Equal
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| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)(Capital / RWA) | 29.8% | 33.0% | 35.1% | 39.0% |
| Leverage Ratio(Tier 1 / Total Exposure) | — | — | 19.6% | 21.0% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross NPL(NPL / Total Loans) | 3.6% | 3.0% | 2.9% | 2.5% |
| Net NPL((NPL − Reserves) / Loans) | 0.8% | 0.3% | 0.7% | 0.6% |
| Non-Performing Assets(NPA / Total Assets) | 2.4% | 2.8% | 2.5% | 2.4% |
| Non-Performing Productive Assets(NP Earning / Earning Assets) | 2.5% | 2.2% | 1.9% | 1.6% |
| Allowance for Impairment (CKPN)(CKPN / Earning Assets) | 3.7% | 4.5% | 3.7% | 3.2% |
| Cost of Credit(Provision Expense / Gross Loans) | 2.1% | 1.8% | 0.8% | 0.6% |
| NPL Coverage(Allowance for Impairment (CKPN) / Gross NPL) | 147.8% | 207.3% | 191.1% | 201.0% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR)(Loans / Deposits) | 91.7% | 97.5% | 92.3% | 86.9% |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)(ASF / RSF) | — | — | 121.4% | 133.4% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)(HQLA / Net Cash Outflows (30d)) | — | — | 232.9% | 242.2% |
| CASA Ratio((Demand + Savings) / Total Deposits) | 47.1% | 47.4% | 44.8% | 42.4% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 1.8% | 1.4% | 1.6% | 1.8% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 6.8% | 5.2% | 6.0% | 5.8% |
| Net Interest Margin (NIM)(NII / Avg Earning Assets) | 5.2% | 4.7% | 4.2% | 4.2% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Expense to Income (BOPO)(Opex / Operating Income) | 74.8% | 80.8% | 76.9% | 75.5% |
| Cost-to-Income Ratio (CIR)(Opex (ex-provisions) / Income) | 41.8% | 47.6% | 51.8% | 52.6% |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan Growth (YoY)(Gross Loans / Prior Year − 1) | — | 7.5% | -0.0% | -4.3% |
| Deposit Growth (YoY)(Total Deposits / Prior Year − 1) | — | 1.0% | 5.6% | 1.8% |
Price Rp 895 · market cap Rp 22 T
| Multiple | PNBN | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 8.04x | 8.04x | 0% |
| P/B | 0.41x | 0.78x | -48% |
| Dividend Yield | 5.59% | 7.46%(14/15) | -25% |
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
A bank cannot be valued on operating cash flow the way a factory can, because for a bank debt is raw material rather than financing. So this model values the equity directly: start from book value, then add the present value of everything the bank earns above its cost of equity. A bank that earns exactly its cost of equity is worth exactly its book value (P/B 1.0).
| Assumption | Default | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Book equity (BV₀) | Rp 53 T | audited Individual-basis equity, FY2025 publication |
| ROE, start of fade | 5.80% | FY2025 disclosed ROE (OJK ratio table) |
| ROE, terminal | 5.89% | median disclosed ROE, FY2022–FY2025: the bank's own demonstrated through-cycle level, fading linearly |
| Fade horizon | 5 yrs | linear fade; final year pins to terminal |
| Retention (explicit phase) | 80.2% | implied from delivered equity growth FY2022–FY2025 (CAGR 4.8%) ÷ average ROE 5.9%. An approximation: equity growth also carries OCI effects (FVOCI marks, revaluations), not only retention |
| Cost of equity | 11.21% | National-footprint franchises (KBMI 3–4 and large private banks). |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | house terminal growth 2.5% (capped at terminal ROE by the engine when binding) |
Equity = BV₀ Rp 53 T + PV(excess, yrs 1–5) -Rp 11 T + PV(terminal) -Rp 24 T = Rp 18 T
At today's price the market pays 122% of this model's equity value. The price embeds more franchise strength than these inputs produce, which amounts to assuming a lower cost of equity or a higher terminal ROE than the defaults here.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 5.80% | 5.82% | 5.85% | 5.87% | 5.89% | 5.89% |
