…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burdendriver | 0.53x | 0.68x | 0.83x | 0.89x | 0.79x |
| Interest burden | 0.92x | 0.93x | 0.89x | 0.85x | 0.85x |
| Operating margin | 47.7% | 52.4% | 54.7% | 52.2% | 47.2% |
| Asset turnover | 0.15x | 0.16x | 0.14x | 0.14x | 0.14x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 1.95x | 1.97x | 1.50x | 1.49x | 1.48x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 6.9% | 10.1% | 8.3% | 8.0% | 6.7% |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 4.5% | 7.1% | 9.1% | 9.0% | 7.8% |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 1.40x | 0.51x | 3.54x | 3.65x | 4.11x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 1.32x | 0.48x | 3.44x | 3.56x | 3.98x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 0.63x | 0.31x | 2.78x | 2.88x | 3.35x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | $ 80 M | -$ 424 M | $ 619 M | $ 601 M | $ 667 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 0.78x | 0.75x | 0.37x | 0.37x | 0.37x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 0.95x | 0.97x | 0.50x | 0.49x | 0.48x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.40x | 0.38x | 0.25x | 0.25x | 0.25x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | $ 833 M | $ 683 M | $ 53 M | $ 91 M | $ 34 M |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 12.08x | 13.64x | 9.18x | 6.62x | 6.75x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 1.95x | 1.97x | 1.50x | 1.49x | 1.48x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 50.6% | 55.1% | 55.9% | 59.0% | 53.9% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 47.7% | 52.4% | 54.7% | 52.2% | 47.2% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 23.1% | 33.0% | 40.3% | 39.4% | 31.8% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | $ 284 M | $ 307 M | $ 331 M | $ 324 M | $ 331 M |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 76.9% | 79.5% | 81.4% | 79.7% | 76.4% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 3.5% | 5.1% | 5.5% | 5.4% | 4.5% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 6.9% | 10.1% | 8.3% | 8.0% | 6.7% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 0.53x | 0.68x | 0.83x | 0.89x | 0.79x |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 0.92x | 0.93x | 0.89x | 0.85x | 0.85x |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 4.5% | 7.1% | 9.1% | 9.0% | 7.8% |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.15x | 0.16x | 0.14x | 0.14x | 0.14x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 11.07x | 8.63x | 7.90x | 9.02x | 7.14x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 2.96x | 3.13x | 2.98x | 3.18x | 3.43x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 2.51x | 2.64x | 2.17x | 1.72x | 2.26x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 33.0 days | 42.3 days | 46.2 days | 40.5 days | 51.1 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 123.3 days | 116.5 days | 122.4 days | 114.9 days | 106.5 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 145.3 days | 138.1 days | 168.3 days | 211.9 days | 161.8 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 10.9 days | 20.7 days | 0.3 days | -56.6 days | -4.2 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | $ 222 M | $ 189 M | $ 187 M | $ 155 M | $ 229 M |
Price Rp 1,010 · market cap Rp 42 T ($ 2.3 B at the cited rate; statements are filed in USD)
| Multiple | PGEO | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 17.02x | 17.40x | -2% |
| P/B | 1.15x | 1.15x | 0% |
| P/S | 5.42x | 3.91x | +39% |
| EV/EBITDA | 7.19x | 7.19x | 0% |
| EV/EBIT | 11.64x | 11.64x | 0% |
| EV/Sales | 5.50x | 4.30x | +28% |
| FCF Yield | 9.78% | 9.78% | 0% |
| Dividend Yield | 5.26% | 4.16% | +26% |
EV = mkt cap $ 2.3 B + debt $ 753 M − cash $ 718 M = $ 2.4 B
At today’s price, the market is paying for 0.8%/yr FCF growth (-2.6% at 9.3% to 3.9% at 13.3% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: 0.8% FCF · 4.1% revenue.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 9.3–13.3% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 4.66% | US 10Y Treasury, 10 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.46 → 0.58 | Green & Renewable Energy (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.32 |
