Equal · Financial Report

Pertamina Geothermal Energy

PGEO/FY2021–FY2025/Educational Analysis/USD/Data source · 2026-07-10

ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Tax burdendriver	0.53x	0.68x	0.83x	0.89x	0.79x
Interest burden	0.92x	0.93x	0.89x	0.85x	0.85x
Operating margin	47.7%	52.4%	54.7%	52.2%	47.2%
Asset turnover	0.15x	0.16x	0.14x	0.14x	0.14x
Leverage (equity mult.)	1.95x	1.97x	1.50x	1.49x	1.48x
= Return on Equity (consolidated)	6.9%	10.1%	8.3%	8.0%	6.7%
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)	4.5%	7.1%	9.1%	9.0%	7.8%

Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.

Liquidity

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities)	1.40x	0.51x	3.54x	3.65x	4.11x
Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities)	1.32x	0.48x	3.44x	3.56x	3.98x
Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities)	0.63x	0.31x	2.78x	2.88x	3.35x
Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities)	$ 80 M	-$ 424 M	$ 619 M	$ 601 M	$ 667 M

Leverage & Solvency

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity)	0.78x	0.75x	0.37x	0.37x	0.37x
Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity)	0.95x	0.97x	0.50x	0.49x	0.48x
Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets)	0.40x	0.38x	0.25x	0.25x	0.25x
Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash)	$ 833 M	$ 683 M	$ 53 M	$ 91 M	$ 34 M
Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense)	12.08x	13.64x	9.18x	6.62x	6.75x
Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity)	1.95x	1.97x	1.50x	1.49x	1.48x

Profitability

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue)	50.6%	55.1%	55.9%	59.0%	53.9%
Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue)	47.7%	52.4%	54.7%	52.2%	47.2%
Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue)	23.1%	33.0%	40.3%	39.4%	31.8%
EBITDA(EBIT + D&A)	$ 284 M	$ 307 M	$ 331 M	$ 324 M	$ 331 M
EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue)	76.9%	79.5%	81.4%	79.7%	76.4%
Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets)	3.5%	5.1%	5.5%	5.4%	4.5%
Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners))	6.9%	10.1%	8.3%	8.0%	6.7%
Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax)	0.53x	0.68x	0.83x	0.89x	0.79x
Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT)	0.92x	0.93x	0.89x	0.85x	0.85x
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)	4.5%	7.1%	9.1%	9.0%	7.8%

Operations & Efficiency

Turnover	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets)	0.15x	0.16x	0.14x	0.14x	0.14x
Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory)	11.07x	8.63x	7.90x	9.02x	7.14x
Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables)	2.96x	3.13x	2.98x	3.18x	3.43x
Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables)	2.51x	2.64x	2.17x	1.72x	2.26x

Conversion Period	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS)	33.0 days	42.3 days	46.2 days	40.5 days	51.1 days
Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue)	123.3 days	116.5 days	122.4 days	114.9 days	106.5 days
Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS)	145.3 days	138.1 days	168.3 days	211.9 days	161.8 days
Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO)	10.9 days	20.7 days	0.3 days	-56.6 days	-4.2 days

Cash Flow

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex)	$ 222 M	$ 189 M	$ 187 M	$ 155 M	$ 229 M

Valuation

price as-of 2026-07-31fundamentals: FY2025FX 18,058 IDR/USD (2026-07-31)

Price Rp 1,010 · market cap Rp 42 T ($ 2.3 B at the cited rate; statements are filed in USD)

Multiple	PGEO	Peer median	vs median
P/E	17.02x	17.40x	-2%
P/B	1.15x	1.15x	0%
P/S	5.42x	3.91x	+39%
EV/EBITDA	7.19x	7.19x	0%
EV/EBIT	11.64x	11.64x	0%
EV/Sales	5.50x	4.30x	+28%
FCF Yield	9.78%	9.78%	0%
Dividend Yield	5.26%	4.16%	+26%

EV = mkt cap $ 2.3 B + debt $ 753 M − cash $ 718 M = $ 2.4 B

What the price implies

At today’s price, the market is paying for 0.8%/yr FCF growth (-2.6% at 9.3% to 3.9% at 13.3% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: 0.8% FCF · 4.1% revenue.

Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 9.3–13.3% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.

Forward DCF (glass-box)

This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.

Base year contains named one-off item(s): FY2023: February 2023 IPO: the balance sheet is not comparable across the listing. The EBIT basis screens out most non-operating items, but read the Earnings Quality section before trusting the base margin.

Assumption	Value	Basis
Rf (risk-free)	4.66%	US 10Y Treasury, 30 Jul 2026
ERP (Rm − Rf)	6.69%	Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%)
β	0.46 → 0.58	Green & Renewable Energy (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.32
Cost of equity	8.52%	Rf + β × ERP
Cost of debt	6.68%	median interest coverage 9.2x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a Aaa/AAA synthetic rating and a 0.40% default spread, over a 6.28% base (US 10Y 4.66% + Indonesia's 1.62% sovereign spread). Its BOOK rate is 4.0%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms)
Tax rate	20.9%	median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest)
WACC	7.73%	76% E × CoE + 24% D × Kd × (1 − t)
Revenue growth (yr 1, fading)	4.1%	delivered 4-yr revenue CAGR 4.1%, fading linearly to terminal
EBIT margin	51.4%	mean EBIT margin, last 3 FYs
D&A / revenue	27.8%	mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs
Capex / revenue	20.6%	mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 7.7% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 32.3% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 39.6% of revenue against depreciation of 27.8%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral
ΔNWC / Δrevenue	53.9%	median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP)
Terminal growth	2.5%	BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%)

Growth path

year 1 → fading to terminal over 5 yrs4.1%

EBIT margin51.4%

WACC7.7%

Terminal growth2.5%

Explicit years5

FCFF drivers

FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − capex − ΔNWC

Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.

Capex

% of revenue20.6%

D&A

% of revenue27.8%

ΔNWC

% of the CHANGE in revenue53.9%

Year	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	T∞
Growth	4.1%	3.7%	3.3%	2.9%	2.5%	2.5%
Revenue	$ 450 M	$ 467 M	$ 482 M	$ 496 M	$ 509 M	$ 521 M
EBIT	$ 231 M	$ 240 M	$ 248 M	$ 255 M	$ 261 M	$ 268 M
NOPAT	$ 183 M	$ 190 M	$ 196 M	$ 202 M	$ 207 M	$ 212 M
+ D&A	$ 125 M	$ 130 M	$ 134 M	$ 138 M	$ 141 M	$ 145 M
− Capex	$ 93 M	$ 96 M	$ 99 M	$ 102 M	$ 105 M	$ 206 M
− ΔNWC	$ 9.5 M	$ 8.9 M	$ 8.3 M	$ 7.5 M	$ 6.7 M	$ 6.8 M
FCFF	$ 206 M	$ 215 M	$ 223 M	$ 230 M	$ 237 M	$ 143 M
PV	$ 191 M	$ 185 M	$ 178 M	$ 171 M	$ 163 M	$ 1.9 B

Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding

EV = PV(explicit) $ 888 M + PV(TV) $ 1.9 B = $ 2.8 B · TV 68% of EV · − net debt $ 34 M − minority $ 0 = equity $ 2.7 B ÷ shares outstanding · per share is in USD, shown in IDR at 18,058

Model output: Rp 1,182/share (+17% vs price Rp 1,010)· exit-multiple check (7.2x): Rp 1,228

Under these assumptions the model lands 17% above today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for slower growth, a thinner margin, or a higher discount rate than the inputs here assume.

Sensitivity (per share, Rp)

g \ WACC	6.7%	7.7%	8.7%
2.0%	1,313	1,104	956
2.5%	1,433	1,182	1,010
3.0%	1,584	1,275	1,073

Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.

Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.