| Book (start) | Rp 53 T | Rp 55 T | Rp 58 T | Rp 61 T | Rp 63 T | Rp 66 T |
| Net income | Rp 3.1 T | Rp 3.2 T | Rp 3.4 T | Rp 3.6 T | Rp 3.7 T | Rp 3.9 T |
| Retained | Rp 2.5 T | Rp 2.6 T | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 2.9 T | Rp 3.0 T | — |
| Excess return | -Rp 2.9 T | -Rp 3.0 T | -Rp 3.1 T | -Rp 3.2 T | -Rp 3.4 T | -Rp 3.5 T |
| PV | -Rp 2.6 T | -Rp 2.4 T | -Rp 2.3 T | -Rp 2.1 T | -Rp 2.0 T | -Rp 24 T |
Check it yourself: NI = ROE × book · ER = (ROE − COE) × book · PV = ER ÷ (1+COE)^yr · next book = book + NI × retention · TV = ER(T∞) ÷ (COE − g), discounted from year 5
| ROE_T \ COE | 10.21% | 11.21% | 12.21% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.89% | 0.17x | 0.15x | 0.14x |
| 5.89% | 0.39x | 0.33x | 0.29x |
| 7.89% | 0.62x | 0.53x | 0.46x |
Model output under the stated assumptions, never a target. ROE record: FY2022 6.79% · FY2023 5.21% · FY2024 5.98% · FY2025 5.80%
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interest income | Rp 12 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 13 T |
| Interest expense | Rp 3.4 T | Rp 4.4 T | Rp 5.5 T | Rp 5.6 T |
| Net interest income | Rp 8.5 T | Rp 7.8 T | Rp 7.5 T | Rp 7.6 T |
| Fees & commissions | Rp 371 M | Rp 408 M | Rp 461 M | Rp 430 M |
| Impairment/provision expense | Rp 2.6 T | Rp 2.4 T | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 804 M |
| Personnel expenses | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 2.0 T |
| Operating profit | Rp 3.5 T | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 3.4 T | Rp 3.7 T |
| Profit before tax | Rp 3.4 T | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 3.3 T | Rp 3.7 T |
| Net profit | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 2.6 T | Rp 2.7 T |
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash | Rp 1.7 T | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 1.7 T |
| Placement with Bank Indonesia | Rp 8.3 T | Rp 8.2 T | Rp 9.6 T | Rp 3.9 T |
| Placement with other banks | Rp 6.6 T | Rp 4.9 T | Rp 5.2 T | Rp 5.8 T |
| Securities | Rp 28 T | Rp 26 T | Rp 38 T | Rp 50 T |
| Loans (gross) | Rp 120 T | Rp 129 T | Rp 129 T | Rp 124 T |
| Allowance for impairment: loans (CKPN) | -Rp 6.4 T | -Rp 8.0 T | -Rp 7.2 T | -Rp 6.2 T |
| Fixed assets & equipment (net) | Rp 9.8 T | Rp 9.6 T | Rp 9.5 T | Rp 9.5 T |
| Total assets | Rp 194 T | Rp 199 T | Rp 221 T | Rp 213 T |
| Demand deposits (Giro) | Rp 12 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 13 T |
| Savings deposits (Tabungan) | Rp 49 T | Rp 51 T | Rp 51 T | Rp 48 T |
| Time deposits (Deposito) | Rp 69 T | Rp 70 T | Rp 77 T | Rp 82 T |
| Debt securities issued | Rp 7.8 T | Rp 3.7 T | Rp 5.3 T | Rp 7.2 T |
| Total liabilities | Rp 148 T | Rp 151 T | Rp 171 T | Rp 160 T |
| Total equity | Rp 46 T | Rp 48 T | Rp 50 T | Rp 53 T |
PNBN is a genuinely conservative, dual-controlled bank (the domestic Gunawan family via PT Panin Financial, ~46.0%, alongside ANZ Banking Group as a real strategic co-owner, ~38.8% via Votraint No. 1103) choosing capital preservation over growth, and the full 4-year window (FY2022-2025) shows this is not a one-year posture but a sustained, multi-year pattern. CAR has risen EVERY year for 4 straight years (29.81%→32.98%→35.13%→39.03%, +9.22pp cumulative) while gross NPL has FALLEN every year over the same span (3.58%→2.97%→2.92%→2.50%, -1.08pp cumulative): a clean, monotonic capital-build/de-risking trend, not an FY2025 snapshot. FY2025 (Individual basis): gross loans fell 4.3% (Rp129.3tn→Rp123.7tn) and total assets contracted 3.5%, management’s own stated reason being soft credit demand and still-elevated lending rates, met with a deliberately conservative response rather than a forced one; LDR eased from 92.3% to 86.9%. Net profit still grew (+3.9% Individual, to Rp2.68tn), but ROE actually eased slightly (5.98%→5.80%) because equity (+5.1%) grew faster than earnings, the direct arithmetic of building capital faster than deploying it; over the full 4-year window this same compression runs deeper still (ROE 6.79%→5.21%→5.98%→5.80%). **A real, previously-hidden wrinkle the extended window surfaces**: FY2023 was a genuine profitability trough; net profit fell 19.0% that year (Rp2.655tn→Rp2.151tn) on a real operating-profit decline (-22.1%, driven by a wider net non-interest expense and BOPO rising to 80.8%, not by provisioning; provisionExpense was actually lower in FY2023 than FY2022), before recovering +19.9% in FY2024. Net effect: FY2022→FY2025 net profit is essentially FLAT (+0.9% over 4 years) even as CAR built +9.2 percentage points; capital accumulation has outpaced earnings for the entire window tracked here, not just the latest year. The FY2025 path itself was not smooth either: 9-month cumulative profit was down 4.4% YoY (a 35% jump in provisioning through Q3), reversed by a strong Q4; a real, disclosed swing, not glossed over.
Giro, Tabungan and Deposito from corporate, commercial and retail customers form the funding base.
EconomicsA conventional, low-cost-leaning funding mix -- funding cost is not PNBN's binding constraint.
Corporate/commercial-weighted lending; FY2025 saw this step deliberately restrained.
EconomicsGross loans fell 4.3% -- the single most consequential operating choice of the year, made for risk-management reasons, not capacity constraints.
NIM held essentially flat (4.16% vs 4.15% prior year) despite the smaller loan book.
EconomicsMargin discipline was maintained even as volume was sacrificed -- a genuinely selective, not indiscriminate, contraction.
Impairment/provision expense swung meaningfully through the year -- a 35% YoY jump by Q3, easing by year-end.
EconomicsThe single most volatile line behind PNBN's bumpy quarterly profit path in 2025.
CAR climbed to 39.0% (Individual) as retained earnings and slower risk-weighted-asset growth (from the shrinking loan book) both built capital.
EconomicsCapital is accumulating faster than it is being put to work -- the direct arithmetic behind ROE easing even as net profit grew.
Cost structureInterest expense (Rp5.59tn, FY2025) and provisioning (Rp804.2bn, down from Rp1,056.1bn -- though the path there included a sharp Q3 spike) are the two largest cost lines below net interest income; personnel expense (Rp2.01tn) is broadly stable. Cost-to-income ratio held around 52-53% both years -- a moderate, not standout, efficiency level.
Cash cycleThe bank funding-cost-to-NIM chain, not a goods cash cycle: deposits gathered at low cost, redeployed into loans/securities at a 4.16% net margin, provisioning taken against credit risk as it emerges. FY2025's twist is that the "deploy" step was deliberately throttled -- securities holdings grew (Rp37.8tn->Rp49.9tn) even as loans shrank, a real substitution of asset mix toward lower-risk instruments.
Depositors are fragmented and sticky, the same low-cost-CASA dynamic as the rest of the sector; PNBN's own conservatism (not chasing deposit-funded growth) further reduces any funding-cost pressure.
Implication → Funding cost is not PNBN's constraint: deployment discipline is.
Corporate and commercial borrowers negotiate rates; PNBN's FY2025 stance (willing to let the loan book shrink rather than compete aggressively on price/terms) shows it is not chasing marginal borrowers to defend volume.
Implication → A real trade-off, disclosed in the numbers: buyer power is being ceded on volume to protect asset quality.
Standard sector-wide capital/licensing/trust barriers; PNBN's own dual domestic-family/ANZ ownership and long operating history are additional, bank-specific incumbency advantages.
