weakest year, a real ~8-point gap versus OPM's 13.2% that year, similar to MEDC's 2025 pattern; pointing to a non-operating drag specific to that year). ROE: 12.0% → 12.4% (2022 peak) → 10.3% → 12.0% → 7.9% (2025, weakest). ROIC: 9.18% → 9.88% → 8.80% → 10.63% (2024 peak) → 6.68% (2025). D/E fell every single year: 0.90× (2021) → 0.62× → 0.44× → 0.35× → 0.30× (2025); a clean, genuine 5-year deleveraging trend. Interest coverage improved every single year: 3.32× (2021) → 4.93× → 5.65× → 7.67× → 9.41× (2025); the best, most consistent improving trend of any name in this industry, even as operating margin was declining over the same period. Net debt flipped to net cash in 2024-2025: −111.8 M (2024), −237.5 M (2025); a real, genuine achievement. Current ratio stayed healthy throughout (1.29-2.54× range). Asset turnover improved steadily: 0.40× (2021) → 0.64× (2025); genuinely more capital-efficient over time. FCF positive every year, USD 359.8-837.0 M range. Revenue (USD): 3,036.1 M → 3,568.6 M → 3,646.3 M → 3,788.6 M → 3,975.9 M (2025), growing every year.
PGAS depends on upstream gas producers (including MEDC and other Indonesian E&P operators, plus its own smaller Oil & Gas segment) for pipeline supply: a real, genuine exposure to upstream production reliability, distinct from BREN/PGEO/MEDC, which each control their own core production/generation assets.
Implication → Gas-supply security is PGAS's most distinct supplier-side risk in this industry, tied to domestic upstream producers' output rather than its own resource ownership.
PGAS's distribution customers (industrial, commercial, household) have limited alternative gas suppliers given PGAS's 92% infrastructure share, giving PGAS real pricing latitude: though regulated tariff-setting (BPH Migas) constrains how much of that latitude PGAS can actually exercise.
Implication → PGAS's buyer relationship is closer to a regulated utility than to BREN/PGEO's PLN-concentrated model or MEDC's commodity-price-taker position.
Gas transmission infrastructure (PGAS's 92% share) is a natural-monopoly-style asset base built over decades, not economically replicable by a new entrant.
Implication → PGAS's infrastructure moat is arguably the strongest and most durable of any name in this industry, immune to the resource-depletion risk that eventually affects E&P (MEDC) or the capacity-buildout execution risk facing BREN/PGEO.
PGAS's piped gas competes against LPG, electricity and (in industrial use) coal as alternative energy sources for its end customers.
Implication → Substitution risk is a real, ongoing consideration for PGAS's distribution volumes, distinct from the generation-capacity substitution risk BREN/PGEO face.
PGAS effectively has no direct rival given its 92% infrastructure share: its competitive dynamic is regulatory (tariff-setting via BPH Migas) rather than market-share-based.
Implication → PGAS's real competitive exposure is regulatory and policy risk, not market-share erosion: a fundamentally different risk profile from the other three names in this industry.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Indonesia's energy sector spans three genuinely different value chains under one industry here: upstream oil & gas E&P (MEDC; 163 kboe/d production, 528 MMboe reserves, plus real diversification into clean-energy power and copper/gold mining), geothermal power generation (BREN and PGEO together; Indonesia ranks #2 in the world for installed geothermal capacity, 2,742 MW, behind only the US, with a national target of 5.2 GW by 2034), and gas transmission/distribution (PGAS, 92% of domestic gas infrastructure, a Pertamina subholding, joined by RAJA, a far smaller private gas trader/distributor in the same subsegment). All five report in USD: including PGAS and RAJA, whose USD filings (PGAS total assets ~USD 6.3 B; RAJA ~USD 0.5 B) are frequently re-quoted in Rupiah-equivalent terms by Indonesian financial media, a display artifact worth knowing about rather than a sign of dual functional currencies.