Macro backdropfull backdrop + sensitivity map →

BI Rate 5.75%IDR/USD 18,05810Y government bond yield 7.26%Inflation 3.34%(as-of 2026-07-31)

Oil ↑(H)Rupiah weaker(M)GDP/consumption ↑(M)

Income Statement

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Revenue	$ 369 M	$ 386 M	$ 406 M	$ 407 M	$ 433 M
Cost of Goods Sold	$ 182 M	$ 173 M	$ 179 M	$ 167 M	$ 200 M
Gross Profit	$ 186 M	$ 213 M	$ 227 M	$ 240 M	$ 233 M
Operating Income (EBIT)	$ 176 M	$ 202 M	$ 222 M	$ 213 M	$ 204 M
Interest Expense	$ 15 M	$ 15 M	$ 24 M	$ 32 M	$ 30 M
Net Income	$ 85 M	$ 127 M	$ 164 M	$ 160 M	$ 138 M
Net Income Attributable to Owners	$ 85 M	$ 127 M	$ 164 M	$ 160 M	$ 138 M
Depreciation & Amortization	$ 108 M	$ 105 M	$ 108 M	$ 112 M	$ 126 M

Balance Sheet

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Cash & Equivalents	$ 125 M	$ 262 M	$ 678 M	$ 655 M	$ 718 M
Accounts Receivable	$ 125 M	$ 123 M	$ 136 M	$ 128 M	$ 126 M
Inventory	$ 16 M	$ 20 M	$ 23 M	$ 18 M	$ 28 M
Current Assets	$ 280 M	$ 433 M	$ 863 M	$ 829 M	$ 881 M
Total Assets	$ 2.4 B	$ 2.5 B	$ 3.0 B	$ 3.0 B	$ 3.0 B
Accounts Payable	$ 73 M	$ 66 M	$ 83 M	$ 97 M	$ 89 M
Current Liabilities	$ 200 M	$ 858 M	$ 244 M	$ 227 M	$ 214 M
Total Liabilities	$ 1.2 B	$ 1.2 B	$ 993 M	$ 989 M	$ 989 M
Total Interest-Bearing Debt	$ 959 M	$ 945 M	$ 731 M	$ 746 M	$ 753 M
Total Equity	$ 1.2 B	$ 1.3 B	$ 2.0 B	$ 2.0 B	$ 2.0 B
Equity Attributable to Owners	$ 1.2 B	$ 1.3 B	$ 2.0 B	$ 2.0 B	$ 2.0 B

Cash Flow Statement

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Operating Cash Flow	$ 248 M	$ 220 M	$ 255 M	$ 258 M	$ 314 M
Capital Expenditure	$ 26 M	$ 31 M	$ 68 M	$ 103 M	$ 84 M

Company Deep Analysis

Reviewed: 2026-07-31

Analyst Verdict

PGEO gross margin shows 100.0% every year in this dataset: the same synthetic artefact as BREN, not a real metric (no cogs/gross-profit breakout exists in the source for utility-template companies). Operating margin (from real EBIT) is the metric that actually describes PGEO's business: 47.7% (2021) → 52.4% → 54.7% (2023 peak) → 52.2% → 47.2% (2025); strong throughout, mildly declining from the 2023 peak in the most recent two years. NM: 23.1% → 33.0% → 40.3% (2023, NM exceeding OPM; a real, unusual pattern meaning a non-operating gain added to profitability that year) → 39.4% → 31.8% (2025). ROE stayed modest and stable despite PGEO's strong margins: 6.9% → 10.1% (2022 peak) → 8.3% → 8.0% → 6.7% (2025); lower than BREN's ROE, reflecting PGEO's much larger, more conservative equity base. ROIC: 4.50% → 7.09% → 9.07% (2023 peak) → 9.01% → 7.77% (2025). D/E: 0.78× (2021) → 0.75× → 0.37× (2023, a sharp drop as equity nearly tripled from USD 1,255.5 M to 1,971.3 M) → 0.37× → 0.37× (2025, stable and low); meaningfully more conservative than BREN throughout. Interest coverage: 12.08× (2021) → 13.64× (2022 peak) → 9.18× → 6.62× → 6.75× (2025); strong throughout despite the decline from the 2022 peak. Current ratio: 1.40× (2021) → 0.51× (2022, a real, notable dip below 1×) → 3.54× (2023, snapping back sharply, coinciding with the equity jump) → 3.65× → 4.11× (2025). Net debt (USD): 833.3 M (2021) → 683.0 M → 53.1 M (2023) → 90.6 M → 34.4 M (2025, near-fully deleveraged). FCF positive every year, USD 154.9-229.1 M range, relatively stable. Revenue (USD): 368.8 M → 386.1 M → 406.3 M → 407.1 M → 432.7 M (2025), growing steadily every year.

