Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | — | 1.26x | — | — | — |
| Interest burden | -0.67x | 0.15x | -0.83x | -4.39x | — |
| Operating margindriver | 4.8% | 7.8% | 3.6% | 1.8% | -48.1% |
| Asset turnover | 0.30x | 0.33x | 0.33x | 0.36x | 0.38x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 3.88x | 3.89x | 3.73x | 4.40x | 9.98x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | — | 1.8% | — | — | — |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | — | 4.9% | — | — | — |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 1.12x | 1.21x | 1.14x | 1.36x | 1.06x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 0.76x | 0.80x | 0.74x | 0.90x | 0.65x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 0.22x | 0.20x | 0.15x | 0.19x | 0.15x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | Rp 3.6 T | Rp 5.6 T | Rp 3.7 T | Rp 7.8 T | Rp 1.1 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 1.38x | 1.40x | 1.31x | 1.78x | 4.22x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 2.88x | 2.89x | 2.73x | 3.40x | 8.98x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.36x | 0.36x | 0.35x | 0.41x | 0.42x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | Rp 13 T | Rp 15 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 18 T | Rp 15 T |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 0.60x | 1.17x | 0.55x | 0.19x | -3.67x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 3.88x | 3.89x | 3.73x | 4.40x | 9.98x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 12.9% | 14.0% | 11.1% | 13.1% | -19.5% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 4.8% | 7.8% | 3.6% | 1.8% | -48.1% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 1.6% | 1.4% | 2.6% | -7.7% | -37.3% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 928 M | -Rp 7.5 T |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 7.8% | 10.7% | 6.6% | 4.7% | -45.9% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.9% | -2.8% | -14.1% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 2.5% | 2.4% | 4.1% | -16.4% | -192.9% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | — | 1.26x | — | — | — |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | -0.67x | 0.15x | -0.83x | -4.39x | — |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | — | 4.9% | — | — | — |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.30x | 0.33x | 0.33x | 0.36x | 0.38x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 1.34x | 1.49x | 1.51x | 1.72x | 2.45x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 1.40x | 1.47x | 1.43x | 1.63x | 2.06x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 0.91x | 1.07x | 1.49x | 1.83x | 2.55x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 272.9 days | 245.2 days | 242.1 days | 212.4 days | 148.8 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 260.2 days | 249.1 days | 255.6 days | 224.3 days | 177.4 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 401.7 days | 340.6 days | 244.2 days | 199.5 days | 143.4 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 131.4 days | 153.7 days | 253.5 days | 237.3 days | 182.9 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | Rp 45 M | Rp 32 M | -Rp 142 M | Rp 3.5 T | Rp 906 M |
Price Rp 202 · market cap Rp 1.3 T
| Multiple | PTPP | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | NM | —(0/2) | — |
| P/B | 0.40x | 0.43x | -8% |
| P/S | 0.08x | 0.11x | -29% |
| EV/EBITDA | NM | —(0/2) | — |
| EV/EBIT | NM | —(0/2) | — |
| EV/Sales | 1.09x | 0.97x | +12% |
| FCF Yield | 72.50% | 108.70% | -33% |
| Dividend Yield | — | —(0/2) | — |
Only 3 peers are covered here, so the median is itself one of the members. A 0% gap can simply mean PTPP sits at the median.
EV = mkt cap Rp 1.3 T + debt Rp 18 T − cash Rp 2.9 T + minority interest Rp 1.2 T = Rp 18 T
At today’s price, the market is paying for 14.5%/yr FCF growth (11.1% at 12.0% to 17.6% at 16.0% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: 112.1% FCF · -0.7% revenue.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 12.0–16.0% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
Mechanical DCF suppressed: mean EBIT margin over the last 3 FYs is negative (-14.3%), so a mechanical FCFF perpetuity is not meaningful for a pre-profit record. The reverse DCF above shows what the price implies, and the sliders below let you impose a path-to-margin scenario (a target, not history).