Implication → Entry risk is not what shapes PNBN's current story: its own capital-deployment choice is.
Fintech lending and capital markets substitute parts of corporate/commercial credit, the same sector-wide pressure as other banks; PNBN's FY2025 loan contraction plausibly reflects some of this alongside the stated soft-demand/high-rate reasons.
Implication → Substitution is a plausible secondary factor in the loan contraction, not the stated primary one.
PNBN competes with the other private national banks in this dataset (BBCA, BDMN, BNGA, MEGA) for the same corporate/commercial/consumer pools, but its FY2025 behavior (shrinking rather than defending share) is a deliberate opt-out of that immediate rivalry in favor of balance-sheet quality.
Implication → PNBN is currently trading market share for safety: a real, visible strategic choice, not passive underperformance.
Real and operationally-grounded, but bumpy: full-year net profit growth (+3.9% Individual) masks a genuine mid-year swing -- 9-month cumulative profit was down 4.4% on a 35% provisioning jump, reversed by a strong Q4. No disclosed one-off items drive the full-year result; the volatility is a normal credit-cycle/provisioning story, not an earnings-manufacturing one.
Checked: no material one-offs found in the reviewed window.
Cash conversionNot independently computable from the disclosed OJK ratio-table format (no operating cash flow statement in this source) -- flagged as a genuine data gap rather than assumed clean.
A capital-retaining harvester this period, not a builder: FY2025's defining allocation choice was to NOT deploy capital into loan growth, instead letting CAR climb to 39.0% while still distributing a real cash dividend (Rp1tn, June 2026, ~Rp42/share) -- capital preservation and shareholder distribution over balance-sheet expansion.
DeploymentCapital grew via retained earnings (equity +5.1% YoY) while risk-weighted assets grew more slowly than that (the shrinking loan book), mechanically lifting CAR. A real Rp1 trillion cash dividend was still paid (June 2026) -- capital is being both retained AND returned, just not lent out.
Returns trendThe full 4-year window confirms this is not a one-year wobble: ROE 6.79% (FY2022) -> 5.21% (FY2023) -> 5.98% (FY2024) -> 5.80% (FY2025), while CAR climbed every single year over the same span (29.81%->39.03%). Capital has been accumulating faster than PNBN puts it to work for 4 consecutive years running. Whether FY2026 sees a resumption of loan growth (raising ROE toward peers' levels) or continued conservatism (capital keeps building, ROE stays thin) is the central open question for this name.
Originally shipped FY2024-2025 only. The first FY2023 document found (owner-downloaded) was the full 232-page audited consolidated financial statements, not the OJK ratio-table Publikasi format (confirmed by grepping all 232 pages for every ratio label: zero matches). Resolved in a same-session fix-pass (2026-07-17, triggered by a new owner standard requiring 4+ years): a second WebSearch found a correctly-typed FY2023/2022 Publikasi document, but panin.co.id's WAF blocked it too (confirmed again via ctx_fetch_and_index, both the HTML listing page and the direct PDF URL) -- retrieved instead via web.archive.org (Wayback Machine), a different host outside the WAF, without needing a second owner download. Confirmed correct document type by grep and cross-validated via 2 rupiah-exact identities (NII=II-IE; pretax-tax+deferred=netProfit) for both years. The extension is what surfaced the FY2023 profit-trough finding and confirmed the 4-year CAR/NPL trend (see Verdict) -- logged here as a resolved methodology note, not an ongoing limitation.
ROE (5.80%) is the lowest among this dataset's private national banks despite CAR (39.0%) being among the highest -- a real, quantified capital-efficiency gap, not a data artifact (both figures are OJK-disclosed, cross-checked against the KM1 report's independently-consistent capital ratios).
Checked: the Gunawan family (~46.0% via PT Panin Financial) holds a clear plurality over ANZ (~38.8% via Votraint No. 1103) -- effective domestic control, not a 50/50 governance risk. Disclosed as a structural feature, not currently a red flag in itself.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Large, well-capitalised and concentrated among a few systemic players, with ASEAN-leading profitability: though margins and efficiency are now under late-cycle pressure.