Business Model

PGEO (Pertamina Geothermal Energy), part of Pertamina's state-controlled Power & New Renewable Energy subholding, manages 15 geothermal working areas totalling 1,932 MW installed capacity: 727 MW operated directly by PGE, with the remaining 1,205 MW under Joint Operating Contracts (JOC) with other operators. Revenue comes from two structures: Steam Sales Contracts (PGEO owns the steam field, sells steam only to PLN or IPPs, 20-30 year terms with ~2% annual tariff escalation) and Power Purchase Agreements (PGEO owns both steam field and power plant, sells electricity directly to PLN, 30-year terms, PPI/CPI-linked). PGEO is targeting 1 GW of PGE-operated capacity by 2028 and 1.8 GW by 2034.

Operating Model (Business Process)

01Drill and hold the steam field
The productive asset is a geothermal reservoir with wells drilled into it. Once proven and drilled, the field supplies steam for decades with no fuel to purchase.
EconomicsThere is no fuel line in this cost structure, which is the entire reason the margins look the way they do. Cost of goods sold took 49.43% of revenue in FY2021 and 46.14% in FY2025, and none of it is a commodity input whose price a supplier sets.
02Convert steam to electricity
Steam drives turbines at the plants; output is dispatched under long-term power purchase agreements.
EconomicsThis step produces an EBITDA margin that never left a 76.39% to 81.39% band in five years: 76.89%, 79.55%, 81.39%, 79.67% and 76.39%. It is an annuity with almost no variable cost, and it is exactly why the margin must not be mistaken for the return.
03Sell to a single counterparty
Power is sold under contracted tariffs to the state offtaker rather than into a market with many buyers.
EconomicsContracted tariffs remove price risk and replace it with counterparty and collection risk. That trade shows up directly in the receivables: days sales outstanding ran 123.29, 116.50, 122.44, 114.87 and 106.47, never once below 106 days. Revenue is certain; the timing of the cash is not.
04Let suppliers carry the cycle
Payable days ran 145.31, 138.15, 168.29, 211.91 and 161.84, consistently longer than the receivable days above.
EconomicsBecause suppliers are paid more slowly than customers pay, the cash conversion cycle is near zero or negative: 10.94, 20.67, 0.33, negative 56.57 and negative 4.24 days. The working capital of this business is funded by its suppliers, which is why a 106-day collection period has not translated into a cash problem.

Cost structureAlmost entirely fixed, and almost entirely capital rather than operating. Cost of goods sold ran 49.43% of revenue in FY2021 and 46.14% in FY2025, but the EBITDA margin of 76.39% shows how little of the remaining cost is cash: the gap between an operating margin of 47.22% and an EBITDA margin of 76.39% in FY2025 is depreciation of USD 126.2m on a USD 432.7m revenue base. The cost of this business was paid years ago, when the wells were drilled. What the income statement charges now is the amortisation of that decision.

Cash cycleCash conversion cycle: 10.94, 20.67, 0.33, negative 56.57 and negative 4.24 days. The components matter more than the total here. Receivable days never fell below 106.47 and reached 123.29, which for a contracted utility is a collection issue rather than a commercial one. Payable days ran longer still, from 138.15 to 211.91, and that is what holds the net cycle near zero. Operating cash flow of USD 313.5m against revenue of USD 432.7m in FY2025, a 72.45% conversion, confirms the cash does arrive; it simply arrives on the supplier’s timetable rather than the customer’s.