Base year contains named one-off item(s): FY2025: Impairment (asset value write-down). The EBIT basis screens out most non-operating items, but read the Earnings Quality section before trusting the base margin.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 7.26% | Indonesia 10Y government bond, re-verified 31 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.89 → 10.99 | Engineering/Construction (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 14.55 |
| Cost of equity | 80.78% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 23.26% | median interest coverage 0.5x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a C2/C synthetic rating and a 16.00% default spread, over a 7.26% base (Indonesia 10Y 7.26%, already the sovereign rate). Its BOOK rate is 11.7%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms) |
| Tax rate | 22.0% | statutory 22% (no clean effective-rate year in window) |
| WACC | 22.17% | 6% E × CoE + 94% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | -0.7% | delivered 4-yr revenue CAGR -0.7%, fading linearly to terminal |
| EBIT margin | -14.3% | mean EBIT margin, last 3 FYs |
| D&A / revenue | 2.7% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 1.4% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 22.2% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 0.0% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 2.7% of revenue against depreciation of 2.7%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | 41.5% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | -0.7% | 0.1% | 0.9% | 1.7% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | Rp 16 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 17 T |
| EBIT | -Rp 2.3 T | -Rp 2.3 T | -Rp 2.3 T | -Rp 2.4 T | -Rp 2.4 T | -Rp 2.5 T |
| NOPAT | -Rp 1.8 T | -Rp 1.8 T | -Rp 1.8 T | -Rp 1.8 T | -Rp 1.9 T | -Rp 1.9 T |
| + D&A | Rp 436 M | Rp 436 M | Rp 440 M | Rp 448 M | Rp 459 M | Rp 470 M |
| − Capex | Rp 228 M | Rp 229 M | Rp 231 M | Rp 235 M | Rp 240 M | Rp 470 M |
| − ΔNWC | -Rp 50 M | Rp 4.5 M | Rp 59 M | Rp 114 M | Rp 172 M | Rp 176 M |
| FCFF | -Rp 1.5 T | -Rp 1.6 T | -Rp 1.7 T | -Rp 1.7 T | -Rp 1.8 T | -Rp 2.1 T |
| PV | -Rp 1.3 T | -Rp 1.1 T | -Rp 912 M | -Rp 783 M | -Rp 677 M | -Rp 3.9 T |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding
EV = PV(explicit) -Rp 4.7 T + PV(TV) -Rp 3.9 T = -Rp 8.6 T · TV 46% of EV · − net debt Rp 15 T − minority Rp 1.2 T = equity -Rp 25 T ÷ shares outstanding
Model output: Rp -4,054/share (-2,108% vs price Rp 202)
Under these assumptions the model lands 2,108% below today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for faster growth, a fatter margin, or a lower discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 21.2% | 22.2% | 23.2% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | -4,083 | -4,009 | -3,941 |
| 2.5% | -4,134 | -4,054 | -3,983 |
| 3.0% | -4,187 | -4,102 | -4,026 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | Rp 17 T | Rp 19 T | Rp 18 T | Rp 20 T | Rp 16 T |
| Cost of Goods Sold | Rp 15 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 19 T |
| Gross Profit | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 2.6 T | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 2.6 T | -Rp 3.2 T |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | Rp 808 M | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 663 M | Rp 351 M | -Rp 7.8 T |
| Interest Expense | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 2.1 T |
| Net Income | Rp 266 M | Rp 272 M | Rp 481 M | -Rp 1.5 T | -Rp 6.1 T |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | Rp 266 M | Rp 272 M | Rp 481 M | -Rp 1.5 T | -Rp 6.1 T |
| Depreciation & Amortization | Rp 505 M | Rp 544 M | Rp 550 M | Rp 577 M | Rp 360 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | Rp 6.6 T | Rp 5.4 T | Rp 4.2 T | Rp 4.2 T | Rp 2.9 T |
| Accounts Receivable | Rp 12 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 7.9 T |
| Inventory | Rp 11 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 10 T | Rp 7.9 T |
| Current Assets | Rp 34 T | Rp 32 T | Rp 31 T | Rp 29 T | Rp 21 T |
| Total Assets | Rp 56 T | Rp 58 T | Rp 57 T | Rp 55 T | Rp 43 T |