| Cost of equity | 8.52% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 4.02% | FY2025 interest expense ÷ total debt |
| Tax rate | 20.9% | median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest) |
| WACC | 7.22% | 76% E × CoE + 24% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 4.1% | delivered 4-yr revenue CAGR 4.1%, fading linearly to terminal |
| EBIT margin | 51.4% | mean EBIT margin, last 3 FYs |
| D&A / revenue | 27.8% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 20.6% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years; in the terminal year capex falls to replacement level (equal to depreciation, 27.8% of revenue) because holding a build-phase or pause-phase ratio in perpetuity misprices the company in whichever direction that phase points |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | 53.9% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 4.1% | 3.7% | 3.3% | 2.9% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | $ 450 M | $ 467 M | $ 482 M | $ 496 M | $ 509 M | $ 521 M |
| EBIT | $ 231 M | $ 240 M | $ 248 M | $ 255 M | $ 261 M | $ 268 M |
| NOPAT | $ 183 M | $ 190 M | $ 196 M | $ 202 M | $ 207 M | $ 212 M |
| + D&A | $ 125 M | $ 130 M | $ 134 M | $ 138 M | $ 141 M | $ 145 M |
| − Capex | $ 93 M | $ 96 M | $ 99 M | $ 102 M | $ 105 M | $ 145 M |
| − ΔNWC | $ 9.5 M | $ 8.9 M | $ 8.3 M | $ 7.5 M | $ 6.7 M | $ 6.8 M |
| FCFF | $ 206 M | $ 215 M | $ 223 M | $ 230 M | $ 237 M | $ 205 M |
| PV | $ 192 M | $ 187 M | $ 181 M | $ 174 M | $ 167 M | $ 3.1 B |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5
EV = PV(explicit) $ 901 M + PV(TV) $ 3.1 B = $ 4.0 B · TV 77% of EV · − net debt $ 34 M − minority $ 0
Model output: Rp 1,694/share (+68% vs price Rp 1,010)· exit-multiple check (7.2x): Rp 1,254
Under these assumptions the model lands 68% above today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for slower growth, a thinner margin, or a higher discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 6.2% | 7.2% | 8.2% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | 1,915 | 1,554 | 1,309 |
| 2.5% | 2,140 | 1,694 | 1,404 |
| 3.0% | 2,435 | 1,867 | 1,516 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $ 369 M | $ 386 M | $ 406 M | $ 407 M | $ 433 M |
| Cost of Goods Sold | $ 182 M | $ 173 M | $ 179 M | $ 167 M | $ 200 M |
| Gross Profit | $ 186 M | $ 213 M | $ 227 M | $ 240 M | $ 233 M |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | $ 176 M | $ 202 M | $ 222 M | $ 213 M | $ 204 M |
| Interest Expense | $ 15 M | $ 15 M | $ 24 M | $ 32 M | $ 30 M |
| Net Income | $ 85 M | $ 127 M | $ 164 M | $ 160 M | $ 138 M |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | $ 85 M | $ 127 M | $ 164 M | $ 160 M | $ 138 M |
| Depreciation & Amortization | $ 108 M | $ 105 M | $ 108 M | $ 112 M | $ 126 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $ 125 M | $ 262 M | $ 678 M | $ 655 M | $ 718 M |
| Accounts Receivable | $ 125 M | $ 123 M | $ 136 M | $ 128 M | $ 126 M |
| Inventory | $ 16 M | $ 20 M | $ 23 M | $ 18 M | $ 28 M |
| Current Assets | $ 280 M | $ 433 M | $ 863 M | $ 829 M | $ 881 M |
| Total Assets | $ 2.4 B | $ 2.5 B | $ 3.0 B | $ 3.0 B | $ 3.0 B |
| Accounts Payable | $ 73 M | $ 66 M | $ 83 M | $ 97 M | $ 89 M |
| Current Liabilities | $ 200 M | $ 858 M | $ 244 M | $ 227 M | $ 214 M |
| Total Liabilities | $ 1.2 B | $ 1.2 B | $ 993 M | $ 989 M | $ 989 M |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | $ 959 M | $ 945 M | $ 731 M | $ 746 M | $ 753 M |
| Total Equity | $ 1.2 B | $ 1.3 B | $ 2.0 B | $ 2.0 B | $ 2.0 B |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | $ 1.2 B | $ 1.3 B | $ 2.0 B | $ 2.0 B | $ 2.0 B |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $ 248 M | $ 220 M | $ 255 M | $ 258 M | $ 314 M |
| Capital Expenditure | $ 26 M | $ 31 M | $ 68 M | $ 103 M | $ 84 M |