Unit economicsThis is the number that explains the company, and it is a two-term product. In FY2025 net margin was 31.82% and asset turnover was 0.1426 times. Multiply them and return on assets is 4.54%, which is exactly what the engine reports. A business can earn thirty-two cents of profit on every dollar of revenue and still return four and a half cents on every dollar of assets, if each dollar of assets only produces fourteen cents of revenue a year. The margin is enormous because there is no fuel; the return is ordinary because the reservoir, the wells and the turbines cost so much per unit of annual revenue they support.

Segments

PGEO's 1,932 MW total installed capacity splits between directly-operated assets (727 MW, generating both steam-sale and power-sale revenue) and JOC-managed capacity (1,205 MW, where PGEO's economic interest is structured differently through the joint-operating arrangement). The directly-operated share is set to grow toward 1 GW by 2028 as new projects (Ulubelu, Hululais, Lahendong, Sungai Penuh, Kamojang expansions) come online through 2029-2030.

Value Chain & Positioning

Geothermal resource exploration and drilling → steam field development → either steam-only sale (Steam Sales Contracts, to PLN/IPPs) or steam-plus-power-plant development and direct electricity sale (Power Purchase Agreements, to PLN) → long-term contracted revenue (20-30 year terms). PGEO's scale (15 working areas) gives it a broader development pipeline than BREN's more concentrated asset base.

Competitive Forces (Porter’s 5)

Supplier powerLow

How much leverage input/funding providers have over pricing.

PGEO owns its own geothermal working areas and steam fields outright (for directly-operated capacity): no third-party generation dependency for its core business.

Implication → Cost structure is driven by resource quality and drilling economics, not supplier leverage.

Buyer powerHigh

How much leverage customers have to push prices down.

PGEO sells steam and/or electricity almost exclusively to PLN (and IPPs, for steam-only contracts) under long-term Steam Sales Contract / PPA structures: a concentrated buyer base with real negotiating leverage on new-contract terms, though PPI/CPI-linked tariff escalation on existing PPAs provides real inflation protection.

Implication → PLN's buyer concentration caps upside on new capacity while existing contracts' escalation clauses provide more built-in protection than BREN's fixed-tenor contracts.

Threat of new entryLow

How easily new competitors can enter the market.

Geothermal development requires enormous, multi-year exploration and drilling capital before any revenue: real barriers that have kept Indonesia's tapped geothermal share near just 10% of its 29 GW potential.

Implication → PGEO's 15 working areas and Pertamina's state backing give it access to capital and working-area rights that would be difficult for a new entrant to replicate.

Threat of substitutesMedium

Risk that alternative products/services replace demand.

Geothermal power competes against coal, which still supplies over half of Indonesia's generation capacity.

Implication → PGEO's growth, like BREN's, depends partly on continued government commitment to RUPTL renewables targets.

Competitive rivalryMedium

Intensity of competition among existing players.

PGEO and BREN are direct rivals in the same geothermal-development race, both targeting multi-GW capacity over overlapping 2028-2034 horizons: though Indonesia's largely-untapped 29 GW potential means both can grow for years without directly displacing each other.

Implication → PGEO's larger, more diversified 15-working-area portfolio versus BREN's more concentrated asset base is a real structural difference in growth-pipeline breadth, even if BREN's per-project operating margins currently run slightly higher.

Moat / Competitive Edge

PGEO's moat is scale, diversification and state backing: 15 geothermal working areas totalling 1,932 MW (larger than BREN's 926 MW), Pertamina's capital access and policy alignment, and a genuinely conservative balance sheet (D/E just 0.37× since 2023, versus BREN's 2.3-4.8× range). Operating margin has stayed strong throughout (47.2-54.7%), and interest coverage, while declining from its 2022 peak (13.64× to 6.75×), remains healthy. The real vulnerability is the 2022 liquidity dip (current ratio fell to 0.51×, briefly below 1×): a real, notable event that reversed sharply the following year, worth understanding rather than dismissing, since a similar working-capital squeeze could recur during a future capacity build-out phase.