| Accounts Payable | Rp 16 T | Rp 15 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 9.4 T | Rp 7.6 T |
| Current Liabilities | Rp 30 T | Rp 27 T | Rp 27 T | Rp 22 T | Rp 19 T |
| Total Liabilities | Rp 41 T | Rp 43 T | Rp 41 T | Rp 42 T | Rp 39 T |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | Rp 20 T | Rp 21 T | Rp 20 T | Rp 22 T | Rp 18 T |
| Total Equity | Rp 14 T | Rp 15 T | Rp 15 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 4.3 T |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | Rp 11 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 9.3 T | Rp 3.1 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | Rp 469 M | Rp 268 M | Rp 436 M | Rp 3.7 T | Rp 924 M |
| Capital Expenditure | Rp 424 M | Rp 237 M | Rp 578 M | Rp 199 M | Rp 18 M |
PTPP is winning the competitive race (Rp24.95tn of new contracts in 2025, the most of any BUMN Karya name) and losing the P&L at the same time; a real, disclosed Rp7.35tn impairment charge (up from just Rp356bn in FY2024) is what turned a modest, sustainable-looking business into a Rp6.08tn net loss. This is the clearest of the three cases here: net income (-Rp6.08tn, matching independent reporting almost exactly) is real and reliable, but the seeded gross-profit and EBIT lines are not; they show a negative gross margin (-19.5%) that simply isn’t true; PTPP’s actual FY2025 gross profit was +Rp1.46tn (≈9.0% margin), with the impairment appearing to have been miscategorized into cost-of-revenue by the seed source rather than shown as the separate non-operating item it really is. Strip that out and PTPP’s underlying construction business, while thinner-margined than its FY2021-23 run (12.9-14.0% gross margin), was not collapsing at the operating level the way the seeded numbers suggest. Owner equity fell 65.2% but stayed positive (Rp3.15tn): a real deterioration, not the negative-equity crisis WIKA faces. PTPP is the one BUMN Karya name staying independent under the current Danantara restructuring plan, which makes its FY2026 path: does the impairment prove a one-time balance-sheet cleanup or the first of more to come; the single most important open question.
Competes for government/state-enterprise civil-engineering and EPC tenders; won Rp24.95tn of new work in 2025, the most of any BUMN Karya name.
EconomicsWinning volume sets up FY2026-27 revenue, but margin quality on this specific book won't be visible until execution.
Site delivery billed on progress; real FY2025 gross margin ~9.0% (independently sourced, not the seeded -19.5%).
EconomicsThinner than FY2021-23's 12.9-14.0% gross margin, but not the collapse the seeded data implies.
A Rp7.35tn impairment charge, up from Rp356bn in FY2024, hit the FY2025 result.
EconomicsThis single line is larger than the entire net loss (Rp6.08tn): the core business alone would have been closer to breakeven.
Financial charges of Rp2.13tn against a shrinking equity base (D/E 1.78x -> 4.22x in one year).
EconomicsInterest coverage turned negative (-3.67x): a real, worsening solvency signal independent of the impairment.
Property development and precast manufacturing (PP Presisi) run alongside core contracting.
EconomicsA diversification cushion, though not large enough to offset this year's impairment.
Cost structureMaterials and subcontractor costs dominate direct project costs (real gross margin ~9.0%); the Rp7.35tn impairment and Rp2.13tn financial charges sit below that line and are what actually drove the net loss: the seeded COGS/gross-profit lines conflate the impairment with cost-of-revenue, which this narrative corrects using independently-reported figures.
Cash cycleFY2025 operating cash flow was positive (+Rp923.9bn) despite the large net loss: consistent with the impairment being a real non-cash charge, not a cash-collection problem. This supports reading the loss as an asset-valuation event rather than an operating-cash crisis.
Standard commodity materials exposure (steel, cement) shared across the sector; PTPP’s stronger 2025 contract-win position gives it somewhat more scale to negotiate with than its distressed peers.
Implication → A relative, not absolute, advantage over WIKA/WSKT.