PGEO gross margin shows 100.0% every year in this dataset: the same synthetic artefact as BREN, not a real metric (no cogs/gross-profit breakout exists in the source for utility-template companies). Operating margin (from real EBIT) is the metric that actually describes PGEO's business: 47.7% (2021) → 52.4% → 54.7% (2023 peak) → 52.2% → 47.2% (2025); strong throughout, mildly declining from the 2023 peak in the most recent two years. NM: 23.1% → 33.0% → 40.3% (2023, NM exceeding OPM; a real, unusual pattern meaning a non-operating gain added to profitability that year) → 39.4% → 31.8% (2025). ROE stayed modest and stable despite PGEO's strong margins: 6.9% → 10.1% (2022 peak) → 8.3% → 8.0% → 6.7% (2025); lower than BREN's ROE, reflecting PGEO's much larger, more conservative equity base. ROIC: 4.50% → 7.09% → 9.07% (2023 peak) → 9.01% → 7.77% (2025). D/E: 0.78× (2021) → 0.75× → 0.37× (2023, a sharp drop as equity nearly tripled from USD 1,255.5 M to 1,971.3 M) → 0.37× → 0.37× (2025, stable and low); meaningfully more conservative than BREN throughout. Interest coverage: 12.08× (2021) → 13.64× (2022 peak) → 9.18× → 6.62× → 6.75× (2025); strong throughout despite the decline from the 2022 peak. Current ratio: 1.40× (2021) → 0.51× (2022, a real, notable dip below 1×) → 3.54× (2023, snapping back sharply, coinciding with the equity jump) → 3.65× → 4.11× (2025). Net debt (USD): 833.3 M (2021) → 683.0 M → 53.1 M (2023) → 90.6 M → 34.4 M (2025, near-fully deleveraged). FCF positive every year, USD 154.9-229.1 M range, relatively stable. Revenue (USD): 368.8 M → 386.1 M → 406.3 M → 407.1 M → 432.7 M (2025), growing steadily every year.
PGEO owns its own geothermal working areas and steam fields outright (for directly-operated capacity): no third-party generation dependency for its core business.
Implication → Cost structure is driven by resource quality and drilling economics, not supplier leverage.
PGEO sells steam and/or electricity almost exclusively to PLN (and IPPs, for steam-only contracts) under long-term Steam Sales Contract / PPA structures: a concentrated buyer base with real negotiating leverage on new-contract terms, though PPI/CPI-linked tariff escalation on existing PPAs provides real inflation protection.
Implication → PLN's buyer concentration caps upside on new capacity while existing contracts' escalation clauses provide more built-in protection than BREN's fixed-tenor contracts.
Geothermal development requires enormous, multi-year exploration and drilling capital before any revenue: real barriers that have kept Indonesia's tapped geothermal share near just 10% of its 29 GW potential.
Implication → PGEO's 15 working areas and Pertamina's state backing give it access to capital and working-area rights that would be difficult for a new entrant to replicate.
Geothermal power competes against coal, which still supplies over half of Indonesia's generation capacity.
Implication → PGEO's growth, like BREN's, depends partly on continued government commitment to RUPTL renewables targets.
PGEO and BREN are direct rivals in the same geothermal-development race, both targeting multi-GW capacity over overlapping 2028-2034 horizons: though Indonesia's largely-untapped 29 GW potential means both can grow for years without directly displacing each other.
Implication → PGEO's larger, more diversified 15-working-area portfolio versus BREN's more concentrated asset base is a real structural difference in growth-pipeline breadth, even if BREN's per-project operating margins currently run slightly higher.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Indonesia's energy sector spans three genuinely different value chains under one industry here: upstream oil & gas E&P (MEDC; 163 kboe/d production, 528 MMboe reserves, plus real diversification into clean-energy power and copper/gold mining), geothermal power generation (BREN and PGEO together; Indonesia ranks #2 in the world for installed geothermal capacity, 2,742 MW, behind only the US, with a national target of 5.2 GW by 2034), and gas transmission/distribution (PGAS, 92% of domestic gas infrastructure, a Pertamina subholding, joined by RAJA, a far smaller private gas trader/distributor in the same subsegment). All five report in USD: including PGAS and RAJA, whose USD filings (PGAS total assets ~USD 6.3 B; RAJA ~USD 0.5 B) are frequently re-quoted in Rupiah-equivalent terms by Indonesian financial media, a display artifact worth knowing about rather than a sign of dual functional currencies.