Key Drivers & Sensitivities

Geothermal Capacity Expansion (15 Working Areas)
PGEO is targeting 1 GW of PGE-operated capacity by 2028 and 1.8 GW by 2034, with named projects (Ulubelu, Hululais, Lahendong, Sungai Penuh, Kamojang expansions) coming online through 2029-2030: a real, disclosed, multi-year pipeline broader than BREN's more concentrated growth plan.
Conservative Balance Sheet (D/E 0.37x Since 2023)
PGEO's D/E fell sharply in 2023 (0.75× to 0.37×, as equity nearly tripled from USD 1,255.5 M to 1,971.3 M) and has stayed there: a genuinely more conservative capital structure than BREN's, consistent with state-owned capital discipline, though it may also mean PGEO has less leverage-driven ROE upside than BREN showed in 2022.
PLN Contract Structure (SSC vs PPA)
PGEO's revenue mix between Steam Sales Contracts (steam only, ~2% annual escalation) and Power Purchase Agreements (steam+power, PPI/CPI-linked) determines how much inflation protection its long-term revenue actually has: a real, structural difference from BREN's simpler electricity-only contracts.
2022 Working-Capital Liquidity Dip
Current ratio fell to 0.51× in 2022 (from 1.40× in 2021), a real, notable dip below 1× that reversed sharply in 2023 (3.54×) coinciding with a near-tripling of equity: understanding what drove both the dip and the reversal is more informative than either data point alone.

Earnings Quality

High quality and unusually literal: there is very little between EBITDA and cash here. Operating cash flow was USD 248.4m, USD 220.3m, USD 255.2m, USD 258.3m and USD 313.5m against net income of USD 85.1m, USD 127.3m, USD 163.6m, USD 160.5m and USD 137.7m, so cash exceeded reported profit in every single year. Nothing in the five-year record depends on a below-the-line item: net margin sits below operating margin throughout, which is the ordinary and healthy ordering. The FY2025 decline in net income of 14.20% came alongside an EBIT decline of 3.86% and an interest bill that has doubled, so the profit fall is explained by identified items rather than by anything unaccounted for.

Period	One-off item	Impact
FY2023	February 2023 IPO: the balance sheet is not comparable across the listing	Equity rose from USD 1,255.5m to USD 1,971.3m and cash from USD 262.3m to USD 677.7m in a single year, taking debt to equity from 0.75 to 0.37 and the current ratio from 0.51 to 3.54. None of those improvements were earned by the operating business; they were purchased with new shares. Leverage and liquidity trends measured across FY2022 to FY2023 measure the IPO, not performance.

Cash conversionFree cash flow was positive in every one of the five years, at USD 222.2m, USD 189.4m, USD 187.1m, USD 154.9m and USD 229.1m, cumulating to USD 982.6m, and capital expenditure absorbed only 24.16% of five-year operating cash flow. Operating cash flow converted 72.45% of FY2025 revenue. For a business with this asset intensity that is a genuinely strong record, and it is the strongest single argument in PGEO’s favour: whatever the return on capital says, the cash is real and it arrives every year.

Capital Allocation

Mixed: no single dominant pattern

Mixed, because PGEO raised growth capital and has largely not spent it. The February 2023 IPO lifted cash from USD 262.3m to USD 677.7m, and cash stood at USD 718.5m at FY2025, equal to 30.66% of the entire market capitalisation. Meanwhile the productive base barely moved. Total assets rose 26.57% across the window, but strip out cash and assets grew 1.93%, from USD 2,272.1m to USD 2,316.0m. Almost the whole increase in the balance sheet is money raised and still sitting there. At the same time the company deleveraged, cutting debt 21.46%, and paid a 5.26% dividend yield. Raising equity for growth, then returning cash while the asset base is flat, is not one pattern; it is two, and the tension between them is the capital-allocation question here.