The government client sets tender and payment terms for all BUMN Karya; PTPP’s new-contract leadership in 2025 shows it can still win work on those terms better than peers.
Implication → Buyer power caps margin economics industry-wide, but PTPP is capturing more volume within that constraint than its peers.
Bonding capacity and track record remain real barriers; PTPP’s continued independence (vs. being merged away like WIKA/WSKT) is itself a signal of relatively stronger standing within the protected group.
Implication → PTPP is better positioned within the barrier than its peers, not just protected by it.
No real substitute for large civil/EPC infrastructure delivery; PTPP’s leading new-contract volume suggests it is currently the preferred BUMN choice among the alternatives available to the government.
Implication → PTPP’s win rate is itself evidence against near-term substitution risk for this specific company.
PTPP is currently outcompeting WIKA, ADHI and WSKT on new-contract volume even while posting a large net loss: rivalry here is being won on revenue share, not yet on profitability.
Implication → Whether PTPP’s win-rate advantage converts into margin advantage once the impairment cycle passes is the real test.
A one-off-dominated loss, unusually cleanly so: the Rp7.35tn impairment alone exceeds the entire Rp6.08tn net loss, meaning the underlying business, at its real (non-seeded) ~9.0% gross margin, was close to operating breakeven. This is a materially different quality-of-earnings picture than WIKA’s structural, multi-year decline: PTPP’s FY2021-23 track record (consistently profitable, 1.4-2.6% net margin) supports reading this as a real but survivable balance-sheet event rather than a broken business model.
| Period | One-off item | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| FY2025 | Impairment (asset value write-down) | Rp7.35tn, up from Rp356bn in FY2024 -- larger than the entire net loss |
Cash conversionOCF (+Rp923.9bn) positive despite a large net loss (-Rp6.08tn): strong evidence the loss is a non-cash asset-valuation event, not a cash-generation failure. This is a meaningfully healthier signal than WIKA’s simultaneously-negative OCF and net loss.
A company still winning new work (industry-leading Rp24.95tn in 2025) while simultaneously absorbing a large legacy-asset write-down: neither purely building nor purely harvesting. Capex stayed minimal (Rp17.7bn, FY2025): new-contract growth here is won on bidding/execution capability, not capital deployment, typical of an asset-light contracting model.
DeploymentFY2025 capex negligible (Rp17.7bn) against Rp16.27tn revenue; the year’s real capital event was the Rp7.35tn non-cash impairment, not any cash deployment decision. Positive operating cash flow (Rp923.9bn) was largely retained/absorbed by the deteriorating balance sheet rather than distributed or reinvested at scale.
Returns trendROE was consistently modest-positive FY2021-23 (2.4-4.1%), turned negative FY2024 (-16.4%) and severely negative FY2025 (-192.9%, on a shrunken equity base). The FY2025 figure is extreme but not a sign-flip artifact like WIKA’s: it reflects a real, large loss against real, if diminished, equity.
FY2025 seeded gross margin is -19.5% (grossProfit -Rp3.17tn); independent reporting shows a genuinely positive Rp1.46tn gross profit (~9.0% margin). The Rp7.35tn impairment appears miscategorized into cost-of-revenue at the source. Net income is unaffected and reliable. Any operating-margin or gross-margin ratio computed from the seeded FY2025 lines for PTPP should be treated as NOT MEANINGFUL.
FY2025's Rp7.35tn impairment is disclosed and appears to be a genuine balance-sheet-realism event under Danantara's restructuring push, not hidden -- but whether it recurs in FY2026 is not yet knowable and would materially change the recovery case.
D/E rose from 1.78x to 4.22x and interest coverage turned negative (-3.67x) in a single year -- a real, worsening solvency trend that would persist even if the impairment doesn't recur.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
The state-owned contractors (BUMN Karya) that built Indonesia’s decade-long toll-road boom on borrowed money: now all reporting losses at once (a combined ~Rp25tn across WIKA/PTPP/ADHI/WSKT in FY2025) while the government force-merges the survivors into three entities.