DeploymentCapital expenditure ran USD 26.2m, USD 30.9m, USD 68.1m, USD 103.4m and USD 84.4m. The FY2023 and FY2024 step up is real and follows the IPO, but FY2025 spending fell back to USD 84.4m, which is 0.67 times depreciation of USD 126.2m: the company is now investing below the rate at which its own assets are being written down. The dividend test is comfortable on FY2025 numbers: free cash flow of USD 229.1m covers the implied dividend of roughly USD 123.2m by 1.86 times, and even if capital expenditure were lifted to the full depreciation charge the cover would still be 1.52 times. The payout is not the problem. The undeployed cash is the open question.

Returns trendROIC ran 4.50%, 7.09%, 9.07%, 9.01% and 7.77% against an engine WACC of 7.73%, clearing the hurdle in three of five years and, in FY2025, by 0.04 percentage points, which is another way of saying it earned exactly its cost of capital. That is the whole lesson of this page and it deserves stating plainly: an EBITDA margin of 76.39% produced a return on equity of 6.73% and a return on capital indistinguishable from the hurdle. A high margin tells you about the cost structure; it tells you nothing about the return until you divide by the capital that produced it. BREN’s page draws the same conclusion from an even higher margin, and the two names are worth reading together for that reason.

Linkages

PGEO and BREN both sell to PLN and are direct rivals in Indonesia's geothermal-development race. PGEO, as Pertamina's geothermal subholding, shares an ultimate parent with PGAS (Pertamina's gas subholding): both are part of the same state energy group, tracked here as separate listed entities with their own statements and genuinely different subsegments (geothermal generation vs. gas transmission).

Recent Developments

The most stable business in this group and the least levered. Operating margin has run between 47.2% and 54.7% in all five years and net margin between 23.1% and 40.3%, on revenue that grew in every year from USD 368.8m to USD 432.7m. FY2025 net income of USD 137.7m is nonetheless below the USD 163.6m of FY2023 despite the higher revenue, because margin eased: gross margin 59.0% to 53.9% and operating margin 52.2% to 47.2%. Debt to equity fell from 0.78× to 0.37× and has held there for three years, interest coverage is 6.75× and the current ratio rose to 4.11×. Returns are the caveat: ROIC has never exceeded 9.1% and ROE never 10.1%, modest for margins this wide, which is what a capital-hungry geothermal asset base looks like.

Regulation

PGEO operates under geothermal working-area (Wilayah Kerja Panas Bumi) permits issued by Kementerian ESDM, governed by UU Panas Bumi, with its Joint Operating Contract structure adding an additional layer of regulatory/contractual complexity versus BREN's more direct ownership model. PLN's RUPTL sets the capacity-addition roadmap PGEO's targets are built against. As a Pertamina subholding, PGEO's capital-allocation decisions also reflect broader state-energy-policy considerations. All new capacity requires AMDAL environmental clearance.

ESG & Sustainability

Environmental: geothermal is a genuine low-carbon generation source, positioning PGEO as a direct beneficiary of Indonesia's energy-transition policy. Social: operations span multiple regions (the 15 working areas are geographically distributed) with real community/land-rights considerations. Governance: PGEO is state-controlled (a Pertamina subholding); SOE oversight and public-policy alignment shape its capital-allocation decisions alongside commercial objectives, a genuinely different governance structure from BREN's private Barito Pacific ownership.

Red-Flag Protocol

IPO proceeds largely undeployed three years onwatch
Cash stood at USD 718.5m at FY2025, 30.66% of market capitalisation, while assets excluding cash grew just 1.93% across the five years against total assets up 26.57%. FY2025 capital expenditure of USD 84.4m was 0.67 times depreciation. Capital raised to grow a geothermal base has, on this record, mostly not yet gone into the ground, and idle cash earns nothing like the return the assets are meant to.
Collection period never falls below 106 dayswatch
Days sales outstanding ran 123.29, 116.50, 122.44, 114.87 and 106.47. For a utility selling contracted power to a single state offtaker, the risk is not whether the revenue is earned but when it converts. It has not yet caused a cash problem because payable days run longer still, at 161.84 in FY2025, which means the exposure is being passed to suppliers rather than absorbed.
Interest expense doubled while debt fellwatch
Interest expense rose 2.08 times, from USD 14.6m to USD 30.3m, while total debt FELL 21.46%, from USD 958.6m to USD 752.9m. The implied average cost of borrowings, interest expense over year-end debt, went from 1.52% to 4.02%. Interest coverage fell from 12.08 to 6.75 times as a result. Coverage remains adequate, but the direction is the opposite of what a deleveraging balance sheet would normally produce and it is not explained in the seeded statements.
FY2025 return on capital sits exactly at the hurdlewatch
ROIC of 7.77% against a WACC of 7.73% is a margin of 0.04 percentage points, which is not a margin at all. After clearing the hurdle by 1.34 and 1.27 points in FY2023 and FY2024, the FY2025 reading means the business created no measurable economic value that year. Return on equity of 6.73% was the weakest of the five years.
Pre-IPO liquidity: checked, resolvednone found
Checked, no current concern, but worth recording. The current ratio was 0.51 in FY2022, meaning current liabilities were roughly twice current assets in the year before listing. It has since risen to 4.11 on IPO proceeds. The improvement was bought with equity rather than earned, which is why it is recorded here rather than counted as an operating achievement.
Minority interests and earnings attribution: checkednone found
Checked, none found. Equity attributable to owners is within 0.02% of consolidated equity in every year, so non-controlling interests are immaterial and consolidated figures can be read as the shareholder claim without adjustment. This is not true of several other names in this book and is worth knowing when comparing them.

Risks

Gross margin/cogs are not meaningful metrics for PGEO given this data source's utility-template presentation (no COGS breakout exists) -- operating margin is the correct metric, and while strong, it has declined from its 2023 peak (54.7% to 47.2% by 2025)
The 2022 current-ratio dip to 0.51x (briefly below 1x) was a real, notable liquidity event -- understanding its cause matters for assessing whether a similar squeeze could recur during future capacity build-out phases
PGEO and BREN both depend on PLN as their dominant/sole buyer -- any adverse shift in PLN's tariff-setting or capacity-planning priorities directly affects PGEO's growth economics
As a Pertamina subholding, PGEO's capital-allocation decisions may reflect broader state-energy-policy priorities rather than pure shareholder-return optimisation
Geothermal capacity targets (1 GW by 2028, 1.8 GW by 2034) depend on execution against genuinely difficult, multi-year subsurface and construction development across a 15-working-area, partly-JOC-managed portfolio

Outlook & What to Watch

Base: PGEO's directly-operated capacity grows toward 1 GW by 2028 as named projects come online, operating margin stays in the high-40s to low-50s percent range, the conservative balance sheet (D/E 0.37x) persists. Bull: Indonesia's RUPTL renewables targets get reinforced, new PPA/SSC tariff terms improve, and PGEO's broader 15-working-area pipeline lets it capture more of the 29 GW untapped potential than more concentrated rivals. Bear: JOC-managed capacity's more complex economics compress PGEO's effective margin capture, and coal's continued grid dominance slows the pace of new PLN contract awards. PGEO is best read as a large-scale, state-backed, conservatively-financed geothermal operator with a broader growth pipeline than BREN but a lower current ROE: the tradeoff between BREN's more aggressive capital structure and PGEO's more conservative one is a real, ongoing contrast worth tracking across both companies. (Interpretation, not a forecast.)

Key KPIs

Operating Margin (Real Metric, Not Gross Margin): 47.2-54.7% range across all 5 years -- strong; gross margin shows a synthetic 100% in this dataset and is not meaningful for PGEO's business model
Directly-Operated Capacity Growth: 727 MW currently (of 1,932 MW total), targeting 1 GW by 2028 and 1.8 GW by 2034
D/E Ratio (Conservative): 0.37x since 2023 -- meaningfully lower leverage than BREN's 2.3-4.8x range
2022 Liquidity Dip: Current ratio fell to 0.51x (from 1.40x in 2021), reversed sharply in 2023 (3.54x) as equity nearly tripled
International Project Funding: Up to USD 477.87M secured across three geothermal projects (per Q1 2026 disclosure) -- a real, disclosed capital-access signal

Sources

Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.